STATE OF FLORIDA, Pеtitioner, vs. JOSE MAISONET-MALDONADO, Respondent.
No. SC19-1947
Supreme Court of Florida
December 10, 2020
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Maisonet-Maldonado v. State, 283 So. 3d 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), in which the Fifth District certified the following question of great public importance:
DOES THE “SINGLE HOMICIDE” RULE FOUND IN HOUSER V. STATE, 474 SO. 2D 1193 (FLA. 1985), PRECLUDE SEPARATE CONVICTIONS OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE AND FLEEING AND ELUDING CAUSING SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH THAT INVOLVE THE SAME VICTIM?
Maisonet-Maldonado, 283 So. 3d at 863. For the reasons explained below, we answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision of the Fifth District.1
I. BACKGROUND
In 2010, Jose Maisonet-Maldonado stabbed his girlfriend, Berlitz Alvelo, and ran оver her with a car, resulting in her death. After fleeing the scene, Maisonet-Maldonado was quickly pursued by law enforcement officers. He then led police on a dangerous, high-speed chase that ended when he crashed into another vehicle. The vehicle‘s driver, James Laconte, sustained serious injuries, while the vehicle‘s passengers, Amanda Taylor and Francesсa Jeffrey, were killed.
A jury convicted Maisonet-Maldonado of one count of first-degree murder with a weapon for the murder of Ms. Alvelo, three counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death, and two counts of vehicular homicide. Amanda Taylor and Francesca Jeffrey were each named as the victim for one count of fleeing and eluding causing serious bodily injury or death and one count of vehicular manslaughter. Maisonet-Maldonado‘s convictions were upheld by the Fifth District in 2014. Maisonet-Maldonado v. State, 149 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). In 2016, Maisonet-Maldonado filed a postconviction motion pursuant to
On appeal, the Fifth District concluded that Maisonet-Maldonado‘s convictions were prohibited under the single homicide rulе, which prohibits dual convictions for a single homicide under two different statutes. Relying on our decision in Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985), the Fifth District held that the single homicide rule “prohibits his convictions ... for vehicular homicide and fleeing and eluding causing serious injury or death that involve the same victim.” Maisonet-Maldonado, 283 So. 3d at 862. Accordingly, the Fifth District reversed the postconviction order and certified the question currently before us.
II. ANALYSIS
Because the statutory language of
A. Double Jeopardy Principles and the Single Homicide Rule
“As this Court has explained, both the United Statеs and Florida Constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses that ‘prohibit[] subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense.‘” State v. Shelley, 176 So. 3d 914, 917 (Fla. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009)). But “there is no constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishmеnts.” Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1070. “The prevailing standard ... is whether the Legislature ‘intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.‘” Id. (quoting Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 2001), receded from on other grounds by Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1077).
“[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)] ‘same-elements’ test pursuant to
(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposеs of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not,
without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial. (b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or trаnsaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are:
- Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
- Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.
- Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.
In Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (Fla. 1985), this Court held that convictions for DWI manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter were prohibited under double jeopardy principles, despite being separate offenses under a Blockburger analysis. Observing that the codified Blockburger test was only a “tool[] of statutory interpretation,” the Houser Court established what would come to be known as the single homicide rule, that dual convictions for offenses resulting from a single death were prohibited in Florida. Id. at 1196. The Court concluded that it should “resolve[ ] all doubts in favor of lenity” and follow the presumption that the Legislature did not intent to punish a single homicide under two different statutes. Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 170 (Fla. 1987) (describing Houser). This Court later reaffirmed the single homicide rule in Carawan, in which it held that dual punishments for attempted manslaughter and aggravated battery arising from a single act were similarly prohibited. Id. Embracing the rule of lenity in the context of double jeopardy, the Carawan Court found that “Florida‘s lenity requirement constitute[d] a rule of construction coequal to the Blockburger test codified in
The Legislature, however, disagreed with our decision in Carawan and, in 1988, enacted an amendment to
“A court‘s determination of the meaning of a statute begins with the language of the statute.” Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State, 278 So. 3d 545, 547 (Fla. 2019) (citing Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2018)). If the language of the statute is clear, “the statute is given its plain meaning, and the court does not ‘look behind the statute‘s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory сonstruction.‘” Id. (quoting City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171, 176 (Fla. 2008)). For the following reasons, we conclude that the plain meaning of
First, subsection (4)(a) expresses the intent of the Legislature that the text of the statutory offense, not the facts of the crime, are relevant for a double jeopardy analysis. See Gaber, 684 So. 2d at 190 (“Thus, we cannot examine facts from the reсord . . . . Rather our double-jeopardy analysis must look only to the statutory elements . . . .“). The subsection states that “[w]hoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense.”
Second, the Legislature clearly stated its intent to convict for all offenses that pass the Blockburger test and rejected the principle of lenity as it applies to double jeopardy analysis in the text of subsection (4)(b), undermining the reasoning of the Houser Court. Specifically, the amended language states that “[t]he intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentencе for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent.” This language conflicts with the Houser Court‘s conclusion that “Florida courts have repeatedly recognized that the legislature did not intend to punish a single homicide under two different statutes.” See Chapman, 625 So. 2d at 839-40 (quoting Houser, 474 So. 2d at 1197). Further, as we have explained, the Houser decision and resulting single homicide rule were rooted in principles of lenity. See Carawan, 515 So. 2d at 170 (“Finding no
Finally, subsection (4)(b) gives three exceptions to the Blockburger same-elements test, none of which recognizes the single homicide rule. The statute states that these exceptions “are” the exceptions to the same-elements test and does not use terms of expansion like “include” or “are not limited to,” so we can conclude from the text that this list is exhaustive. Cf. White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Servs. of Se. Fla., LLC, 226 So. 3d 774, 781 (Fla. 2017) (concluding that “includes” introduces a nonexhaustive list). Exceptions 1 and 3 give specific exclusions based on the elements of proof needed for an offense, which can vary depending on the type of homicide offense. Exception 2 provides for offenses that are degrees of one another and only prohibits dual convictions for a single death for offenses that are explicitly designated as degree variants or aggravated forms of one another. Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1075-76. None of these exceptions grants a general protection against multiple convictions for offenses arising from a single death, and because the list is exhaustive, we may not add an exception where the text does not provide for one.
After the 1988 amendment, the plain language of
A conclusion that a predecessor Court has erred, however, does not end our analysis. As we have explained, “[w]hen we are convinced that a precedent clearly conflicts with the law we are sworn to uphold, precedent normally must yield.... But once we have chosen to reassess a precedent and have come to the conclusion that it is clearly erroneous, the proper question becomes whether there is a valid reason why not to recede from that precedent.” State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020). “The critical consideration ordinarily will be reliance.” Id.
In evaluating reliance interests, courts consider “legitimate expectations of those who have reasonably relied on the precedent.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1415 (2020) (Kavаnaugh, J., concurring in part). “It is generally accepted that reliance interests are ‘at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights.‘” Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). “And reliance interests are lowest in cases . . . ‘involving procedural and evidentiary rules.‘” Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 828). “As the Supreme Court has observed, the role of stare decisis is reduced in the cases of procedural rules . . . that do not ‘serve аs a guide to lawful behavior.‘” Knight v. State, 286 So. 3d 147, 154 (Fla. 2019) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).
In this case, Maisonet-Maldonado and other defendants who might benefit from the single homicide rule have minimal reliance interests in the Chapman decision. Maisonet-Maldonado does not claim to have changed his behavior based on the existence of the single homicide rule, nor does it appear that he has changed any legal positions to his detriment in reliance
B. This Case
Proceeding to the facts at hand, we must address whether Maisonet-Maldonado‘s dual convictions for vehicular manslaughter and fleeing or eluding causing serious injury or death are prohibited under the same-elements test codified in
Maisonet-Maldonado contests his dual convictions for fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death under
(3) Any person who willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer in an authorized law enforcement patrol vehicle, with agency insignia and other jurisdictional markings prominently displayed on the vehicle, with siren and lights activated, and during the course of the fleeing or attempted eluding:
. . . .
(b) Drives at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, аnd causes serious bodily injury or death to another person, including any law enforcement officer involved in pursuing or otherwise attempting to effect a stop of the person‘s vehicle, commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall sentence any person convicted of committing the offense described in this paragraph to a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years imprisonment. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.
“Vehicular homicide” is the killing of a human being, or the killing of a viable fetus by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a rеckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.
(1) Vehicular homicide is:
(a) A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
“Under the plain meaning of
Maisonet-Maldonado‘s dual convictions are not prohibited by
Additionally, none of the three statutory exceptions in
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we recede from State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993), and hold that this Court‘s decision in Houser v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985), establishing the single homicide rule, was superseded by
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Certified Great Public Importance
Fifth District - Case No. 5D18-942
(Orange County)
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, and Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, Andrew Mich and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defenders, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent