STATE OF ARIZONA v. DANIEL LOUIS SANTILLANES
No. CR-23-0042-PR
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
January 23, 2024
COUNSEL:
Rachel Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Krista Wood (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Maricopa County Attorney‘s Office, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona
Derek Debus (argued), Craig Rosenstein, Kenneth Misajet, Rule 39(c) Certified Law Student, Stone Rose Law PLLC, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Daniel Louis Santillanes
Sarah L. Mayhew (argued), Tucson City Public Defender‘s Office, Tucson, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice; and Julie R. Gunnigle, Law Office of Julie Gunnigle, PLLC, Scottsdale, Attorney for Amicus Curiae National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
JUSTICE KING authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, and JUSTICES BOLICK, LOPEZ, BEENE, and PELANDER (RETIRED) joined.*
JUSTICE KING, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 In 2011, Daniel Santillanes pleaded guilty to one felony count of facilitation to commit sale or transportation of marijuana. Nine years later, Arizona voters adopted Proposition 207, known as the Smart and Safe Arizona Act (the “Act“). The Act authorizes a trial court to expunge an individual‘s
¶2 The sole issue before us is whether the State has the right to appeal the trial court‘s order granting Santillanes‘s request for expungement and restoration of his civil rights, or whether it may seek relief only through a petition for special action. We conclude that the State has the right to appeal this expungement order under
* Justice William G. Montgomery has recused himself from this case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Justice John Pelander (Ret.) of the Arizona Supreme Court was designated to sit in this matter.
BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2011, the State charged Santillanes with (1) possession of “four pounds or more” of marijuana for sale, a class 2 felony; (2) possession or use of “less than two pounds” of marijuana, a class 6 felony; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony; and (4) possession or use of narcotic drugs (cannabis), a class 4 felony. Santillanes pleaded guilty to an amended count one: facilitation to commit sale or transportation of marijuana, a class 6 designated felony (“2011 conviction“). As part of his guilty plea, the State dismissed counts two, three, and four. At a hearing, counsel for Santillanes stated the following factual basis for Santillanes‘s guilty plea: “On or about February 17, 2011, Santillanes did provide the means or opportunity to another to sell or transport marijuana.” The State indicated that it did not “have anything to add or correct.” The trial court accepted Santillanes‘s guilty plea and placed him on two years’ probation with a three-month jail term as a condition of probation. The court also ordered him to complete twenty-four hours of community service, participate in substance abuse counseling, and pay various fees and fines. Santillanes subsequently completed the term and conditions of probation.
¶4 The Act permits either an individual, or a “prosecuting agency... on behalf of any individual who was prosecuted by that prosecuting agency,” to petition the court to have the individual‘s records of certain marijuana-related offenses expunged.
¶5 In 2021, Santillanes filed a petition requesting that the court expunge “the record of arrest, charge, adjudication, conviction and sentence relating to [his 2011] conviction,” citing
¶6 The State objected to Santillanes‘s petition, arguing that the weight of the marijuana involved in his offense exceeded the 2.5-ounce limit set forth in
¶7 The trial court granted Santillanes‘s petition for expungement without a hearing. The court also restored Santillanes‘s civil rights, including his right to possess a firearm. The State appealed.
¶8 The court of appeals held that “the State does not have statutory authority to appeal an order granting expungement but may seek review via a special action.” State v. Santillanes, 254 Ariz. 301, 304 ¶ 1 (App. 2022). The court reasoned that
¶9 Nonetheless, the court of appeals exercised its discretion to review the State‘s appeal as a special action. Id. at 306-07 ¶¶ 20-21. The court determined that the trial court erred by (1) failing to hold a hearing on Santillanes‘s petition, and (2) not making adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law in the expungement order. Id. at 308-09 ¶¶ 30, 35. The court of appeals vacated the trial court‘s expungement order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 309 ¶ 36.
¶10 The State filed a petition for review on the sole issue of whether
DISCUSSION
¶11 “We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” State v. Jones, 246 Ariz. 452, 454 ¶ 5 (2019) (quoting Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 237 Ariz. 119, 122 ¶ 6 (2015)). Where the language of a statute passed by voter initiative “is clear and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and the inquiry ends.” Id.
A. Does A.R.S. § 36-2862(F) Preclude The State‘s Right To Appeal Under A.R.S. § 13-4032(4)?
¶12 The court of appeals’ jurisdiction is addressed in
¶13 However, Santillanes claims that
¶14 We cannot read
¶15 In the context of statutory construction, this Court has emphasized:
[R]epeal of statutes by implication is not favored in the law. In State ex rel. Larson v. Farley, we held that if it is reasonably practical, a statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes to the end that they may be harmonious and consistent; and, if statutes relate to the same subject and are thus in pari materia, they should be construed together with other related statutes as though they constituted one law. Unless a statute, from its language or effect, clearly requires the conclusion that the legislature must have intended it to supersede or impliedly repeal an earlier statute, courts will not presume such an intent. Also, when reconciling two
or more statutes, courts should construe and interpret them, whenever possible, in such a way so as to give effect to all the statutes involved.
Pima County ex rel. City of Tucson v. Maya Constr. Co., 158 Ariz. 151, 155 (1988) (internal citations omitted) (cleaned up). This is our role regardless of whether a statute was enacted by voter initiative (like
¶16 Santillanes‘s reading of
¶17 Section 36-2862(F) states: ”If the court denies a petition for expungement, the petitioner may file a direct appeal....” (Emphasis added.) The italicized prefatory language provides guidance to represented and self-represented petitioners alike—whether an individual or a prosecuting agency filing a petition under
¶18 Section 36-2862(F) adds something not previously available under Arizona law. Individuals who are arrested but never charged are not a “defendant” with an “order made after judgment” under
¶19 Further,
¶20 Santillanes argues that “where general statutes conflict with special statutes on the
¶21 Amici contend that
¶22 Therefore,
B. Does An Expungement Order Pertaining To Records Of A Felony Conviction Affect The Substantial Rights Of The State?
¶23 “Historically, appeals by the state in criminal matters have not been favored and are allowed only when that right is clearly provided by constitution or statute.” State ex rel. McDougall v. Gerber, 159 Ariz. 241, 242 (1988). Thus, “[i]n the absence of a constitutional provision or statute conferring the state‘s right to appeal, an appellate court has no subject matter jurisdiction to consider that appeal.” State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 280 (1990); see also State v. Moore, 48 Ariz. 16, 18 (1936) (“The right of appeal in criminal cases is not known to the common law and exists, if at all, by virtue of some constitutional or statutory provision.“).
¶24 Here, the parties agree that whether the State has the right to appeal turns on the meaning of
¶25 Arizona statutes and court opinions do not provide a precise definition of “substantial rights,” but courts have found several circumstances that implicate the substantial rights of the state. See State v. Lewis, 224 Ariz. 512, 513 ¶ 1, 514 ¶¶ 9-10 (App. 2010) (addressing termination of probation); State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 8-9 ¶¶ 1-2 (App. 2004) (addressing order releasing defendant from incarceration); State v. Corno, 179 Ariz. 151, 153 (App. 1994) (addressing denial of motion to withdraw from a plea agreement, and concluding a “‘substantial right’ is implicated because the state ordinarily may withdraw from a plea agreement when the trial court rejects a sentencing stipulation“).
¶26 This Court addressed the substantial rights of the state in McKelvey, a case in which the defendant was convicted, sentenced to imprisonment for nine months, and ordered to pay a $250 fine. 30 Ariz. at 265-66. Partially into his prison term,
¶27 Santillanes contends that his case differs from McKelvey because he completed the term and conditions of probation, and therefore the expungement order does not affect the “substantial rights of the state” under
¶28 The electorate substantially and directly involved the state throughout the Act‘s statutory expungement scheme codified in
¶29 In this context, it is significant that the electorate authorized the expungement of only certain marijuana offenses—those expressly specified in
direct involvement allows it to review and take legal measures to ensure that only those specified offenses are expunged. No reason appears why the electorate would grant the state a significant role in the expungement process, yet simultaneously create a process that implicitly eliminates the state‘s appeal rights.
¶30 But Santillanes claims that the substantial rights of the state are affected only if its procedural rights in the expungement process are denied. For example, if the state requested and was denied the right to introduce evidence in a proceeding, this denial would affect a substantial right of the state. But, according to Santillanes, after the state has been afforded its procedural rights, an order granting expungement does not affect the state‘s substantial rights. Therefore, in this case, Santillanes claims that the State at most has a substantial interest, but not a substantial right.
¶31 We conclude that Santillanes‘s expungement order does in fact affect a substantial right of the State. As the court of appeals explained in Wanna, “[t]he state has a substantial right to ensure that defendants face the legal consequences of their convictions.” 2023 WL 2318465, at *2 ¶ 8. In addressing Wanna‘s felony conviction, the court concluded that “the state has a substantial right to preserve the host of legal consequences
¶32 Indeed, Arizona law allows a prior felony conviction to be used for aggravation and enhancement of a sentence. See State v. Cota, 229 Ariz. 136, 152 ¶ 85 (2012) (“Use of a prior felony conviction for aggravation and enhancement is expressly authorized by
¶33 Under the Act, however, an expunged conviction “may not be used in a subsequent prosecution by a prosecuting agency or court for any purpose.”
¶34 Santillanes maintains that McKelvey‘s vitality diminished after this Court developed the
¶35 Moreover, Arizona law deprives a convicted felon of certain civil rights, including the right to possess a firearm. See
¶36 Our opinion does not thwart the purpose of the Act, as amici claim, because records ordered expunged will become unsealed only after an appellate court determines that those records are statutorily ineligible for expungement in the first place. Moreover, we do not permit the state “to appeal every granted expungement,” a concern that amici raised. As discussed, appeals from orders expunging records of a felony conviction are always appealable by the state because they affect the substantial rights of the state under
¶37 For these reasons, we hold that an order that expunges records pertaining to a felony conviction is “[a]n order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the state” under
¶38 Our holding today applies only to the right to appeal an expungement order pertaining to records of a felony conviction under
CONCLUSION
¶39 We vacate paragraphs 1 and 7-21 of the court of appeals’ opinion. Because the court of appeals decided additional legal issues that were not raised to this Court, we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the remainder of the court of appeals’ opinion.