THE STATE EX REL. SCHREINER v. ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL.
No. 2024-0052
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
January 29, 2024
174 Ohio St.3d 555 | 2024-Ohio-290
Submitted January 24, 2024
[Cite as State ex rel. Schreiner v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-290.]
Elections—Prohibition—
IN PROHIBITION.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Dennis Schreiner, seeks a writ of prohibition against respondents, the Erie County Board оf Elections and its members, Thomas Ferrell, Maryann Groot, Lisa Crescimano, and Nancy McKeen. Schreiner seeks a writ ordering the board of elections to remove Steven Kraus, a candidate for the Ohio House of Representatives, from the March 2024 primаry-election ballot. Because Schreiner has not shown that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over the property of a
I. FACTUAL, PROCEDURAL, AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Kraus is a Republican candidate in the March 2024 primary election fоr the office of state representative for the 89th Ohio House District. In 2015, Kraus was convicted in the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas of theft from an elderly person in violation of
{¶ 3} On or about December 19, 2023, Kraus filed his declaration of candidacy with the boаrd of elections to run for state representative. As part of his declaration, Kraus declared, “[I]f elected to said office or position, I will qualify therefor.” See
{¶ 4} The board of electiоns held a hearing on the protest on January 5, 2024. At the hearing, Kraus stipulated that he had been convicted of a disqualifying offense for purposes of
{¶ 5} On January 10, Schreiner filed this verified petition for a writ of prohibition. He seeks a writ ordering the board of elections to remove Kraus from the ballot in the March 2024 primary election. Kraus filed a motion to intervene as a respоndent, which we granted. 172 Ohio St.3d 1449, 2024-Ohio-156, 225 N.E.3d 999.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal standards
{¶ 6} Prohibition is an appropriate remedy to challenge a board of elections’ decision to place a candidate on the ballot. State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 153 Ohio St.3d 313, 2018-Ohio-1660, 106 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 13. To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Schreiner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was unlawful, and (3) he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Federle v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 156 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-849, 126 N.E.3d 1091, ¶ 10. “A board of elections exercises quasi-judicial authority when it decides a protest after a mandatory hearing that includes sworn testimony.” State ex rel. Moscow v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 169 Ohio St.3d 161, 2022-Ohio-3138, 202 N.E.3d 684, ¶ 15. Here, the board of elections was required to and did hold a hearing on Schreiner‘s protest, see
{¶ 7} The remaining question is whether the board of elections acted unlawfully when it denied Schreiner‘s protest. A board of elections’ exercise of
B. R.C. 2961.02: The disqualification statute
{¶ 8} The core issues in this case involve the interpretation of
{¶ 9}
(B) Any person who pleads guilty to a disqualifying offense and whose plea is accepted by the court or any person against whom a verdict or finding of guilt for committing a disqualifying offense is returned is incompetent to hold a public office or position of public employment or to serve as a volunteer, if holding the public office or position of public employment or serving as the volunteer involves substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or рrivate entity.
(C) Division (B) of this section does not apply if a plea, verdict, or finding of the type described in that division regarding a disqualifying offense is reversed, expunged, or annulled. The full pardon of a person who has pleaded guilty to a disqualifying offense and whose рlea was accepted by the court or a person against whom a verdict or finding of guilt for committing a disqualifying offense
was returned restores the privileges forfeited under division (B) of this section, but the pardon does not release the person from the costs of the person‘s conviction in this state, unless so specified.
Thus, in accordance with the disqualification statute, a person is incompetent to hold a public office if (1) the person was convicted of a disqualifying offense, (2) the public office “involvеs substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity,” and (3) the person‘s conviction has not been expunged, reversed, annulled, or pardoned.
{¶ 10} Here, the parties agree that Krаus‘s 2015 felony-theft conviction for violating
C. Substantial management or control
{¶ 11} Kraus argues that the disqualification statute does not disqualify him from serving as a state representative, because the position does not “involv[e] substantial management or control over the property of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity” as required by
{¶ 12} The disqualification statute does not define the phrase “substantial management or control,” nor has any case decided what the phrase means. Thus, the ordinary definition of the terms the General Assembly used at the time of enactment should be used to guide our determination of legislative intent. Rockies Express Pipeline, L.L.C. v. McClain, 159 Ohio St.3d 302, 2020-Ohio-410, 150 N.E.3d 895, ¶ 12. A contemporary edition of Webster‘s New World College Dictionary (4th Ed.1999) defined “substantial” as “considerable; ample; large,” id. at 1428, “manage” as “to have charge of; direct; administer,” id. at 871, and “control” as “to exercise authority over; direct; command,” id. at 317. Similarly, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th Ed.2000) defined “substantiаl” as “[c]onsiderable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent,” id. at 1727, “manage” as “[t]o direct the affairs or interests of,” id. at 1061, and “control” as “[a]uthority or ability to manage or direct,” id. at 400.
{¶ 13} Applying these terms, we determined that a state representative has no direct management or control over the property of any state agency, political subdivision, or private entity. Rather, the directors of a state agency, political subdivision, or private entity manage and control the proрerty. See, e.g.,
{¶ 14} Schreiner argues that the General Assembly manages and controls state agencies through thе budgeting process and general legislative oversight of state agencies. But such oversight is not the equivalent of directing or administering a state agency in the usual sense. And even if such oversight is considered substantial management or control, the General Assembly acts as a whole in exercising such authority, and each state representative is only 1 of 99 members of one chamber of the assembly. Schreiner has not established that acting alone, a single state representative exercises substantial management or control over a state agency‘s property.
{¶ 15} Schreiner also argues that the disqualification statute applies here because a state representative has control over office space and must manage legislative assistants. The General Assembly is not explicitly included in the disqualification statute‘s definition of a state agency. See
{¶ 16} In addition to the plain language of
{¶ 17} Because Schreiner has not shown that the office of state representative involves substantial management or control over the property of а
{¶ 18} Because we deny the writ on this ground, we need not address whether a sealed conviction is the equivalent of an expunged conviction for purposes of the disqualification statute. We also do not need to address Kraus‘s constitutional arguments.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 19} The board of elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable law when it denied Schreiner‘s protest and kept Kraus on the March 2024 primary-election ballot. We therefore deny Schreiner‘s petition for a writ of prohibition.
Writ denied.
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in judgment only.
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., and Taylor M. Thompson, for relator.
Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Gerhard R. Gross and Jason R. Hinners, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for respondents.
Mayle, L.L.C., Andrew R. Mayle, Benjamin G. Padanilam, and Nichole Kanios Papageorgiou, for intervening respondent.