STATE OF IOWA v. ADAM AARON RHODES
No. 23-0338
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
Submitted April 2, 2024—Filed May 10, 2024
STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, vs. ADAM AARON RHODES, Appellant.
The defendant appeals a conviction for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, arguing that his muzzleloader replica of an antique firearm is not a firearm within the meaning of
Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
S.P. DeVolder (argued) of the DeVolder Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Norwalk, and William L. Kutmus and Trever T. Hook of Kutmus, Pennington & Hook, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
WATERMAN, Justice.
In this appeal, we must determine whether a replica of an antiquе muzzleloader rifle qualifies as a “firearm” within the meaning of
On our review, we agree with the district court and the State. The Iowa legislature declined to enact the federal definition of “firearm.” Our precedents apply the common meaning of “firearm” that encompasses this muzzleloader rifle. The felon-in-possession law uses the disjunctive “or” to prohibit felons from possessing a “firearm or offensive weapon.”
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 2004, Adam Rhodes was convicted of third-degree burglary under
On October 19, 2021, during the muzzleloader hunting season, the Iowa Department of Natural Resources law enforcement team received multiple complaints about Rhodes killing a “big deer” and that something was just “not right.” The next day, officers met with Rhodes, who admitted to killing a deer from his tree stand. Rhodes initially told the officers that he used a bow. The officers located the deer carcass and found a gunshot wound with a copper bullet “in the hide of the deer.” The officers sent that part of the hide to a veterinarian who determined that “there were definitely pieces оf lead or ‘shrapnel’ in the hide.”
The officers obtained a search warrant on October 21 to examine the contents of Rhodes‘s cell phone and confiscate his rifle. They found text messages Rhodes sent his wife, including a photo of Rhodes sitting in a deer blind with the muzzle-loading rifle and admitting that he shot the deer with his muzzleloader.
The State charged Rhodes with knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of
The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Rhodes testified about his possession and ownership of the rifle. He also called an expert witness, Michael Anderson, who worked at an Iowa firearm dealership and served as a cavalry scout in the United States military for twenty years. Anderson is a certified National Rifle Association firearms instructor and teaches Iowa‘s permit-to-carry course. Anderson testified that Rhodes‘s rifle does not qualify as a firearm under federal or Iowa law and that the Federal Bureau of Alсohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives does not consider muzzle-loading rifles as firearms. He opined that Rhodes‘s rifle is not considered a firearm because it cannot be converted into a rifle or shotgun, it cannot be converted to shoot rimfire or centerfire cartridges, it is a replica of an early 1800s muzzle-loading rifle with an antique firing mechanism, and it can only be safely fired using black powder or an approved black powder substitute.
The prosecutor only asked one question of Anderson: “Does the Thompson/Center Impact have the ability to propel a projectile by exрlosive force?” Anderson responded,
Both parties presented arguments to the district court. Rhodes contended that a replica of an antique firearm does not fall within the definition of a “firearm” under
The district court agreed with the State. The court found that the replica of an antique firearm is an “instrument used in the propulsion of shot, shell, or bullets by the action of gunpowder exploded within it.” (Quoting Firearm, Black‘s Law Dictionary 761 (4th rev. ed. 1968).) “The Defendant wants this court to conclude the Defendant could have had no idea he was purchasing a firearm from Dick‘s Sporting Goods. The court cannot go to that extent.”
A trial on the minutes commenced on August 22, 2022. The district court again heard arguments from both parties. The fighting issue remained whether the antique firearm constitutes a “firearm” under
On September 1, the district court entered judgment against Rhodes, finding him guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
The district court also rejected several affirmative defenses raised by Rhodes, most notably a void for vagueness constitutional challenge. The court stated, “[W]hen Iowa Code Section 724.1 and Section 724.26 are read together, the sweep of the prohibition against firearm possession is clear. There is a difference between possеssion of a firearm and possession of an offensive weapon.” The court determined that an individual of ordinary intelligence would understand that “firearm” encompasses an instrument that discharges a projectile that was used to kill a deer.
The district court imposed a suspended fine and sentence, placing Rhodes on probation for a period not to exceed five years. Rhodes appealed his conviction, and we retained the case.
II. Standard of Review
We review statutory interpretation questions and rulings on motions to dismiss a charge in a trial information for correction of errors at law. State v. Middlekauff, 974 N.W.2d 781, 790 (Iowa 2022). We review constitutional rulings de novo. Id. at 791. We reviеw rulings on the sufficiency of evidence for correction of errors
III. Analysis.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Thompson/Center Impact .50 caliber in-line muzzleloader rifle is a “firearm” within the meaning of
We begin our analysis with the operative statutory language. Iowa Code chapter 724 is entitled “Weapons.” Iowa‘s felon-in-possession statute provides:
A person who is convicted of a felony in a state or federal court, or who is adjudicated delinquent on the basis of conduct that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, and who knowingly has under the person‘s dominion and control or possession, receives, or transports or causes to be transported a firearm or offensive weapon is guilty of a class “D” felony.
a. A machine gun. A machine gun is a firearm which shoots or is designed to shoot more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.
b. Any weapon other than a shotgun or muzzle loading rifle, cannon, pistol, revolver or musket, which fires or can be made to fire a projectile by the explosion of a propellant charge, which has a barrel or tube with the bore of more than six-tenths of an inch in diameter, or the ammunition or projectile therefor, but not including antique weapons kept for display or lawful shooting.
c. A bomb, grenade, or mine, whether explosive, incendiary, or poison gas; any rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces; any missile having an explosive charge of more than one-quarter ounce; or any device similar to any of these.
d. A ballistic knife. A ballistic knife is a knife with a detachable blade which is propelled by a spring-operated mechanism, elastic material, or compressed gas.
e. Any part or combination of parts either designed or intended to be used to convert any device into an offensive weapon as described in paragraphs “a” through “d”, or to assemble into such an offensive weapon, except magazines or other parts, ammunition, or ammunition components used in common with lawful sporting firearms or parts including but not limited to barrels suitable for refitting to sporting firearms.
f. Any bullet or projectile containing any explosive mixture or chemical compound capable of exploding or detonating prior to or upon impact, or any shotshell or cartridge containing exothermic pyrophoric misch metal as a projectile which is designed to throw or project a flame or fireball to simulate a flamethrower.
The statute next excludes certain devices from the definition of “offensive
[A]ny firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system, manufactured in or before 1898 or any firearm which is a replica of such a firearm if such replica is not designed or redesigned for using conventional rimfire or centerfire fixed ammunition or which uses only rimfire or centerfire fixed ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United States and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade.
In
As used in this chapter, an “antique firearm” means any firearm, including any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system, manufactured in or before 1898. An antique firearm also means a replica of a firearm so described if the replica is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition or if the replica uses rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United States and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade.
The controlling provision,
When the legislature does not define a term in a statute, “we look to the context in which the term appears and give it its ordinary and common meaning.” State v. Shorter, 945 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Iowa 2019)); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 70 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia & Garner, Reading Law] (“One should assume the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise.”). We give “firearm” its common and ordinary meaning at the time the statute was enacted.
Iowa‘s felon-in-possession statute was enacted in 1976. 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 (ch. 1), § 2426 (codified at
Other contemporaneous dictionary definitions are consistent. Black‘s Law Dictionary, in 1968, defined “firearm” as “[a]n instrument used in the propulsion of shot, shell, or bullets by the action of gunpowder exploded within it.” Firearm, Black‘s Law Dictionary 761 (4th rev. ed. 1968). Webster‘s New Collegiate Dictionary defined “firearm” as “a weapon from which a shot is discharged by gunpowder—usu[ally] used only of small arms.” Firearm, Webster‘s New Collegiate Dictionary 427 (1981). The common dictionary meaning of “firearm” is a weapon that can fire a projectile using a prоpellant such as gunpowder.
Our cases have consistently applied the common definition of “firearm.” In State v. Pinckney, we confronted the same question presented here—does a specific weapon fall within the definition of a “firearm” under
In Pinckney, the defendant was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon. Id. at 727. The defendant admitted that he possessed a shotgun, but noted that “the gun had no firing pin” and “the ammunition he put in the gun ‘wasn‘t thе right gauge for that shotgun.‘” Id. at 728. He relied on an amendment to
It is plain the above amendment merely removed unserviceable firearms from the definition of “offensive weapons.” Firearms and offensive weapons are not synonymous, a distinction made obvious by the alternate reference in section 724.26 to “a firearm or offensive weapon” (emphasis supplied). If there were no difference, use of the two words would be redundant. It is not
presumed the legislature intended words in a statute to be given a redundant or useless meaning.
From its decision specifically to exempt unserviceable firearms from section 724.1, as well as from section 724.15 (annual permit, see [Iowa Code section 724.15(2)(b)]), and its failure to apply the exemption to section 724.26, we discern a legislative intent that convicted felons are not to possess, receive or transport firearms, whether serviceable or unserviceable.
Id. at 728–29 (citation omitted). We determined that if a weapon is designed to fire a projectile, it falls within the definition of a “firearm.” Id. at 729. We held “that under section 724.26[,] there is no requiremеnt that the firearm be serviceable, and find this issue raised by defendant to be without merit.” Id.
In State v. Hemminger, we applied the same definition—a weapon “designed to be capable of propelling a projectile by explosive force”—to “firearm” under
In State v. Kenney, we again were confronted with a challenge to Iowa‘s felon-in-possession
We see no reason to depart from our precedent consistently defining “firearm” under
Rhodes‘s Thompson/Center Impact .50 caliber in-line muzzleloader rifle falls squarely within this common meaning. The weapon Rhodes possessed is designed to fire a 50-caliber projectile by an explosive force—black powder or black powder substitute. As Rhodes‘s expert testified, a muzzleloader can propel a projectile by explosive force. “That‘s what a muzzleloader does.” We hold that Rhodes‘s muzzleloader falls within the meaning of “firearm” in
We acknowledge the overlap between the definitions of “offensive weapon” and “firearm.” Some firearms are also offensive weapons—such as a “machine gun.”
We addressed this overlap in State v. Halliburton, determining whether a defendant who violates
Although section 724.3 applies to any unauthorized person, it only prohibits the possession of “offensive weapons.” The term “offensive weapons” is defined to include particularly lethal weapons such as machine guns and hand grenades. Iowa Code § 724.1 (1993). In contrast, section 724.26 is directed toward potеntially harmful persons—felons. They are prohibited from possessing not only offensive weapons, but also firearms. Id. § 724.26. Thus, these sections focus on different dangers; section 724.3 is aimed at a class of particularly harmful weapons, whereas section 724.26 is aimed at a group of potentially harmful persons.
Rhodes argues that we should follow the federal felon-in-possession statute,
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
Congress specifically exempted antique firearms from the definition of “firearm,” stating that “[s]uch term does not include an antique firearm.”
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressly declined to read the federal exemption for antique firearms into that state‘s felon-in-possession statute. See Harris v. State, 137 P.3d 124 (Wyo. 2006). The Wyoming statute, like Iowa‘s, lacks a definition of “firearm.” Id. at 128. The Harris v. State court determined that “firearm” is unambiguous and should be given its common definition: “capable of firing a projectile by using an explosive as a propellant.” Id. at 128–29. The defendant argued, like Rhodes, that the state‘s highest court should “adopt the definition of firearms” from the federal statute and exclude “[m]uzzle-loading black powder rifles.” Id. at 129. The Harris court called the defendant‘s approach “misguided,” stating:
We must give effect to the Wyoming legislature‘s intent as expressed in the language of the statute. The Wyoming legislature chose to modify the term “firearm” with the word “any.” The phrase “any firearm” signifies the legislature‘s intent to keep firearms away from felons who have demonstrated their propensity for violence. If the legislature intended to create an exception for a muzzle-loading black powder rifle, it could have done so. It did not. We are not free to legislate. We cannot read exceptions into a statute that were not
made by the legislature. The inescapable conclusion is that a muzzle-loading black powder rifle falls within the definition of “firearm” as contemplated by
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–8–102 .
Id. (citations omitted). We reach the same conclusion under Iowa Code chapter 724. Rhodes cites no on point contrary authority.
The Supreme Court of Nevada, faced with the same question, cited Harris, and determined that “[w]hile federal law currently The Iowa legislature presumably declined to exempt antique firearms from our state felon-in-possession law to further its goal of keeping firearms from the hands of convicted felons. “No one questions the legislature‘s purpose in prohibiting felons from possessing firearms. It is because the legislature considers them dangerous. This is a legitimate public purpose because such persons have an elevated tendency to commit crimes of violence.” State v. Buchanan, 604 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Iowa 2000) (citation omitted); see also Olsen, 848 N.W.2d at 368 (noting that the purpose of Rhodes also relies on the placement of 1. As used in section 724.26, the word “felony” means any offense punishable in the jurisdiction where it occurred by imprisonmеnt for a term exceeding one year, but does not include any offense, other than an offense involving a firearm or explosive, classified as a misdemeanor under the laws of the state and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less. 2. As used in this chapter, an “antique firearm” means any firearm, including any firearm with a matchlock, flintlock, percussion cap, or similar type of ignition system, manufactured in or before 1898. An antique firearm also means a replica of a firearm so described if the replica is not designed or redesigned for using rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition or if the replica uses rimfire or conventional centerfire fixed ammunition which is no longer manufactured in the United States and which is not readily available in the ordinary channels of commercial trade. Nothing in this section expressly exempts antique firearms from the firearms felons are prohibited from possessing in The term “antique firearm” is now only used in one other section of chapter 724: Chapter 724 was initially enacted in 1976 without a definition of “antique firearm.” See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 (ch. 1), § 2426. But in 2021, the legislature amended We reiterate that the surplusage canon should not be applied rigidly, and it should not be used to trump the ordinary meaning. See Marek v. Johnson, 958 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2021) (“[T]he rule against interpreting statutes so they have surplusage is not the be all and end all.”); see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 176–77 (“Put to a choice, however, a court may well prefer ordinary meaning to an unusual meaning that will avoid surplusage. So like аll other canons, this one must be applied with judgment and discretion, and with careful regard to context. It cannot always be dispositive because (as with most canons) the underlying proposition is not invariably true.”). The surplusage canon does not trump the legislature‘s language chosen in The plain meaning controls here. In our view, “antique firearms” are a subset of “firearms.” A Venn diagram containing a larger circle for firearms would include within it a smaller circle for antique firearms. Indeed, Rhodes‘s reading of the statute would write in a new exception to “[T]he legislature knew how to make its wishes known” if it wanted to exempt antique firearms from Finally, Rhodes argues that “when different terms contained within a criminal statute are ambiguous and the ambiguity cannot be resolved by application of the ordinary rules of interpretation and construction, then the statute must be interpreted with leniency—that is, narrowly—and in favor of the criminal defendant.” The rule of lenity does not help Rhodes. “We apply the rule of lenity in criminal cases, but we only do so as a last resort.” State v. Zacarias, 958 N.W.2d 573, 581 (Iowa 2021). “Firearm” is not ambiguous. See Harris, 137 P.3d at 128 (“[T]he term ‘firearm’ is not a word that requires us to suрply a new or different definition because it is not ambiguous.”). We have defined the term “firearm” consistently since the enactment of The district court correctly ruled that Rhodes violated For those reasons, we affirm the district court‘s judgment of conviction. AFFIRMED.
IV. Disposition.