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State of Iowa v. Jonas Dorian Neiderbach
836 N.W.2d 470
Iowa
2013
Check Treatment

*1 Iowa, Appellee, STATE of THOMPSON,

Christopher Craig

Appellant.

No. 12-0255.

Supreme Iowa. Court

Aug. *4 Smith,

Mark Appellate C. State Defend- er, Wilson, and Theresa R. Assistant State Defender, Appellate appellant. Miller, General, Attorney Thomas J. Bridget A. B. Chambers and Andrew Pros- marriage, prior General, teenage daughters from Jill Attorneys ser, Assistant worked on Thompson and Savana. Sierra appellee. Kistler, Attorney, for County M. and returned during the week the road WATERMAN, Justice. weekends. home on weekends, defen- County jury found would An Allamakee On guilty consuming a case dant, Craig Thompson, heavily typically Christopher drink — regularly the death and Gabel murder for of beer. second-degree During arguments, He their Angela argued. Gabel. girlfriend, his live-in other. Gabel slap after she each in the head would sometimes her twice fatally shot daughters’ in her bedroom slept inside a gesture from often obscene made an Thompson’s Thompson. during away from get had retreated she car where parked ag- Gabel as the verbal viewed on four relatives appeals He argument. an Thompson to urged A friend gressor. erred district court arguing the grounds, up with her. break (1) an instruction failing to submit voluntary offense of included the lesser 2, Thompson was Saturday, October On *5 (2) hearsay evi- excluding manslaughter; day watching football most of the home diminished-capacity his relevant to dence son, Gabel of their while taking and care stress posttraumatic his based on defense drinking began Thompson at work. was (3) (PTSD); declining to obtain disorder boyfriend and her p.m. Sierra at around victim’s mental review the deceased and ready p.m. get about 6 returned hоme for health records homecoming dance. high her school’s for Cashen, 789 N.W.2d under State v. p.m. 7 and 8 arrived home between Gabel (Iowa 2010), section and Iowa Code being was Thompson noted Sierra (4) 622.10(4) applying (Supp.2011); Shortly her mother. “grouchy” towards rejecting his claim wrong standard left boyfriend and her p.m., Sierra after evidence. contrary to the verdict was Ga- p.m., At around 11:30 the dance. Sierra, still at who was bel called decide the appeal retained We receiving after went home dance. Sierra 622.10(4). For constitutionality of section sounded her mother the call because below, uphold explained reasons She scared, something wrong.” was “like face. as constitutional on its the statute entrance. blocking cars police found court committed conclude the district in and not let Sierra The officers would rulings error in no reversible was dead. that her mother later told her af- appeal. We therefore challenged on Thompson’s firm conviction. the Allamakee enforcement from Law and the Monona County Sheriffs Office Background Facts and Proceed- I. call to a 911 Department responded Police ings. p.m. Thompson 11:32 Thompson placed at girlfriend his dispatcher he and light facts in the most told the ‘We recite the Garcia, sitting in a while she was got fight in a State v. favorable to the verdict.” 2000). I car, big finger F gave me By all “[s]he f_shot the officers ar- her.” When accounts, Thompson and Gabel had a red Gabel dead inside they rived found They living had been rocky rеlationship. driveway. Monona, in the farmhouse parked a farmhouse outside Corsica together at house with his came out of the Iowa, Thompson years. two October for about him to Officers advised in his arms. of the farmhouse son the other residents retreated Thompson but up, his hands put and Gabel’s eight-month-old were their son Thompson ultimately back into his house. nothing does for him. got Gabel out of police surrendered to the at 1:19 a.m. and slapped bed and him. Thompson then was taken to the Waukon Police Depart- pushed against her the wall. Gabel left ment. the room and ran downstairs and outside yell while continued to at each other. Thompson rights was read his Miranda Thompson accused her of leaving go approximately agreed a.m. He to a outside, the riverboat casino. Once Gabel videotaped During interview. that inter- climbed into her daughter’s car after find- view, Thompson estimated that he drank ing hers Thompson, locked. watching beers, eighteen but said he did not know deck, from the saw Gabel him flip off and Deputy whether he was sober. Clark Mel- saw her talking on her phone. cell lick Thompson testified was intoxicated Thompson believed talking Gabel was actually but “was functioning at that time.” mother, telling his her what a guy” “bad Thompson given was later a breath test he is. He “pissed off’ and went inside after the interview ended at 4:40 a.m. His to retrieve a .22 caliber rifle from their blood alcohol level was .184. bedroom. Thompson vented to the officers about He came back out prоblems onto the deck relationship in his with with Ga- him rifle. Gabel They flipped again.

bel. off fought money. over He said he paid aiming, Without gambled gun the bills while she fired the at the at her twenty riverboats. from fifteen to complained away. about feet *6 The infrequent through their sex bullet went complained life. He driver’s side that she failed to window. He told properly discipline police only he meant to shot, children. scare her with Thompson they fought said the first of- not kill her. approached ten and that He slap Gabel would him to find her breathing, but punch him all could gonna the time. Gabel tell “she wasn’t had also make it.” put pistol Thompson to told pulled his head and officers he shot her a sec- trigger. “put ond time to Thompson said he had her out of her misery.” been tell- ing He past away Gabel for the four was three feet when months that he fired the she should leave second shot. The they get autopsy because didn’t showed Gabel along and was shot in because his “head was twice the head and snappin’.” either shot it, put As he could have guy just “Sometimes a been fatal. can’t f_take anymore.” it On October the State filed a trial Thompson told they officers that began charging Thompson with mur- arguing day on the of the incident some- degree, der the first in violation of Iowa time after game they 707.1, 707.2(2) were watching 707.2(1), Code sections (2009). ended. Thompson claimed up- Gabel was pled guilty He not and waived his set him with because he wanted to watch speedy to trial. He filed a notice of more football while she wanted to go rely have intent to on the defenses of insanity sex with him. Gabel go decided to responsibility. bed and diminished He filed a without him at around 10:30 p.m. When motion to suppress his statements po- later, Thompson lice, came up she asleep. claiming was capacity he lacked the mental He up woke her to have sex. Gabel told rights. to waive his Miranda The district him it Thompson was too late. told the court hearing held a on the motion and officers that her temper flared after Thompson he denied it. appeal does not called her a “bitch” pays and told her he ruling allowing videotaped his confession everything for for though her even she into evidence. 15, 2011, ruling court’s as to wheth- Thompson filed an review a district August

On of discovery contrary weight the dis- er a to the asking verdict application an in camera review the for abuse of State trict court conduct evidence discretion. (Iowa Reeves, Gabel’s mental health to deter- v. of 2003). if contained evi- mine hearing The held

dence. district court Analysis. III. September applica- 12 and denied the on two later. ruling days tion in a written Voluntary Manslaughter A. Jury contends Instruction. The jury began The trial November 8. by failing court erred to submit district guilty of lesser jury found on the lesser requested jury his instruction included offense of murder the second voluntary manslaugh included offense in violation of Iowa section degree, Code ter. the evi The district concluded Thomp- 707.3. The district court denied provocation dence was insufficient motion for new trial and son’s combined support submission: judgment. The court arrest of sentenced that the factual court is concerned Thompson to of incarceration not to a term Voluntary inadequate give record fifty years. Thompson appealed. exceed under Instruc- Manslaughter Uniform proce- We discuss additional facts and 700.15, specifically finding tion evidence history specific dural with the issues decid- provocation as defined the record ed below. Instruction 700.16. Uniform evidence court understands that there is Scope II. of Review. having victim the Defen- slapped A district court’s refusal to sub There is of the victim dant. evidence requested jury mit a is re instruction finger having given Defendant viewed for correction of errors at law. occasions. The court is several Rains, State provoca- satisfied that that constitutes *7 1998). We review the district court’s evi- tion. dentiary of rulings for abuse discretion. “seri- agree. We had to show Huston, 531, State v. 825 N.W.2d 536 provocation” by ous Iowa Gabel. See Code (Iowa 2013). Rulings admissibility on the § provoca- The evidence of 707.4. serious hearsay evidence are reviewed for cor slapped tion in this case—that Gabel rection of errors at law. State Buena v. flipped before he Thompson and him off (Iowa 2003). ventura, 38, 660 50 N.W.2d shot insufficient to submit a vol- her —was Discovery challenged rulings on constitu untary manslaughter instruction. grounds tional are reviewed de novo. (“Because Cashen, 789 at 405 be sub N.W.2d “Lesser offenses must jury issues in this rest on as within the case constitutional mitted to included if involving process chаrged only claims Cashen’s due offense but if meet defense, present appropriate our review is de both and factual legal novo.”). Ware, 707, 714 challenges Nonconstitutional to tests.” State v. 338 N.W.2d (Iowa 1983). discovery legal An rulings are reviewed for abuse of offense meets “ (“Ordinarily, composed discretion. Id. we test if lesser [is] review dis offense ‘[t]he discretion.”). covery solely orders for an abuse of some but all elements 299 greater Sangster, We review of ineffective crime.’” State v. claims assistance (Iowa 1980) Blaise, (quoting of counsel de In re Det. State novo. N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 2013). Furnald, 830 N.W.2d 263 N.W.2d 1978)). legal jective The test met here because objective standard and standards explicitly provides Iowa section 707.4 Code be met before a defendant can be convict- “[v]oluntary manslaughter is an included ed of voluntary manslaughter.” offense under an indictment for murder in N.W.2d at 122. We elaborated: degree.” the first or second Iowa Code subjective requirement of section 707.4;1 Inger, accord State v. 707.4 is that the defendant must act (Iowa 1980) (“By N.W.2d solely sudden, violent, as a result of 707.4, paragraph second of section the leg- sudden, passion. irresistible vio- islature has seen fit to make voluntary lent, and manslaughter passion irresistible lesser included offense must result Therefore, second-degree murder. the ‘le- from provocation serious sufficient to ex- satisfied.”). But, gal’ test ... Thomp- passion cite such in a reasonable person. son fails to meet the factual test. This is an objective requirement. It is necessary, also as a objective final re-

Determining whether a lesser quirement, that there is not an interval included offense meets the factual in test “ provocation between the and the killing volves ‘an ad hoc determination whether there is a factual basis in the record for in which a person ordinary reason and submitting the included offense to the temperament regain would his or her ” jury.’ Sangster, 299 suppress control and impulse to kill. 752). Furnald, (quoting 268 N.W.2d at A Id. factual basis exists if the defendant has produced “substantial evidence of each The district court give declined to necessary element of the lesser-included voluntary manslaughter instruction be- Royer, State v. offense[].” cause there was insufficient evidence of the (Iowa 1989). 637, 643 objective first requirement “[t]he —that Section 707.4 provides: sudden, violent, passion and irresistible person A voluntary commits man- ... from provocation resulted] serious slaughter when that person causes the passion sufficient to excite such in a rea- person, death of another under circum- person.” sonable Thompson presented Id. stances which would otherwise be mur- him, evidence that slapped Gabel had der, if person causing the death acts him, arguing with him given had “the sudden, violent, solely as the result of finger” before he Inger, shot her. passion resulting irresistible from recognized that evidence the victim as- *8 provocation serious sufficient to excite saulted the defendant could be sufficient to passion such person in a and there is not provocation. establish serious Id. We аn interval between the provocation and summarized the evidence in that case as killing in ‍​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍which a person ordinary follows: reason temperament regain and would control suppress impulse to kill. Defendant testified that at- decedent added). § Iowa Code 707.4 (emphasis him, tempted thereby inducing to strike swing defendant to Inger,

In out of explained [decedent] we that requires 707.4 that anger. “[s]ection both a sub- fear or Other evidence showed nonsubstantive, general (West 2013). assembly 1. The provision § made 224 This can be (West, technical amendments to Iowa 707.4(3) Code section found in Iowa Code section session, during legislative 707.4 its 2013 legislation Westlaw current with from the breaking statutory provision into four sub- Sess.). Reg. 2013 90, Legis. sections. See 2013 Iowa Serv. ch. attack, his told him after the mother she hit defendant then [decedent] defendant then with his fist. somehow had been assaulted man [Decedent] head pole against support- killed)). a metal inapposite fell down cases be- Those are and, store while ing grocery [the “merely were cause the words Gabel used down, quickly was defendant decedent] did not tell insulting or abusive”—she head. in the kicked [decedent] anyone she had assaulted close Thompson to omitted). him. (citations We concluded Id. testimony provide[d] a own “[d]efendant’s with district agree meet subjec- factual to sufficient basis him and insult- slapping Gabel’s actions the defendant acted requirement

tive ing fell short of gestures him with obscene sudden, violent, and solely as a result of re- objectively provocаtion serious (emphasis add- passion.” Id. irresistible voluntary manslaughter quired to submit ed). Ballinger, No. instruction. See State v. alone, historically, Additionally, words (Ohio 962835, 79974, at *6 2002 WL Ct. provide to a factual have been insufficient 2002) App. “trial court did May (holding See, e.g., provocation. basis for serious refusing not to on the err in instruct inferi- 179, 192, Rutledge, 248 Iowa State voluntary manslaughter” or offense (1951). Thompson con- slapped when victim however, tends, jurisdictions are that some accidentally have come into contact with ap- beginning to reevaluate historical infant and called de- daughter defendant’s proach. support proposition, of this bitch). fendant a Wayne cites R. LaFave’s trea State had Finally, argues tise, According Law. Substantive Criminal time to think twice and calm down. After treatise, recog this courts have to some finger through Gabel him the the car gave may be nized that words alone sufficient to away, to feet twenty window fifteen he provocation if the words are in establish deck to his walked from outside bed of a (conveying formational get room the rifle and returned provo fact which constitutes a reasonable observed) But, given holding deck shoot her. our cation when that fact is rather insufficient, merely abusive we insulting provocation than words. need LaFave, Wayne R. Substantive whether this was a sufficient Criminal decide (2d ed.2003). 15.2(b)(6), Law at 499-500 “person ordinary interval for a reason support cited in of this Two cases regain his or her temperament [to] proposition being involved a defendant told suрpress impulse control and kill.” victim a close rela that the had assaulted Inger, 122. Accordingly, 292 N.W.2d at (citing tive. id. at n. 60 State v. Co See the district refusal affirm court’s pling, N.J.Super. A.2d voluntary submit an instruction man (Ct.App.Div.1999)(noting person “a slaughter. actually provoked can be without witness- *9 Hearsay Evi B. Exclusion of on the

ing provoking assault relative” Thompson dence. the district appeals defendant, analyzing while whose whether of hearsay court’s exclusion evidence show had mother told him the victim attacked ing an occasion Gabel brother, that on earlier pro- defendant’s younger was with a voked), Specifical threatened him firearm. and Berry, Commonwealth (1975) (hold- ly, testimony court the district excluded Pa. 263-65 A.2d from friend ing jury Joseph could his Christen pro- find was when, forty-five arriving shortly thirty voked on the scene told him to Thompson a A days expert earlier Gabel had aimed revolv- suffered from PTSD. defense was testify The district morning. regarding er at him the same allowed to the content of event, testimony any court also excluded from Gabel’s the letters. the evidence of daughter putting told her about that Gabel guilt overwhelming. Thompson’s gun Thompson’s head. conclude We videotaped confession his includes admis- reviewing after record that this evi- intentionally sions that he Gabel shot correctly hearsay. dence was excluded as “put second time to her out of her misery.” Thompson lay to ad- did foundation Accordingly, Thompson was not entitled to any exception mit the under evidence Howard, new trial. See State v. the hearsay rule. 2012) (noting evi- dentiary еrror is harmless when State es- also the district Thompson claims overwhelming of guilt). tablishes evidence erroneously sup court excluded evidence We affirm the district court’s evidentia- porting his PTSD defense. The evidence ry rulings denial of Thompson’s and mo- correspondence Thompson includes sent for a tion new trial. Iraq describing experiences. from his war The State that the court responds district Thompson’s Request C. for Gabel’s correctly hearsay. his as excluded letters Thompson Mental Health Records. chal- lay agree. Thompson We failed to a foun lenges the district court’s denial of his any dation supporting exception application to obtain review camera hearsay present impres rule such as sense Gabel’s mental health records. must emotional, mental, existing sion or then 622.10(4)or decide whether section Cashen physical state of mind. See Iowa R. Evid. governed request. this Thompson argues 5.803(1), (3). example, Thompson For nev 622.10(4) appeal that section is uncon- er showed the letters were while written under the Iowa stitutional Constitution to he was ... or “perceiving event imme extent the statute makes it more diffi- 5.803(1). diately r. thereafter.” See id. for a potentially cult defendant to obtain reasons, For the same the district from evidence a victim’s men- correctly testimony Thomp from excluded than tal it would be under brothers, Cristen, Tyler regard son’s protocol forth in set Cashen.2 We ing the letters. begin by comparing the and statu- Cashen tory approaches to frame the constitutional Moreover, carefully after review analysis. record, ing we conclude that error in excluding 'protocol. this evidence was harmless. 1. The Cashen Cashen Ross Tyler testify regarding charged was allowed de was with domestic abuse assault experiences. injury, fendant’s of his class “D” reports war and willful felonies with dispute Thompson ten-year prison The State did not sentences. potential Cash- appeal. challenge did not the constitu- this issue on facial chal- direct His 622.10(4) tionality of lenge section in district court. constitutionality statute of the appeal, Thompson On contends his trial coun- question of law. Because we conclude the sel was ineffective because he failed to chal- reject statute is his facial constitutional lenge constitutionality statute under challenge, his ineffective-assistance claim nec- the Iowa Constitution. concedes essarily prejudice. See fails for lack of State v. complies the statute with the United States Elston, (Iowa 2007) Constitution, contends but it violates his ("[I]f decide [an the record is sufficient to present to a fair trial and to a defense under *10 ], we ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] claim[ process the due clause of the Iowa Constitu- appeal.”). will do so on direct adequate tion. We find the record to decide en, privileged at He claimed victim’s mental health records.” 404-05. ... a argued emphasize[d] at Id. at 405. ‘We Id. 404. Cashen self-defense. victim, engage the is not entitled to in a health records of the mental Doe, credibility seeking a fishing expedition to her when victim’s were relevant Jane Then, violence.” Id. at 408. “propensity her for mental records.” and to show a already five-step protocol. some of her we outlined Id. at acquired Id. He had First, must file a sought more. Id. The state 408-10. the defendant records limine, “demonstrating good her records were confidential motion a arguing moved factual the records sought Id. The court denied faith basis that inadmissible. district the records contain evidence relevant to defen- the motion and ruled the were Second, to claim of self-defense dant’s innocence.” Id. at 408. the relevant Cashen’s attorney credibility. granted county notifies and with and Doe’s Id. We the confers discretionary for victim. Id. “If the victim to application state’s review the consents disclosure, the to the court of the the court shall issue a sub- and transferred case for the part poena produced which but failed records to be un- appeals, affirmed to to the Id. If the discovery procedure address the for der seal court.” victim a objects, hearing mental health records. Id. at 404-05. We court is to “hold to granted probability at 405. if a ex- further review. Id. determine reasonable ists that the records contain exculpatory argued psychotherapist The state “ tending evidence to create reasonable into privilege prevented ‘intrusion ” and, to the guilt” doubt as defendant’s if and, mental health alter- victim’s records’ so, for the subpoena “issue[s] records to be lim- natively, that disclosure should produced under seal to court.” Id. argued Id. at 405. Cashen his con- ited. to protective The court is enter a order supported to a right stitutional fair trial issuing Id. subpoena. before at 408- access to compelled confidential records Third, obtained, once records are 09. exculpatory contain evidence. attorney, judge, the defendant’s not the J., (Cady, dissenting). Id. at 414 Our inspects records at courthouse. precedent employing reviewed court “a Fourth, Id. at if defense counsel balancing party test to determine if a to a information, exculpatory identifies is entitled the confi- proceeding to review attorney are county and the court notified nonparty.” dential medical of a county to a prior hearing, attorney (majority opinion). Id. at 405-07 We rec- review given opportunity to the iden- ognized patients qualified, have a rather Fifth, records. the court tified Id. holds a absolute, right than an “constitutional to hearing closed to determine whether the privacy in their medical records.” Id. at and, so, information is if allows recognized defen- 406. And we “a criminal use, subject protective order. Id. process present dant has a due jury might evidence to a influence require expressly declined “a jury’s guilt.” determination of Id. that the showing in the Ritchie, Pennsylvania (citing U.S. from records could not be obtained anoth- 39, 56, 989, 1000-01, 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d source, testimony, er such the victim’s as (1987)). 40, 56-57 before the defendant is allowed to seek opportunity production tоok the of the victim’s mental health Cashen Id. at proper protocol “set forth to be used records.” 410. We concluded Cash- showing a court to determine when and how a en had made the threshold attorney with gain defendant’s can access remanded instructions issuance of *11 subpoena for Doe’s mental health rec- to supersede proto- Cashen test with a ords. Id. at 410-11. col protection that restores for the confi- dentiality of counseling records while also Cady dissenting Justice dissented. His protecting process the due rights of defen- opinion controversy foreshadowed Walker, dants. See State v. 804 N.W.2d engendered: Cashen (Iowa 2011) 284, (“ ‘We seek a reason- majority adopts The one of the weakest able interpretation which will best effectu- to the in an tests known law area of the ate purpose of the statute ....’” law that deals with the clash of two of Johnson, (quoting 638, State v. compelling the most and venerable in- (Iowa 1995))); id. at (noting known step terests to the law. This is a “ our court’s ‘mandate to construe statutes gives backwards. It the defendant more in a fashion to avoid a constitutional infir- power necessary than protect ” mity possible’ where (quoting In re trial, presenting to a fair while 2010))). Young, 780 N.W.2d serious risk of a different form of abuse for victims of domestic violence. This 2. The constitutionality section new ultimately test also cause vic- 622.10(1). charges While murder were tims to to report decline domestic abuse pending against Thompson, legis- the Iowa protect order to thеmselves from be- lature, Cashen, in reaction to passed Sen- ing required to very personal disclose ate File 291. 2011 Iowa ch. Acts private alleged information to the The law upon took effect its enactment on parties abusers and other to the prose- March 2011. 2011 Iowa Acts ch. cution. § 3. Senate File 291 amended section J., (Cady, by adding Id. at 411 622.10 dissenting). following Others subsection: See, e.g., raised the same concerns. Caro- 4. a. Except as otherwise provided Bettis, Note, line K. Adding Insult to In- subsection, in this confidentiality jury: How the Cashen Protocol Fails to privilege under this section shall be ab- Properly Balance Competing Constitu- solute with regard to a criminal action Iowans, tional Interests 60 Drake and this section shall not be construed to (2012) L.Rev. 1151 [hereinafter Bettis]. authorize or require the disclosure of any privileged dissent a defendant in Cashen concluded as fol- a criminal action either lows: unless following occur: The new test developed by majori- (1) ty may easy and beneficial to defen- The privilege voluntarily holder dants, step but it is a back both for waives the confidentiality privilege. victims and for progress made in (a) (2) seeking defendant access addressing domestic violence over the privileged records under this section last only way decade. The victims of demonstrating good files motion domestic history abuse with a of coun- probability faith a reasonable seling will be able to ensure the confi- likely to contain dentiality private of their counseling rec- exculpatory infоrmation that is not avail- ords is to not report domestic abuse. able from other source and for The law should be able to do better. which there is a for the compelling need legislature 789 N.W.2d at 417. The re- present a defense in the sponded in its next session. We must case. Such a motion shall be filed not interpret the resulting statutory forty days enact- later than arraignment after ment mindful legislature’s purpose under seal of the court. Failure *12 “a” shall not admissible timely paragraph file a motion to such

defendant any criminal action. of the to seek a waiver constitutes this records under privileged 622.10(4) access to (Supp.2011). § Iowa Code court, section, good for cause but the 622.10(4) is Thompson argues section shown, relief waiv- may grant from such its face because the unconstitutional on er. sets the constitutional protocol Cashen

(b) floor for defendants’ access to the showing a reasonable criminal Upon exculpatory mental health rec- potentially privileged that the records probability alleged victims. ords their likely exculpatory contain sought key focuses on three differences between is not available from information 622.10(4). and section protocol the Cashen source, the court conduct other shall any First, requires stronger the statute review of records to an in camera such showing threshold to obtain mental health exculpatory whether informa- determine inspection. ‍​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍records an in camera Com- for in such tion is contained records. 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a) § pare (requiring id. de- (c) exculpatory information is con- If proba- fendant “a reasonable to establish records, shall tained in such the court bility sought likely that the information is need to such infor- balance the disclose exculpatory to contain information ... for against privacy the interest of mation compelling need for the which there is a privilege holder. present a defense in the defendant (d) determination, court’s Upon the case”), Cashen, 789 N.W.2d at 408 with privileged that the information writing, (majority (requiring opinion) defendant is a sought exculpatory that there probability show there is “a reasonable need for such information compelling exculpatory records contain evi- sought outweighs privacy interest of tending dence to create reasonable doubt holder, the court shall issue privilege Second, guilt”).3 as to the defendant’s only allowing an order disclosure of the information be un- requires statute of the that con- portions those records any available other source”—a hur- “from exculpatory information. The tain Compare Iowa dle omitted under Cashen. prohibit any court’s order shall also fur- 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a), Cashen, with Code ther dissemination (rejecting such a re- N.W.2d at defendant, than any person, other Cashen, Third, quirement). under the ini- attorney, prose- the defendant’s and the inspection performed by tial in camera cutor, by unless otherwise authorized defense counsel while under statute the court. court first reviews records district exculpatory Privileged identify b. information obtained camera to informa- Cashen, than in tion. 789 N.W.2d at 409 provided Compare means other as showing ate a doubt as to the defendant's describes the the defendant reasonable Cashen Cashen, step the first differ- guilt.” must make under in three at 408. Presum- (1) basis,” ways: ent "a reasonable basis to believe ing "good faith factual "reasonable likely exculpatory the records are contain basis,” "specific establishing rea- facts tending to create a doubt evidence reasonable equivalent, probability” sonable are all (2) guilt”; good faith as to the defendant's "a primary between these standards is difference sought that the records contain factual basis the evidence under Cashen must tend evidence relevant cence"; to the defendant’s inno- doubt, create a whereas under the reasonable (3) "specific establishing a facts must establish a "com- statute the defendant probability the reasonable pelling evidence. need” for the tending evidence to cre- contain (“[T]he who attorney importance maintaining ate the confi- *13 in dentiality mental shall have health treatment: subpoena obtained inspect the records at the courthouse. “Psychotherapy probes the core of the by patient’s personality. in camera The patient’s An review records insufficient”), most intimate thoughts court is with Iowa Code emotions 622.10(4)(a)(2)(b) (“[T]he exposed are during § shall the course of court psychiatric patient treatment. The con- an in review of rec- conduct camera [the] therapist] fides his more utterly [in than to determine in- exculpatory ords whether anyone else in records.”). the world.... lays [H]e in is contained [the] formation self, dreams, bare his entire his his fan- must determine whether these We statuto- tasies, sin, his and his shame. pa- The requirements their ry face violate the innermost thoughts may tient’s be so process rights due of criminal defendants. frightening, embarrassing, shameful or that patient morbid in therapy will fight Before we address those sick, to remain struggle rather than to issues, ing we reiterate the well-settled those thoughts reveal even to himself. challenges governing rules constitutional possibility that the psychotherapist to Iowa statutes: compelled could be to reveal those com- “We challenges review constitutional ... anyone munications can deter so, In doing statute de novo. we persons from seeking needed treatment must that are remember statutes destroy progress.” treatment in presumption cloaked with a of constitu- McMaster Iowa Bd. Psychology tionality. challenger heavy bears a (Iowa Exam’rs, 1993) 754, 509 758 N.W.2d burden, prove because it must un- (quoting Psychiatric Soc’y Haw. v. Ariyo beyond constitutionality a reasonable shi, (D.Haw.1979) F.Supp. 1028, 481 1038 Moreover, ‘the challenger doubt. must (citations omitted)); Hedgepeth v. cf. every upon refute reasonable basis Clinic, 789, Whitman Walker 22 A.3d 816 could to be which statute be found (D.C.2011) (“[I]t especially n. 43 likely is Furthermore, constitutional.’ if therapist’s that a of highly per- disclosure capable being statute is construed by sonal information а patient revealed manner, more than one one of which vulnerably exposed during who feels thera- constitutional, must con- adopt that would py sessions cause serious emotional struction.” distress.”). v. Seering, State 701 N.W.2d 661 begin analysis our with the (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Hernandez showing required subpoena threshold 2002) -Lopez, N.W.2d and review mental health records. Under (citations omitted)); Cashen, see also Iowa Code subpoenaed records 4.4(1) (2013) (“In statute, enacting it is if review defense counsel defendant presumed [compliance ... with the good “a faith factual basis that the shows sought of the state and of Unit contain evidence relevant Constitutions intended.”).4 Cashen, ed States is We also reiter- to the innocence.” defendant’s against charges The mental in- criminal health records in this case in Iowa. See In re Whalen, volve Gabel’s treatment while 188 n. 2 Wisconsin Estate (“Iowa (Iowa 2013) [applies] apply she an Illinois resident. We Iowa law when no argues foreign party party pleads proves law because no Illi- the law of law governs Thompson’s governs.” (citing Emp'rs nois Wisconsin access Talen v. Mut. Cas. Co., (Iowa 2005))). to Gabel’s mental health records to defend contrast, must find has an By the stat- district court defendant N.W.2d at 408. the rec- purpose honest motive or to seek to show requires ute Accordingly, ords. the district good probability faith a reasonable deny upon finding should the motion likely dishonest, mo- defendant has a bad-faith information that is contain tive, testi- such as to deter victim from available from other source and fying against him. *14 compelling a need for for which there is in present the defendant defense probabili- The next term is “reasonable case. analogous ty,” which we have defined in an ‘substantial,’ ‘just “a setting to mean 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a). § are Iowa Code “We Madsen, conceivable,’likelihood.” v. State obligated presume statutes be consti- (Iowa 2012) 714, (quoting 813 727 N.W.2d tutional, obligated and we are further (Iowa State, 565, King v. 797 N.W.2d 572 pos- them construction give any reasonable 2011)) (discussing prejudice re- showing of sible to make them constitutional.” State quired for an ineffective-assistance-of- 538, (Iowa Wiederien, v. 709 N.W.2d 544 claim). “likely” counsel The term turn 2006). We the words of the give statute reasonably “means to be ex- ‘probable meaning by “their common ordinary and ” B.B., 425, 826 433 pected.’ In re N.W.2d within considering the context which (Iowa 2013) (quoting Oseing, In 296 re Alcoholic Beverages are used.” Auen v. (Iowa 1980)); 797, 801 see also N.W.2d (Iowa 2004). Div., 586, 679 590 In N.W.2d (5th 834, Dictionary 1081 Black’s Law 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a), drafting “the section ed.1979) “likely” (defining “proba- to mean legislature language that invokes employed ble,” “[hjaving in turn is which defined as with legal traditional standards definitions against”). more than evidence for commonly assigned jurisprudence.” our Vertrue, Inc., See State ex Miller v. rel. to ex juncture We decline this 2013). (Iowa 12, N.W.2d 44 reiter- 834 We plicate any “not phrase available from ate that it is “our mandate to construe other for a com source and which there is statutes in to avoid a fashion a constitu- pelling for the present need defendant to possible.” tional re infirmity where in the case.” defense Iowa Code Young, But, 780 N.W.2d at we can- 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a). We those terms give not use the doctrine constitutional Auen, ordinary their 679 meaning. avoidance to change meaning of unam- case-by- N.W.2d at 590. leave it to biguous statutory language. Id. adjudication partic case to determine on a in the ular statutory first term factual record whether the informa faith,” “good privileged threshold is tion from requirement sought mental “ meanings; any which ‘has various is “available from other sometimes times, it viewed and at v. objectively Today, example, other source.” State ” Neiderbach, subjectively.’ City v. hold Riverdale the district (Iowa 2011) Diercks, 643, concluding 806 656 erred the circum N.W.2d under 794, Sieg (quoting Kelly, v. 568 N.W.2d stances of that case that the defendant Co. (Iowa 1997)). failed “not “good We define faith” to show the information was subjectively “honest other because to mean motive” when available from source” objective the term is an he take the paired deposition with term failed to such as Id. privilege-holding “reasonable.” at 656-57. codefendant. Here, 180, 194, “in 2013 WL requirement good show 2013). Moreover, a defendant probability” reasonable means the whether faith records, “compelling need” for information shows a defendant must establish a rea- rec- sonable is best determined under factual likelihood that the privileged rec- Cashen, ords contain exculpatory ord of each case. See 789 N.W.2d information nec- J., essary proper for a (Cady, dissenting) (noting at 415 a bal- defense.” Goldsmith State, 337 Md. 651 A.2d ancing test “focuses on all the facts аnd (1995). Michigan Supreme fully circumstances of each case to assess a Court re- information”). quires a defendant to show a “reasonable compelling need for the probability that the privileged records are We first address the constitution likely to contain material information nec- ality requirement of the initial threshold essary to his defense.” People v. Stana- the defendant “a show reasonable way, 446 Mich. that the probability (1994). The New Hampshire Supreme likely to contain information.” requires Court the defendant to “establish *15 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a). § Iowa In Code Com a probability reasonable that the records Barroso, monwealth v. the Kentucky Su contain information that is material and preme surveyed Court addressing cases relevant to his defense.” King, State v. criminal defendant’s constitutional right 629, (2011). 655, 162 N.H. 34 A.3d 658 obtain to a access witness’s mental health Court, Supreme Wisconsin recogniz- 554, records. 122 (Ky. S.W.Sd 558-64 ing “strong public policy favoring pro- 2003). The court noted that Ritchie in records,” tection of the counseling requires by agency gov volved records held a state a defendant to “show a ‘reasonable likeli- by analysis erned a Brady5 inapplicable to hood’ that the records contain relevant determining the threshold standard re necessary information to a determination quired subpoena records from a third guilt Green, of or innocence.” State v. 253 party. Id. at 559-60. The Barroso court 356, 298, (2002). Wis.2d 646 N.W.2d observed that a The foregoing requirements threshold majority of the state courts that have found by constitutional these state su- addressed this issue have held that a preme courts are similar to the initial defendant, criminal upon preliminary showing required under the Iowa statute. showing that the likely records contain 622.10(4)(u)(2)(a) (re- § See Iowa Code evidence, exculpatory is entitled to some quiring defendant to show “a reasonable pretrial discovery form of of prosecu- probability sought that the information is tion witness’s mental health treatment information”). likely exculpatory to contain records.... authorities, foregoing Based on the we re- ject added). Thompson’s facial challenge to the Id. (emphasis at 561 The Barroso statutory requirement that the defendant court held that the defendant’s constitu- show “a probability reasonable tional rights by are satisfied authorizing an likely information to contain ex- “in camera review of a psycho- witness’s culpatory information.” therapy ... upon receipt of evi- dence sufficient to establish a reasonable nextWe address defendant’s con belief that the exculpatory records contain challenge statutory stitutional to the re evidence.” Id. at 564. quirement the in camera review be

Maryland’s highest court, court held that “to performed by the not defense coun 622.10(4)(a)(2)(b). require disclosure at trial of privileged sel. Id. re- Cashen 83, 1194, Brady (1963). Maryland, 5. v. 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d 215 right disagree with the decision process for the due to We lied on Ritchie s to the privi Pennsylvania Supreme Court ex- acces Cashen, it counsel N.W.2d at 407 tent that allows defense access records. leged Ritchie, 56, file. camera review at 107 S.Ct. at to the CYS An in (citing U.S. 56-57). serve Ritchie’s 1000-01, According by the trial court will 94 L.Ed.2d at destroying interest without Com- scope look to for the ly, we Ritchie Allen, 684, protect the confi- monwealth’s need right. See State 2005) (“[P]ast dentiality of involved child- construction of those investigations. persuasive ... abuse the federal constitution interpretation corresponding in our L.Ed.2d at 107 S.Ct. at at Id. Constitution.”). of the Iowa provisions Thus, Ritchie, under the criminal de- pro- does not have a federal due fendant Ritchie, was found an inspection by cess in camera jury sexually abusing guilty by his lawyer. Rather, his own camera thirteen-year-old daughter. 480 U.S. at judge. is to be the trial inspection Id. 994-95, at L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. report Her abuse 48-49. of child argues nevertheless investigated by agency, Pennsylva- a state rights find broader of access under should (CYS). nia Services Children Youth process the due clause of the Iowa Consti- *16 43, 994, Cashen, 107 L.Ed.2d tution, Id. at S.Ct. at 94 at relying on Cashen. Defense the subpoenaed however, 48. counsel CYS merely cited to Ritchie with- agency objected, citing records. Id. The any separate analysis out citation the statutory privilege. Id. The trial court process Iowa due clause. Constitution’s production Cashen, the 405, 407, refused to order CYS 789 See N.W.2d at 408. fully records to the and did not by defendant squarely Ritchie holds that review 44, 107 review the file. at counsel, CYS Id. S.Ct. at judge, by rather than defense trial 994, Pennsylvania at 94 L.Ed.2d 49. The constitutionally 480 is sufficient. U.S. at Supreme Court vacated the conviction and 61, 1003, at at 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d the case in camera remanded for an reviеw reasons agree. There are sound by of the CYS defense counsel. records reaching refrain from a different conclu- 45, 995, 107 Id. at S.Ct. at 94 L.Ed.2d at sion under Iowa Constitution. The Supreme granted 49-50. The U.S. Court majority choice policy made a Cashen 995, 46, at certiorari. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 94 allow defense counsel to conduct the in L.Ed.2d at 50. stating proce- review that camera without constitutionally required. dure is We hold The Ritchie Court that the defen- held later, year that it is not. than a Less entitled Due dant was under ‍​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍the Process legislature policy Iowa made a different to an in camera review of the CYS Clause judge the trial choice—to substitute for 58, by the trial records court. Id. at 107 inspec- defense counsel for the in camera 1001-02, A five- S.Ct. at 94 L.Ed.2d at 58. decline law tion. We to make new under however, justice majority, held that process due clause to redraw the Iowa defense counsel was not entitled to conduct to strike constitutional boundaries down his camera review of the CYS own legislature’s policy choice. in light of the state’s compelling confidentiality interest in the relied on a Massachusetts child Cashen case 60, adopting requiring abuse information. at 107 at a similar de- protocol Id. S.Ct. 1002-03, majority perform 94 L.Ed.2d The fense counsel to the initial review at 59. Cashen, at concluded: of the records. emphasized in Cashen that (citing Dwyer, v. defendants are Commonwealth (2006)). not to embark permitted “fishing 859 N.E.2d on a Mass. protocol expedition” through court stated this “is Dwyer The confidential mental constitutionally compеlled.” 859 health records. Id. at 407-08. We believe argu- 419. The constitutional counsel who merely N.E.2d at defense is not by rejected in “fishing” ment should be able to made articulate to specifically district court what Ritchie: being why. guid- With excul- right A defendant’s to discover ance, Iowa judges we trust district court patory evidence does not include the recognize will be able to infor- exculpatory authority search unsupervised mation when see it. files. Al- through Commonwealth’s eye though an advocate powerful A pre- counterbalance to the ferreting to a defendant in out helpful discovery rights of trial a defendant information, held— this Court has never constitutional victim-patient’s right pri- restrict- even in absence of a statute vacy in her mental records. See id. alone ing disclosure—that patients (recognizing have “a consti- to the may make the determination as privacy tutional their medical materiality of the information. Settled records”). legislature was entitled to contrary. typi- is to the In the practice a neutral judge choose to have review only where a defendant cal case makes records, victim’s rather private than request material general alleged advocate for the abuser. Rit- Brady Maryland, under 378 U.S. chie observed that the inter- Court State’s (1963), it 83 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 215 protecting ests in confidential child-abuse informa- is the State decides which information would be al- undermined *17 tion must be disclosed. Unless defense lowing defense counsel to review records becomes aware that exсul- counsel other relevancy: patory brings evidence was withheld and full disclosure To allow to defense attention, prosecu- it to the court’s type counsel in this of case would sacri- on tor’s decision disclosure is final. De- unnecessarily the fice Commonwealth’s fense counsel has no constitutional compelling protecting interest in its his own to conduct search of the State’s If child-abuse information. the CYS argue files to relevance. made records were available to defen- Ritchie, at 480 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. dants, counsel, through even it could (footnote at L.Ed.2d and citations seriously have a adverse effect on Penn- omitted). Although eye we of agree “the sylvania’s efforts to uncover treat and may helpful an advocate be to a defendant abuse. abuse is one of the most Child information,” ferreting out role is that prosecute, difficult crimes detect and constitutionally not mandated. Nor should large part because there often are no can judge per- it be when neutral trial except the witnesses victim. A child’s form the review. feelings vulnerability guilt of and and his stated, “Only unwillingness majority The or her to come forward Cashen acute attorneys representing parties particularly know are when the abuser are It they looking parent. what for in the records. is a therefore is essential have a may may state-designated The court cannot foresee what that the child turn, may not to the he and to do important person be defendant.” Cash to whom en, Yet, repeatedly confidentiality. at assurance of 789 N.W.2d 409. so with the J., Cashen, (Cady, at dis- suspect neighbors

Relatives and who senting). come A commentator elaborated willing also will be more abuse who learn their if that identi- mind-set victims they forward know their this, private will lawyer attacker’s review their Recognizing be protected. ties will mental health records: Commonwealth—like all other effort made a commendable States —has Consider the circumstance of a woman and to assure victims witnesses raped. been The crime itself who has they may speak to the CYS counselors traumatic, likely shattering, has had a fear general without disclosure. impact ability and destructive on her frus- purpose would be Commonwealth’s live had the life she before it was com- if this trated confidential material had In an effort to deal with mitted. and upon disclosed demand a defen- be ordeal, from her she has under- recover abuse, criminal charged dant with child gone counseling, which she during may may a trial court simply because information, thoughts, have disclosed recognize evidence. Nei- fears, and self-doubts of the most in- precedent nor common re- ther sense It tensely personal private kind. such quires a result. that, trial, enough bad come the she her ordeal before an audi- must relive Ritchie, 60-61, at at U.S. S.Ct. strangers, judge ence of (footnote 1003, 94 L.Ed.2d at 59-60 omit- will examine her to determine ted). Accordingly, Supreme the U.S. whether contain information that held Court that the defendant’s “interest must be disclosed to the defense. Commonwealth) (as wеll as that of the Massachusetts, however, she must take ensuring fully protected” a fair trial can knowing the witness stand that her ra- through inspection by an in camera pist’s responsibil- whose lawyer, primary alone, though trial court even “this rule ity testimony, attack her credibility is to denies the benefits of ‘an [the defendant] character, file has read the entire ” eye.’ at advocate’s Id. 107 S.Ct. her in the counseling. lawyers case 1002-03, 94 agree. L.Ed.2d at every have confidence defense will second-guessing legisla- The cost counsel has adhered and adhere to *18 witness, contrast, by ture’s sound choices in section To the policy rules. 622.10(4) Cady As high. may provide compared would be Justice this little comfort humiliation, betrayal, observed: to the sense of and likely exposure experience. she is to If victims of domestic violence must Fishman, Access to Clifford S. a Defense embarrassing debilitating suffer the Psychotherapy Prosecution Witness’s of their physician-patient privilege loss Records, Counseling Or. L.Rev. once a witness become in a crimi- (2007) Fishman]; accord Bet [hereinafter nal prosecution, domestic-abuse a chill- (“When tis, L.Rev. 60 Drake at 1202 a effect ing report- will be cast over the are being victim discovers abuse, ing of domestic disclosure of attacker, sought alleged an this alone by providers by information treatment victim.”). will likely re-traumatize the victims, the ability physicians of .psychotherapists Finally, light importance to treat in psychological abuse, arising maintaining confidentiality, disorders from domеstic of we hold the testify legislature constitutionally require and the victims willingness of could against their to show the information abusers. defendant above, in the health rec- interest by victim’s mental this is not outweighed “not other ords available from is right present Fromme’s a complete )(2)(b). 622.10(4)(a Iowa source.” Code Accordingly, defense. Fromme does statutory requirement is constitution- This have a right constitutional to an in cam- face. al on its Whether it is unconstitu- era of review Crisis Connection’s rec- applied tional as must be determined a ords. In the absence of a violation of basis. have case-by-case Other “courts rights, Fromme’s constitutional apply we that, requisite even if the held standard the victim privilege advocate provided as established, in camera review has been by the Assembly. General only if defendant entitled to disclosure evidence is from comparable ‘unavailable Thus, Fromme, Id. at 802. in the Indiana ” Fishman, sources.’ 86 Or. less intrusive Supreme held that the Court defendant’s cases). (collecting at 50 & n. L.Rev. “right present complete defense” was policy Although Cashen court made by outweighed compelling interest omit requirement, choice to this it cited no serving the psychological and emotional authority for rejecting it. cites needs of victims of domestic violence and holding process requires due al- no case Here, sexual abuse. our legislature has the defendant to victim’s lowing obtain the recognized compelling a similar interest privileged mental health records оbtain protecting psychological and emotional other, available from limiting needs crime victims dis- Kentucky less intrusive sources. The Su- closure mental of their In records. Court held that evi- preme so, doing legislature has not created dence found the court’s in camera re- new, Indiana; privilege absolute as in it view “must be disclosed to the defendant if merely has restricted the circumstances unavailable less intrusive sources.” from traditional, under which a long-recognized Barroso, 122 (emphasis S.W.3d add- privilege be overcome. This is within ed). legislature’s power. Moreover, supreme other state courts upheld against have absolute privileges Let’s examine alternative. If challenges by constitutional criminal de- were to find that a criminal has See, Connection, e.g., fendants. Crisis process a general due to obtain oth- (Ind. Fromme, 789, 802 Inc. v. 949 N.E.2d evidence, it privileged erwise where would 2011). Fromme, In Supreme the Indiana end? a case where a victim a Consider analysis thorough conducted a Court in- gives serious crime somewhat violent federal state caselaw. Id. at 795-802. happened— consistent accounts as to what constitutionality upholding not uncommon occurrence. Could victim-advocate privilege Indiana’s *19 —an spouse crime be to subpoenaed victim’s privilege absolute court concluded: —the oath testify under about what the victim sum, by providing complete ban § told him or her? See Iowa Code 622.9 present in to disclosure eases like the Iowa). marital in (recоgnizing privilege the one, privilege Indiana’s victim advocate priest be subpoenaed? Could the victim’s advances the State’s interest compelling 622.10(1)(recognizing § priest- See id. confidentiality maintaining in of in- at- penitent privilege). Could the victim’s gathered formation in the course of torney required produce to communica- serving emotional psychological and 622.10(1) § tions with the victim? See id. of needs victims of domestic violence attorney-client abuse. stated (recognizing privilege). and sexual For the reasons 490 death patient’s long- over interests after the no disagree minds

Reasonable rights the competing revictimizing to balance er the concern over how best includes and through their victims. specific living of criminal defendants victim disclo- simply to decide whether Our task is sure of confidential records to her her in by the elected branches chilling balance struck or the victim’s lawyer, abuser’s 622.10(4) is constitutional. ‍​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍We section to ongoing counseling report or incentive 622.10(4)is constitutional that section But, hold further the societal interest abuse. supersedes on the Cashen its face health privacy of mental records con- protocol. regardless tinues death of unabated any generally victim. See Iowa individual next determine whether the district

We privacy ch. of mental (protecting Code 228 correctly applied the statute. Cashen, information); health 789 N.W.2d confidentiality mental 3. The the fundamental im- (discussing patient’s survives death. health records confidentiality in mental health portance of with analysis our the observation begin treatment). confidentiality Gabel’s mental that the her survives death. See health records meet failed (“[T]he Cashen, phy at 414-15 to obtain requirements threshold Gabel’s continues after sician-patient privilege mental health records. claimed death....”) Broun, (citing 1 Kenneth et S. he needed mental health Gabel’s records al., Evidence at 462 McCormick He support argued his PTSD defense. (6th Heemstra, ed.2006)); State v. her contain records could information (Iowa 2006) (noting medi N.W.2d manipulation, showing prone “she was privilege patient’s cal continued after anger, violence all of which exac could Chi., death); Bailey v. & Burlington cf. symptoms.” Thompson erbate his PSTD R.R., Quincy N.W.2d failed to Gabel received mental show when (“[T]he 1970) by protective provided shield why she was treated. treatment ... generally Code section 622.10 survives Thompson’s The State resisted motion for death, the client’s termination of the rela September an in On inspection. camera litiga of a tionship, or dismissal case 14, 2011, Thomp the district court denied tion.”). determining upon son’s motion he had course, pa Of the death of the “no showing proba made of a reasonable consider in balancing tient is a fact to bility records privileged rights exculpato of a criminal defendant to may likely exculpatory information contain ry in confidential records. Af source, other available from all, ter holder of the has privilege “[t]he compelling which defendant had a need private preventing little interest disclo present a defense.” The district court sure, he is dead.” because United States “[f|acts regarding found victim’s Hansen, F.Supp. 1226 conduct relating PTSD] defense [the Cashen, (D.Mont.1997); accord already presented deposi have been (noting at 414 the “diminish[ed] tions” and other sources were avail ... importance protecting the expert. able to We agree. the defense death). patient’s from disclosure” after the *20 Thompson showing no evidence offered Perversely, a defendant who his vic- kills access a nexus between the issues trial and greater tim have to her mental by treatment received than an vic- the mental health health records abuser whose virtually no extrinsic balancing competing tim Gabel. He offered survives. Rather, argued circumstances sur- court. he regarding Thompson the trict evidence involuntary rounding hospitaliza- prejudiced evidentiary errors, by prin- Gabel’s was why her videotaped asked mother cipally tion. When his confession was hospital, in” to the Gabel’s into despite “checked admitted evidence his intoxi- daughter my “because simply ruling said he not challenge cation—a does on her — Um, just upset her grandma, appeal. agree mom. with State that though she needed point her she Thompson failed to error preserve on his I did not help, guess.” Thompson estab- applied the district wrong claim court occurred, 2.24(2)(6)(6). when the or hospitalization lish under standard rule Thompson had even whether Gabel and event, already we havе concluded Further, relationship at the time. al- overwhelming supported evidence before though Thompson asserted the dis- Accordingly, verdict. guilty the district expert trict court that the defendant’s in- did deny- court not abuse its discretion in obtaining records would dicated ing Thompson’s for new motion trial. See valuable,” “very there was no affidavit Reeves, 670 at 202 (noting N.W.2d our other evidence submitted from the ex- court’s review of the district court’s ruling only the pert point, arguments on this but contrary as whether the was verdict of counsel. weight of the evidence is for abuse of Thompson’s disputed. PTSD was not discretion). denying We affirm order plead He did not self-defense. Gabel’s Thompson’s motion new trial. for jury mental state was not at issue. The evidence the conduct of regarding

heard IV. Conclusion. Thompson night he and Gabel shot reasons, For these affirm the rulings her, concerning as well as evidence Thompson’s of the district court and con- relationship. Thompson of their nature viction. go fishing expedi- not entitled to was AFFIRMED. in her mental records. He tion already had what he needed. district justices CADY, C.J., All except concur correctly court ruled failed to specially, Appel, concurs who showing required make the for an in cam- HECHT, WIGGINS, JJ., who 622.10(4). inspection era under section separately specially. concur D. The Was Not Verdict Con CADY, (concurring spe- Chief Justice trary to the Evidence. moved cially). trial, a new because “the part, for ver by majority I concur in guilty jury opinion, dict rendered was but my contrary separately express to evidence.” He claims on write view that ap applied statutory judicial the district review peal wrong standard motion under denying stating standard his of confidential records Iowa Code 622.10(4) jury’s supported by (Supp.2011) verdict am should be section “[t]he through the ple appeal, given application evidence in the record.” On its definition case-by-case Rule facts on basis. As Thompson relies on Iowa of Criminal of this 2.24(2)(6)(6) Neiderbach, Ellis, and State and State v. Procedure case 1998). (Iowa 180, 220-43, 2013), Howev WL er, illustrate, never are Thompson’s counsel cited that the facts what should the “reasonable posttrial meaning rule or Ellis in his motion or breathe into standard, during motion and this standard hearing probability” on that in dis- *21 492 involved, Thompson dem- in the frame could not greater clarity gain

will continue good faith belief that give required cases continue to onstrate the future as additional probability a existed shape. reasonable it ex- likely were to contain records APPEL, (concurring specially). information, Justice or that the defense culpatory had need compelling a records. below, I con- expressed For the reasons 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a) (Supp. See Iowa Code in this case. only in the result cur 2011). Hence, Thomp- the State contends son not establish what information in did of Mental Health Rec- I. Production him in his help medical records would ords. particularized defense. Without more Thomp- the Parties. A. Positions of knowledge of the contents of the mental in not claims the district errеd son records, suggests, produc- health the State Angela health rec- ordering Gabel’s mental tion is unjustified. of the documents produced inspection. for in camera ords Further, Thompson the State claimed evidence Gabel was hos- Thompson offered failed to demonstrate the information was past in the for mental health is- pitalized other unavailable from sources. State Skemp at Franciscan Medical Center sues living

493 conclusion, specific request One of the reasons for in the context of a however, specific Neiderbach, is the threshold standard case. See 837 of mental health production records is N.W.2d at 225 n.8. overly demanding. The standard of Finally, although the statements are in- probability” “reasonable in Iowa sec- Code dicta, direct plainly and are I disagree with 622.10(4)(a)(2) requires plausible tion any suggestion that exculpatory evidence showing that the mental health in in the trial of a defendant facing life in may likely produce the case exculpatory prison might be denied to the defendant Further, any ap- evidence. Id. at 226. privacy because of the needs of a deceased proach to the proper recog- standard must Heemstra, party. In where the defendant statutory nize all of language, includ- sought a deceased’s victim’s medical rec- ing probability” “may.” “reasonable ords, we found the defendant had set forth 622.10(4)(a (re- )(2)(b) Iowa See Code a “bona fide claim of compelling interest quiring the district court to conduct in sufficient tо require a limited disclosure of camera review when the defendant has privileged information” and noted the shown “a reasonable probability that the might be able to use the evi- privileged record sought may likely con- dence to impeach key prosecution wit- tain exculpatory information that is not 559, ness. 721 N.W.2d at doing 563. In any (empha- available from other source” so, we cited another finding case a defen- added)). addition, sis proper inter- dant’s need for treatment records to out- pretation recognize of the statute must weigh a privacy deceased’s interest. Id. at constitutional restraints described Hansen, 562 (citing United States v. 955 Ritchie, 39, Pennsylvania v. 480 U.S. 107 (D.Mont.1997)). F.Supp. 1225 989, It would (1987); be S.Ct. 94 40 L.Ed.2d Davis v. astounding to me that a Alaska, party facing life in 308, 1105, 415 94 U.S. S.Ct. 39 prison deprived would be (1974); of L.Ed.2d 347 and United v. States Valenzuela-Bernal, 858, protect evidence order to the privilege 458 U.S. 102 S.Ct. (1982). 3440, And, course, of a 73 deceased victim. of Finally, L.Ed.2d 1193 while do not have characterization of the effort before us an absolute privilege as “fishing expedition” has emotional statute appeal, related to domestic abuse or sexual it cannot victims, be a substitute for analysis of assault which would raise a num- length (Iowa 2013) J., discussed at some the benefit that will (Appel, concurring specially). purchased by Our view of what evidentiary creation of the might policy consequence. be better noof

privilege encouragement in this case: the Mauti, See State v. 208 N.J. 33 A.3d psychoanalytic counseling” and that has “[i]t (2012) (stating that where the purchase price: not mentioned the occasional legislature privilege, has enacted a the court’s injustice”). upon We decide our cases based "own conclusions about what would be better upon perceptions facts and law and not policy simply consequence”); are of no see whether a decision will be viewed some as Sebelius, Indep. also Nat'l Fed’n Bus. controversial. -, -, 2566, 2600, U.S. 132 S.Ct. legisla- I also implication resist that the (2012) (noting L.Ed.2d it is not the approach approach tive was "better” than the pass upon Court’s role to the wisdom of the my spe- in Cashen. As stated in Neiderbach requirement federal Affordable Care Act’s concurrence, cial the issue is not whether the pay individuals tax if do not obtain better, approach legislature or even insurance, only upon but rather its worse, face, approach, but whether the on its constitutionality). Any implication that cer requirements meets the United States policy preferences tain are relevant with re Neiderbach, spect and Iowa Constitutions. State v. constitutional issues this case *23 PTSD, mens he did not have the rea that should not time very difficult issues ber of a case support in the absence of or prejudged ‍​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‍necessary to first —or second-de- controversy before us.7 question. murder on in gree night the Proper Application Standard. of

C. case has similarities to The some of proper application turn to the the I now Heemstra, In the defendant Heemstra. my articulated in Nеiderbach standard victim, the did not contest that he shot but Thompson’s main defense was opinion. victim was a argued instead that the hot PTSD, Thompson his because of was that that he to shoot provoked head and was requisite premeditation form the unable to in at him self-defense. 552. second- a conviction of first- or support Heemstra, in makes no Thompson Unlike had Thompson murder. evidence degree that he the victim in self- argument shot very poorly, treated him but he that Gabel Thompson argues that defense. because get into unable this evidence the was on pulled triggers Gabel his PTSD the Thompson at trial because declined record question, in he did not form the night wit- the stand the defense to take first-degree requisite support intent to knowledge not have of personal nesses did charge. health murder The mental rec- hearsay evi- Thompson’s the incidents. that, could contain evidence objective ords gun pointed dence indicated Gabel once Heemstra, in had like the victim Gabel the pulled trigger. head and On to his personality tending kind of to behave in a occasion, apparently she held a another to Thomp- fashion that could be relevant throat. knife to his son’s claim of entitlement to an instruction argues kind of Thompson this behavior voluntary manslaughter. on Iraq toward a troubled veteran of the war Heemstra, however, mental to destabi- experience with combat tended impeach key records tended aggravate the relationship lize his witness, wife, who the deceased’s claimed Thompson argued PTSD. the mental had disposition. the decedent a calm Id. health records could demonstrate Gabel Here, does not Thompson claim personality. a mean and manipulative had impeach evidence could be used Thompson asserted such evidence witness, only but it could be used to that mental health could convince a person Gabel establish was the kind of who Thompson’s jury that PTSD was fact enjoyed aggravating symptoms. his PTSD by exacerbated conduct on Gabel’s that, attempted night of the murder and because of to establish this appearance impartiality lying Wigmorean in the Law undermines of Absolutism judicial review. Evidentiary L.Rev. Privileges, 65 U. Pitt. (2004) (concluding, canvassing after privilege 7. The case for has been absolute studies, empirical "lay respondents that were leading attacked in at least one treatise judicially compelled as concerned not about See, e.g., Edward the academic literature. J. Wigmore hy- that disclosure confidences Imwinkelried, Wigmore: The New A Treatise proceeding pothesized” and to review consti- Evidence, 5.2.2, (2d ed.2009) on at 313-23 privi- tutional doctrines that render absolute (canvassing empirical studies related to the Weissenberger, leges qualified); Glen psychotherapist-patient privilege and con- Supreme Psychotherapist Privilege and the cluding that "the ... do available studies Legisla- Misplaced Court's Reliance on State assumption mind bear out the that in the tures, (1998) Hastings L.J. typiсal patient, the existence of an eviden- (agreeing with Imwinkelried Professor tiary privilege major has a influence either on psycho- justification "the instrumental professional decision consult a therapist privilege unimpressive” and the decision to make revelations to a consult- Imwinkelried, empirical professional”); ed J. "the evidence for instrumental Edward weak”). Questioning Assumption Under- rationale is Behavioral incidents direct evidence of the am not convinced that such offering knife, involving gun and the but could was in fact available from other sources. following prosecution’s hear- not do so however, problem, say objection. Although the evidence *24 offered showing no evidence be- nexus Thompson offered hearsay, nonetheless tween at the issues trial and the mental evidence had a hearsay indicating Gabel health treatment received Gabel. He manipulative personality and en- mean and virtually offered no extrinsic re- evidence gaged activity in that would to exac- tend garding the circumstances surrounding symptoms. PTSD erbate his involuntary hospitalization. Gabel’s When also did argues Thompson The State not why asked her mother “checked in” the the provide any court with hospital, daughter simply Gabel’s “be- said this, sought, about records he the but my Um, grandma, cause her mom. her — course, is the catch-22 See argument. they just her upset to the she point Neiderbach, 837 Because 225. thought needed help, she I guess.” confidential, Thompson are the records Thompson not indicating did offer evidence in- provide cannot the district court with occurred, when the hospitalization or even specific formation related to their contents. whether and Thompson Gabel had a rela- But, Thompson to do is required all Further, tionship at time. although surrounding show that the circumstances Thompson told the district court that mental Gabel’s health treatment are suffi- expert obtaining defendant’s indicated that trigger a reasonably plausible cient to ba- valuable,” “very would be records there is informa- sis to believe Thompson no offered affidavit or other records. tion in the evidence from the expert submitted on this The district denied the motion only point, arguments but of counsel. ground the information the na- about Because failed through extrin- relationship ture of the between Gabel and plausibly hospitalization sic facts to tie the other available from case, in I the issues this conclude the sources. For the reasons in expressed did not err in declining district court Neiderbach, I find the district court erred allow for in camera review of the docu- reaching in this rec- conclusion. Medical my ments the standard in under outlined gold evidence. ords are standard of Neiderbach concurrence. I special do Further, Thompson See at 228-29. id. any concur in additional discussion of the exercised his constitutional to not application beyond Neiderbach test take the stand. There were no other facts, provide which legally the above witnesses tо their do- third-party private denying production sufficient basis relationship sought mestic that Thompson Any in this case. dis- further Further, develop. the information merely cussion is dicta and is not neces- included the potential observations of a I diagnosis professional. sary trained of this the outcome case.8 argu- logic slope slippery-slope-type linguistic slippery I resist also further make a Schauer, regarding Slopes, application process Slippery ment of due claim.” Frederick course, (1985). long principles privileges. to other noted Of As Harv. L.Rev. every ago essay, virtually only a classic "in before the case issue court involves made, 622.10(4), slippery slope argument application as in which of Iowa Code section court, opposing party by this equal could with formal construed to the facts at hand. II. Conclusion. above, expressed

For reasons I con- only case.

cur result this HECHT, JJ., join this

WIGGINS

special concurrence. notes had with Ga- Thompson been Crosse, Citing in La State v. Wisconsin. years bel for two to the (Iowa prior at least time Heemstra, 2006), 721 549 N.W.2d argues he be in killed her he would argues that if there was infor- Thompson position to know if Gabel from suffered sug- in the mation mental mental illness. State contends cruel, manipulative, that Gabel was gesting showing regarding made no an mean, it be valuable could inquiry couples’ of the that would friends experts, who for the defense’s were assert- have them interact. seen that, posttraumatic of his ing because (PTSD), Thompson disorder lacked stress Proper B. Standard for Produсtion. necessary support intent to a murder challenges constitutionality conviction. of Iowa section its face Code 622.10 on as The State that the responds request recently legislature. amended the Iowa speculative. expressed special too For simply my Defense counsel the reasons Neiderbaeh, have “might stated deceased been hos- concurrence State v. 837 2013) 180, 220, pitalized,” give approxi- (Ap- but could not N.W.2d J., purported hospitaliza- pel, concurring specially), mate date Gabel’s I conclude State, 622.10(4) According Iowa uncon- tion. without some Code section is not for treatment time- its face.6 idea reasons stitutional on 6. A reference made to tion Cashen has been "the contro- that our decision was controver- versy engendered” sial. Id. at 1187. Cashen with citation to a describes, among review law note that other court, course, our are Decisions of often things, the "Evils of Heemstra Decision” possible It con- controversial. to avoid in reference this court's decision in State v. troversy hotly poten- contested cases as all Heemstra, (Iowa 2006). 721 549 See likely tial resolutions are to be controversial Note, Bettis, Adding K. Caroline Insult to In- Indeed, quarters. recognition in some jury: Prop- How the Cashen Protocol Fails to psychotherapist patient privilege is sub — erly Competing Redmond, Balance Constitutional Inter- ject controversy. See Jaffee lowans, 1151, 1932, Drake L.Rev. ests U.S. S.Ct. (2012). (1996) X, (Scalia, This further note references articles dissent L.Ed.2d ing) noting Register (caustically Des proposi- from the Moines for the Court has "[t]he

Case Details

Case Name: State of Iowa v. Jonas Dorian Neiderbach
Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa
Date Published: Aug 23, 2013
Citation: 836 N.W.2d 470
Docket Number: 11–1082
Court Abbreviation: Iowa
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