THE STATE EX REL. HAWKINS, APPELLANT, v. FREDERICK, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
No. 2024-1761
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
October 2, 2025
Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-4540
Submitted June 3, 2025
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-4540
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Hawkins v. Frederick, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-4540.]
Habeas corpus—Appellant‘s maximum sentence has not expired, and he failed to show that trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to sentence him or that his commuted sentence is void—Governor‘s exercise of clemency power merely substitutes a lesser punishment and therefore does not create a new judgment subjeсt to appeal or jurisdictional challenge—Federal Ex Post Facto Clause forbids neither the commutation of a sentence nor a commuted sentence imposed under an otherwise constitutional statute and therefore does not apply to appellant‘s commuted sentencе—Court of appeals’ judgment granting warden‘s motion to dismiss affirmed.
The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
Per Curiam.
{1} Appellant, Shawn L. Hawkins, was convicted on four counts of aggravated murder in 1990 and sentenced to death. In 2011, the governor commuted his death sentеnces to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Hawkins then requested a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District Court of Appeals, arguing that his commuted sentence was void because it was not a statutorily authorized punishment for aggravated murder when he was convicted. The Third District granted the warden‘s
{2} Hawkins has аppealed and also requests that we take judicial notice of another state‘s caselaw. We affirm the Third District‘s dismissal and deny Hawkins‘s request for judicial notice.
I. BACKGROUND
{3} Hawkins is incarcerated at the Marion Correctional Institution. In 1990, he was convicted by a Hamilton County jury on four counts of aggravated murder with death specifications and two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications. The crimes were committed in June 1989. The trial court sentenced him to death for each murder conviction, 10- to 25-year indefinite prison terms for each aggravated-robbery conviction, and 3-year mandatory terms fоr each firearm specification. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. State v. Hawkins, 1st Dist. Nos. C-900092 and 910017, 1991 WL 270633 (Dec. 18, 1991).
{4} Thereafter, Hawkins sought commutation of his death sentences. The governor, upon recommendation of the Ohio Parole Board, commuted Hawkins‘s death sentences in 2011 to life in prison without the possibility of pаrole. In 2014,
{5} In September 2024, Hawkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third District against appellee, George Frederick, warden оf the Marion Correctional Institution, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release because the governor had lacked authority to commute Hawkins‘s death sentences to life in prison without the possibility of parole, which was not a possible sentence for aggravated murder when he was arrested and convicted. He also alleged that the trial court had “vacated the former sentences,” including the commuted sentence, and failed to reimpose any of his prior sentences when it granted him jail-time credit in 2023.
{6} The warden moved to dismiss under
{7} Hawkins has timely appealed. He also requests that we take judicial notice of Oregon caselaw.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Request for Judicial Notice
{8} Hawkins requests that we take judicial notice of а decision recently issued by the Supreme Court of Oregon styled Brown v. Kotek, 548 P.3d 1286 (Ore. 2024). The court in that case held that the present governor of Oregon lacked
{9} A request for judicial notice is authorized by
B. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
1. Standard of Review
{10} This court reviews de novo a court of appeals’
2. No Entitlement to Writ of Habeas Corpus
{11} Hawkins‘s core argument is that the governor laсked authority to commute his death sentences to life without the possibility of parole because life without the possibility of parole was not a possible sentence for aggravated murder when he was arrested and convicted.1 He asserted several variations of this argument in his petition, all of which lack merit. For three reasons, we conclude that Hawkins has failed to state a claim for a writ of habeas corpus.
a. Hawkins has not shown that his maximum sentence has expired
{12} First, the writ petition does not establish, and Hawkins does not argue, that his maximum sentence has expired. His commuted sentence is life in рrison without the possibility of parole. Because his maximum sentence of life imprisonment has not yet expired, Hawkins is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on this basis. State ex rel. Davis v. Turner, 2021-Ohio-1771, ¶ 10.
b. Hawkins has not shown that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
{13} Second, Hawkins has not shown that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to sеntence him. If an inmate‘s maximum sentence has not expired, a writ of habeas corpus “will lie only to challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.” Appenzeller v. Miller, 2013-Ohio-3719, ¶ 9, citing
{14} But the commutation of a sentence by the governor is an executive act, not a judicial one.
c. Hawkins has not shown that his commuted sentence is void
{15} Third, Hawkins has not shown as an alternative means of obtaining habeas relief that his commuted sentence is void for reasons other than a lack of
i. Proposition of law No. 1
{16} As his first proposition of law, Hawkins contends that his commuted sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.2
{17} For two reasons, we conclude that this argument lacks merit. First, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the enactment of laws that retroactively increase the punishment for criminal acts. See, e.g., Morales at 504; Collins at 43-44;
ii. Proposition of law No. 2
{19} As his second proposition of law, Hawkins argues that because his commuted prison term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was “not authorized by law” and thus is “absolutely void” (boldface deleted) and
iii. Proposition of law No. 3
{20} As his third proposition of law, Hawkins argues that he lаcks an otherwise adequate remedy for challenging his allegedly void commuted sentence. Because Hawkins has not shown that his maximum sentence has expired or that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him, the Third District‘s judgment may be affirmed without reaching this argument. See Leyman, 2016-Ohio-1093, at ¶ 8. In addition, the argument is not properly before us, because it was not asserted in Hawkins‘s writ petition and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See State ex rel. White v. Aveni, 2024-Ohio-1614, ¶ 22, quoting Fields v. Zanesville Police Dept., 2021-Ohio-3896, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.) (“‘A party cannot assert new arguments for the first time on appeal.’ “). Therefore, dismissal of Hawkins‘s writ petition was appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
{21} The Third District Court of Appeals correctly determined that Hawkins failed to state a claim for a writ of habeas corpus. We therefore affirm its judgment dismissing Hawkins‘s petition, and we deny his request for judicial notice.
Judgment affirmed.
Shawn L. Hawkins, pro se.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
