The STATE ex rel. DAVILA, Appellee, v. CITY OF BUCYRUS et al., Appellants.
No. 3-10-20
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Crawford County
Decided April 11, 2011
194 Ohio App.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-1731
James F. Mathews and Matthew E. Crall, for appellants.
PRESTON, Judge.
{¶1} Respondents-appellants, the city of Bucyrus, Mayor Daniel F. Ross, and Police Chief Kenneth Teets, appeal the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas’ grant of summary judgment in favor of relator-appellee, Edwin Davila. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} On March 17, 2009, Davila sent a letter addressed to the “City of Bucyrus care of Mayor Dan Ross or President of Records Commission,” requesting “copies of the minutes and public notices of all meetings held by the City of Bucyrus Records Commission.” That same day, Davila also sent a letter to the Bucyrus chief of police requesting access to the department‘s reel-to-reel tapes, which recorded telephone calls and radio traffic to and from the police department. Davila requested access to “the data that was recorded on both the primary and back-up tapes that [the] department used over the years during the time that such a tape recording system was used.” Davila further requested access to “all entries of incoming and outgoing calls for service that were placed on the Bucyrus Police Department‘s Radio Log * * * for the above mentioned tapes or tape system.”
{¶3} On April 17, 2009, the Bucyrus city law director responded to Davila‘s public-records request by letter, indicating that he had included the minutes and public notices of the Bucyrus Records Commission for the last five years and that if Davila needed documents from prior years, he should contact the mayor‘s office. The law director also requested that Davila clarify his request for the police department records. He noted that the police department had not used reel-to-reel audio recordings since at latest 1998 and that retention of such records was for a period of two years pursuant to its retention policy, approved in 1990. The law director did include one copy of a radio log for February 13-14, 1994, that had been maintained as part of a case involving an inmate on death row. The law director further advised Davila that he should contact Captain John Beal at the police department to set up a time to review other records he might be interested in viewing.
{¶4} On April 28, 2009, Davila wrote a letter in response to clarify that he was seeking “all the meeting minutes for each of the meetings held by the Record‘s Commission from the first meeting to the last.” (Emphasis sic.). On May 5, 2009, the law director responded by letter indicating that he had included copies
{¶5} On June 16, 2009, Davila filed a complaint for writ of mandamus and alternatively for civil forfeiture pursuant to
{¶6} On July 13, 2009, respondents filed an answer denying the substantive allegations of the complaint and asserting several affirmative defenses. At this time, respondents did not file responses to the requests for admissions.
{¶7} On July 29, 2009, Davila filed a motion that facts related to his unanswered request for admissions be taken as admitted and motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Davila argued that respondents’ failure to timely respond to the request for admissions resulted in default admissions pursuant to
{¶8} On July 30, 2009, respondents moved for recusal of Judge Russel B. Wiseman from the case. On August 3, 2009, respondents filed a motion for extension of time to answer the request for admissions and production of documents. In support of this motion, respondents asserted that they were unable to respond to the request for admissions since many of the answers required contacting persons no longer with the city.
{¶9} On August 6, 2009, Judge Wiseman recused himself from the case and referred the matter to the Ohio Supreme Court to appoint Judge David C. Faulkner, retired, of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas, to preside over the case.1
{¶10} On August 12, 2009, Davila filed a memo in opposition to respondents’ motion for an extension of time to answer the request for admissions and production of documents.
{¶11} On August 19, 2009, Judge Faulkner filed a briefing schedule for Davila‘s pending motion that his unanswered request for admissions be taken as admitted and motion for summary judgment. Judge Faulkner gave the parties until August 26, 2009, to file affidavits, briefs, and other supporting documents.
{¶12} On August 24, 2009, respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file briefs, affidavits, and other supporting documents in opposition to the motion for summary judgment because respondents had hired new, outside counsel to
{¶13} On September 4, 2009, respondents filed a combined brief in opposition to Davila‘s motion for summary judgment, a cross-motion for leave to amend answers to requests for admissions, and motion for additional discovery under
{¶14} On December 14, 2009, the trial court granted Davila‘s request for default admissions pursuant to
{¶15} On February 19, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on forfeiture and damages for those documents that respondents could not provide. On March 12, 2010, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
{¶16} On July 19, 2010, the trial court filed its judgment entry finding that Davila was entitled to a judgment of $1,409,000 for 1,409 public records being destroyed.
{¶17} On July 28, 2010, respondents filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and new trial pursuant to
{¶18} On October 4, 2010, the trial court overruled respondents’ motion. On October 14, 2010, respondents filed a notice of appeal.
{¶19} On October 22, 2010, Davila filed a motion to dismiss with this court, alleging that the July 19, 2010 judgment was a final, appealable order from which respondents failed to appeal within 30 days as required under App.R. 4(A). On November 30, 2010, however, we overruled the motion, finding that respondents’ timely
{¶20} On December 13, 2010, Davila filed notice of filing a complaint for preemptory writs of prohibition and mandamus with the Ohio Supreme Court and a motion to stay proceedings in this court. On January 6, 2011, this court denied
{¶21} The case is now before this court for review. Respondents raise seven assignments of error for our review. We elect to combine their first two assignments of error for our discussion.
Assignment of Error I
The trial court erred in its misstatement or misidentification of the record, suggesting that the appellants did not file a motion for relief from the default admissions under
Assignment of Error II
The trial court erred when it did not hear the appellants’ motion for relief from the default admissions, since the appellants demonstrated grounds for such relief, establishing prejudice to appellants.
{¶22} In their first and second assignments of error, respondents argue that the trial court inappropriately denied their
(A) * * * A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of
Civ. R. 26(B) set forth in the request, that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. * * *(1) * * * The matter is admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, not less than twenty-eight days after service of a printed copy of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by the party‘s attorney. * * *
(B) Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. * * * the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice the party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
{¶23} “A request for admission can be used to establish a fact, even if it goes to the heart of the case. This is in accord with the purpose of the request to admit—to resolve potentially disputed issues and thus to expedite the trial.” Cleveland Trust Co. v. Willis (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 66, 67, 20 OBR 364, 485
{¶24} “Any matter admitted under
{¶25} A trial court‘s decision on a motion to withdraw admissions will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Weidner, 3d Dist. No. 13-06-08, 2006-Ohio-6852, 2006 WL 3771981, ¶ 28, citing Snyder v. Ford Motor Co., 3d Dist. No. 1-05-41, 2005-Ohio-6415, 2005 WL 3274868, ¶ 14, citing Graham v. Allen Cty. Sheriff‘s Office, 3d Dist. No. 1-05-18, 2005-Ohio-4190, 2005 WL 1939413. “Abuse of discretion” implies that the trial court was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
{¶26} Davila served his requests for admissions upon respondents on June 16, 2009. The respondents did not respond to the request for admissions within 28 days, so Davila moved that the requests be deemed admitted pursuant to
{¶27} The trial court, however, determined that it was without discretion to grant relief from the default admissions, because respondents had failed to timely respond to the request for admissions. Therefore, the trial court overruled respondents’ motion for an extension of time to respond to the request for admissions as moot. The trial court reasoned as follows:
Requests for admissions are governed by Civil Rule 36 which provides in pertinent part as follows:
“* * * The matter is admitted unless within a period designated in the request, not less than twenty-eight days after service thereof or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection * * *”
The rule is clear that unless action is taken within the period of time designated, whether that action be to admit, deny or request additional time, the matter as to which admission is requested and not responded is deemed admitted. While there may be exceptions for cases of excusable neglect or other Rule 60(B) grounds, they have not been alleged and are not applicable in this case.
The rule in question does not provide for the exercise of discretion by the Court unless there be some timely responses to the requests. Here there was none. Responses of some type were due by July 14, 2009 at the latest, yet nothing was filed until August 3, 2009 after Relator filed the motion for summary judgment. At that time, the Court could not extend the time because the time had already passed. The motion was therefore moot and is overruled.
For the forgoing reasons, the matters contained in Relator‘s request for admission are deemed admitted by Respondents for purposes of this case.
{¶28} We agree with the trial court that a party‘s failure to timely respond to a request for admissions results in matters being automatically admitted under
{¶29} Most significantly, as respondents argue, the trial court had discretion to grant their
{¶30} Davila, for his part, failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the withdrawal of the admissions. Davila argued that he would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the admissions, because summary judgment was appropriate based upon those admissions. Prejudice under
{¶31} Under the circumstances here, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant respondents’ motion to withdraw or amend their default admissions. As we have already noted, the grounds for granting the
{¶32} Respondents’ first and second assignments of error are therefore sustained.
Assignment of Error III
The trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the appellee which is unsupported by any record of evidence, relying instead upon default admissions, to the appellants’ prejudice.
{¶33} In their third assignment of error, respondents argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based upon the default admissions. We agree.
{¶34} We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Doe v. Shaffer (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and the conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.
{¶35} After respondents failed to timely respond to Davila‘s request for admissions, Davila moved for summary judgment based upon respondents’ default admissions and the complaint, alone. The trial court granted Davila‘s motion for summary judgment and request for damages based entirely upon respondents’ default admissions. In fact, the trial court noted that it would not consider several of respondents’ arguments concerning whether they had a legal duty to maintain the records in question because respondents had failed to respond to Davila‘s request for admissions. Since we have determined that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant respondents’
{¶36} Respondents’ third assignment of error is therefore sustained.
Assignment of Error IV
The trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the appellee which is without merit as a matter of law, since the record does not substantiate appellee as a “person aggrieved,” to the appellants’ prejudice.
Assignment of Error V
The trial court erred in its award of damages for civil forfeiture in this case, which award is excessive, contrary to the record of evidence, and, thereby, prejudicial to the appellants.
Assignment of Error VI
The trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it rejected application of
Assignment of Error VII
The trial court erred when it denied the appellants’ posttrial motion for remittitur or new trial (refusing to reopen the case), to the appellants’ prejudice.
{¶37} In their fourth assignment of error, respondents argue that the trial court erred in awarding Davila forfeiture, since he was not an “aggrieved person” under
{¶38} In light of our decision that the trial court abused its discretion by denying respondents’
{¶39} Respondents’ fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error are, therefore, overruled as moot.
{¶40} Having found error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
ROGERS, P.J., and SHAW, J., concur.