Sheet Metal Workers Local Union 33 v. SuttonSheet Metal Workers Local Union 33 v. Sutton
{¶1} Defendants-appellants Thomas F. Sutton, Jr., et al. appeal the October 22, 2010 Judgment Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 33. Appellants also appeal the April 9, 2010 Judgment Entry, which denied their request for fees.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} Appellee is a local trade union affiliate of an international labor union. Appellants were voluntary members of Appellee, working as employees of Kiko Heating & A/C. Kiko was a covered employer and signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with Appellee.
{¶3} On June 19, 2009, Jerry Durieux, Appellee‘s business representative, contacted Appellant Thomas F. Sutton, Jr., who was the union steward for Kiko. Durieux asked Appellant Sutton to arrange a meeting for all Kiko employees who were members of Appellee. At the meeting, Durieux advised Kiko‘s union member employees that Kiko was three weeks behind on fringe benefit payments. Appellant and the other employees agreed with Durieux‘s decision to remove them from Kiko should the employer not pay the fringe benefits by the following day. Following the meeting, Durieux provided Tim Brown, owner of Kiko, notice if the fringe benefits were not paid, Appellee would remove all of its members from Kiko. Kiko did not pay the delinquent fringe benefits. As a result, Appellee exercised its right under the collective bargaining agreement and pulled its members working for Kiko.
{¶5} On December 1, 2009, Appellee filed five separate actions against each Appellant in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, seeking to uphold the disciplinary sanctions and to collect the disciplinary fines. Appellants filed individual motions to dismiss. While the motions were pending, Appellants filed separate motions to consolidate, which the trial court granted. The trial court treated the motions to dismiss as motions for change of venue. The trial court ordered the consolidated cases be transferred to Stark County. The Stark County Court of Common Pleas received the transfer on February 11, 2010. Appellants filed an Answer as well as a motion for attorney fees. Via Judgment Entry filed April 9, 2010, the trial court denied Appellants’ request for fees.
{¶7} It is from this judgment entry Appellants appeal, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY RESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT IN THE MOVANT‘S FAVOR.
{¶9} “II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE UNION HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE EMPLOYEES.
{¶10} “III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE FINE IN THE MATTER WAS APPROPRIATE RATHER THAN ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE.
{¶11} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES TO DEFENDANTS UPON THE CHANGE OF VENUE UNDER OHIO CIVIL RULE 3.”
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶12} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc. (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212. As
{¶13}
{¶14} It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1987), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265. The standard for granting summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264: ” * * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party‘s claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under
I
{¶15} In their first assignment of error, Appellants contend the trial court improperly resolved issues of fact in Appellee‘s favor. Specifically, Appellants take issue with the trial court‘s resolution of the question of what Jerry Durieux told Appellants about whether there would be other work available after they were removed from Kiko.1 We find what Durieux told or did not tell Appellants regarding other available work is not a material fact as it relates to Appellee‘s decision finding Appellants violated the contract2.
{¶16} Generally, the provisions set forth in a union‘s constitution and bylaws, which define punishable conduct and establish the procedures for internal trial and appeal, constitute a contract between the union and its members. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. (1967), 388 U.S. 175, 180, 182, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2008, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, 1129. (Citation omitted). Since federal law does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary fines by unions upon its members or the resort to judicial enforcement of such fines, “[s]tate law governs union lawsuits to collect disciplinary
{¶17} “Under Ohio law, unions and other unincorporated associations may sue their voluntary members to collect debts and to enforce discipline.” Local Lodge 1297, supra, 22 Ohio St.3d at 232, 22 OBR at 410, 490 N.E.2d at 869. A disciplinary fine imposed by a union upon its member is a binding contractual obligation that constitutes a debt. Id.; 48 American Jurisprudence 2d (1979) 308, Labor and Labor Relations, Section 397; Annotation (1967), 13 A.L.R.3d 1004.
{¶18} Ohio courts will not review the actions and decisions of a union in disciplining its members in the absence of mistake, fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, where the union has afforded the member due process. State ex rel. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Judges (1962), 173 Ohio St. 239, 19 O.O.2d 52, 181 N.E.2d 261, paragraph three of the syllabus; Lough v. Varsity Bowl, Inc. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 153, 45 O.O.2d 483, 243 N.E.2d 61, syllabus.
{¶19} Appellants were sent notice of the September 12, 2009 trial committee hearing. Appellants chose not to attend or send a representative on their behalf. We find Appellants were afforded due process.
{¶20} Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶21} In their second assignment of error, Appellants maintain the trial court erred in finding Appellee had jurisdiction over them. We disagree.
{¶23} We find Markell to be factually distinguishable. Although Appellants in the instant action were fined after their resignations, they were charged for violations of the Union Constitution committed prior to their resigning. The crucial inquiry with regard to membership status is not whether the person was a member of the union at the time the fines were imposed or enforced, but rather, whether the person was a member of the union on the date of the alleged union violation. Booster Lodge No. 405, Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. N.L.R.B. (D.C.Cir.1972), 459 F.2d 1143 affirmed 412 U.S. 84, 93 S.Ct. 1961, 36 L.Ed.2d 764 (1973). Furthermore, contrary to Appellants’ position, we find Appellee did not institute the disciplinary action nor impose the fines as a means of restricting Appellants’ ability to resign. Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B. (1985), 473 U.S. 95, 105 S.Ct. 3064.
{¶24} Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in determining Appellee had jurisdiction over Appellants.
III
{¶26} In their third assignment of error, Appellants submit the trial court erred in finding the fines imposed upon them by Appellee were not arbitrary or unreasonable.
{¶27} “The severity of the fine alone or its punitive effect … is not tantamount to arbitrariness or unreasonableness since the levying of a fine is not merely the collection of damages but relates to the power of a labor organization to promote solidarity among its members.” International Bhd. of Elec.v. Smith (1992), 76 Ohio App.3d 652, 662. “Among the factors considered by the courts in making a determination as to whether the fine is arbitrary and unreasonable are: (1) methods and formulas used for calculation, (2) the member‘s conduct for which the fine was imposed, (3) income of the member, (4) amount of fine, (5) resulting harm or damage to the union or its other members, (6) nature of offenses being punished, (7) manner and extent to which the member benefited or profited, and (8) the current economic conditions.” Id. (Citations omitted).
{¶28} Appellee submitted a second affidavit of Jerry Durieux in support of its position the fines were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Durieux averred the fines imposed were appropriate based upon the economic loss suffered by Appellee as well as the resulting harm and damage to the Union as a whole. In opposing Appellee‘s motion for summary judgment, Appellants submitted their own affidavits in which they each averred the fine imposed was greater than his annual income. Apellant‘s further stated Durieux told them he did not have work available for the men, and instructed them to find work where they could.
{¶30} Appellants’ third assignment of error is sustained.
IV
{¶31} In their final assignment of error, Appellants argue the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees pursuant to Civ. R. 3.
{¶32} A trial court‘s decision as to the appropriateness of an award of attorney fees will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
{¶33}
{¶34} “(2) When an action is transferred to a county which is proper, the court may assess costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the time of transfer against the party who commenced the action in a county other than stated to be proper in division (B) of this rule.”
{¶35} Appellee originally filed the actions against Appellants in Cuyahoga County because the main office of the Union is located in Parma, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and because Appellants participated in business in Cuyahoga County as a result of their voluntary Union membership.
{¶36} We find Appellee had valid reasons to believe Cuyahoga County was the appropriate venue. We further find Appellee did not “deliberately or heedlessly” initiate the actions in Cuyahoga County. See, Premier Assoc., Ltd. v. Loper (2002), 149 Ohio App.3d 660 (Citation omitted).
{¶37} Appellants’ fourth assignment of error is overruled.
By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Edwards, J. concur
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter is remanded for hearing in accordance with this Opinion and the law. Costs divided equally.
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS