*1 No. 30865. Aug. 1978.] [L.A. COOPER,
GERTRUDE Plaintiff and Appellant, al., BRAY CLAUDE LEWIS et Defendants and Appellants; TASHMA, RUTH Defendant Respondent.
Counsel
Green, Seaman, Leonard for Plaintiff & Green and Sacks Irving Royce and Appellant. Ammirato, Smith, Mark Rutter and
Buck, & Buck & D. Nimmo Molony, E. Smith Richard for Defendants Appellants. Curiae on & and Michael Brown as Amici Gould Bowers R.
Spray, behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Edward L. LeBerthon and Fernandes & LeBerthon Defendant Respondent.
Opinion
TOBRINER, J. third time we are For in recent confronted years, section the Vehicle Code violates with the of whether 17158 of question our (Cal. clause of state or federal Constitution protection equal 7; Const., out, Const., I, 14th art. U.S. Amend.) singling § victims, one narrow accident wide automobile class—injured range are which who to own car in they injured—and passengers happen this, this, class victims from obtaining recovery only barring their caused drivers who injuries. negligently v. Jones (1975)
In our court concluded Schwalbe initially April violated the constitutional this (Cal.), statutory equal provision Thereafter, however, we granted rehearing guarantee. protection and, sustained the of the court Schwalbe upon rehearing, majority v. Jones (Schwalbe statute constitutional challenge. reexamina- Cal.3d 514 546 P.2d After a careful 1033].) [128 issue, we have tion of the concluded our constitutional original that, determination was correct and under the appropriate governing standard, treatment mandated equal protection disparate 17158 cannot be sustained. Since the trial court in the constitutionally instant case that section 17158was in fact proceeded upon assumption unconstitutional, we conclude that its should be affirmed. judgment
1. Thefacts 13, 1971, 64, On Gertrude was February Cooper, age seriously in an automobile accident while as a in her own injured riding passenger accident, car. At the time of the defendant Claude Lewis Bray, age her of the service station where Miss took car employee Cooper regularly the vehicle. Miss had been a customer for servicing, driving Cooper the Colonial Oil service station where worked for five or (Arco) Bray accident, Mr. to the and on a number of occasions six Bray years prior her a block or two had Miss car at residence (located picked up Cooper’s had driven it to the station for and had then from station), repairs^ occasions, her home. On two or three Mr. had returned the car to Bray thereafter driven the car back to the station with Miss as a riding Cooper her own and Miss had then driven car back to passenger, Cooper home alone. accident,
On before Miss called February day Cooper the station her car because had stalled as she entered the of her driveway residence. She to have the vehicle and arranged picked up, repaired returned to her home at 8 a.m. the following day.
The next Mr. called to tell Miss that her car was morning, Bray Cooper later, and that he would return it to her home. A few minutes Mr. ready there, drove into Miss told her “to I’m Bray driveway Cooper’s get to drive back to the station.” Miss entered the going myself Cooper and Mr. drove toward the side station. Bray passenger’s uncontested, facts were at trial was the above testimony Although the events the accident. Miss conflict as to immediately preceding her between home distance Mr. drove short testified that Bray Cooper an hour), 35 miles at fast (30 station service relatively speed the last at at down he failed either slow sign stop stop in front made a left turn and that he before the service station intersection than 30 miles more was still traffic while the car traveling on-coming the left turn as testified that an hour. Miss also making Bray Cooper car saw a the service station she into rapidly suddenly approaching out, a The came shouted, “Oh, car is look warning her coming.” right late, however, the ultimate collision. too to avert Miss the events differed
Mr. recollection of significantly Bray’s a full at the last intersection’s that he made He testified stop Cooper’s. station, service drove the street slowly adjacent sign, up stop cars, then, no left turn activated his on-coming observing signal he He stated that commenced a left-hand turn into service station. station and saw a Chevrolet then heard Miss sudden scream Cooper’s with the collided station very rapidly. wagon wagon approaching later, one second front door right spinning passenger approximately vehicle around and it collide with another customer’s Cooper causing car in service station. *5 Tashma, station also testified
Ruth the driver of the Chevrolet wagon, 35 miles stated that she was trial. Mrs. Tashma approximately driving did not see the hour, that, it a clear she day, Cooper although per stated that the feet from her car. She it but few vehicle until was Cooper car, her front of left, of at an excessive rate car turned directly speed, avoid the or to swerve to did have time either to brake and that she not accident. the the were in the to accident facts leading dispute,
Although clear. As a result were all too of the collision unfortunate consequences collision, Miss through Cooper propelled impact from and suffered lacerations and of her automobile windshield bleeding of her face. She also sustained an and from rest her inguinal eyes ribs, hernia, her wrist and extensive lacerations fractures of right to a number her shoulder post-traumatic neurological injury right disorders. commenced the action
In Miss instant against Cooper January Prior Oil Mrs. Tashma. Colonial Bray, (Bray’s employer), trial, our initial decision in our court rendered commencement of Jones, Schwalbe unconstitutional Vehicle Code section holding supra, 17158 insofar as that section barred for owner-passengers recovering inflicted drivers their own vehicles. On basis injuries negligently Schwalbe, the trial court that it indicated would submit the entire case under jury ordinary negligence principles. trial, however, our court During pendency granted Schwalbe, Oil and counsel and Colonial then Bray rehearing instructed under objected having jury ordinaiy negligence princi- that under defendants could these be arguing only ples, held if liable found that accident resulted from jury Bray’s intoxication or willful The trial misconduct. court nonetheless instructed of all defendants could be on jury posited ordinaiy that, as the taking principles, apparently position original held, Schwalbe had section 17158 was indeed unconstitutional as opinion addition, In over defendants’ applied owner-passengers. objections, trial court refused to give comparative contributoiy negligence instructions, there was insufficient evidence concluding Miss to warrant such instructions. Cooper’s negligence deliberation, After vote, a nine-to-three returned a verdict jury, by and Colonial Oil liable for Miss but finding Bray injuries, Cooper’s Mrs. Tashma of for the accident. trial absolving any responsibility court entered in accordance with the verdict. judgment jury
Defendants and Colonial Oil now Bray appeal judgment them, that, entered of this court’s contending principally light *6 Jones, on v. decision in Schwalbe 16 Cal.3d intervening rehearing supra, 514, the trial court erred in the them find liable under permitting jury turn, Plaintiff in from the ordinary negligence principles. Cooper, appeals Tashma, in of favor Mrs. that under the evidence judgment claiming trial, Mrs. established as a matter of Tashma’s presented law. We the turn first to of defendants and Colonial Oil. Bray appeal
2. treatment accorded by disparate owner-passengers a
17158 bears no rational relation to conceivable realistically legisla tive and thus the section violates the clauses equal protection the and United States Constitutions. of California turn The merits of defendants’ the constitu- appeal principally upon of Vehicle Code section 17158 which an bars automobile tionality accident, a in cause of injured maintaining “owner-passenger,” vehicle, her action a driver of his or unless the against permissive result from the or intoxication willful misconduct driver.1 Despite statute, the the the court that the of trial instructed the jury provisions in this could from the case recover plaintiff owner-passenger damages his under driver traditional (Bray) periqissive employer constitutional, If is section 17158’s principles. owner-passenger provision a the trial were erroneous and court’s instructions clearly prejudicial, If, hand, of on the other the reversal would be judgment required.2 unconstitutional, in is the trial court did not err statutory provision on issue. this instructing jury noted, of section
As
of
constitutionality
already
question
court in
was most
before our
17158’s
recently
owner-passenger provision
Jones,
Schwalbe,
In
In Newland we refrained from one ‘correct’ constitutional selecting standard” from formulations, various alternative among linguistic of the formulas court concluding to conduct simply require “[a]ll ‘u serious and into the between genuine judicial inquiry correspondence ” the classification and (Italics added.) (Id.) legislative goals.’ classes,
Section 17158 divides automobile into two injured passengers who own the vehicle in which and are passengers they injured passengers vehicle, who do not own the those who fall injured deprives persons into the traditional to sue the owner-passenger category right legal driver of vehicle for inflicted an negligently preserving damages, in in which his situations recoveiy only owner-passenger’s result the driver’s intoxication or willful misconduct. proximately Newland, Under our task in the case “to a instant is conduct serious determine whether this treatment genuine judicial inquiry” disparate a bears rational owner-passengers relationship realistically conceivable or of the goal purpose legislation. section 17158 contains no statement of
Although explicit intent, a review origin legislative history provision rather clear into the provides enactment insight demonstrates was not intended to provision impose special on burdens but rather such owner- owner-passengers proposed place on an with most other automobile passengers equal plane injured passengers. Schwalbe,
As in the in explained dissenting opinion statutory at issue here was enacted in “as owner-passenger provision initially statute!3] amendment to the then automobile explicit existing guest 3“Vehicle Code as amended in read full: ‘No or person riding a vehicle owned him and driven another with and no his occupying person permission who as a a ride in vehicle person without guest accepts any highway giving upon ride, other civil for such nor has of action for compensation any person, any right vehicle the driver of the or other for the damages any liable against person legally conduct of the driver account of to or the personal injury on death of owner or guest ride, such action establishes death during unless injury from the resulted intoxication or willful misconduct the driver.’ The proximately
849 the 1961 1, A 1961, 1600, few ch. 3429.) § (Stats. years prior p. awas enactment, of whether ‘guest’ ‘owner-passenger’ question statute, and hence of the automobile precluded within guest meaning the automobile caused for from- by recovering time; under the the first driver, in California for original guest had arisen not had as a who statute, a was defined given passenger ‘guest’ for the ride. ‘compensation’ P.2d 30], 747-751
“In 147 (1957) v. Hanisch Cal.App.2d [306 Ray ‘the mere fact was the Court of held riding although plaintiff" Appeal defendant, friend, not her does her own car while it was driven in by in that her a the social between as parties arrangement classify guest,’ law, owner had not demonstrated, as matter of that the case given ride; the court held that for ‘compensation’ consequently, could not recover. In v. was a Ahlgren ‘guest’ owner-passenger however, 218], 216 on facts 185 (1960) Cal.App.2d Ahlgren [8 case, concluded that an the Court of closely Ray Appeal analogous statute, not a under ‘guest’ guest injured owner-passenger car, his the driver to use apparently reasoning permitting the act. also (See had within the owner meaning given ‘compensation’ P.2d 725 88].) (1957) Ahlgren Ahlgren Cal.App.2d [313 cases was not confusion illustrated “The Ray Ahlgren states had reached scene. Courts other to the California varying unique 312; Note 65 A.L.R.2d on this issue Annot. (see (1959) conclusions very 652; and Dean 93) Note So.Cal.L.Rev. (1958) U.C.L.A.L.Rev. (1957) statute’s had Prosser observed ‘knotty among guest pointedly and otherwise little entirely petty inconsequential involving problems of the car be it law’ was the ‘Can owner guest question: points ed. 1971) The Law Torts (Prosser, (4th when someone else is driving?’ 187.) § p. confusion, enacted the in 1961 eliminate this
“To case, was to that a at issue in this establishing passenger-owner provision whether or not as an automobile treated in a similar manner be ‘guest,’ could be construed as the owner’s conduct providing ‘compensation’ 1960-1961 Review Selected (See ride. Legislation California Bar J. 858.) 36 State (Fn. amendment.” from dis. opn.; the 1961 added language emphasized renumbered.) *9 “The 1961 amendment to the automobile ‘owner-passenger’ guest came the first time in Patton v. La Bree (1963) statute before this court for 60 Cal.2d 387 P.2d In Patton plaintiff, 398]. [35 serviced, car owner who had taken her car to an automobile dealer be while one was while as a accident occurred injured riding passenger; of car dealer’s was Plaintiff claimed initially employees driving. because she had for the her car had she paid servicing given ride; for the then she that insofar as the amended ‘compensation’ argued statute between who had guest distinguished given nonowner-passengers who had compensation given compensation, owner-passengers latter, the former but allowing recovery by barring recovery by statute’s classification scheme invalid under the equal protection clause. claim,
“Our court
but
rejected
equal protection
[contrary
defendants’ contention and to the
suggestion
majority opinion
Schwalbe
Cal.3d at
the Patton
in no sense
(16
519-520)]
pp.
holding
above,
the instant case. As
the statute before the court
controls
explained
all
the same treatment as
in Patton accorded
injured owner-passengers
While the
had concluded that
most
social
injured
Legislature
passengers.
a real distinction in the
‘guest’
giving
compensation represented
context,
who
differential treatment between those passengers
justified
not,
had
had
for the ride and those who had
paid
that in the context of an
concluded
‘owner-passenger’
apparently
earlier, in
as noted
had little meaning;
concept
giving ‘compensation’
some
some
sense
(e.g.,
every owner-passenger provides
‘compensation’
the rental value of the
for the ride.
Lorch
car)
(See,
Eglin
e.g.,
“[T]he different from the At the Patton. time Patton was question presented decided, the statutory provision denying owner-passenger recovery a driver’s negligence simply operated place injured owner-passengers on a contrast, with most social in the instant case injured par guests; inflicts a burden on challenged provision injured owner-passengers *10 in victims. difference other automobile accident borne no class of by circumstances, course, to this court’s of is attributable intervening 388, Cal.3d 855 v. Merlo [(1973)] in Brown decision [106 to we in in which held that 505], P.2d 66 A.L.R.3d recovery denying of the violated the basic statute the protection equal ‘guests’ nonpaying laws. Merlo, the in v. of of the automobile statute Brown
“In demise light guest treatment accorded it that the by is clear owner-passengers disparate no rational relation bears original legislative challenged provision seen, was enacted in order As we have at issue provision purpose. statute; now treat as under ‘guests’ guest owner-passengers denied for are no suffered automobile recovery guests longer driver, not of a the instant classification does the hands negligent clearly the same further legislative according owner-passengers purpose out treatment as such but rather defeats that guests, by singling purpose all other automobile for differential treatment owner-passengers accident victims.” Cal.3d at (16 530-532.) pp. Merlo,
Defendants, that this in court’s decision Brown v. recognizing undermines rationality owner-passenger supra, portion reverse in section our court to reconsider and the decision urge Merlo, Brown v. and then to of the challenged uphold validity on the of Patton. As defendants provision authority owner-passenger however, in 1973 acknowledge, repealed guest- Legislature 17158 and turn the clock thus passenger portion any attempt and law is futile. After Brown v. Merlo back to Merlo clearly pre-Brown can the 1973 amendment of section the owner-passenger provision if there survive is conceivable realistically only purpose which treatment accorded rationally justifies disparate presently owner-passengers nonowner-passengers. that such rational for
Defendants justification suggest initially treatment can be found in the interest statute’s Legislature’s disparate the careful automobile selection safety by promoting encouraging have no drivers car owners. we Although permissive supervision interests, are a number that these state doubt legitimate important we conceivable of reasons cannot find either these concerns are or that such can statute in rationally question purposes purposes the treatment accorded justify provision. with,
To defendants of section begin suggest although 17158 is to to use care in the selection and owners encourage supervision cars, no of those who to drive their the statute itself draws they permit who do use care these distinction between those owners activities care, who do not use such but instead bars all owners those owners If the without to the exercise or nonexercise care. recovering regard had intended statute encourage diligence *11 drivers, that it of it is hard to believe selection and permissive supervision as owner- would have drafted the statute so to bar all recovery by selected the most the most careful owners who including passengers, the and cautious drivers who driving. scrupulously supervised is made no more defendants’ rationale by plausible proposed have determined to bar by recovery may suggestion alike, and because of all negligent nonnegligent owner-passengers, direct control the actions of owner’s permissive “legal right” “It common driver. As in the Schwalbe: is dissenting opinion explained which course, as of the cars now a result knowledge, speed traffic and the of streets and most accidents travel freeways, congestion little almost op- develop instantaneously, leaving any owner-passenger Moreover, when he has intercede. as for those few occasions portunity owner, cliche, no ‘in the wheel, to revert to a is surrendered longer would increase driver’s seat’ and intercession in all likelihood physical reduce the most rather than Finally, impor- probability mishap. as well and effectiveness of intercession as likelihood tantly, physical course, are, a such as verbal assistance sounding warning car, car.” (16 not his title functions of a passenger’s presence Cal.3d at 534.) p. with reconciled cannot be
Moreover, this legislative purpose suggested an 17158, which in section embodied permit “exceptions” statutory caused when his is to obtain injury recovery proximately owner-passenger If of section a or misconduct. intoxication the driver’s purpose willful drivers, it care in the selection supervision to encourage an when statute to no recovery makes sense permit obviously car, when owner to drive owner intoxicated person permits rather than willful misconduct a who simple selects driver engages identical which These excep- parallel statutory exceptions, negligence.4 statutory that the defendants’ belated 4These also refute argument statutory exceptions of discouraging be conceivable purpose classification may justified tions in the statute fn. it (see ante), make that the original guest plain to accord provision simply injured owner-passengers treatment with social and not to disabilities equal guests, impose special on such owner-passengers. other in the same
Finally,
statutory provisions—located
chapter
that,
Vehicle Code as section 17158—make it clear
as between a negligent
owner,
driver and an
in this state
permissive
general legislative policy
is to hold the
driver
liable for
negligent
primarily
resulting injuries,
not, as defendants’
to saddle a
owner
argument suggests,
nonnegligent
“Thus,
with the entire loss.
whereas Vehicle Code section 17150 povides
that an automobile owner is liable for
to third
parties resulting
vehicle,
driver’s
of the owner’s
permissive
negligent operation
declares
it is the
or driver
explicitly
negligent operator
*12
who is
liable and ‘recourse shall first be had
primarily
against
of the
moreover, section 17153
property
operator’;
specifically provides
that
there is
,
. . . under this
an owner
. .
.
recovery
‘[i]f
chapter against
the owner ...
is
to all the
of the
. . .
subrogated
rights
person injured
recover from the
the total amount
may
of
operator
any judgment
.[5]”
.
Jones,
costs.
.
(Schwalbe
automobile owners from ever driver to drive the allowing permissive vehicle when the owner is present, because of the ostensibly driver’s limited permissive with the familiarity vehicle. If this were indeed the it is legislative purpose, to believe that the impossible would have created Legislature for such have the effect present exceptions, exceptions of “disincentive” with removing statutory to those drivers who respect permissive pose hazard. greatest safety owner, 5“Section 17152 in full: ‘In provides action an any or against personal 17150, 17154, of a decedent on representative account of Sections liability imposed by or vehicle, 17159 for the or act or negligent wrongful omission of the of a operator shall be made a defendant if operator service of can be made party in a manner process sufficient to secure over the personal jurisdiction operator. Upon recovery judgment, ” recourse shall first be had so served.’ against property operator “Section 17153 in full: ‘If there provides is under this recovery an chapter against owner, owner, decedent, owner, bailee of an or of a personal representative bailee of owner, or aof decedent is personal representative to all subrogated rights or whose has been person injured recover from the property injured may operator owner, owner, total amount of and costs recovered bailee judgment of an ” or (Fn. renumbered.) of decedent.’ from dis. personal representative opn.; Thus, reasons, for all of the above classification at issue statutory cannot be as a means of care in the justified selection or encouraging drivers. supervision permissive
Defendants, on the Schwalbe, relying primarily majority opinion if even our court suggest cannot alternatively find that realistically the statute’s treatment of disparate was intended to owner-passengers owners, care such we should promote nonetheless sustain the statutory classification as related to an ostensible rationally legislative purpose drivers from “protecting” negligent to owner- permissive true, course, It is that section 17158 does have passengers. the effect of drivers their “protecting” (and “insulating” insurers) negligent lawsuits This rendition of a by injured owner-passengers. suggested however, does no more than restate the terms of the purpose, statute itself and neither indicates the which the general goal intended to such ostensibly promote providing “protection” nor does it demonstrate that such a owner-passengers’ expense, can be ascribed realistically Legislature.
It state, course, is the basic in this is policy every person for the Code, of his acts (Civ. 1714) responsible § consequences negligent and, noted, as we have numerous Vehicle Code sections already explicitly drivers bear provide permissive primary responsibility *13 which are caused their injuries (Veh. proximately by negligent driving. Code, In §§ of these 17153.) we find it light general provisions, difficult to attribute to the a conscious intent to Legislature protect drivers from for which inflict negligent liability injuries they upon owner-passengers. there is in the of section 17158 to
Although nothing legislative history thesis, support defendants—adverting majority opinion Schwalbe—contend that the have intended Legislature may purposefully to driver from suit in view protect permissive owner-passenger that, the fact 11580.1,6 under Insurance Code section the owner- insurance not afford to for passenger’s policy might coverage Schwalbe, however, owner. As out in the pointed dissenting opinion “California law that all automobile drivers as statutory explicitly provides owners, well as automobile are to obtain insurance required adequate (c), 6Section 11580.1 subdivision that an provides automobile insurance liability policy “(5) exclude may by for to an appropriate provision coverage Liability bodily injury insured.” Code, In 16020.)[7] § Veh. (See light longstanding coverage. to to automobile drivers California carry seeking encourage policy Note, Constitu Financial Laws in insurance (see liability Responsibility 61 Cal.L.Rev. it cannot 1076-1078), tional Perspective maintained enacted or be realistically plausibly reenacted section 17158 to those drivers who choose not obtain protect insurance, and, their at own to afford that particular, protection victims whom such uninsured drivers very expense negligently at 537.) Cal.3d As the facts of this case demon (16 injure.” p. vividly strate, in most situations section 17158 to relieve the operates simply driver’s insurer of for a of risk v/hich such insurer type clearly to assume. agreed sum,
In
conducted a “serious and
into
having
genuine judicial inquiry
between the
classification
correspondence
[statutory]
legisla
Governors,
tive
(Newland
v. Board
19 Cal.3d
we
711),
goals”
supra,
are convinced that the
treatment
the statute is not
accorded
disparate
related
conceivable
rationally
realistically
legislative purpose.
“Enacted to
with the same treatment
provide injured owner-passengers
accorded
social
the statute now
owner-
injured
guests,
deny
operates
other class
automobile
passengers
legal rights enjoyed by every
Jones,
accident victims.”
(Schwalbe
16 Cal.3d
(dis.
supra,
p.
we conclude that the
violates
classification
opn.).) Accordingly,
statutory
the state and
Jones,
federal
Schwalbe v.
equal protection guarantees.
As the trial court in this case proceeded upon assumption that section 17158 was unconstitutional and refused to instruct the on jury basis but statute instead instructed the could jury and Colonial Oil under prevail normal against Bray negligence princi in view of our ples. conclusion that section is *14 unconstitutional, indeed trial court did not err in this and regard in favor of consequently judgment plaintiff Bray against **8 Colonial Oil should be affirmed.* of, shall, 7“Section 16020 in full: driver a provides ‘Every and owner motor vehicle at of, times, all maintain in force one of the forms of financial in Section responsibility specified (Italics added.)” (Fn. 16021.’ renumbered.) from dis. opn.; 8In addition to the trial court’s challenging on section ruling defendants Bray and Colonial Oil contend that the trial erred court refusing instruct on the jury comparative doctrine. The trial court negligence concluded that there was insufficient evidence of plaintiff’s to warrant negligence submitting issue to the jury, although determination, defendant attacks that we with the trial agree court’s As the facts ruling. 3. Mrs. Tashma is appeal judgment Plaintiff’s from favor of without merit.
As discussed at the outset of this
at trial the
absolved
opinion,
jury
Tashma,
collision,
Mrs.
the driver of the other vehicle involved in the
for the accident. Plaintiff
from the
entered
any liability
appeals
judgment
favor,
in Mrs. Tashma’s
that the evidence establishes Mrs.
contending
trial,
Tashma’s
as matter of law. Plaintiff’s own
testimony
however,
indicated that
turned
into the
of Mrs.
Bray
directly
path
Tashma’s
automobile without
and the
could
on-coming
warning
jury
concluded,
have
on the
of such
either that
basis
Mrs.
certainly
testimony,
Tashma was not
or that her
was not a
negligent
negligence
proximate
cause of the
Since there
thus
evidence to
substantial
injury.
support
must fail.
Foreman &
(See,
jury finding, plaintiff’s present appeal
e.g.,
3 Cal.3d
Bird,
J., Mosk, J., Manuel, J.,
concurred.
C.
two
RICHARDSON, J. I
dissent. Only
years ago,
respectfully
of this court
constitutionali
substantial
of the justices
upheld
majority
that it
Code to the extent
of section 17158 of
Vehicle
precluded
ty
the driver on account
personal
recovery by
owner-passenger
to,
of,
from the
death
the owner
or
resulting
proximately
related above undisputed have defendant contends that the danger. Although jury might as she was aware of any drive her car or in to instruct in either Bray failing permitting found plaintiff negligent *15 determined we believe the trial court properly earlier in brief trip, him to slow down not have been warranted in finding would that on the facts jury presented due under the circumstances. had failed to exercise care The concludes that section 17158 lacks rational majority any justifica tion, in a conclusion to our Schwalbe. As we contrary directly holding California had courts (Schwalbe, 521-522), carefully explained supra, pp. insurance excluded from which validity liability upheld policies the insured or of his members coverage family. Legislation permitted such exclusion as well as under the terms of uninsured motorist recovery owner’s When 1973 the considered the policy. Legislature of the owner of former 17158 “it did so in the reenactment section portion enactments, of its own whose effect was to context prior practical the owner recourse to his own (P. 522.) preclude policy.” that, have concluded use Justice to Sullivan’s Legislature rationally might it “was not fair” to (ibid.) allow the language, simply owner-passenger driver, selected, own sue his whom he and over whom he person some retained to “seek control and his power supervision recovery the insurance Indeed, assets of the driver.” (Ibid.) personal of such have been deemed a reasonably imposition may trap class of drivers. nonowner there particular persons—uninsured, Surely drive, are who are able to not but who do own a many vehicle persons are Such uninsured. consent to drive an accordingly persons may to his destination assume that because owner-passenger only they owner possesses which extends users. liability coverage permissive Thus, in the absence of a such as section the uninsured provision driver would face unlimited his when results personal liability or death to the injury owner-passenger. does not find it that section
Although present majority plausible motorists, enacted to uninsured it I think protect very probable that the interests driver and owner Legislature weighed conflicting concluded the driver should be the owner’s given protected, of, over, selection it driver. While with may disagree supervision matter of as a cannot legislative reasoning majority policy, surely characterize the conclusion as irrational or inconceivable.
The issues in the before with matter us were stated characteristic “Plaintiffs, succinctness Justice Sullivan in Schwalbe: in order to their sustain denies them position equal protection laws, must not be above content that the argue reasoning unwise, or that the could have been better furthered another Nor is it means. for them to show that the enough lawmakers, areas, similar in similar have made addressing problems' dissimilar The burden cast them is that of demonstrat- judgments. upon
858 irrational, were or that the that the means chosen by ing concern. which furthered was not a they legitimate legislative indicates, This have not done. As analysis foregoing they a fair achieving clearly legitimate goal Legislature, pursuing conduct, for caused unreasonable distribution of damage vehicle, it himself whether he drives that the owner of a motor concluded chauffeur, pr should not recover to act as his selects another of that to the sustained him due vehicle—especial- negligent operation such the case driver of the fact that in any surrogate ly light We with of that driver. would be at the may disagree recovery expense reason. To conclusion, as but we cannot brand it this beyond pale We function. do be to erode our constitutional so would seriously count for nonsuit on the conclude therefore that motion Jones, 522- 16 Cal.3d at v. (Schwalbe pp. granted.” supra, properly 523, fns. omitted.) court five of this concluded
Just two years ago, justices a rational basis disclosed challenged supporting foregoing analysis holds The fact contrary majority present provision. In such minds differ on the matter. that reasonable may only emphasizes in favor that we must resolve doubts we have said case consistently In re H. Ricky challenged legislation. (E.g., constitutionality 76, M. P.2d In re Dennis 204]; 2 Cal.3d (1970) Cal.Rptr. [86 State 296]; 450 P.2d 70 Cal.2d [75 365, 371 P.2d 7].) 48 Cal.2d Ind. Acc. Com. (1957) [310 California in favor of would I reverse judgment Oil. and Colonial defendants Bray J.,
Clark, concurred.