State ex rel. Moore v. FornshellState ex rel. Moore v. Fornshell
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman, and Curt C. Hartman, for appellant.
Adam M. Nice, for appellees.
BYRNE, J.
{¶ 1} Dale Moore appeals the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents in Moore‘s taxpayer lawsuit. For the reasons described below, we affirm the common pleas court‘s decision.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} This case turns on the meaning of language in a statute. The statute,
On or before the first Monday in January of each year, the judge of the court of common pleas or, if there is more than one judge, the judges of the court of common pleas in joint session may fix an aggregate sum to be expended for the incoming year for the compensation of assistants, clerks, and stenographers of the prosecuting attorney‘s office.
The prosecuting attorney may appoint any assistants, clerks, and stenographers who are necessary for the proper performance of the duties of his office and fix their compensation, not to exceed, in the aggregate, the amount fixed by the judges of the court of common pleas. The compensation, after being so fixed, shall be paid to the assistants, clerks, and stenographers biweekly from the general fund of the county treasury, upon the warrant of the county auditor.
{¶ 3} In sum,
{¶ 4} In June 2022, Moore filed a taxpayer lawsuit pursuant to
During the calendar year 2022 to the date of the filing of this action, the Warren County Prosecutor employed and compensated a number of assistants and clerks. For this same calendar year, the Warren County Prosecutor‘s Office, along with other county departments and elected officials, submitted proposed budgets for 2022 the year prior. On May 21, 2021, and again on September 21, 2021, the Warren County Prosecutor submitted an estimated 2022 budget to the Warren County Commissioners which included the funds necessary to compensate assistants, clerks, and stenographers.
The Warren County Commissioners approved the 2022 Tax Budget for all county offices including the prosecutor‘s office on July 20, 2021. On August 27, 2021, the Warren County Auditor prepared the 2022 Official Certification of Estimated Resources. Once the estimated resources and tax revenues were obtained, the commissioners requested all county departments to submit revised budgets limiting their expenses to a 3% increase from the prior year.
On December 14, 2021, the Warren County Commissioners adopted the Annual Appropriation Measure Resolution. On January 1, 2022, the Warren County Auditor certified the total amount of appropriated funds available for fiscal year 2022.
At no point in the process of budgeting, appropriating, or certifying the availability of funds for compensation of the Warren County Prosecutor‘s Office assistants, clerks, and stenographers for either 2022 or 2023 did the judges of the Warren County Common Pleas Court fix an aggregate sum to be expended for the compensation of the assistants, et al. of the Warren County Prosecutor‘s Office. This exact same process was used for fiscal year 2022 and 2023.
* * *
The parties submit the facts are not in dispute and agree there remains no genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, this case involves a question of law, namely to what extent R.C. 309.06 imposes certain requirements on common pleas judges to approve compensation of the assistants, clerks, and stenographers of a prosecutor‘s office.
(We removed references by the common pleas court to the summary judgment record and inserted paragraph breaks for readability purposes.)
{¶ 6} In addressing the legal issues presented in the competing motions for summary judgment, the common pleas court noted that the plain language of {¶ 7} The common pleas court further noted that the respondents lawfully complied with the requirements set forth in {¶ 8} Accordingly, the common pleas court granted the respondents’ motion for summary judgment, denied Moore‘s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed all of Moore‘s various claims for relief. Moore appealed and raised one assignment of error. {¶ 9} Moore‘s assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE DECISION AND ENTRY GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (T.D.56) WHEREIN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR [OF] RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES AND DENIED PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR [OF] RELATOR-APPELLANT. {¶ 10} Moore argues that the common pleas court erred in its interpretation of {¶ 11} “Summary judgment is appropriate under {¶ {¶ 13} This court reviews a trial court‘s summary judgment decision under a de novo standard. Id. at ¶ 16, citing Sexton at ¶ 7. {¶ 14} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that a court‘s “duty in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted.” Pelletier v. Campbell, 2018-Ohio-2121, ¶ 14. Rather than reading the tea leaves of legislative history in an effort to divine legislative intent, the intention of the legislature is to be determined from the words used in the statute. See Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., 2024-Ohio-1625, ¶ 13. “Therefore, ‘[t]he question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Id., quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. In other words, in construing the words of a statute we are to determine the original public meaning of the actual words the General Assembly enacted and apply that meaning. Pelletier at ¶ 14; Caldwell at ¶ 13. {¶ 15} If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary. State ex rel. Burrows. v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 1997-Ohio-310. “Unambiguous statutes are to be applied according to the plain meaning of the words used . . . and courts are not free to delete or insert other words.” Id. {¶ 16} In reviewing statutory text, we first read words and phrases in context and construe them according to rules of grammar and common usage. State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 2004-Ohio-4960, ¶ 21. We give words their plain, ordinary meaning—unless the legislature has clearly expressed a contrary intention. In re Application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-2406, ¶ 19. {¶ 17} Upon a de novo review and a plain reading of all the language of {¶ 18} As a reminder, the first paragraph of On or before the first Monday in January of each year, the judge of the court of common pleas or, if there is more than one judge, the judges of the court of common pleas in joint session may fix an aggregate sum to be expended for the incoming year for the compensation of assistants, clerks, and stenographers of the prosecuting attorney‘s office. {¶ 19} With respect to the first paragraph, by using the phrase “may fix,” {¶ 20} Moore agrees with the proposition that the judges’ power to fix the aggregate sum is discretionary. Moore states in his appellant‘s brief, “the judges are not obligated to fix any amount, let alone any specific amount - and that is the discretionary nature [of] the right granted to the judges in {¶ 21} Having conceded that the judges’ power under the first paragraph of {¶ 22} Again, as a reminder, the second paragraph of The prosecuting attorney may appoint any assistants, clerks, and stenographers who are necessary for the proper performance of the duties of his office and fix their compensation, not to exceed, in the aggregate, the amount fixed by the judges of the court of common pleas. The compensation, after being so fixed, shall be paid to the assistants, clerks, and stenographers biweekly from the general fund of the county treasury, upon the warrant of the county auditor. {¶ 23} Moore focuses on the language “the prosecuting attorney may . . . fix their compensation, not to exceed, in the aggregate, the amount fixed by the judges of the court of common pleas.” Effectively, he argues, this language means that the right of the prosecutor to fix any amount of compensation for his assistants is dependent upon the judges exercising their discretion and fixing an aggregate sum, whether it be $1 or $10,000,000. In other words, Moore believes that the statute operates such that if the judges fail to exercise their discretion and do not fix any aggregate amount, then the judges have effectively fixed an aggregate amount of zero dollars and the Board may not appropriate any amount to the prosecutor for the compensation of the prosecutor‘s assistants. {¶ 24} But the statute does not say this. We disagree with Moore‘s interpretation {¶ 25} The only scenario where the prosecutor is precluded from compensating his assistants under {¶ 26} Moore argues that this interpretation ignores the phase “not to exceed, in the aggregate, the amount fixed by the judges of the court of common pleas.” But this interpretation does not ignore those words. Instead, that part of the statute is simply inapplicable when the judges do not exercise their discretion, as they are permitted to do under the statute. Our interpretation of the statute—which is simply a reading of the plain text of the statute—does not render any provision of the statute meaningless, inoperative, or superfluous. {¶ 27} Moore also argues that two Ohio Attorney General opinions, one issued in 1912 and one issued in 1933, support his interpretation of {¶ 28} In the 1912 opinion, a county prosecuting attorney had requested the attorney general‘s opinion on whether he could hire assistants to help with collecting various fees. In opining that the prosecutor could hire such assistants, the attorney general pointed to You will note that the judge of the court of common pleas of your county, on or before the first Monday in January in each year, should fix an aggregate sum to be expended for the incoming year for the compensation of assistants, clerks and stenographers of the prosecuting attorney‘s office. After the amount is fixed by the common pleas judge, then, under authority of Section 2915 of the General Code, you have the right to appoint such assistants, clerks and stenographers as you deem necessary for the proper performance of the duties of your office; and under authority of said section you have the right to fix their compensation. But the amount paid to your assistants, clerks and stenographers shall not exceed, in any one year, 1912 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 503. {¶ 29} There are two reasons the 1912 opinion does not provide persuasive support for Moore‘s argument. First, the 1912 opinion, in summarizing the former {¶ 30} Next, Moore cites an Attorney General Opinion issued in 1933. But this second opinion merely reiterated that the judges have the right to fix the aggregate sum of compensation for the prosecutor‘s assistants, stating: It is clearly the intention of sections 2914 and 2915 that the judges of the Court of Common Pleas shall have the right to fix the maximum amount which may be expended for [the hiring of the prosecutor‘s assistants]. 1933 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 1175. The 1933 opinion does not support Moore‘s argument. Instead, it supports the common pleas court‘s interpretation of {¶ 31} For these reasons, we find Moore‘s interpretation of the text of {¶ 32} Moore also points to two canons of statutory construction, and argues that these canons support his interpretation of {¶ 33} Finally, Moore cites case law providing that “[i]n case of doubt as to the right of any [public body] to expend public moneys under a legislative grant, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the public and against the grant of power.” State ex rel. A. Bentley & Sons Co. v. Pierce, 96 Ohio St. 44 (1917), paragraph three of the syllabus. We need not apply this principle because, for the reasons described above, the plain text of {¶ 34} Moore makes another argument we must consider, separate from his arguments concerning the text of The officers mentioned in section 325.27 of the Revised Code may appoint and employ the necessary deputies, assistants, clerks, bookkeepers, or other employees for their respective offices, shall fix the compensation of those employees and discharge them, and shall file certificates of that action with the county auditor. The employees’ compensation shall not exceed, in the aggregate, for each office, the amount fixed by the board of county commissioners for that office. When so fixed, the compensation of each such deputy, assistant, bookkeeper, clerk, and other employee shall be paid biweekly from the county treasury, upon the warrant of the county auditor. The amount of the biweekly payment shall be adjusted so that the total amount paid out to an employee over a period of one year is equal to the amount the employee would receive if the employee were paid semimonthly. {¶ 35} Moore notes that compels the conclusion that the board of county commissioners do not possess that power vis-a-vis the county prosecutor‘s office through the budgetary or appropriation process, or otherwise; instead, the explicit statutory power and authority to fix the aggregate compensation for the prosecutor‘s office is vested in the common pleas court judges. {¶ 36} Again, we disagree. There is nothing in either {¶ 37} The fact that {¶ 38} In any event, {¶ 39} Moore has not challenged and in fact stipulated in the summary judgment proceedings that the respondents properly followed the procedures set forth in {¶ 40} For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Moore‘s claims. We overrule Moore‘s sole assignment of error. {¶ 41} Judgment affirmed. S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.II. Law and Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard and Standard of Review
B. Statutory Interpretation
C. Analysis of
D. The Board of Commissioners’ Authority to Appropriate Funds to the Prosecutor‘s Assistants
Notes
(Emphasis added.)the prosecuting attorney may appoint secret service officers whose duty it shall be to aid him in the collection and discovery of evidence to be used in the trial of criminal cases and matters of a criminal nature . . . . The compensation of said officers shall be fixed by the judge of the court of common pleas, or, if there is more than one judge, such compensation shall be fixed by the judges of such court in joint session, and shall not be less than one hundred twenty-five dollars per month for the time actually occupied in such service nor more than seventy-five per cent of the salary of the prosecuting attorney for a year.