THE STATE EX REL. NALLS, APPELLANT, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2002-0323
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
October 2, 2002
96 Ohio St.3d 410 | 2002-Ohio-4907
[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 96 Ohio St.3d 410.]
Writs of prohibition, mandamus, and procedendo sought in an abuse and dependency case before the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga Count Court of Common Pleas—Orders of reference to magistrates—Juv.R. 40—Court of appeals’ denial of writs affirmed, when.
(Submitted July 24, 2002—Decided October 2, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 80410, 2002-Ohio-583.
{¶1} On January 31, 2001, the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS“) removed Darin Nalls (“Darin“) from the home in which he was residing with his mother, appellant, Nichole D. Nalls (“Nalls“), after Nalls‘s other child, Danielle, had died while in her custody. On May 31, 2001, CCDCFS filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, alleging that Darin was an abused and dependent child and requesting that the juvenile court grant legal custody of Darin to his father.
{¶2} Under a June 25, 1999 entry titled, “Appointment of Magistrate and Order of Referenсe,” appellee Mark R. Majer was appointed magistrate:
{¶3} “Pursuant to
{¶4} In accordance with this order of reference, any cаse that is assigned to appellee Judge Joseph F. Russo of the juvenile court in which temporary custody is sought by CCDCFS is referred to Magistrate Majer as a matter of course. Consequently, Magistrate Majer was assignеd to preside over the Nalls case.
{¶5} On October 15, 2001, Judge Russo and Magistrate Majer both signed an entry adjudging Darin to be a dependent child and ordering disposition to be set in accordance with the juvenile court‘s аnd the attorneys’ schedules. The entry, which was journalized on October 22, 2001, contained the following introductory language:
{¶6} “This matter came on for hearing this 3rd day of October, 2001, before the Honorable Joseph F. Russo, uрon the Report of Magistrate Mark R. Majer.
{¶7} “The case came before the court on a refiled complaint alleging abuse and neglect [sic, dependency] pursuant to
{¶8} “The Magistrate finds that noticе requirements have been met and that all necessary parties were present this day in court.
{¶9} “The complaint was read in open court.
{¶10} “The Magistrate explained legal rights, including the possible effect on parental rights. Mother and father have cоunsel.
{¶11} “The Magistrate heard testimony and accepted evidence.”
{¶12} The remainder of the entry contains a procedural history of the case and an analysis of the CCDCFS allegations of abuse and dependency and concludes with the adjudication that Darin is a dependent child.
{¶13} On October 25, 2001, Nalls filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County against appellees, Judge Russo, Magistrate Majer, and Judge Peter M. Sikora, the Ex Officio Clerk of the juvenile court. In her complaint, as
{¶14} On February 14, 2002, the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denied the writs.
{¶15} This cause is now bеfore the court upon Nalls‘s appeal as of right.
{¶16} In her appeal as of right, Nalls contends that the court erred in denying her request for writs of prohibition, mandamus, and procedendo. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Prohibition
{¶17} Nalls asserts that she is entitled to writs of prohibition against Judge Russo and Magistrate Majer because they lack jurisdiction over the underlying proceeding. Nalls claims that they lack jurisdiction because there was no proper order of reference of the case to the magistrate and the magistrate did not file a separate decision.
{¶18} In the absence оf a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal. Statе ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 447, 449-450, 727 N.E.2d 900.
{¶19} Judge Russo has basic statutory jurisdiction over the underlying abuse and dependency proceeding pursuant to
{¶20} Nalls initially contends that Judge Russo and Magistrate Majer lacked jurisdiction over the abuse and dependency proceeding because there was no proper order оf reference for the magistrate to be authorized to act. See White v. White (1977), 50 Ohio App.2d 263, 266, 4 O.O.3d 225, 362 N.E.2d 1013; Ordway v. Ordway (Dec. 30, 1998), Wayne App. No. 97CA006947, 1999 WL 1789.
{¶21} As the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County recently observed, however, ”
{¶22} Nalls, however, cites Davis v. Reed (Aug. 31, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76712, 2000 WL 1231462, in support of her contentiоn that an order of reference must be either (1) an individual journalized order of reference in a particular case or cases, (2) a blanket, journalized order of reference in a particular tyрe or types of cases, or (3) a local rule or rules providing for automatic reference in certain types of cases. See, also, White, 50 Ohio App.2d at 267, 4 O.O.3d 225, 362 N.E.2d 1013. But as Davis and White expressly acknowledge, this list of
appropriate reference orders is nonexhaustive. Davis (“an order of reference may be made in one of at least three ways“). (Emphasis added.)
{¶23} The June 25, 1999 entry here was titled in part an “Order of Referencе,” and expressly authorized Magistrate Majer to “hear and recommend dispositions on official cases assigned to him as the Court shall direct.” The juvenile court directed Magistrate Majer to preside over the custody proceeding.
{¶24} Moreover, the authorities Nalls cites to support her contention concerning no orders of reference, such as Davis, supra, 2000 WL 1231462, were decided by way of appeal rather than by extraordinary writ. See State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 169, 172, 712 N.E.2d 742 (“Significantly, most of the authorities relied on by appellаnts were resolved by appeal rather than by extraordinary writ“).
{¶25} Nalls next contends that Judge Russo and Magistrate Majer patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the custody proceeding because the Octоber 22, 2001 entry did not constitute a separate magistrate‘s decision, as required by
{¶26} None of the cases cited by Nalls, however, holds that any error in this regard constitutes a jurisdictional defect, and in those cases, comparablе claims were resolved on appeal rather than by extraordinary writ. See, e.g., In re Bortmas (Oct. 15, 1999), Trumbull App. No. 98-T-0147, 1999 WL 959842; Swain v. Swain (Nov. 22, 2000), Summit App. No. 20048, 2000 WL 1729472.
{¶27} In fact, if the jointly signed October 22, 2001 entry is considered to be, as appellees assert, Judge Russo‘s immediate adоption of Magistrate Majer‘s report under
{¶28} Therefore, Nalls failed to establish that despite their basic jurisdiction over the abusе and dependency proceeding, Judge Russo and Magistrate Majer were patently and unambiguously divested of that jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 430, 751 N.E.2d 472. Prohibition will not issue as a substitute for appeal to review mere errors in judgment. Brooks v. Gaul (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 202, 203, 729 N.E.2d 752. The court of appeals properly denied the writs of prohibition.
Mandamus
{¶29} Nalls asserts that Judge Sikora, in his capacity as Ex Officio Clerk of the juvenile court, had a duty to strike the October 22, 2001 entry because it is void due to a рatent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Russo and Magistrate Majer.
{¶30} As previously discussed, Nalls has or had adequate remedies at law by way of timely objections and an appeal to raisе her claims. The presence of these remedies precludes extraordinary relief in mandamus. State ex rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 578, 757 N.E.2d 357; State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393, 678 N.E.2d 549;
Procedendo
{¶31} Nalls finally claims that if she is not entitled to the requested writs of prohibition and mandamus, she is alternatively entitled to a writ оf procedendo to
compel the magistrate to issue a separate decision pursuant to
Conclusion
{¶32} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied the writs of prohibition, mandamus, and procedendo. We affirm the judgment of the court оf appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
Lester S. Potash, for appellant.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees.