THE STATE EX REL. NEIL, APPELLANT, v. FRENCH, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
No. 2017-1221
Supreme Court of Ohio
July 11, 2018
2018-Ohio-2692
Submitted January 23, 2018
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Neil v. French, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2692.]
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2692
THE STATE EX REL. NEIL, APPELLANT, v. FRENCH, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Neil v. French, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2692.]
Procedendo—
(No. 2017-1221—Submitted January 23, 2018—Decided July 11, 2018.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 17AP-241.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Miguel Neil, appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of procedendo against appellee, Franklin County Common Pleas Court Judge Jenifer French. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Background
{¶
{¶ 3} Neil filed an affidavit of indigency with his complaint and requested that the court waive its filing fee. In the affidavit, he attested thаt he is incarcerated, that he nets only $13.50 a month for his job assignment, and that he has no assets or property.
{¶ 4} The court of appeals referred the case to a magistrate. On April 27, 2017, the magistrate recommended that the court of аppeals dismiss the complaint sua sponte because Russell had failed to comply with the requirements of
{¶ 5} Neil did not object to the magistrate‘s recommendation. After a review of the record, the court of appeals adopted the recommendation and dismissed the comрlaint. Neil appealed.
Analysis
{¶ 6} In his merit brief, Neil changes the theory of the merits of his request for a writ of procedendo. He now asserts that “on October 31, 2016, the trial court rendered a decision but [Neil] was never served notice of the judgment entry, preventing him from appealing to a superior court.” Neil‘s admission that the trial court did in fact issue a judgment entry is a concession that his procedendo complaint is moot. State ex rel. Poulton v. Cottrill, 147 Ohio St.3d 402, 2016-Ohio-5789, 66 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 1-2 (holding that “[p]rocedendo will not compel the performаnce of a duty that has already been performed” and that in such circumstances, the complaint is moot). Instead, Neil implies that he is seeking relief because the court‘s failure to serve the judgment properly cost him his opportunity tо appeal. But Judge French agrees that he was not properly served with a decision and that Neil therefore “can prоceed with an appeal of the trial court‘s ruling.”
{¶ 7} However, “[t]he requirements of
{¶ 8} Neil argues that “[i]t is unсonstitutional to deny one party judgment due to a single technicality.” (Emphasis sic.) He cites no authority for this proposition and has therefore “failed to rebut the presumed constitutionality of the statute.” State ex rel. Evans v. McGrath, 151 Ohio St.3d 345, 2017-Ohio-8290, 88 N.E.3d 957, ¶ 6 (rejecting constitutional challenge to
{¶ 9} Finally, in his second proposition of law, Nеil attempts to craft a constitutional argument based on what he argues is inconsistent treatment of pro se suits by the variоus courts of appeals. According to Neil,
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
some [Ohio courts] hold that pro se litigants should be held to the same standards as lawyers, while others hold that they should not be held to the same standards as lawyers and give greater latitude towards errors in pro se litigant‘s pleadings.
(Italics sic.) He asks this court to adоpt a blanket rule of substantial compliance to excuse errors and omissions in pro se pleadings.
{¶ 10} We have rеpeatedly declared that “pro se litigants * * * must follow the same procedures as litigants represented by counsel.” State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 123 Ohio St.3d 96, 2009-Ohio-4150, 914 N.E.2d 376, ¶ 5. “‘It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and thаt they are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.‘” (Italics sic.) State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448, 800 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv., 145 Ohio St.3d 651, 654, 763 N.E.2d 1238 (2001).
{¶ 11} Neil is correct that thе state‘s appellate courts sometimes express a willingness to deviate from this principle. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Holzer Med. Ctr., 4th Dist. Gallia No. 16CA20, 2017-Ohio-8244, ¶ 7 (“Becаuse we ordinarily prefer to review a case on its merits rather than dismiss the action due to procedural technicalities, we generally afford considerable lenience to pro se litigants“); Johnson v. Geico Homesite, Inc., 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-17-003, 2017-Ohio-7273, ¶ 9 (a “court may afford a pro se litigant some leeway by generously
{¶ 12} The court of appeals properly dismissed Neil‘s complaint for failure to attach the statement of inmate account required by
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
DEGENARO, J., not participating.
Miguel E. Neil, pro se.
Ron O‘Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Benjamin D. Humphrey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.