In re MITCHELL P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. STEWART C. SMITH, as Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MITCHELL P., Defendant and Appellant.
L.A. No. 30886
Supreme Court of California
Dec. 22, 1978
946
Chuck Nacsin, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Bobby R. Vincent for Defendant and Appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Kremer, Assistant Attorney General, Alan S. Meth, A. Wells Petersen and Rudolf Corona, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
CLARK, J.-Appeal by Mitchell P., a minor, from juvenile court judgment finding him to come within provisions of
Appellant and other juveniles entered a jewelry store at night through a broken window, removing jewelry valued at $13,000.
In a petition filed pursuant to
The accomplice testimony rule is not constitutionally based. Rather it was court created in the first instance. (People v. Eckert (1860) 16 Cal. 110, 112.) Eckert reached its holding not on constitutional grounds but on English common law (see 7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2056, fn. 5) and today‘s legislative codification of the rule may be modified or repealed without infringing constitutional rights. The rule does not exist in many states and where it does exist it is normally of statutory origin. (7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2056, p. 319.) Federal courts have rejected the rule, holding “a conviction may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. . . .” (United States v. Turner (9th Cir. 1975) 528 F.2d 143, 161; see also United States v. Daniel (9th Cir. 1972) 459 F.2d 1029.) Therefore, due process does not require the rule be adopted in either criminal or juvenile proceedings.
A more difficult constitutional issue is presented by appellant‘s contention that, because the state deems uncorroborated accomplice testimony insufficient to support a criminal conviction, equal protection requires the same quality of proof in support of a juvenile jurisdictional finding. The Supreme Court in In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068] held that a minor cannot be subjected to “institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult.” (Id., at p. 367 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 377].)
At issue in Winship was the degree of factual proof of charged misconduct. In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428]
Appellant‘s equal protection contention cannot be rejected, of course, merely because it is not supported by Winship. The state has created a classification-placing those persons charged with crimes and subject to criminal penalties in a category different from those treated as juveniles and subject to restrictions the state deems to be for their best interests and necessary for their rehabilitation. The issue is whether the state can require a lesser quality of evidence in juvenile proceedings. This is not to say degree of proof may be different in the two proceedings-Winship established proof beyond reasonable doubt shall apply to juvenile as well as criminal proceedings. The issue is whether evidence deemed insufficient in a criminal proceeding-although standing alone it may constitute proof of criminal conduct beyond reasonable doubt-is sufficient in a juvenile proceeding, so long as the charged misconduct is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Appellant appears to argue on equal protection grounds that all rules of evidence in criminal proceedings must extend to juvenile court proceedings because in both criminal and juvenile proceedings the person charged faces the possibility of loss of freedom.
However, disparities among classes are constitutionally permissible when reasonably related to proper purpose.3 In T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767 [94 Cal.Rptr. 813, 484 P.2d 981] we upheld
The critical question is whether the purpose served by the accomplice corroboration rule permits, as in the case of record sealing, disparate treatment between persons charged with crime and persons charged with juvenile misconduct. We examine the differing effects of the rule when applied in different procedures.
Accomplice testimony is generally suspect because it may have been proffered in the hope of leniency or immunity, and thus greater weight may be accorded such testimony than is warranted. (See People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 808 [197 P.2d 734].) However, when a judge rather than a jury is trier of fact it is not unreasonable to assume he is more critical of accomplice testimony and more likely to accord it appropriate weight. Although juries are generally required upon demand by defendant in a criminal proceeding, the state is not constitutionally compelled to provide a jury in juvenile proceedings (see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528 [29 L.Ed.2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976]), the juvenile court judge or referee being the trier of fact. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Carl W.) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 271 [124 Cal.Rptr. 47, 539 P.2d 807].) It thus follows there is less reason for application of the arbitrary accomplice corrobora-
While adjudication of a juvenile offender may well result in an incarceration which is not unlike that in the case of persons convicted of crimes, it must be acknowledged that a person convicted of a serious crime is generally exposed to a greater and more onerous term of confinement than a juvenile ward charged with the same misconduct. In providing for the kind of evidence which can constitute proof of charged misconduct, it is not unreasonable that our Legislature has placed more severe limitations on evidence which may be used to prove the criminal violation, bearing in mind of course that the degree of proof calls for the same reasonable doubt standard in each instance.
Although the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court may not warrant a lesser degree of proof of the charged misconduct, the Legislature may well consider that judicial intervention in the interest of rehabilitating an impressionable minor outweighs policies against the use of particular kinds of testimony not otherwise constitutionally proscribed.5 It is the Legislature‘s prerogative, acting within constitutional guidelines, to strike a proper balance between these competing interests.
In the absence of direct constitutional prohibition or compulsion, equal protection has not been held in any instance to compel in juvenile proceedings evidentiary determinations identical to those in criminal courts.6 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. 528, the Supreme Court stated the broad issue to be whether there was a “constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court” (id., at p. 535 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 655]), but purported to dispose of that issue on a due process analysis. However, it recognized the equal protection issue, summarily disposing of it.7 In holding that a juvenile is not entitled to a jury determination of a
jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose served by juvenile court proceedings-a purpose different from that served by criminal prosecutions-could not be accomplished if those proceedings were burdened by the full panoply of rights accorded criminal defendants. “If the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial.” (Id., at p. 550 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 663].) Surely, if there are sufficient distinctions between criminal and juvenile proceedings to justify granting the constitutional right to a jury to the former and denying it to the latter, those same distinctions must also apply to the quality of evidence-providing that in both proceedings charged misconduct is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
We conclude that when due process and other constitutional demands have been satisfied, reasonable differences in criminal and juvenile evidentiary procedures are constitutionally permissible.
The judgment is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
BIRD, C. J.-I respectfully dissent.
In reaching the conclusion that a minor may be adjudged to have committed a crime solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a witness, who had been given immunity for his own admitted criminal acts, the majority err twice. They violate the Legislature‘s mandate that in the juvenile court system, “accomplice testimony should be surrounded with the usual safeguards. . . .”1 They also contradict the constitutional prohibition that judicial “intervention [into the life of a minor] cannot take the form of subjecting the child to the stigma of a finding that he
Today‘s decision by this court provides further support for the conclusion of one scholar that “few fields exist in which more serious coercive measures are applied, on such flimsy objective evidence, than in that of juvenile delinquency.” (Bovet, Psychiatric Aspects of Juvenile Delinquency (World Health Organization, 1951) p. 79, quoted in In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 25 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 541, 87 S.Ct. 1428].) It is, indeed, sad to see this distinguished court join such a questionable tradition.
I
The rule that a conviction may not be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice has deep historical roots in this state‘s criminal law. The rule was adopted at the very first session of the California Legislature. (Stats. 1850, ch. 119, § 405, p. 304.) It was reenacted in the Criminal Practice Act of 1851 (Stats. 1851, ch. 29, § 375, p. 252), and, when the penal laws were codified in 1872, it became
This court has observed that “[t]he requirement of
An accomplice is recognized to be a “tainted” source of evidence. (People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 471 [110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298].) He has a strong motive to fabricate testimony which incriminates innocent persons or which attributes the more active roles or the more serious offenses to others, in order that he might gain leniency or even immunity for his own criminal actions. (See, e.g., People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 468; People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 808 [197 P.2d 734].) An accomplice has other reasons, as well, to “tailor the truth to his or her own self-serving mold. . . .” (People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 471.) The accomplice may well be a friend of those who committed the crime with him, and he may attempt to keep them out of trouble by incriminating an innocent person instead of his actual associates. In addition, the accomplice may “purposely lie in order to convict an innocent man, thereby carrying out a threat or obtaining revenge against him.” (Comment, Accomplice Corroboration-Its Status in California (1962) 9 UCLA L.Rev. 190, 192.) Finally, an accomplice-especially one who, like the accomplice in the present case, is himself a minor-may be under great parental or societal pressure to focus the blame for his own misconduct on someone else. (Heydon, The Corroboration of Accomplices (Eng. ed.) 1973 Crim. L.Rev. 264, 276; see also People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 469-470.)
The danger in using the testimony of an accomplice is not limited to its lack of trustworthiness. The problem is compounded by the fact that an accomplice‘s fabrications “will usually have a seeming plausibility because the accomplice will have familiarity with at least some details of the crime: ‘an accomplice is not merely a witness with a possible motive to tell lies about an innocent accused but is such a witness peculiarly equipped, by reason of his inside knowledge of the crime, to convince the unwary that his lies are the truth.‘” (Heydon, supra, at p. 266; People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 967 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335].) Thus, “the chance of successful perjury is increased by the fact that the accomplice, completely familiar with the events of the crime, can fabricate a believable story which can withstand cross-examination.” (Note (1954) 54 Colum. L. Rev. 219, 234.)
For all of these reasons,
Since a minor‘s guilt of a criminal offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile court, the same legislative intent expressed in
II
Not only are the legislative purposes and policies embodied in
California‘s present statutory scheme for the juvenile courts (
In view of the “pronounced absence of uniformity of court procedures,” the commission proposed in its Recommendation No. 11 that the “juvenile court law should set forth minimum procedural rules as outlined in the comments accompanying this recommendation.” (Com. Rep., pt. I, at p. 29.) Those comments specifically referred to the accomplice-corroboration rule and recommended that “accomplice testimony should be surrounded with the usual safeguards. . . .”6 (Id., at p. 30, italics added.) The commission explained that “[a]ll of the reasons for employing rules of evidence in other judicial proceedings, e.g., to insure truthful, reliable, and fair testimony, apply with equal force to a hearing on a minor‘s delinquency. . . .” (Ibid., italics added.)
The conclusion that the accomplice-corroboration rule is applicable to juvenile court proceedings is strongly supported by this court‘s decision in People v. Superior Court (Carl W.), supra, 15 Cal.3d 271. There, this court held that the Legislature, in acting upon the commission‘s Recommendation No. 11, decided to provide more protection for the minor at contested jurisdictional hearings than did the commission. The court held that by adding certain language to
accomplice-corroboration in favor of less formality or fewer rights, as suggested by the majority opinion. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 952-953.)
The majority contend nevertheless that the accomplice-corroboration rule could not have been intended to apply in juvenile court because
The earliest version of the language relied upon by the majority was enacted by the Legislature in 1937 as former
Whatever doubts there may have been concerning the purpose of the language upon which the majority rely, those doubts were resolved
Further, the majority‘s reasoning flies in the face of this court‘s admonition “to look to the consequences of the proceedings rather than the formal labels to determine what rights are appropriately applied to juvenile proceedings.” (In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 866, fn. 21; see also Note (1974) 14 Santa Clara Law. 881, 883-884.) The “wooden approach”10 adopted by the majority has been repeatedly rejected, regardless of whether the rights involved are of constitutional origin (see, e.g., In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at pp. 49-50 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 558-559]; People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 244 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375]) or are based on statute (In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 866, fn. 21).11 “[I]n terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory hearing [in California‘s juvenile court system] from a traditional criminal prosecution.” (Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 530 [44 L.Ed.2d 346, 356, 95 S.Ct. 1779].) Clearly, the majority‘s statutory argument lacks merit.
III
The majority opinion‘s analysis of the denial of equal protection of the law is also erroneous. “The concept of the equal protection of the laws
In this case, equal protection does not involve differences in the formalities of how a court goes about determining whether an individual has committed criminal misconduct. (See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 551 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 664].) Rather, it concerns whether a minor may be convicted of an offense at all, when, as a matter of law, an adult-on trial for the identical offense on the basis of identical evidence-cannot be found guilty.12 It is established that “[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child.” (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 365 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 376].) Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that a minor may not constitutionally be subjected to “the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult.” (Id., at p. 367 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 377], fn. omitted.) These principles control here.
The majority offer several rationales in an attempt to justify a contrary result. None has merit.13 For example, the majority “assume” that a judge is a more competent trier of fact than a jury and thus will be “more critical of accomplice testimony” than a jury. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 951.) Yet, just three years ago this court “hasten[ed] to express our doubts” about the validity of such a startling assumption. (People v. Superior Court (Carl W.), supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 280.) In suddenly reversing itself, the majority has today attempted to deny a basic premise of our constitutional forefathers. (Cf.,
It is further asserted that a minor may be found to have committed a crime on evidence statutorily inadequate to convict an adult due to the state‘s need to intervene “in the interest of rehabilitating an impression-able minor. . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 952.) The majority do not elaborate. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have on numerous occasions expressed grave doubts whether minors actually receive the benefits of any special rehabilitation or treatment. For this reason, the courts have required that such a justification allowing differences between the juvenile and adult court must be more elaborate than “mere verbiage” and “more persuasive than cliché can provide.” (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. at pp. 29-30 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 547].) Courts must “look to the consequences of the proceedings rather than the formal labels to determine what rights are appropriately applied to juvenile proceedings.” (In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 866, fn. 21.)
Only three years ago the Supreme Court “candidly appraised” California‘s juvenile system and found “no persuasive distinction” between a
The majority also rely heavily upon McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. 528, in which the Supreme Court held that minors do not have a federal due process right to a jury trial at a jurisdictional-type hearing in juvenile court. There, the Supreme Court noted that its earlier Gault and Winship decisions had placed “an emphasis on factfinding procedures.” (403 U.S. at p. 543 [29 L.Ed. at p. 659].) A jury trial was not a due process requirement in juvenile court, the court reasoned, because “one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate factfinding.” (Ibid., italics added.) The court also stated a jury trial right “would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial.” (Id., at p. 550 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 663].)
From the holding in McKeiver, the majority conclude there can be no constitutional compulsion for an accomplice-corroboration rule in juvenile court. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 952-953.) However, the majority have significantly misinterpreted McKeiver. At the threshold, the majority appear to believe that McKeiver was partly decided as an “equal protection issue.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 952.) In fact, McKeiver was based only on the “narrow but precise” due process issue. (403 U.S. at p. 530 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 652].) Thus, while McKeiver might at most have disposed of appellant‘s federal due process claim, the equal protection problem was never resolved.
In the context of an equal protection analysis premised on the rational basis test, the inquiry is twofold: (1) can the reason that is offered to support the disparate treatment (e.g., of juveniles with respect to the accomplice-corroboration rule) “realistically be ascribed to the Legisla-ture“; and, if so, (2) is the disparate treatment “rationally related to [that] legislative purpose?” (Cooper v. Bray, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 854, 855.) Viewed from this perspective, McKeiver offers the majority no comfort.
Most of the reasons relied upon in McKeiver-including the most critical one-cannot realistically be ascribed to the Legislature when it
As to the remaining reasons offered in McKeiver for not having jury trials in juvenile court-i.e., delay and a public trial-neither are in any way involved by incorporation of the accomplice-corroboration rule. None of the concerns are rationally advanced by refusing to apply the accomplice-corroboration rule in juvenile court. Therefore, McKeiver fails to support the position of the majority.
IV
The legislative history of our Juvenile Court Law makes clear that the accomplice-corroboration rule was intended to apply to juvenile court. In view of what the majority concede is the “difficult constitutional issue” presented by this case (ante, at p. 949), I find it extraordinary they choose to pay so little attention to that history.
Further, it should violate our most fundamental notions of equality that one person may be found to have committed criminal misconduct and be subject to a potentially lengthy term at an undeniably penal institution operated by the California Youth Authority, while another person accused of the same crime on the same evidence must be acquitted. The former, a minor who is assertedly the recipient of specialized treatment, is in reality the recipient of specialized punish-ment. I cannot agree that our Constitutions require this court to stand idly by and ignore this basic inequity.
Newman, J., concurred.