William v. GonzalesWilliam v. Gonzales
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Williams
Lead Opinion
Petition for review granted; order vacated by published opinion. Judge SHEDD wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge MICHAEL joined. Chief Judge WILLIAMS wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
SHEDD, Circuit Judge:Tunbosun Olawale William petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) holding that it could not consider his motion to reopen immigration proceedings which was filed after he had been removed from the United States. In reaching this conclusion, the BIA relied on
I
Since 1962, aliens involved in immigration proceedings have been able to file motions to reopen those proceedings before the BIA. Initially, motions to reopen were creatures solely of regulation. Medinar-Morales v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 520, 528 (9th Cir.2004) (“Until . . . 1996, [tjhere [was] no statutory provision for reopening of a deportation proceeding, and the authority for such motions derive[d] solely from regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.”) (internal punctuation omitted) (alteration in original). As part of this regulatory scheme,
[A] motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
This regulation largely paralleled a statutory provision,
In 1996, Congress made major changes to immigration law through the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-208,110 Stat. 3009. Among other things, IIRIRA (1) repealed the statutory bar to judicial review of deportation orders when the alien had departed the country and (2) codified and enacted procedures governing the filing of motions to reopen. Specifically, in codifying motions to reopen, Congress provided: “An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section....”
After Congress’ codification of the motion to reopen in IIRIRA, the Attorney General repromulgated, in essentially the same form, the regulation imposing the
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
II
William is a native and citizen of Nigeria who became a permanent legal resident of the United States in 1996. In June 1997, William pled guilty to receipt of a stolen credit card in violation of Maryland law. William was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment, with nine months suspended, and three years probation.
On November 28, 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) charged William with being removable as an aggravated felon for committing an offense involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000. See
On July 11, 2005, William was removed from the United States. Shortly thereafter, William filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in state court seeking to vacate his Maryland conviction. The state court granted the writ and vacated William’s conviction in October 2005. On December 21, 2005, William filed a motion to reopen immigration proceedings before the BIA in which he asserted that the exceptional circumstances of his case warranted reconsideration of his removal. The BIA refused to consider William’s motion to reopen — thereby effectively denying it on procedural grounds — reasoning that William had already been removed from the United States and, in those circumstances,
Ill
William argues that
The statutory provision in question is
We find that
For these reasons,
IV
Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for review, vacate the order of the BIA, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; ORDER VACATED
Notes
.The Government cites Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir.2007), recently decided by the First Circuit, in support of its argument in this case. Pena-Muriel, however, is of limited relevance here because the First Circuit did not address the primary argument made by William: i.e. that the regulation barring post-departure motions to reopen conflicts with the clear language of
. The clarity and breadth of the statutory language likewise overcome the Government‘s argument that, in enacting
. The Government‘s position also lacks contextual support, for one of IIRIRA‘s aims is to expedite the removal of aliens from the country while permitting them to continue to seek review of their removal orders from abroad. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 192 (4th Cir.2004) (noting that departure from the country no longer “purport[s] to cut off appel late jurisdiction”); IIRIRA § 306(b) (repealing former statutory bar to post-departure judicial review).
. The test for whether a word or phrase used in a statute is ambiguous is not whether we can craft a more artful or articulate statute, which we possibly could do in many cases. Instead, the test is whether the statute‘s text, on its face, is “reasonably susceptible to multiple meanings.” Holland v. Big River Minerals Carp., 181 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir.1999). Here, the statute refers to “an alien,” and there is simply no other statutory language or statutory context which supports reading this to mean “some aliens.” The dissent fails to explain how the text itself allows for multiple meanings. Instead, it references the statute’s legislative and administrative history, not to resolve an ambiguity, but to create one in the face of clear statutory language. See BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (“[LJongstanding precedents . . . permit resort to legislative history only when necessary to interpret ambiguous statutory text.”).
. Of course, we express no view on the merits of William’s motion to reopen. Likewise, we do not consider the Government’s argument that we would have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s adjudication of the merits of William’s motion because that determination is committed to the discretion of the BIA. As the BIA has not ruled on the merits of William’s motion, this argument is hypothetical and not properly before us at this time. Moreover, the Government does not argue that a remand to the BIA would be futile because of a procedural or other defect in William’s motion or that the BIA would necessarily refuse to exercise its discretion to reopen proceedings. In fact, at oral argument, the Government noted that none of the statutory or regulatory limitations (other than
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
Congress has decreed that “[a]n alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings.”
Although I appreciate the majority’s reading of the statute, I am not convinced that we should halt our inquiry at step one of the two-step analysis set forth in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Congress’s codification of a numerical limitation on motions to reopen does not speak precisely, or even generally, to the question of whether the Attorney General’s departure bar on motions to reopen is a valid exercise of his rulemaking authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Given that a nearly identical provision limiting aliens to one motion to reopen existed before enactment of the IIRIRA, and in the same regulation containing the departure bar now located
Thus, I am unable to join in the majority’s Chevron analysis and therefore undertake my own inquiry under Chevron’s familiar framework. This inquiry leads me to conclude that, although a close question,
I.
Today our court becomes the first court to invalidate
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
When the validity of an agency’s regulation is at issue, we of course apply Chevron. We must first consider whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” id. at 842,104 S.Ct. 2778, in which case “the court, as well as the agency, “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” ” id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. As part of this inquiry, we may “employ[ ] traditional tools of statutory construction [to] ascertain[] that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.” I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778). “Even for an agency able to claim all the authority possible under Chevron, deference to its statutory interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of congressional intent.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 540 U.S. at 600, 124 S.Ct. 1236. If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, however, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. And where Congress has not merely failed to address a precise question but has also made an explicit delegation of rulemaking authority to the agency, “the agency’s regulation is ‘given controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’ ” Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239, 124 S.Ct. 1741, 158 L.Ed.2d 450 (2004)(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778)(alter-ation in original). Congress has made such a delegation to the Attorney General with respect to the INA. See
According to the majority, we need not venture past Chevron’s first step in this case because
As an initial matter, it is clear that
But there are other problems with focusing in on the words “an alien” in the Chevron analysis, not the least of which is that a regulation with nearly identical language that limited aliens to one motion to reopen existed before enactment of the IIRIRA. Pre-IIRIRA, the Attorney General had already ruled that “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge).”
The remainder of
It stands to reason that if Congress intended to repeal the departure bar, it would have done so by doing more than merely repeating the numerical limitation already contained in the regulations, a lim
Although not discussed by William or the American Immigration Law Foundation (“AILF”) as amicus curiae in this case, the majority finds additional support for its reading of
First, the domestic-violence exception is not relevant to the question of whether the IIRIRA repealed the regulatory departure bar, for Congress did not add the exception to
Second,
Having explained my disagreement with the majority’s Chevron analysis, I now address William’s broader challenge to the regulation, an argument that draws on other of the IIRIRA’s amendments.
II.
A. Chevron Step One.
William contends that Congress has precisely spoken through the IIRIRA to the issue of
1.
In 1961, Congress amended the immigration statutes and, among other things, gave the circuit courts jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation through a petition for review. See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub L. No. 87-301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651 (1961) (codified at
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
Id. As the majority and William note, at this time there was no statutory basis for the motion to reopen. It was entirely a creature of regulation. Both the statutory departure bar to judicial review and the regulatory departure bar to BIA review remained unchanged until 1996.
On April 29, 1996, after a lengthy notice and comment period, the Attorney General amended
On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA. The IIRIRA contained many provisions “aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts— indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.” Reno v. Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999). These provisions included
On March 6, 1997, the Attorney General promulgated regulations implementing the IIRIRA. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed.Reg. 10,312 (March 6,1997). Although the IIR-IRA repealed the departure bar to judicial review, the Attorney General retained the departure bar to BIA review, only slightly modifying the provision to read as follows:
(d) Departure, deportation, or removal. A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.
Id. at 10,331 (codified at
No provision of the new section 242 of the [INA] supports reversing the long established rule that a motion to reopen or reconsider cannot be made in immigration proceedings by or on behalf of a person after that person’s departure from the United States.... The Department [of Justice] believes that the burdens associated with the adjudication of motions to reopen and reconsider on behalf of deported or departed aliens would greatly outweigh any advantages this system might render.
Id. at 10,321. In 2003, the former
2.
William’s argument is an argument by negative implication: Because Congress repealed the departure bar to judicial review, codified the time, numerical, and content limitations on motions to reopen, and carved out limited exceptions to the time and numerical limitations, William contends that Congress’s failure to codify the departure bar clearly shows that it intended that no such bar exist. This line of argument is a familiar one, having roots in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.”)
But for this interpretive thrust, there is a parry. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L.Rev. 395 (1950); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 263, 114 S.Ct. 1483,
The First Circuit recently reached this same conclusion, moving past Chevron’s first step in upholding the validity of
B. Chevron Step Two.
If the statute is silent (I have concluded that it is), and if the agency is empowered by statute to issue regulations to dispel the silence (the Attorney General is), then we must uphold the agency’s interpretation if it is “reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design.” NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995). This deferential standard requires that we give the agency’s interpretation “controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Household Credit Servs., 541 U.S. at 239, 124 S.Ct. 1741 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778); see also Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 120 (3d Cir.2005) (“Chevron, of course, stands for the proposition that administrative agencies receive broad deference in interpreting the statutes which they are charged with enforcing.”). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’ ” I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (quoting I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988)).
As noted above, the IIRIRA also repealed
For one thing, judicial review is not BIA review. The repealed
Perhaps more importantly, judicial review of an alien’s petition for review with respect to a final order of removal is not the same as BIA review of a motion to reopen. William’s argument assumes that a petition for review of a final administrative order enjoys co-equal status with a motion to reopen, but the history of the motion to reopen indicates that it has been long disfavored under the immigration laws. A petition for review of a final order of removal represents an alien’s first and only opportunity for judicial review of the merits of the order, whereas a motion to reopen seeks a subsequent opportunity for administrative review. It is no surprise, then, that “[mjotions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.” I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). “There is a strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective cases.” Abudu, 485 U.S. at 107, 108 S.Ct. 904. To be sure, another long-cited reason for disfavoring motions to reopen — that they were often used as part of dilatory tactics and permitted “endless delay of deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and material facts sufficient to establish a prima facies case,” id. at 108, 108 S.Ct. 904 (internal quotation marks omitted) — is no longer in play once the alien has departed or been removed from the country, but the interest in promoting finality in immigration proceedings still remains, and is as strong as ever.
The differences between a petition for judicial review and a motion to the BIA to reopen proceedings, in my view, largely explain why Congress repealed the departure bar to judicial review and acquiesced to the continued application of the Attorney General’s departure bar to BIA review. Given that the IIRIRA streamlined the rules and procedures of the INA to make it easier for the BIA to deport aliens, Congress surely must have understood that the result would be that many more aliens would be removed during the pendency of their judicial proceedings. Repealing
Having established that Congress’s repeal of the departure bar to judicial review of final removal orders has little or no bearing on the validity of the regulation’s departure bar to BIA review of motions to reopen, I turn to the only remaining question: Does the departure bar undermine the INA’s purposes as evidenced by Congress’s codification of the motion to reopen? Although not without some uncertainty, I conclude that the answer is no. William’s argument essentially is that we can infer from Congress’s failure to codify the departure bar, in light of its codification of much of the pre-IIRIRA regulatory landscape governing motions to reopen,
Returning to my earlier discussion of William’s “thrust” and the Government’s “parry,” I believe that the Government has the better of the argument. Given the INA’s silence with respect to the departure bar, I understand Congress’s failure to explicitly repeal
In sum, I conclude that Congress has not spoken precisely to the question at issue merely by using the words “an alien” in a provision setting a numerical limitation on motions to reopen. Even looking to the other changes made by the IIRIRA to the INA’s framework and to post-IIRI-RA amendments to the INA, I am unable to conclude that Congress has clearly signaled its intention to repeal the departure bar in
Turning to Chevron’s second step, the Attorney General believes that the burdens associated with the adjudication of motions to reopen on behalf of departed or removed aliens would greatly outweigh any advantages such adjudication would render and would not promote the goal of finality in immigration proceedings. In light of Congress’s express delegation of rulemaking power to the Attorney General and the INA’s silence on the question we face here, I believe we should give the Attorney General’s view controlling weight in this case, an expression of deference that is “especially appropriate” given the immigration context, Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting Abu-d%, 485 U.S. at 110, 108 S.Ct. 904), and the vintage of the regulation, see Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145-46, 40 S.Ct. 237, 64 L.Ed. 496 (1920) (stating that deference to an agency’s construction of a statute is “especially [appropriate] where such construction has been long continued”).6 I would therefore uphold
. The 1990 Act also “cut in half the time for seeking judicial review of the final deportation order, from 180 to 90 days.” Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 400, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (citing the 1990 Act § 545(b)).
. Moreover, and as discussed earlier in addressing my concerns regarding the majority‘s Chevron analysis, it is difficult to conclude that Congress spoke to the precise question at issue here when it merely codified a number of provisions relating to motions to reopen that already existed in similar form as part of the regulatory framework, provisions that were designed to operate in conjunction with the departure bar to promote efficiency and finality in removal proceedings. The time limitation, the numerical limitation, the contents provision — all of these items were part of
.The AILF as amicus curiae argues that
. It should further be noted that, in striking down
. To reiterate, no other court has invalidated
. My conclusion is similar to the one reached by the First Circuit in Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir.2007), in which that court upheld the departure bar in