State ex rel. Donaldson v. Athens City School District Board of EducationState ex rel. Donaldson v. Athens City School District Board of Education
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Moyer, Wright (per curiam)
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[Cite as State ex rel. Donaldson v. Athens City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), Ohio St.3d .]
Mandamus to compel board of education to reinstate relator to administrator‘s position with back pay and benefits from which he was non-renewed for the school years 1988-1989 through 1991-1992 -- Writ granted when written -- Notice provision of
Terry D. Donaldson, appellee, requested a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Athens County, alleging that the Athens City School District Board of Education, appellant, had not provided timely written notice of its intent not to issue him an administrator‘s contract for the school years 1988-1989 through 1991-1992, as required by
The court of appeals found the following facts:
“Donaldson was first employed by the Board in 1968. From then until July 1988 he was a full time employee of the Athens City School District working in many capacities. During the 1987-88 school year the Board employed Donaldson as ‘Attendance Officer and Coordinator of Community Education.’
“In August 1987, the Superintendent of the Athens City Schools notified Donaldson that he was a ‘supervisor’ pursuant to
R.C. 4117.01 and exempt from classified service.“By a letter dated July 18, 1988 the Board notified Donaldson that it had abolished the ‘unclassified position of Coordinator of Community Education * * * effective at the conclusion of the 1987-88 school year.’
“Donaldson appealed the abolishing of that position to the Athens Civil Service Commission. The Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction to consider his appeal [because Donaldson did not perform duties within the classified service]. The Athens County Common Pleas Court affirmed the Commission‘s order. Donaldson appealed to this court.” Donaldson v. Athens City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (June 9, 1992), Athens App. No. 1479, unreported, at 1-2.
The court of appeals granted the writ by summary judgment pursuant to
Gary E. Hunter, Law Director, and Lisa A. Eliason, City Prosecutor, for appellant.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the court of appeals did not err in granting the writ. Accordingly, we affirm.
R.C. 3319.02 and “Other Administrator” Status
The court of appeals found that the board of education had a clear duty to continue Donaldson‘s employment under
“An assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator is, at the expiration of his current term of employment, deemed reemployed at the same salary plus any increments that may be authorized by the board of education, unless he notifies the board in writing to the contrary on or before the first day of June, or unless such board, on or before the last day of March of the year in which his contract of employment expires, either reemploys him for a succeeding term or gives him written notice of its intention not to reemploy him. The term of reemployment of a person reemployed under this paragraph shall be one year, except that if such person has been employed by the school district as assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator for three years or more, the term of employment shall be two years.” (Emphasis added.)
We have held that written and timely notice is mandatory under
The board argues that no evidence in the record establishes Donaldson‘s status as an administrator and, therefore, that the court of appeals erred in finding that there was no dispute as to this material fact. The board complains that
“As used in this section, ‘other administrator’ means any employee in a position for which a board of education requires a certificate of the type described by division (I) [supervisor/teacher for kindergarten to twelve], (M) [pupil-personnel workers], or (O) [educational administrative specialists] of section 3319.22 of the Revised Code, * * * or any other employee, except the superintendent, whose job duties enable him to be considered as either a ‘supervisor’ or a ‘management level employee,’ as defined in section 4117.01 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.)
In a letter dated August 4, 1987, the school superintendent declared Donaldson and others to be “supervisors (administrators)” pursuant to
The board also contends that Donaldson‘s contract was suspended due to decreased enrollment as part of a reduction in force under
Moreover, the court of appeals did not find the nonrenewal of Donaldson‘s contract to be part of a valid reduction in force, and neither do we. The July 18, 1988 notice to Donaldson advised that he would “not receive a contract for * * * [the part-time position of Coordinator of Community Education] for the 1988-89
Adequate Remedy and Equitable Defenses
The board‘s remaining arguments are that (1) Donaldson did not establish the last condition for a writ of mandamus to issue -- the absence of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
The board first contends that Donaldson‘s civil service appeal is an adequate and available remedy. Indeed, appeal from the civil service commission would constitute an adequate remedy if Donaldson were attempting to enforce his rights as a classified public employee in this case. State ex rel. Farmer v. McCormick (1961), 171 Ohio St. 530, 14 O.O.2d 453, 172 N.E.2d 461 (mandamus may not be substituted for appeal from civil service commission order). Donaldson, however, seeks to enforce his rights as an unclassified administrator, which are rights apart from the protections afforded classified civil servants and rights which a civil service commission has no jurisdiction to determine.
The board next argues that an action for breach of contract is an adequate and available remedy. A contract action for damages, however, does not enforce the duty in
To successfully invoke the defense of laches, the board must show unreasonable delay and material prejudice. Smith v. Smith (1959), 168 Ohio St. 447, 7 O.O.2d 276, 156 N.E.2d 113; State ex rel. Madden v. Windham Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 86, 90, 537 N.E.2d 646, 649-650.
The board argues that Donaldson delayed unreasonably in pursuing mandamus by waiting two and one-half years after he appealed his job abolishment to the civil service commission before filing the instant complaint. The board, however, has not explained how it was materially prejudiced by Donaldson‘s delay, and prejudice will not be inferred from the mere passage of time. Madden, supra, at 91, 537 N.E.2d at 650. Accordingly, laches did not require denial of the writ of mandamus.
Finally, the board maintains that the issue of Donaldson‘s reinstatement was finally determined in the civil service appeal, such that collateral estoppel and res judicata now bar relief through mandamus. According to Donaldson, the parties dismissed by agreement Donaldson‘s civil service appeal, which suggests that a final determination has been reached in that case. However, for collateral estoppel and res judicata to apply, the judgment to which preclusive effect would be given must have been issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. State ex rel. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 44, 47, 573 N.E.2d 596, 599-600. The jurisdiction invoked by Donaldson‘s appeal from the civil service commission did not extend to claims other than those related to his alleged employment as a classified civil servant. Thus, we also reject these defenses.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the court of appeals’ decision to grant a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment, which compelled the board “to issue an ‘other administrator‘s’ contract to Donaldson pursuant to
Judgment affirmed.
A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur.
Moyer, C.J., and Wright, J., dissent.
Moyer, C.J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Even assuming this case is not distinguishable from State ex rel. Luckey v. Etheridge (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 404, 583 N.E.2d 960, we should not ignore the notice provided on July 18, 1988, even though it was not in time for the 1988-1989 school year. The July 18, 1988 notice advised Donaldson of the board‘s intent not to reemploy him, and it came before the last day of March 1989, the year in which his 1988-1989 contract expired. Thus, this notice was timely with respect to the 1989-1990 school year and should be considered sufficient under
Wright, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.