Stansbury v. FaulknerStansbury v. Faulkner
This is a failure-to-pay-overtime case brought under the
For the following reasons, Stansbury‘s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
I. Background
PoH is a cardiology medical clinic in Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No. 51-1 ¶ 1.) Faulkner is the sole member and owner of PoH. (Id.) For each of the calendar years 2016, 2017, and 2018, PoH had a gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000. (ECF No. 46 ¶ 1.)
In August 2016, Faulkner hired Stansbury to work in his home to assist his ailing mother (“Mrs. Faulkner“). (ECF No. 56-1 ¶¶ 19, 48.)1 Stansbury was scheduled to work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, and was paid $15 per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 29, 58.) The parties dispute Stansbury‘s exact role and the duties she performed while working in Faulkner‘s home, but agree that Stansbury was instructed to be attentive to Mrs. Faulkner; assist her with bathing; make sure that she was steady
while using her walker; monitor her eating; perform light housework; sweep; mop; clean the bathrooms; clean any accidents; do laundry; and wash dishes. (See id. ¶¶ 22, 47.)
In September 2016, in addition to working four days at Faulkner‘s home, Stansbury started working one day a week in PoH‘s medical office doing office work. (See ECF No. 56-2 at 10:19-12:15.) While working in the medical office, Stansbury brought patients back and got lists of their medications. (ECF No. 55-1 ¶ 6.) Sometime near the end of September 2016 or beginning of October 2016, Stansbury stopped working in PoH‘s medical office and continued to work five days a week at Faulkner‘s home. (ECF No. 56-1 ¶ 28.) Sometime in October or November 2016, Stansbury‘s pay was increased to $20 per hour. (See ECF No. 45-4 at 126:12-127:15; ECF No. 56-1 ¶ 56.)
When Faulkner hired Stansbury in August 2016, Faulkner provided her with a PoH employee handbook and instructed her to read it. (ECF No. 45-4 at 27:22-28:2; ECF No. 56-1 ¶¶ 21, 60.) That handbook included a rule that Faulkner must approve all overtime before it was performed. (See ECF No. 45-3 at 59:10-14;
On May 14, 2018, Faulkner and PoH terminated Stansbury. (See ECF No. 45-3 at 22-25; ECF No. 56-1 ¶¶ 63-64.) On October 26, 2018, Stansbury filed her complaint against Faulkner alleging unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA. (ECF No. 1.) Stansbury
alleges that she worked from October 11, 2016, to November 2017 at an average of fifty-five hours per week without receiving overtime compensation. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9; see also ECF No. 28 ¶ 12.) On July 8, 2019, after the Court granted leave to amend, (ECF No. 27), Stansbury filed an amended complaint that added PoH as a defendant. (ECF No. 28.) Defendants filed an amended answer to Stansbury‘s amended complaint. (ECF No. 40.) On October 21, 2019, Stansbury moved for partial summary judgment. (ECF No. 45.) On October 21, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 49.)
II. Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over Stansbury‘s claim. Under
III. Standard of Review
Under
had sufficient opportunity for discovery, lacks evidence to support an essential element of her case. See
When confronted with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.” FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Although the parties in this case have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the legal standard remains the same, and
each motion will be considered separately. See Lee v. Loandepot.com, LLC, No. 14-cv-01084-EFM, 2016 WL 4382786, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 17, 2016) (citations omitted). To the extent the cross-motions overlap, the Court addresses the legal arguments together. Id. (citation omitted).
IV. Analysis
The relevant FLSA overtime provision states:
(a) Employees engaged in interstate commerce; additional applicability to employees pursuant to subsequent amendatory provisions (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2015)).
To establish an FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must show that the employer or its employees are engaged in interstate commerce. See Bey v. WalkerHealthCareIT, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-1167, 2018 WL 2018104, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2018);
The FLSA creates exemptions that are affirmative defenses to an employer‘s duty to pay a covered employee overtime. See
To succeed on an unpaid overtime claim under the FLSA, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an employer-employee relationship;
(2) that the employer or its employees are engaged in interstate commerce; (3) that the employee worked more than forty hours; and (4) that overtime was not paid. See Whaley, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1001 (citations omitted). Once a plaintiff has established these elements, the burden shifts to the employer who may show by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the exemptions afforded by
A. Stansbury‘s October 16, 2019 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
In her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Stansbury asks the Court to conclude as a matter of law that: (1) PoH is Stansbury‘s employer, (ECF No. 45-1 at
1. Employer-Employee Relationship
Stansbury asks the Court to determine as a matter of law that PoH is Stansbury‘s employer. (Id. at 6-9). The FLSA defines an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”
law applications.” Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). Whether there is an employment relationship is a question of law. See Eberline v. Douglas J. Holdings, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 3d 634, 641 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (subsequent history omitted) (citing Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1132 (6th Cir. 1994)); U.S. Dep‘t of Labor v. Cole Enter., Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d at 965).
In her briefing, Stansbury relies on what has become known in this Circuit as the “economic reality” test. (ECF No. 45-1 at 6-9). Under that test, there is an employer-employee relationship if the employee is “as a matter of economic reality . . . dependent upon the business to which [she] render[s] service.” Keller, 781 F.3d at 807 (quoting Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984)). The “economic reality test” is not the proper test here. It is used primarily to determine whether an employment relationship is classified as employer-employee or independent contractor. See, e.g., Acosta v. Off Duty Police Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir. 2019). Here, the parties do not dispute how Stansbury‘s employment relationship with PoH is classified, but rather, during the relevant time, whether Stansbury was employed by PoH at all.
Defendants respond to Stansbury‘s reliance on the economic reality test, arguing that Stansbury never worked in the office of PoH (other than a short time outside the relevant period), did not work to further the goals of PoH, and was paid through PoH‘s payment system for administrative purposes only. (See ECF No. 51 at 2-5.) The Court understands Defendants’ argument to be, not that Stansbury was employed as an independent contractor for PoH, but that Stansbury was not employed by PoH at all (at least in any meaningful sense). The relevant question is whether PoH employed Stansbury, see
The Court cannot conclude that PoH employed Stansbury during the relevant time because PoH did not “suffer or permit [Stansbury] to work.”
(internal citation omitted) (citing Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944)). Stansbury‘s argument fails because Stansbury‘s work in Faulkner‘s home was not “pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit” of PoH. See Brock, 236 F.3d at 801. PoH is a cardiology medical clinic that provides medical services to Memphis residents. (ECF No. 51-1 ¶ 1.) During the time for which Stansbury seeks compensation, Stansbury did not work in PoH‘s office, but worked solely in Faulkner‘s home. (ECF No. 51-1 ¶ 6; ECF No. 55-1 ¶ 9.) Housekeeping and homecare of a business owner‘s mother, although perhaps tangentially related to the business, are not work pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of a cardiology medical clinic. Stansbury‘s arguments that Faulkner testified that PoH was Stansbury‘s employer, that PoH issued tax forms to Stansbury, that Stansbury was paid through the same payroll systems that PoH uses, and that PoH was included as an employer in Stansbury‘s termination notice, (ECF No. 45-1 at 7-9), are inapposite because the main inquiry is whether Stansbury worked necessarily and primarily for the benefit of PoH. See Brock, 236 F.3d at 801. She did not.
The Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that PoH was Stansbury‘s employer during the relevant time. Stansbury‘s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on this issue is DENIED.
2. Covered Enterprise
Stansbury next asks the Court to determine as a matter of law that PoH is a “covered enterprise” within the meaning of
(s)(1) “Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” means an enterprise that --
(A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person; and
(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level that are separately stated).
B. Defendants’ October 21, 2019 Motion for Summary Judgment
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants ask the Court to determine as a matter of law that: (1) Defendants are entitled to the FLSA‘s “companionship exception“; (2) PoH is not a “covered enterprise“; (3) Stansbury cannot prove that she worked more than forty hours a week; (4) Defendants have not violated the FLSA‘s recordkeeping requirements; (5) Stansbury is not entitled to liquidated damages; and (6) Stansbury‘s recovery amounts are limited by the relevant statute of limitation. (ECF No. 49-2 at 3-12.)
1. Companionship Exemption
Once a plaintiff has established the elements of a failure-to-pay-overtime claim, an employer may show by a preponderance of the evidence that one of the exemptions afforded by
employed in domestic service employment [who] provide[s] companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary).”
The relevant regulations interpreting the FLSA define “companionship” as used in
(a) [T]he provision of fellowship and protection for an elderly person or person with an illness, injury, or disability who requires assistance in caring for himself or herself. The provision of fellowship means to engage the person in social, physical, and mental activities, such as conversation, reading, games, crafts, or accompanying the person on walks, on errands, to appointments, or to social events. The provision of protection means to be present with the person in his or her home or to accompany the person when outside of the home to monitor the person‘s safety and well-being.
(b) The term companionship services also includes the provision of care if the care is provided attendant to and in conjunction with the provision of fellowship and protection and if it does not exceed 20 percent of the total hours worked per person and per workweek. The provision of care means to assist the person with activities of daily living (such as dressing, grooming, feeding, bathing, toileting, and transferring) and instrumental activities of daily living, which are tasks that enable a person to live independently at home (such as meal preparation, driving, light housework, managing finances, assistance with the physical taking of medications, and arranging medical care).
In this Circuit, the care exception works as an exception to the companionship exemption. See Cummings v. Bost, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 978, 984 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (citing Toth v. Green River Reg‘l Mental Health/Mental Retardation Bd., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 216, 217 (W.D. Ky. 1989), aff‘d sub nom. Hengesback v. Green River Reg‘l Mental Health/Mental Retardation Bd., Inc., 985 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1993)).6 Under this framework, an employer first bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the companionship exemption of
shifts to the employee to prove that she is entitled to the care exception (i.e., submit proof that she performed care-related work more than 20% of the time). See
Stansbury is entitled to coverage under the FLSA. Under the FLSA, the role of “domestic worker” is an enumerated role entitled to individual coverage. See
There is a dispute in the record about the exact title, duties, and role of Stansbury‘s job. Defendants classify Stansbury as a “companion.” (ECF No. 49-2 at 3.) Stansbury classifies herself as a “domestic worker.” (ECF No. 45-4 at 10:6-10; ECF No. 56 at 2; ECF No. 56-1 ¶¶ 50-53.) Even classifying Stansbury as Defendants do (i.e., “companion“), her role falls under the regulation‘s definition of “domestic service employment.” See
Defendants have offered evidence that supports their entitlement to the companionship exemption. Both parties agree that some of Stansbury‘s duties fall under the regulatory definitions of “fellowship and protection.” (See ECF No. 56 at 5-6; No. 56-1 ¶¶ 22, 47.) Stansbury‘s own testimony supports a finding that her role was, at least in part, a companion. (See ECF No.
(holding that the companionship exemption applied when the services the employee performed “f[e]ll squarely within” the regulatory definitions of that term). The burden shifts to Stansbury to prove that there is a dispute of fact about entitlement to the companionship exemption. See Toth, 753 F. Supp. at 217.
Stansbury argues that, although some of her duties fell under the regulatory definitions of fellowship and protection, she is entitled to the care exception because more than 20% of her time was spent “performing housework for the benefit of the household[7] and assisting with activities of daily living and instrumental activities of daily living.” (See ECF No. 56 at 6.) Stansbury testified that she performed a variety of care-related tasks. (See ECF No. 56-2 at 43:5-46:21; 95:6-97:24; 263:3-263:24; see also ECF No. 51-4 at 2; ECF No. 56-1 ¶ 40.) The exact time spent on each of those tasks is unclear from the record. (See ECF No. 56-1 ¶ 47.) Her testimony suggests that she could have spent more than 20% of her time each week performing them. (See ECF No. 56-2 at 95:20-97:13; 101:15-104:3.)
To preclude summary judgment, it is enough for Stansbury to list and testify that she performed care-related tasks and allege
that she met the 20% threshold for the care exception. See, e.g., Anglin v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-689-ORL-22DAB, 2009 WL 2473685, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2009) (precluding summary judgment when plaintiff listed the household-related tasks she performed and stated in deposition that she “regularly spent” more than 20% of her time performing general household work); Fernandez v. Elder Care Option, Inc., No. 03-cv-21998, 2005 WL 8165440, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2005) (finding summary judgment improper when plaintiff stated in an affidavit that he performed household duties and it was not possible to determine from the record whether more than 20% of his time was spent performing those duties); Terwilliger v. Home of Hope, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1301-02 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (precluding summary judgment when plaintiffs claimed they met the 20% threshold and submitted affidavits stating they “performed general household work such as cleaning and grocery shopping at least twenty percent of the hours they worked each week“).
Defendants do not appear to dispute that Stansbury performed tasks that would fall under
51-4 at 1.) There is a material dispute about what Stansbury‘s role and duties were.
On the current record, a reasonable factfinder could find that Stansbury spent more than 20% of her time on care-related tasks. Stansbury has proven that there is a dispute of fact about her entitlement to the care exception. Summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate. See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 414 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“At this stage of the proceedings the amount of time plaintiffs devote to general household work remains a triable issue of fact; hence summary judgment is inappropriate.“).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is DENIED.
2. Covered Enterprise
Defendants ask the Court to determine as a matter of law that PoH is not a “covered enterprise” within the meaning of
3. Worked More Than Forty Hours
To succeed on a failure-to-pay-overtime claim, a plaintiff must establish that she worked more than forty hours a week. See Whaley, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. Defendants ask this Court to find as a matter of law that Stansbury cannot prove that she worked more than 40 hours a week. (See ECF No. 49-2 at 7-8.)
“[An] FLSA plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that he or she performed work for which he or she was not properly compensated.” O‘Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 602 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). “The most common method of proof of undercompensation is discovery and analysis of the employer‘s records.” Keller, 781 F.3d at 816 (citing O‘Brien, 575 F.3d at 602). When an employer has not introduced records that definitively establish the hours that an employee worked, an employee‘s testimony to the number of hours she worked is enough to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. See Keller, 781 F.3d at 816.
Faulkner has submitted no evidence that definitively establishes the number of hours Stansbury actually worked. Faulkner testified that he reported Stansbury worked forty hours a week, every week, regardless of the number of hours she actually worked. (ECF No. 56-1 ¶ 26.) Stansbury testified that, from October 2016 to November 2017, she worked from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00or 7:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. (ECF No. 56-1 ¶¶ 30, 59; No. 56-2 at 124:16-20, 125:21-126:14.) She also submits timesheets showing that, for certain periods during the relevant time, she worked more than forty hours a week. (See ECF No. 56-3 at 1-4.) That is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. See Keller, 781 F.3d at 816; Ramirez v. Rifkin, 568 F. Supp. 2d 262, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying summary judgment when employer did not keep adequate records and plaintiff testified that she worked more than forty hours a week); see also Mumbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that the district court properly relied on the employee‘s recollection of the number of hours she worked when her employer failed to keep adequate records as required by the FLSA).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is DENIED.
4. Recordkeeping Requirements
Defendants ask the Court to determine as a matter of law that they did
Normally, “[a]n FLSA plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she performed work for which he or she was not properly compensated.” White v. Baptist Mem‘l Health Care Corp., 699 F.3d 869, 873 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 192 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, if an employer does not keep adequate records in compliance with the FLSA, then an employee can carry the employee‘s burden “if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee‘s evidence.” Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. at 687-88; see also Keller, 781 F.3d at 816 n.10.
Defendants argue that they did not keep records improperly in violation of the FLSA because they satisfy
[W]here a domestic service employee works on a fixed schedule, the employer may use a schedule of daily and weekly hours that the employee normally works and either the employer or the employee may:
- Indicate by check marks, statement or other method that such hours were actually worked; and
- When more or less than the scheduled hours are worked, show the exact number of hours worked.
Reading the words “statement or other method” in
5. Liquidated Damages
Defendants ask the Court to conclude as a matter of law that, if a violation of the FLSA is proven, Stansbury is not entitled to liquidated damages. (ECF No. 49-2 at 9.) Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that an employer who violates
[To satisfy its burden of acting in good faith,] an employer must show that it took affirmative steps to ascertain the [FLSA‘s] requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions. Establishing that the employer did not willfully misclassify an employee is insufficient to show good faith. Rather, the employer has an affirmative duty to ascertain and meet the FLSA’s requirements, and an employer who negligently misclassifies an employee as exempt is not acting in good faith.
Timberline, 925 F.3d at 856 (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted); see Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d at 584 (“To prove that it acted in good faith, an employer ‘must show that [it] took affirmative steps to ascertain the Act‘s requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions.’”) (quoting Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 908 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Defendants argue that, based on the totality of the circumstances, they acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for failing to pay Stansbury because: (1) Faulkner never acted intentionally to violate the FLSA’s overtime requirements; (2) Faulkner did not know that Stansbury was performing tasks other than fellowship and protection of Mrs. Faulkner more than 20% of the time; (3) Faulkner relied on third party vendors to assurethat Stansbury‘s federal taxes and social security taxes were fully accounted for; (4) Faulkner paid Stansbury for days when she did not work and gave her money on various other occasions to help her out; (5) Stansbury never raised the issue of overtime during the relevant period and never asked for more money, with one exception in October 2016; (6) Faulkner was compensating Stansbury above the industry standard; (7) Faulkner went above and beyond to provide Stansbury a comfortable standard of living and paid her a very good rate and helped her meet her financial needs early on in her employment; and (8) Faulkner provided Stansbury with a handbook that stated the overtime policy and Stansbury was aware of the rule. (See ECF No. 49-2 at 9-12.)
(W.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[T]he existence of written policies setting forth proper rules for the payment of overtime does not itself immunize an employer from a finding that the employer willfully violated the FLSA.”).10 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is DENIED.
6. Limitation of Liability
The FLSA has a two-year statute of limitations for actions to recover unpaid overtime.
Stansbury responds that the three-year statute governs because Defendants’ violation was willful. (See ECF No. 56 at 10);
Stansbury seeks damages from October 11, 2016, to November 2017. (ECF No. 28 ¶ 12.) If the date of her original complaint controls (October 26, 2018), a two-year statute of limitations would allow her to collect damages from October 26, 2016, to November 2017. If the date of her amended complaint controls, a two-year statute of limitations would allow her to collect damages from July 8, 2017, to November 2017. A three-year statute of limitations under either date would allow her to collect the full damages she seeks.
An FLSA violation is willful if “the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.” McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988) (adopting standard promulgated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985)). Anemployer who acts unreasonably or negligently in violation of the FLSA does not act willfully. See Elwell, 276 F.3d at 842 n.5 (citing McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 135); Hall, 940 F.2d 660, at *3. The burden of proving an employer‘s willfulness falls on the employee. Frye v. Baptist Mem‘l Hosp., Inc., No. 07-2708, 2011 WL 1595458, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2011) (citation omitted), aff‘d, 495 F. App’x 669 (6th Cir. 2012).
The willfulness determination is a question of fact. A district court should only answer the question as a matter of law when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. See Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cty., 872 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted); Taha v. Bucks Cty. Penn., 367 F. Supp. 3d 320, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2019); see also Figueroa v. District of Columbia, 923 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The determination of willfulness is necessarily fact-specific.”) (citing Youngblood v. Vistronix, Inc., 2006 WL 2092636, *5 (D.D.C. July 27, 2006)). Here, a reasonable factfinder could find that Faulkner‘s failure to inquire into the number of hours Stansbury worked and compensating her for forty hours a week regardless was a willful violation of the FLSA. (See ECF No. 56-1 ¶¶ 25-26, 39); Elwell, 276 F.3d at 844 (“[A]n employer‘s recordkeeping practices may nonetheless corroborate an employee‘s claims that the employer acted willfully in failing to compensate for overtime.”) (citingMajchrzak v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 537 F. Supp. 33, 36 (E.D. Mich. 1981)). A reasonable factfinder could also find that, because Faulkner specifically instructed Stansbury not to work more than 40 hours a week, did not know Stansbury was working overtime, and gave Stansbury a handbook outlining overtime policy, Faulkner‘s failure to compensate Stansbury for overtime work was not willful.
Whether a two- or three-year statute of limitations is applicable turns on whether Defendants’ conduct was willful. See
The Court need not consider whether Stansbury‘s amended complaint meets the requirements of
In her motion for leave to file her amended complaint, Stansbury asked the Court to allow her to add PoH as a co-defendant. (ECF No. 26 ¶ 6) (“Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her Complaint to add ‘Physicians of Hearts, P.L.L.C.’ as a co-Defendant.”) (emphasis added). Stansbury‘s addition of PoH was a substantive change in her case, not a technical correction of a pleading mistake. See In re Biozoom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 3d 801, 811-12 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (amended pleading did not “relate back” because it “involve[d] adding both new Defendants and new Plaintiffs” rather than “the substitution of plaintiffs or defendants”); Hiler v. Extendicare Health Network, Inc., No. 5:11-cv-192, 2013 WL 756352, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2013) (amendedpleading did not “relate back” because the defendants it named were “newly added parties, resulting not in substitution or a party change but rather an enlargement of the defendant roster”); DeBois v. Pickoff, No. 3:09-cv-230, 2011 WL 1233665, at *10-11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2011) (amended pleading did not “relate back” because it “add[ed] three new defendants” rather than effecting a “one-for-one substitution”). Stansbury‘s amended complaint adding PoH does not relate back to the date of her original complaint.
Because determining whether the FLSA’s statute of limitation limits Faulkner‘s potential liability turns on a disputed question of fact (i.e., whether Faulkner‘s conduct was willful), summary judgment on this issue is not appropriate. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is DENIED.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Stansbury‘s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
So ordered this 18th day of February, 2020.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE