OPINION
¶ 1 The State of Arizona appeals the trial court’s order releasing Mark W. Cowles from
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In July of 2002, Cowles, an inmate at the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, brought the underlying habeas corpus proceeding in the Navajo County Superior Court questioning ADOC’s calculation of his community supervision period. 1 The issue before the trial court was whether he had served his community supervision period on an earlier conviction while incarcеrated on a subsequent conviction. After determining that there was no controlling statutory authority, the trial court concluded that the community supervision period on the earlier conviction expired during Cowles’ incarceration on the subsequent conviction and ordered Cowles’ release from incarceration. Claiming error, the State appеals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003) and 13-4032(4) (2001).
DISCUSSION
¶ 3 The decision whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb the trial court’s decision unless we see an abuse of that discretion.
Long v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Parole,
¶4 Cowles was sentenced in Mаricopa County Superior Court to three and one-half years imprisonment for a class 3 felony on May 20, 1996.
2
He was also ordered to “serve one day for every seven days оf the sentence imposed under the supervision of the Community Supervision Program, to be served consecutively to the actual period of imprisonment.”
See
A.R.S. § 13-603(I) (Supp.2003).
3
According to the ADOC cаlculations, the community supervision term was six months. A.R.S. § 13 — 603(J);
State v. Razo,
¶ 5 While incarcerated, Cowles was indicted for promoting prison contraband. Under a plea agreement, he pled guilty to a lesser-included offense, a class 3 felony, and was sentenced in Navajо County Superior Court to two and one-half years imprisonment. The sentence was consecutive to the Marico-pa County sentences. He was also ordered to serve four months of community supervision “immediately consecutive to the prison term.”
¶ 6 On March 14, 2001, ninety days before the expiration of his Navajo County prison sentence, Cowles was placed on early release to begin his community supervision.
See
A.R.S. § 31-233(B) (2002) (“[T]he director [of ADOC] may also authorize ... temporary release of any inmate ... for purposes preparatory to a return to the community within ninety days of the inmate’s release date[.]”). The next day, March 15, 2001, Cowles absconded from supervision. On January 16, 2002, he was arrested in Oregon. The Board of Executive Clemency revoked his community supervision on April 8, 2002. On October 11, 2002, while the petition for habeas corpus was pending, the trial court released Cowles on an unsecured bоnd. Eighteen days later, the trial court, in its decision and order,
¶ 7 On appeal, the State argues that the trial court by granting habeas corpus relief “in essence eliminated the community-supervision term from the [Maricopa] sentence[.]” The State maintains that the trial court’s decision was contrary to law. In turn, the State contends that “Cowles must be returned to ADOC’s custody to serve the remainder of his community supervision tеrm.”
¶ 8 “Community supervision” is defined in A.R.S. § 13-105(4) (2001) to mean “that portion of a felony sentence imposed by the court pursuant to § 13-603, subsection I and served in the community after completing a periоd of imprisonment or served in prison in accordance with § 41-1604.07.” Section 13-603(1), in relevant part, provides:
If a person is convicted of a felony offense and the court sentenсes the person to a term of imprisonment, the court at the time of sentencing shall impose on the convicted person a term of community supervision. The term of community supervision shall be served consecutively to the actual period of imprisonment if the person signs and agrees to abide by conditions of supervision established by the state department of corrections.
And under section 41-1604.07(F) (Supp.2003), the term of community supervision is served in prison only “[i]f the prisoner refuses to sign and agree to abide by the conditions of release[.]”
¶ 9 Community supervision is not equivalent to imprisonment.
State v. Uriarte,
¶ 10 In this matter, Cowles did nоt refuse to sign and abide by the release conditions and was released on March 14, 2001. At the time of his release, the term of community supervision totaled ten months, plus the ninety days of еarly release time. See A.R.S. § 31-233(C) (providing that the early release time must be added to the inmate’s term of community supervision). He served one day of community supervision and absconded thе following day, March 15, 2001. During his absconder status, the term of community supervision was tolled. See A.R.S. § 41-1604.07(H) (“If a prisoner absconds from community supervision, any time spent before the prisoner is returned to сustody is excluded in calculating the remaining period of community supervision.”).
¶ 11 Following his arrest on January 16, 2002, the Board of .Executive Clemency revoked the community supervision and returnеd Cowles to custody for the remaining term of his community supervision. See A.R.S. § 31-402(C)(5)(a) (2002). He should have remained incarcerated until February 13, 2003. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erroneously found that Cowles had completed his sentences prior to his release on October 11, 2002. To the contrary, he had 153 days remaining on his term.
¶ 12 In its decision and order, the trial court fоund A.R.S. §§ 13-603(K) and 13-709 inapplicable and determined that there was no statutory law indicating when the community supervision sentence in the Maricopa County conviction began. We agreе with the trial court to a limited extent. We agree that §§ 13-603(K) and 13-709 are not controlling. Section 13-603(K) concerns probation and Cowles was not placed on probation. Section 13-709 (2001) deals with the calculation of terms of imprisonment, and “community supervision is not equivalent to imprisonment.”
Uriarte,
¶ 13 The controlling provisions are A.R.S. §§ 13-105(4), 13-603(I) and 41-1604.07(F). The plain language of A.R.S. § 13-105(4), read in cоnjunction with the related statutes, indicates that Cowles’ community supervision term for the Maricopa County conviction could not have been served while he was incarcerаted for the Navajo County conviction. Instead, the community supervision
¶ 14 We also reject the court’s alternative basis which relied on A.R.S. § 13-708 (2001).
4
Namely, the court held that “if the law were to permit the community supervision sentence in the Maricopa County case to be delayed until the defendant completed his prison sentence in the Navajo County case, the community supervision periods on the two (2) sentences would have been served consecutively because the Court did not ‘direct otherwise’.” This holding fails to recognize that “community supervision is part of the sentence imposed.” Ariz. R.Crim. P. 26.1(b) (“The term sentence means the pronouncement by the court of the penalty imposed upon the defendant аfter a judgment of guilty.”);
State v. Jenkins,
CONCLUSION
¶ 15 For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the writ and release order issued by the trial court. The mattеr is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. He wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Navajo County Superior Court alleging that the timе remaining on his sentence was incorrectly calculated. The letter was designated as a petition for habeas corpus.
. He also received other concurrеnt sentences. However, this was the longest sentence imposed.
. Since Cowles’ conviction in Maricopa County, section 13-603 has been amended. See 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 56, § 1; 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 334, § 6. We refer to the current version because the amendments did not substantially change the portions relevant to this opinion.
. Section 13-708, in part, provides that "when a person who is subjeсt to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run consecutively unless the court expressly directs otherwise!.]”