STATE OF OHIO ex rel. JEREMY J. JONES v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE CAROLYN J. PASCHKE
CASE NO. 2021-G-0013
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY
August 23, 2021
2021-Ohio-2889
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition; Judgment: Petition dismissed
OPINION
Joseph G. Stafford and Nicole A. Cruz, Stafford Law Co., LPA, 55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Relator).
James R. Flaiz, Geauga Cоunty Prosecutor, and Linda M. Applebaum, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Respondent).
PER CURIAM.
{1} Relator, Jeremy J. Jones (“Mr. Jones“), filed a verified petition for writ of prohibition against respondent, the Honorable Judge Carolyn J. Paschke (“Judge Paschke“), to prevent Judge Paschke from exceeding her jurisdiction in the matter of Molly A. Jones v. Jeremy J. Jones in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas by
{2} Judge Paschke moved to dismiss Mr. Jones‘s petition pursuant to
{3} We find that Mr. Jones has an adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal and grant Judge Paschke‘s motion to dismiss.
Factual and Procedural History
{4} In his petition, Mr. Jones alleges that he is the defendant in the divorce proceedings known as Molly A. Jones v. Jeremy J. Jones, which are currently pending before Judge Paschke in Geauga County Court of Common Pleas case no. 19-DC-000752.
{5} From September 19, 2019, to January 1, 2021, Magistrate Bruce C. Smalheer (“Magistrate Smalheer“) conducted all hearings, ruled upon the parties’ motions, and issued interim orders. In January 2021, Magistrate Smalheer retired, and Magistrate Kevin L. Starrett (“Magistrate Starrett“) began issuing orders and conducting hearings in the proceedings. According to Mr. Jones, Judge Paschke did not issue a judgment entry assigning the case to Magistrate Starrett pursuant to
{6} Mr. Jones further alleges that Judge Paschke has disregarded and continues to disregard “the procedures and mandates of
{7} Mr. Jones requests a writ of prohibition “directing and restraining” Judge Paschke from “rubber stamping” Magistrate Starrett‘s rulings and issuing judgment entries in violation of
{8} Judge Paschke filed a motion to dismiss and memorandum in support. She disputes Mr. Jones‘s allegations that she improperly “rubber stamped” orders and contends that Mr. Jones has аn adequate remedy at law through appeal.
{9} Mr. Jones filed a brief in opposition to Judge Paschke‘s motion to dismiss. He contends that he does not have an adequate remedy at law because the orders at issue are not final, appealable orders over which this court has jurisdiction. He further contends that an appeal following a final adjudication on the merits is not an adequate remedy when Judge Paschke, as “the elected official assigned to his divorce prоceedings,” has “abdicated her role as the ultimate fact finder” in favor of Magistrate Starrett.
Standard of Review
{10} Dismissal of a petition pursuant to
{11} A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior cоurts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. Id. As such, it is an extraordinary remedy which is customarily granted with caution and restraint and is issued only in cases of necessity arising from the inadеquacy of other remedies. Id.
{12} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that (1) the respondent is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, 18.
{13} The last two elеments can be met by a showing that the trial court “patently and unambiguously” lacked jurisdiction. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, 11. “Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cаuse, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.” State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 298-299, 691 N.E.2d 253 (1998).
{14} A reviеw of Mr. Jones‘s petition demonstrates he cannot establish that Judge Paschke “patently and unambiguously” lacks jurisdiction or that he lacks an adequate remedy at lаw.
{15} Mr. Jones does not allege in his petition that Judge Paschke lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his divorce proceedings, much less that she “patently and unambiguously” lacks jurisdiction. Rather, Mr. Jones contends that Judge Paschke‘s “conduct” is “outside of the jurisdiction conferred by
{16} In essence, Mr. Jones is challenging Judge Paschke‘s exercise of her subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, 26. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized “a distinction betwеen a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, 10.
{17} In addition, the cases Mr. Jones cites in support of his petition undermine his request for extraordinary relief.
{18} In State ex rel. Lesher v. Kainrad, 65 Ohio St.2d 68, 417 N.E.2d 1382 (1981), the appellant filed actions in mandamus and prohibition against the trial judge and referee for their alleged failure to comply with
{19} The other cases Mr. Jones cites involved direct appeals rather than requests for extraordinary writs. See Davis v. Davis, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-06-011, 2006-Ohio-3384;
{20} This matter is similar to the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio St.3d 410, 2002-Ohio-4907, 775 N.E.2d 522. In that case, the relator sought a writ of prohibition to stop the enforcement of an adjudication of dependency. Id. at 13. The relator alleged, among other things, that the order referring the case to the magistrate was improper and that the magistrate did not file a separate decision before the trial judge issued a ruling. Id. at 17. The Supremе Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court‘s denial of the writ, finding that the trial judge and magistrate had “basic jurisdiction over the abuse and dependency proсeeding” and that “[p]rohibition will not issue as a substitute for appeal to review mere errors in judgment.” Id. at 28.
{21} As the court has explained, “appeal, not mandamus or prоhibition, is the remedy for the correction of errors.” State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 109, 637 N.E.2d 319 (1994). Therefore, “‘[e]xtraordinary remedies, i.e., mandamus [and] prohibition[,] *** may not be employed before trial on thе merits, as a substitute for an appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors, or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having proper jurisdiction * * * .‘” Id., quoting State ex rel. Woodbury v. Spitler, 34 Ohio St.2d 134, 137, 296 N.E.2d 526 (1973).
{23} Although the judgment entries at issue do not appear to be final judgments subject to immediate appeal, Mr. Jones may challenge them on appеal following Judge Paschke‘s issuance of a final judgment. This court has held that an appeal from the judgment concluding the case is an adequate legal remedy bаrring issuance of a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Welt v. Doherty, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2020-P-0018, 2020-Ohio-6684, 21.
{24} Mr. Jones contends that a final adjudication on the merits is not an adequate remedy “when the elected official assigned to his divorce proceedings *** has abdicated her role as the ultimate fact finder to the trial court Magistrate in violation of
{25} Accordingly, Mr. Jones can prove no set of facts establishing that Judgе Paschke “patently and unambiguously” lacks jurisdiction or that he lacks an adequate remedy at law.
{26} For the foregoing reasons, Judge Paschke‘s motion to dismiss is granted.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J., CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., MATT LYNCH, J., concur.
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Case No. 2021-G-0013