State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and D. Chad McKitrick for respondents.
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE‘S DECISION
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶1} Relator, Ricardo Dodson, an inmate of the Belmont Correctional Institution (“BCI“), filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus against respondents, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“), the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA“), and the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“FCCSEA“). Regarding his request for a writ of prohibition, relator seeks an order finding that ODRC and OAPA lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate paternity at his parole hearings and prohibiting ODRC and OAPA from enforcing its paternity adjudication during past, present, and future parole-determination hearings. Regarding his request for a writ of mandamus, relator seeks an order directing ODRC, OAPA, and
{¶2} This matter was referred to a court-appointed magistrate pursuant to
{¶3} Because relator has filed objections, we must independently review the record and the magistrate‘s decision to ascertain whether “the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.”
{¶4} Turning to the magistrate‘s conclusions of law and relator‘s objections to them, we begin by observing that in order to obtain a writ of mandamus, relator is required
{¶5} In order to obtain a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that: (1) the respondent has exercised or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law exists. State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, 156 Ohio St.3d 351, 2019-Ohio-932, ¶ 5. A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). Thus, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. Roush at ¶ 5, citing Tubbs Jones at 73. Relevant to this matter, we note that the “act of holding a hearing to decide whether one convicted of a crime shall be held in confinement or granted parole constitutes an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power.” State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 68 (1974).
{¶6} With regard to respondents’ motion to dismiss relator‘s request for a writ of mandamus, the magistrate found that, even construing all of the allegations in relator‘s complaint as true, relator failed to establish that FCCSEA had a clear legal duty under either
{¶8} In his objections, relator presents no new issues and merely rehashes the same arguments presented to the magistrate. Furthermore, although relator delineates at least ten separate objections, in essence, all boil down to the following two arguments: (1) respondents improperly adjudicated and made the determination that relator is the natural biological father of the child born to the victim and denied parole based on that adjudication; and (2) relator has a clear legal right to take a DNA blood test to determine whether he is the natural biological father of the minor child prior to the next parole hearing and relator is entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent him at said hearing.2 We disagree on both counts. Regarding the first argument, relator has not identified any Ohio law that prohibits ODRC and OAPA from considering the statement of the victim regarding the paternity of her child. Furthermore, relator has not identified any legal authority that supports relator‘s theory that ODRC and OAPA somehow legally established and/or determined paternity of the child born to the victim. And finally, relator has not identified any legal authority that supports relator‘s theory that ODRC and OAPA‘s consideration of the victim‘s statement fell within the parameters of
{¶9} Furthermore, relator‘s assertion that respondents improperly adjudicated and made the determination that relator is the natural biological father of the child born to the victim and denied parole based on that adjudication does not accurately reflect the myriad factors considered by the parole board in denying relator‘s application. Specifically, in addition to respondents’ consideration of the victim‘s statements regarding the paternity of her child, the parole board also considered that relator was convicted of raping two different women on two separate occasions; that one of the victims was kidnapped prior to being raped and was also threatened with being killed by being pushed out of a second story window; that the victim who became pregnant due to the rape was mentally challenged; and that relator had also been convicted of prior crimes for forgery, disorderly conduct and an assault that apparently was an incident of domestic violence. (See Compl., Ex. C-2; C-3; D; D-1; D-2; D-3; D-5; E; and E-1.) Indeed, in the July 12, 2018 Ohio Parole Board Decision and Minutes, the rationale provided for denial of release included that relator‘s “case is aggravated by the case-specific factors of violence, brutality, multiple occurrences, multiple victims, and extensive victimization.” In short, paternity of the child born to one of the rape victims was only one of multiple factors considered by respondents and was in no way dispositive of respondents’ decision in any event.
{¶10} Next, regarding relator‘s second argument presented via his objections, relator has not identified any legal authority that requires ODRC and OAPA to initiate a DNA blood test to establish or refute the paternity of the child born to the victim. There is a reason for this omission: there is no such authority. Indeed, relator himself cites to the proper legal methods in which to establish paternity that relator must undertake if that is truly the relief he seeks, and none of them involves any clear legal duties on the part of respondents.
{¶11} Therefore, after an examination of the magistrate‘s decision, an independent review of the record pursuant to
{¶12} Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate‘s decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law therein. In accordance with the magistrate‘s decision, respondents’ motions to dismiss are granted; relator‘s motion to exclude matters of fact and arguments not contained in the complaint, motion to strike and for sanctions, and motion to dismiss respondents’ motions to dismiss are denied; and this action is hereby dismissed.
Objections overruled; action dismissed.
MENTEL and McGRATH, JJ., concur.
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Ricardo Dodson, pro se.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, William Case, and Kelly N. Brogan, for respondents.
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS ON RESPONDENTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
{¶13} Relator, Ricardo Dodson, has filed this original action seeking a writ of prohibition and, alternatively, a writ of mandamus against respondents, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“), the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA“), and the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“FCCSEA“). With regard to the request for a writ of prohibition, relator seeks an order finding that ODRC and OAPA lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate paternity at his parole hearings and prohibiting ODRC and OAPA from enforcing its paternity adjudication during past, present, and future parole-
Findings of Fact:
{¶14} 1. Respondent ODRC is a governmental agency responsible for, among other things, operating the Ohio prison system.
{¶15} 2. Respondent OAPA is a governmental agency responsible for, among other things, the release of criminal offenders from prison.
{¶16} 3. Respondent FCCSEA is a governmental agency responsible for, among other things, providing child-support services and establishing parentage.
{¶17} 4. Relator is a prisoner incarcerated at Belmont Correctional Institution.
{¶18} 5. In 1991, relator was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and attempted rape. Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The victim gave birth to a daughter, A.M., after the crimes occurred, and A.M.‘s mother subsequently relinquished her parental rights and placed A.M. for adoption.
{¶19} 6. According to relator‘s complaint, in 1992, FCCSEA filed an administrative paternity action and then a paternity action in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Three possible fathers were named in the court action, but it was dismissed in 1993 for failure to prosecute.
{¶20} 7. According to relator‘s complaint, relator was denied parole eight times from 2000-21. In parole hearings in 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2018, the OAPA, using statements made by A.M.‘s mother and her husband at a victim‘s conference, indicated that A.M. was born as a result of the rape, relator is the biological father of A.M., and relator was
{¶21} 8. According to relator‘s complaint, in August 2018, relator filed an action in federal court, claiming that the victim‘s paternity allegation used to deny him parole was false. In February 2021, a federal magistrate concluded that the statement made by A.M.‘s mother and her husband at the victim conference was sufficient to support the conclusion that relator was A.M.‘s biological father, relator could not support his claim that he is not her biological father without DNA evidence, and a letter sent to relator from the victim in March 2018 indicated that relator impregnated her, she gave birth to A.M., and the child was placed for adoption. In July 2021, a federal judge affirmed the magistrate‘s report and recommendation and granted the parole board summary judgment. Relator appealed.
{¶22} 9. According to relator‘s complaint, in July 2021, he was denied parole again, and at the hearing, he denied being A.M.‘s biological father.
{¶23} 10. According to relator‘s complaint, in August 2021, relator served upon FCCSEA via certified mail a request for a copy of the documents from the administrative paternity action, seeking unredacted records regarding the determination of the existence or nonexistence of a parent-child relationship between the putative fathers and A.M., but FCCSEA failed to comply with the request.
{¶24} 11. On September 10, 2021, relator filed his complaint in prohibition and mandamus with this court.
{¶25} 12. On October 12, 2021, FCCSEA filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to
{¶26} 13. On October 25, 2021, ODRC and OAPA filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to
{¶27} 14.On November 18, 2021, relator filed a motion to exclude matters of fact and arguments not contained in the complaint.
{¶28} 15. On December 7, 2021, relator filed a motion to strike and for sanctions, and a motion to dismiss respondents’ motions to dismiss.
Conclusions of Law:
{¶30} A court may dismiss a complaint seeking a writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus pursuant to
{¶31} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth three requirements that must be met in establishing a right to a writ of mandamus: (1) that relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for; (2) that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act requested; and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle, 6 Ohio St.3d 28 (1983).
{¶32} “The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, 156 Ohio St.3d 351, 2019-Ohio-932, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, (1998). To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that a respondent: (1) has exercised or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law exists. Roush at ¶ 5. See State ex rel. McKee v. Cooper, 40 Ohio St.2d 65, 68 (1974) (stating that the “act of holding a hearing to decide whether one convicted of a crime shall be held in confinement or granted parole constitutes an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power“).
{¶33} “Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.” State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 98 (1996). Accord State ex rel. Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St.3d 37, 2002-Ohio-3317, ¶ 24 (concluding the fact the judge had already exercised judicial power by granting a motion, such did not preclude the opposing party from obtaining a writ of prohibition, as prohibition will lie to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions).
{¶34} The magistrate may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect the present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-199, 2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing
{¶35} In the present matter, relator first requests a writ of mandamus against FCCSEA, seeking complete and unredacted records in FCCSEA‘s possession relating to the existence or non-existence of a parent-child relationship between A.M. and the putative fathers. Relator claims he has a clear legal right to obtain, and FCCSEA has a clear legal duty to produce, the complete and unredacted records pursuant to
{¶36} However, even after all factual allegations in relator‘s complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in relator‘s favor, it is beyond doubt
Each obligor and each obligee under a support order may review all records maintained under section 3125.15 of the Revised Code that pertain to the support order and any other information maintained by the child support enforcement agency, except to the extent prohibited by state or federal law.
{¶37} Here, with regard to
{¶38} As for
(1) In any action instituted under sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code, the court, upon its own motion, may order and, upon the motion of any party to the action, shall order the child‘s mother, the child, the alleged father, and any other person who is a defendant in the action to submit to genetic tests.
{¶40} This provision is very specific and is not applicable here. In the present matter, relator has not alleged that, in an action instituted under
{¶41} With regard to appointment of legal counsel, relator argues that he has a clear legal right to, and respondents have a clear legal duty to appoint, legal counsel at any
{¶42} Finally, relator requests a writ of prohibition against ODRC and OAPA, arguing he is entitled to a writ for the following reasons: (1) ODRC and OAPA have previously exercised and/or are about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power during his next parole hearing by making a paternity determination; (2) the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power adjudicating paternity matters is unauthorized by law pursuant to
{¶43} Relator can prove no facts entitling him to a writ of prohibition. It is true that
(A) As used in sections 3111.01 to 3111.85 of the Revised Code, “parent and child relationship” means the legal relationship that exists between a child and the child‘s natural or adoptive parents and upon which those sections and any other
provision of the Revised Code confer or impose rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. The “parent and child relationship” includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.
{¶44} Clearly, ODRC and OAPA‘s use of the victim‘s statement that relator was the father of A.M. does not fit within the parameters of
{¶45} Accordingly, the magistrate recommends that this court grant respondents’ motions to dismiss relator‘s complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus. The magistrate further recommends that this court deny relator‘s motion to exclude matters of
/S/ MAGISTRATE
THOMAS W. SCHOLL III