Sprint Pcs L.P. v. Connecticut Siting CouncilSprint Pcs L.P. v. Connecticut Siting Council
MARK F. KOHLER, Assistant Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendant-Appellee Connecticut Siting Council.
Before: SACK and MCLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges, and CEDARBAUM, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM:
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alfred V. Covello, Chief Judge) dismissing, sua sponte, one of two counts in the plaintiff‘s complaint for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. Each of the parties to this appeal takes the same position: that the district court misinterpreted Connecticut state law governing the appealability of declaratory rulings by state administrative agencies. Because we agree with the parties, we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Sprint PCS L.P. (“Sprint“) is a nationwide wireless telecommunications company that is licensed to provide Personal Communications Services (“PCS“) in the State of Connecticut. “PCS” refers to a recent generation of wireless service using digital transmission to provide wireless telecommunications services. As with traditional cellular telephone technologies, PCS is provided through a network of radio antennas and transmitters (referred to as “sites“). Portable telephones using PCS technology operate by transmitting a low-power radio signal to the antenna at a nearby site. The signal is then sent to an ordinary telephone line and routed to its ultimate destination. Calls or other communications using PCS must be passed from one geographic “cell” site to another as the mobile user travels from place to place. Sites must be sufficiently close together for PCS users to have continuous service.
Traditional cellular carriers use a similar system of broadcast towers to transmit communications to and from their mobile users. PCS providers and traditional cellular carriers thus face comparable zoning and land acquisition problems in constructing their network of sites. Traditional cellular carriers are able to resolve these problems in a streamlined fashion by petitioning defendant-appellee the Connecticut Siting Council for authority to construct their telecommunications facilities. A company unable to petition the Siting Council would be required to seek separate approval from each of the more than 160 municipalities in the State of Connecticut in which it desired to construct a telecommunications facility.
On December 10, 1997, the Siting Council issued a declaratory ruling to the effect that Sprint‘s PCS towers and equipment are not “facilities” within the Siting Council‘s jurisdiction. The Siting Council based its decision on the definition of “facility” in
On January 8, 1998, the plaintiff sued the Siting Council in federal district court in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In Count I of its complaint, Sprint sought a declaration that the definition of “facility” in
Sprint moved and the Siting Council cross-moved for summary judgment on Count II of Sprint‘s complaint. Cellco Partnership, appearing as an intervenor below, filed a brief in support of the plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment. Springwich Cellular Limited Partnership, also appearing as an intervenor below, filed a brief largely in support of the plaintiff‘s position. No party suggested that there was an issue as to whether or not Sprint was foreclosed from pursuing a judicial remedy because it had not exhausted its administrative remedies.
The district court, in an unpublished opinion, denied both of the cross-motions for summary judgment without reaching their merits. It concluded, without the benefit of briefing or argument on the issue, that Count II of the plaintiff‘s complaint should be dismissed because “pursuant to [Conn. Gen. Stat.] 16-50q and 4-183, additional administrative remedies are available with respect to count two and have not been exhausted.” In response to the parties’ motions for reconsideration, the district court declined to alter its ruling.
Upon a request by the parties, the district court then certified its decision for interlocutory appeal pursuant to
I. Standard of Review
As a general matter, when we review a district court‘s decision to deny a motion for summary judgment, we do so de novo. See Schaefer v. State Ins. Fund, 207 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 2000); Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 206 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 2000). The particular question facing this Court--whether Connecticut state law required Sprint to exhaust additional administrative remedies--is, moreover, a quintessential question of statutory interpretation requiring de novo review. See Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., 200 F.3d 753, 755 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating in dicta that exhaustion question depending on interpretation of state statute is reviewed de novo); see generally Hardy v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 792 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo). “It is our job to predict how the forum state‘s highest court would decide the issues before us,” McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 1997), and, to the extent there is any ambiguity in the state statutes under consideration, to “carefully predict how the highest court of the state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity.” Bank of New York v. Amoco Oil Co., 35 F.3d 643, 650 (2d Cir. 1994).
II. Appealability of the Siting Council‘s Declaratory Ruling
Sprint‘s “Petition for Declaratory Ruling” was submitted to the Siting Council pursuant to
The district court dismissed Count II of Sprint‘s complaint on the ground that Sprint had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies “pursuant to [Conn. Gen. Stat.] 16-50q and 4-183.” The first statute referred to by the district court,
Nor does
Although Sprint could have ascertained the jurisdiction of the Siting Council by applying for a certificate pursuant to
We think that, in light of the statutory authority and case law cited above, the Connecticut Supreme Court would hold that Sprint was not required to file an application for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need pursuant to
III. Merits of the Summary Judgment Motions
Sprint and the Siting Council each ask this Court, having resolved the exhaustion of remedies issue, to reach the merits of the parties’ dispute and enter summary judgment in their respective favor. We decline to do so. Initial consideration of the remaining issues would best be undertaken by the district court. See Valley Disposal, Inc. v. Central Vt. Solid Waste Management Dist., 31 F.3d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1994); United Fence & Guard Rail Corp. v. Cuomo, 878 F.2d 588, 596 (2d Cir. 1989).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for it to consider in the first instance the remaining issues pertaining to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.