{¶ 1} This is аn appeal from a judgment denying a writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court judge from proceeding in a case during the purported pendency of an appeal. Because that appeal was dismissed as premature, we affirm.
{¶ 3} In October 2006, Everhart filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for а writ of prohibition to prevent Judge White from exercising any jurisdiction in the underlying case relating to discovery during the pendency of her appeаl from the denial of her motion for a protective order and for modification of a subpoena.
{¶ 4} On November 6, 2006, the court of appеals dismissed Everhart’s appeal from the denial of her motion in the medical malpractice case for lack of a final appеalable order. The court of appeals concluded that Everhart had “filed a premature notice of appeal from a рurported oral decision of the trial court denying [her] motion for protective order and motion to modify subpoena” and that “[a] review of the record indicates a judgment entry has not been entered by the trial court.”
{¶ 5} Judge White filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Everhart’s prohibition action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals, sua sponte, took judicial notice that it had dismissed Everhаrt’s appeal from Judge White’s decision in the medical malpractice case, and it granted Judge White’s motion and denied the writ.
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court upon Everhart’s appeal from the denial of her prohibition case. We substitute Judge White’s successor, Judge Stephen L. McIntоsh, for her as the appellee. Civ.R. 25(D)(1).
{¶ 7} Everhart first asserts that the court of appeals erred in taking judicial notice of its dismissal of her appеal from Judge White’s decision in the medical malpractice case when that dismissal was not part of the record in the prohibition ease. Evеrhart is correct that it has been held that “trial courts may not take judicial notice of their own proceedings in other cases even when the cases involve the same parties.” Phillips v. Rayburn (1996),
{¶ 8} It is true that the record here does not include the dismissal entry relied upon by the cоurt of appeals. It is also true that the website of the clerk of the
{¶ 9} Nevertheless, Everhart filed the dismissal entry as part of her supplement in this appeal. “Our plenary authority in extraordinary actions permits us to consider the instant appeal as if it had been filed in this court originally.” State ex rel. Walker v. Lancaster City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1997),
{¶ 10} Because the parties agree that the court of appeals did, in fact, dismiss Everhart’s appeal from Judge White’s oral decision to deny Everhart’s discovery motion in the medical malpractice case, we will exercise this authority here. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995),
{¶ 11} In so holding, we reject Everhart’s claim that only matters in existence at the time a complaint is filed сan be judicially noticed in assessing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion. In extraordinary-writ cases, courts are not limited to the facts at the time a proceeding is cоmmenced, but should consider facts at the time it determines whether to grant the writ. See State ex rel. Westlake v. Corrigan,
{¶ 12} On the merits issue, Everhart contends that the court of appeals erred in denying the writ of prohibition bеcause her premature appeal of the denial of her motion for a protective order divested Judge White of jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying civil case. “[W]e have consistently held that once an appeal is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over matters that are inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the
{¶ 13} Even so, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the foregoing rule does not apply whеn the appeal is no longer pending. Rock at ¶ 9 (“neither S.Ct.Prac.R. II(2)(D)(1) nor the foregoing precedent authorizes a court to dismiss a case for laсk of jurisdiction once the appeal involving the case has concluded”); State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan (1996),
{¶ 14} Moreover, a premature notice of appeal under App.R. 4(C) does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed because the appeal has not yet been perfected. Bennington v. Robinson (Feb. 7, 2000), Stark App. No. 1999CA00212,
{¶ 15} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly denied the writ of prohibition. Judge White had the requisite jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying case once Everhart’s appeal had been dismissed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.