THE STATE EX REL. DAVIS, APPELLANT, v. TURNER, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
Nos. 2020-0934 and 2020-1130
Supreme Court of Ohio
May 26, 2021
Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1771
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-20-12.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Davis v. Turner, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1771.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-1771
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Davis v. Turner, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-1771.]
Habeas corpus—Erroneous inclusion of a postrelease-control sanction in a judgment entry of conviction does not render the sentencing entry void—Challenges to a sentencing error by a trial court are not cognizable in habeas corpus—Liability for court costs and personal-funds exemption from judgment execution under
(Nos. 2020-0934 and 2020-1130—Submitted March 2, 2021—Decided May 26, 2021.)
{¶ 1} Appellant, Randy H. Davis, is incarcerated in the North Central Correctional
I. Background
{¶ 2} Davis was convicted of murder in September 2001 and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The trial court‘s judgment entry also stated that Davis was subject to postrelease control.
{¶ 3} In March 2018, the trial court vacated the postrelease-control portion of Davis‘s sentence because the offense of murder is a special felony that does not carry a postrelease-control sanction. See
{¶ 4} Davis filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals in April 2020. Davis alleged that his original sentence is “partially void” due to its improper inclusion of a postrelease-control sanction. Turner filed a motion to dismiss Davis‘s complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). In a June 2020 judgment entry, the court of appeals found that Davis failed to state any cognizable claim for relief in habeas corpus, dismissed the complaint, and assessed costs against Davis. In case No. 2020-0934, Davis has timely appealed to this court as of right from the judgment dismissing his habeas complaint.
{¶ 5} Following the dismissal of Davis‘s complaint, the warden‘s collection designee sent Davis notice of the court‘s judgment against him for the payment of court costs. See
{¶ 6} Davis then filed a document titled “Objection to Judgment for Payment” with the court of appeals, in which he renewed his objection to the imposition of costs against him, claiming an exemption under
{¶ 7} The parties have each filed briefs in both appeals. Because both appeals arise from the same proceeding below, we consolidate them for decision in this opinion.
II. Analysis
A. Appeal in Case No. 2020-0934
{¶ 8} This court reviews the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. State ex rel. Norris v. Wainwright, 158 Ohio St.3d 20, 2019-Ohio-4138, 139 N.E.3d 867, ¶ 5. To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, Davis must show that he is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty,
{¶ 9} Davis contends that he is imprisoned under a judgment entry of conviction that is “partially void” due to its inclusion of a postrelease-control sanction that was contrary to law. Even though the trial court vacated the postrelease-control sanction in 2018, Davis argues that the trial court failed to issue a corrected sentencing entry. Thus, he argues that his conviction is void because “there are two separate judgment entries controlling appellant‘s conviction and sentence,” in violation of the so-called “one document” rule. See State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 17-18 (holding that only one document can constitute a final, appealable judgment of conviction), modified in part on other grounds, State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 10} Davis‘s premise that his original judgment of conviction is “partially void” is incorrect. Though the judgment erroneously imposed postrelease control, that error did not render the judgment void. “A sentence is void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused. When the sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void * * *” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 42. Accordingly, Davis‘s sentence is not void. Id. And because his maximum sentence of life imprisonment has not yet expired, Davis is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
{¶ 11} Davis‘s contention that the trial court failed to issue a corrected judgment entry of conviction does not change the result. Davis argues that the court‘s failure to issue a corrected judgment entry after vacating the postrelease-control provision means that his conviction violates the “one document rule.” Even if this court accepts Davis‘s contention as true, his argument amounts to nothing more than a challenge to an arguable sentencing error by the trial court. But sentencing errors are not jurisdictional and, therefore, not cognizable in habeas corpus. State ex rel. Sneed v. Anderson, 114 Ohio St.3d 11, 2007-Ohio-2454, 866 N.E.2d 1084, ¶ 7.
{¶ 12} Davis acknowledges that he filed a motion requesting that the trial court issue a corrected judgment entry, which the trial court denied. Davis could have appealed the order denying his motion, which would have been an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that precludes extraordinary relief. See State ex rel. Haynie v. Rudduck, 160 Ohio St.3d 99, 2020-Ohio-2912, 153 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 12-13.
{¶ 13} For these reasons, Davis‘s claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus. The court of appeals correctly dismissed Davis‘s complaint.
B. Appeal in Case No. 2020-1130
{¶ 14} The court of appeals dismissed Davis‘s complaint “with costs assessed to [Davis] for which judgment is hereby rendered.” Through the date of dismissal, the court costs assessed against
{¶ 15} Davis contends that the funds in his prison account are exempt from execution, garnishment, or attachment to satisfy the judgment for costs. Davis relies on
{¶ 16} Davis‘s argument, however, confuses the issue of liability for costs with the separate issue of executing the judgment for costs.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Davis‘s habeas petition or in denying Davis‘s motion to vacate the judgment of court costs assessed against him.
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
Randy H. Davis, pro se.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.