Cleveland Trust Co v. WillisCleveland Trust Co v. Willis
The issue raised by this appeal is whether the trial court correctly ruled that the signatory status of the parties was conclusively established by Cleveland Trust’s requests for admissions. We hold that the trial court was correct in that ruling.
In the instant case, Charles did not respond to the requests for admissions until the date of trial, forty-two days after service. The requests designated a period of twenty-eight days within which Charles was to respond. When Charles failed to answer the requests, the admissions became facts of record which the court must recognize.
A request for admission can be used to establish a fact, even if it goes to the heart of the case. This is in accord with the purpose of the request to admit — to resolve potentially disputed issues and thus to expedite the trial. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Battle (1975),
Any matter admitted under
In this case Charles failed to justify his dilatory response to the requests. On appeal Charles suggests that illness prevented his timely response. However, Charles did not move for a protective order or otherwise request relief from the duty of responding to these requests for admissions. Extensions of time may always be asked for and are usually
The most emphatic argument Charles now makes is that permission to withdraw and amend his admissions on the first day of trial would not have prejudiced Cleveland Trust in maintaining its action. We disagree. Charles did not cooperate with discovery requests and defied court orders directing him to give his deposition. Because of this conduct Cleveland Trust relied on the requests for admissions as proof of potentially disputed issues. On the first day of trial Charles sought to file his untimely response to the requests for admissions. To permit filing of Charles’ response not only would have prejudiced Cleveland Trust’s pursuit of its remedy and entailed further delay, but it would have put a premium upon lack of diligence. The record discloses plain failure to respond to the requests without justification for the delay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Charles’ motion to amend.
Although Charles admitted to the trial court that his response to the requests was late, he now argues differently. Charles contends that the instruction with respect to the response time for the requests was improper and that a proper instruction would have read “within thirty-two (32) days.” Charles did not raise this argument in the trial court and we need not address it here. Nevertheless, we have examined Charles’ argument and find it to be without merit.
Charles primarily relies upon dictum in a municipal court opinion as authority for his contention. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. McGraw (1980),
In Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. McGraw, supra, the court stated that the minimum time prescribed by the rules for response to requests to admit which are served by mail is thirty-two days. The court calculated the minimum prescribed time by adding the twenty-eight days provided for in
We disagree with the municipal court’s interpretation and construction of the rules.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Elizabeth did not file a notice of appeal in this court. Nevertheless, in a brief styled “Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Elizabeth Firestone Willis,” Elizabeth presents a proposition of law and requests this court to reverse the court of appeals’ judgment against her. Elizabeth’s contention is not properly before us and we do not consider it on appeal.