THE STATE EX REL. FIRE ROCK, LTD., v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ET AL.
No. 2020-1147
Supreme Court of Ohio
Decided March 11, 2021
Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-673
Submitted January 26, 2021
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-673.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-673
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Fire Rock, Ltd. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-673.]
Mandamus—
IN
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Relator, Fire Rock, Ltd., requests a writ of mandamus compelling respondents, the Ohio Department of Commerce and the Ohio Medical Marijuana Control Program (collectively, “the department“), to approve or deny its application to expand its marijuana-cultivation area.1 Fire Rock argues that the department may not, as it has done here, take no action on its application. Rather, Fire Rock
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Fire Rock is a Level II medical-marijuana cultivator, meaning that it is licensed to operate a cultivation area of up to 3,000 square feet. See
{¶ 3} On June 15, 2020, Fire Rock followed up with the department on the status of its application, requesting that the department respond to it. The department responded by letter on June 24, 2020, explaining that because it had not solicited cultivation-area-expansion requests, it was “taking no action on [Fire Rock‘s] expansion request.” Less than a month later, Fire Rock reached out again to the department, this time “demanding a definitive decision” on its application. The allegations and attachments to Fire Rock‘s complaint do not indicate whether the department responded to Fire Rock‘s demand.
{¶ 4} On September 24, 2020, Fire Rock filed in this court a complaint for a writ of mandamus ordering the department to approve or deny its application. The department has filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 5} A writ of mandamus will issue when a relator establishes a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. An administrative rule adopted pursuant to legislative authority may provide the basis for a clear legal duty and a clear legal right in a mandamus case. See State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18.
{¶ 6} A motion for judgment on the pleadings “permits consideration of the complaint and answer.” State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). A court should grant the motion and dismiss the complaint when it determines that “no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 570.
{¶ 7} The questions presented here are purely legal; no material factual issues are in dispute.
A. Ohio law does not prohibit a cultivator from submitting an expansion application on its own initiative
{¶ 8} Before turning to consider the elements of Fire Rock‘s mandamus claim, we begin by addressing a preliminary question—namely, whether, as the department argues, Ohio law prohibits a cultivator, like Fire Rock, from submitting an expansion application on its own initiative. To do this, we consider the statutes and rules that underlie Ohio‘s medical-marijuana scheme.
{¶ 10} Under the rule, the department‘s “director or the director‘s designee, at his or her discretion, may approve a marijuana cultivation area expansion of an existing cultivator‘s facility” not to exceed specified square-footage limits.
{¶ 11} “[T]he director may request expansion plans from existing cultivators” as prescribed by divisions (B) and (C) of the rule.
{¶ 12} The department points to division (D), arguing that its terms and the backdrop of
{¶ 13} Although this case involves the interpretation of a rule rather than a statute, this court‘s statutory-interpretation principles apply just the same. See In re A.J., 148 Ohio St.3d 218, 2016-Ohio-8196, 69 N.E.3d 733, ¶ 19. The starting point for determining a rule‘s meaning is its text, see Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc., 131 Ohio St.3d 316, 2012-Ohio-880, 964 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 16, which must be understood in its context, according to the rules of grammar and common usage, State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. An unambiguous text must be applied according to its terms, without adding or subtracting words. Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14.
{¶ 14} The department‘s argument does not square with the text of
{¶ 15} Division (B) details what a “cultivator seeking to expand its marijuana cultivation area” must do in preparing its expansion application for submission.
{¶ 16} Division (C) provides that “a cultivator shall not submit a request for expansion more than once during any twelve-month period.”
{¶ 17} The department gets no traction from division (D) either. It provides that “the director may request expansion plans” from an existing cultivator. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 18} Principles of administrative deference do not require a different result. Under our caselaw, administrative deference has no place in the face of an unambiguous text. See Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 29. And here, the text of
{¶ 19} The department‘s argument that it should prevail based on the degree of control that it exercises over the medical-marijuana program is no more persuasive. First, no matter how much control the department may exercise over the program, that cannot overcome the plain text of the rule. See Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973) (observing that the “interpretative effort is at an end” when the text “conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite“). Second, allowing Fire Rock to submit an expansion application on its own initiative will not, as the department seems to suggest, wrest control away from the department in supervising the program, for the director retains “discretion” to approve the application under
B. Fire Rock‘s clear legal right and the department‘s clear legal duty
{¶ 20} Having decided that
{¶ 21}
C. Fire Rock lacks an adequate remedy at law
{¶ 22} Finally, we conclude that Fire Rock lacks an adequate legal remedy. First, the department does not argue that Fire Rock has an adequate legal remedy that would preclude extraordinary relief in mandamus. Second,
D. Peremptory writ
{¶ 23} In light of the preceding analysis, we must deny the department‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, for its argument rests on a flawed legal theory. See Midwest Pride IV, 75 Ohio St.3d at 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (“Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law“). And because an alternative writ ordering the submission of evidence and briefing would not aid in our disposition of this case, we grant Fire Rock‘s request for relief based on the reasons set forth above and issue a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the department to approve or deny Fire Rock‘s application. See
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 24} For the foregoing reasons, we deny the department‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant a peremptory writ of mandamus.
Motion denied and peremptory writ granted.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., not participating.
Lagos & Lagos, P.L.L., and Argeri A. Lagos, for relator.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Christie Limbert, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.