SHARI RENEE NAUFLETT v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
No. 17-1986
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
June 14, 2018
PUBLISHED
Aрpeal from the United States Tax Court. (Tax Ct. No. 024427-15)
Argued: May 9, 2018
Decided: June 14, 2018
Before TRAXLER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Allison Bray, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts; Carlton Malben Smith, New York, New York, for Appellant. Richard Caldarone, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: T. Keith Fogg, Director, Harvard Federal Tax Clinic, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, for Appellant. David A. Hubbert, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Francesca Ugolini, Tax Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Shari Renee Nauflett appeals from the dismissal by the United States Tax Court of her petition for relief from unpaid tax liability based on spousal innocence. Nauflett filed her petition one week after the expiration of the 90-day filing requirement in section
I.
The IRS charged Shari and Derek Nauflett, wife and husband and joint income tax filеrs, as jointly and severally liable for unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties for tax years 2002-04 and 2008.1 Nauflett requested relief under the innocent spouse doctrine.2 The letters of final determination from the IRS denying Nauflett‘s request were dated June 17, 2015, and contained the following statement: “If you disagree with our decision, you can file a petition with the United States Tax Court to review our denial. You must file your
petition within 90 days from the date of this letter. . . . [T]he IRS cannot change the time period.” E.g., J.A. 15.
Nauflett alleges that she contacted bоth the IRS contact person listed on the notification letter and an employee at the IRS Taxpayer Advocate Service for assistance in navigating the review process because she believed that she was entitled to relief as an innocent spouse. According to Nauflett, both individuals incorrectly informed her that she had until September 22, 2015, to file her petition.
Nauflett filed her petition for review in the Tax Court on September 22, 2015.3 The IRS moved to dismiss Nauflett‘s petition for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the pеtition was untimely. It pointed out that the notification letters were dated June 17, thereby fixing September 15, 2015—one week before Nauflett filed—as the last day to file a timely petition.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and dismissed Nauflett‘s petition for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the Tax Court relied on its previous decisions holding that the plain language of
Nauflett then moved to vacate the dismissal order, arguing again that the deadline was not jurisdictional and thus could—and should—be equitably tolled. The Tax Court denied Nauflett‘s motion and again rejected Nauflett‘s interpretation of the statute.
Nauflett noted a timely appeal from the Tax Court‘s orders. This Court has jurisdiction under
II.
This appeal presents a straightforward question: is the 90-day filing requirement in
When a filing deadline is jurisdictional, an untimely filing “deprives [the] court of all authority to hear [the] case.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (2015). The Supreme Court has undertaken in recent years to “ward off profligate use of” the label “jurisdictional” by adopting a “readily administrable bright line for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional.” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg‘l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Statutory language is jurisdictional only when “Congress has clearly stated that” it is. Id. (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted). That said, Congress need not “incant magic words in order to” do so; rather, the statute‘s “сontext, including [the Supreme] Court‘s interpretations of similar provisions in many years past” is “probative of whether Congress intended a particular provision to rank as jurisdictional.” Id. at 153-54 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of statutes of limitations and other filing deаdlines, using mandatory language is not enough to classify the provision as jurisdictional. See Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632 (noting that these provisions “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation [rather than] deprive a court of authority to hear a case” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, the question is whether a filing deadline limits “the power of the court rather than . . . the rights or obligations of the parties.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As with any case of statutory interpretation, we begin with the words Congress used in the statute. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep‘t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 283 (2011). The text of subsection (e)(1)(A) clearly demonstrates Congress‘s intent that its filing deadline is jurisdictional. The provision states that an individual claiming relief as an innocent spouse
may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this sectiоn if such petition is filed—
(i) at any time after the earlier of—
(I) the date the Secretary mails, by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer‘s last known address, notice of the Secretary‘s final determination of relief available to the individual, or
(II) [not applicable here], and
(ii) not later than the close of the 90th day after the date described in clause (i)(I).
Nevertheless, additional support to our understanding of Congress‘s intent lies in the broader context of subsection (e)(1)(A) within
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (discussing the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, the language of subsection (e)(1)(B) reinforces our interpretation of subsection (e)(1)(A) in two ways. First, it prohibits the IRS from collecting assessed taxes “until the close of the 90th day referred to in” subsection (e)(1)(A).
In the end, Nauflett relies only on strained readings and broad principles to urge us to reach a different result. But none of Nauflett‘s arguments overcome the plain language of the statute. She points to the equitable nature of the innocent spouse doctrine as a reason for believing Congress intended for the filing deadline to be subject to еquitable tolling. But “[w]here, as here, Congress has balanced [the] interests and costs and embodied the result in an unambiguous statute, it is not for a court to depart from its words, whatever the equities of a particular case may be.” Anderson v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Tr. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 996 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1993).
Nauflett calls attention to the jurisdictional language‘s placement inside a parenthetical. But this designation has no consequence and does not strip the words of their ordinary meaning. As the Supreme Court has recognized, where there is “compelling textuаl evidence” that words inside parentheses have a particular meaning read alongside the other words in the statute, the fact that they are in parentheses does not alter that meaning. See United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013).
Nauflett also relies on the general principle thаt filing deadlines are rarely jurisdictional. That may be true, but where Congress expresses its clear intent for a filing deadline to be jurisdictional, that settles the issue: it is jurisdictional. See Matuszak, 862 F.3d at 197-98 (observing the statute cannot be read any other way); Rubel, 856 F.3d at 305 n.7 (“Congress‘s use of language that ‘speaks in jurisdictional terms’ makes the deadline jurisdictional.“).
Nаuflett further points to the lack of legislative history or Supreme Court case law establishing that subsection (e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional. While such sources could be useful guides to determining whether a provision is jurisdictional in cases where the text is less clear, e.g., Auburn Reg‘l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. at 153-54, that is not the case here. The plain language of the statute speaks for itself, clearly establishing that the Tax Court has jurisdiction only over petitions filed during the 90-day period.
Because subsection (e)(1)(A) is jurisdictional, the Court lacks discretion to waive compliance based on equitable considerations. See Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1631. This is so despite Nauflett‘s allegation that the IRS employees she contacted for clarification of her obligations contributed to her petition being untimely. A misinformed
taxpayer faced the identical obstacle in Rubel. There, the taxpayer relied on a written stаtement from the IRS that she needed to file her petition for review by a date that turned out to be after the statutory 90-day deadline. 856 F.3d at 303. The taxpayer relied on that advice to her detriment, and the Tax Court dismissed her petition as untimely. Id. Even so, the Second Circuit recognized that subsection (e)(1)(A)‘s deadline is jurisdictional and, under Supreme Court case law, “cannot be altered regardless of the equities of the case.” Id. at 306 (internal quotation marks omitted). So, too, here. In sum, neither this Court nor the Tax Court can consider Nauflett‘s equitable arguments in light of the jurisdictional nature of subsection (e)(1)(A)‘s 90-day filing deadline.
III.
The Tax Court‘s order dismissing Nauflett‘s petition for lack of jurisdiction is
AFFIRMED.
AGEE
CIRCUIT JUDGE