BROOKWOOD PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE.
No. 2009-1926
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted June 9, 2010-Decided November 30, 2010.
127 Ohio St.3d 469, 2010-Ohio-5710
PFEIFER, J.
{11} The issue before us is whether a determination by the Ohio Department of Education pursuant to
Factual and Procedural Background
{12} In November 2007, appellant, Brookwood Presbyterian Church (“Brookwood“), submitted an application to appellee, Ohio Department of Education (“ODE“), to sponsor community schools in Ohio. Brookwood sought approval as a sponsor pursuant to
{13} Pursuant to
{14} Brookwood appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. On September 8, 2009, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court. The court of appeals held that although
{15} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal.
Law and Analysis
{16}
{17} Pursuant to
{18} ODE found that Brookwood is not an education-oriented entity as required under
{19} The crux of this case is the interplay between
{110}
{111} Whether
{112}
{113} Had the General Assembly intended that the department‘s determination of whether an entity is education-oriented not be subject to administrative appeal, it could have done so by appropriate language, i.e., by specifying that the department‘s decision is final and not subject to appeal. See Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 125 Ohio St.3d 358, 2010-Ohio-1926, 928 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 9 (General Assembly would have used specific language if it had intended
{114} Appellee points to appellate court decisions holding that a statute‘s characterization of an administrative body‘s holding as final precludes review through an
{115} The cases cited by ODE are inapposite. In those cases, the statutes lacked what is present in this case-a specific, statutory grant of jurisdiction to the trial court to review the decisions of the administrative body pursuant to
{116} Why did the General Assembly term the ODE‘s determination of whether an entity is education-oriented “final“? Ours is not to question why. But of the four requirements set forth in
{117} The ODE asserts that there is a two-tiered process for approving community-school sponsors, a preliminary judgment of eligibility followed by an application review. The ODE argues that the application process is open only to an “eligible entity” and that its
{118} “The decision of the department to disapprove an entity for sponsorship of a community school may be appealed by the entity in accordance with section 119.12 of the Revised Code.”
{119} Thus, even if the ODE employs a two-tiered approval process for community-school sponsorship, the right to appeal applies to an entity disapproved at either tier.
{120} The determination of whether an entity is education-oriented is substantive and important.
{121} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
BROWN, C.J., and CUPP, J., dissent.
BROWN, C.J., dissenting.
{122} At the heart of this matter is the meaning of the word “final” in
{123} The primary assumption for the majority‘s interpretation is that the General Assembly used the word “final” as a legal term of art to mean a judgment or order that is subject to appellate review. The majority further assumes that the General Assembly would have stated explicitly that determinations of education-oriented status are “final and not subject to appeal” if it had intended there to be no appeal right under
{124} The majority‘s assumptions are not borne out by other provisions of the Revised Code. If the General Assembly so clearly intended the use of “final” in
{25} And what is this court to make of the host of other instances in which the General Assembly has simply provided that a decision of an administrative agency or other individual or entity is “final“? See
{26} The lesson gained from a review of the varying uses of the word “final” throughout the Revised Code is that the word is susceptible of more than one meaning. Where statutory language is susceptible of more than one meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation must be applied to determine the true intent of the legislature. Wingate v. Hordge (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 14 O.O.3d 212, 396 N.E.2d 770. A guiding principle of statutory interpretation is that the statute must be construed as a whole and each of its parts must be given effect so that they are compatible with each other and related enactments. Humphrys v. Winous Co. (1956), 165 Ohio St. 45, 49, 59 O.O. 65, 133 N.E.2d 780.
{27} By interpreting the statutory scheme as establishing a two-stage process for the review of applications to sponsor community schools,
{128} Once there has been a preliminary determination that an entity is an eligible entity, ODE must review the application in light of its rules regarding the criteria, procedures, and deadlines for processing applications to become a sponsor of a community school.
{129} Most of the determinations regarding eligibility under
{130} A finding that an entity is education-oriented admittedly is different from most of the other preliminary eligibility requirements.1 It contains a subjective component and requires exercise of discretion by ODE. But this determination is no more on the merits of the application than any other determination made by ODE under
{131} Viewing the ODE‘s review of a community-school sponsorship application under
{132} The majority‘s interpretation renders superfluous the language in
{133} The majority claims that it is not our place to question why the General Assembly chose to treat determinations of education-oriented status differently from all other ODE decisions under
{134}
{135} Additionally, the majority‘s rejection of the two-stage application process yields strange results. The majority concludes that a decision finding that an entity is not an entity specified in
{136} Based on the language of
CUPP, J., dissenting.
{137} A plain and fair reading of the statute in question, I believe, is that the decision of the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE“) regarding whether the applicant, Brookwood Presbyterian Church (“Brookwood“), is an education-oriented entity is final, in the plain and ordinary sense of the word “final,” as that word is used in
{138} My conclusion is not based upon any public-policy considerations, which are not within the province of the courts when the intent of the legislature is clear. It is not for us to decide whether the General Assembly has made a wise policy choice or an undesirable policy choice in entrusting this determination to ODE.
{139} I generally agree with most of Chief Justice Brown‘s analysis, but I would note also that appellant Brookwood, while not granted a statutory right of
{140} In fact, appellant has filed an action in mandamus with this court to challenge ODE‘s decision. The mandamus action has been stayed pending the resolution of this case. Case No. 2009-2055, State ex rel. Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., motion for stay granted, 124 Ohio St.3d 1479, 2010-Ohio-430, 921 N.E.2d 249. Appellant alleges in the complaint in that case that it has operated an educational program since 2002 to provide services to special-needs students who are not adequately served in traditional education programs and that students are referred to appellant‘s program by area schools, public community schools, juvenile court personnel, counseling services, and parents. Based on these allegations, appellant‘s mandamus action may well have merit. But that action in mandamus is the proper manner in which to address this issue-not this appeal.
{141} Consequently, while I would hold that appellant does not have a right of appeal due to the specific requirement of
Buckley King, L.P.A., Donell Grubbs, and James S. Callender Jr., for appellant.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Mia Meucci, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.