Sessa v. Linear Motors, LLCSessa v. Linear Motors, LLC
OPINION & ORDER
Appearances:
Evan S. Rothfarb, Esq.
Schlanger Law Group LLP
New York, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff
Michael C. O‘Neil, Esq.
Albert E. Hartmann, Esq.
Maxwell J. Eichenberger, Esq.
Reed Smith LLP
Chicago, IL
Counsel for Defendants
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Gia Sessa of Putnam Valley (“Plaintiff“) brings this putative class action suit against Linear Motors, LLC d/b/a Curry Hyundai Subaru, Hudson Valley Federal Credit Union (“HVFCU“), CULA, LLC (collectively, “Lessor Defendants“), and TransUnion, LLC, (collectively, “Defendants“), alleging that Lessor Defendants hid certain fees and taxes paid by Plaintiff upon leasing a car in violation of the Consumer Leasing Act,
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Parties’ statements pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, specifically TransUnion‘s 56.1 Statement (Def.‘s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Def.‘s 56.1“) (Dkt. No. 113)) and Plaintiff‘s 56.1 Counterstatement (Pl.‘s Rule 56.1 Counterstatement (“Pl.‘s 56.1 Counterstatement“) (Dkt. No. 123-20 (filed under seal), Dkt. No. 126 (redacted))), and the admissible evidence submitted by the Parties. The facts are recounted “in the light most favorable to” Plaintiff, the non-movant. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The facts as described below are in dispute only to the extent indicated.1
1. The FCRA
The FCRA requires that credit reporting agencies (“CRAs“) prepare “consumer reports,” known otherwise as credit reports, using “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”
The FCRA also imposes various obligations on organizations that supply data to CRAs, known as “furnishers.” See
The FCRA does not pertain only to institutions; to the contrary, it encourages consumers to participate in the credit reporting process, animated by the belief that “enhancing consumers’ access to their credit reports is an effective step towards ensuring an accurate credit reporting system.” S. Rep. No. 103-209, at 5 (1993). To enable such participation, the FCRA affords consumers two mechanisms to dispute the accuracy of information listed on a credit report. First, a consumer can submit a dispute directly to a CRA, who must then forward the dispute to the appropriate furnisher. See
2. TransUnion‘s General Processes Pursuant To Its CRA Obligations
Pursuant to the charge that a CRA use “reasonable procedures” to ensure accuracy, TransUnion will review a furnisher prior to accepting any information from that furnisher, a vetting process commonly referred to as “credentialing.” (See Pl.‘s 56.1 Counterstatement ¶ 68.) TransUnion‘s multi-faceted credentialing process includes but is not limited to reviewing the furnisher‘s reputation as well as the nature of the data to be furnished. (See id. ¶¶ 63–67.)
If a furnisher passes the credentialing process, TransUnion also requires a furnisher to “contractually agree to, among other things, comply with all of the obligations imposed on that furnisher,” including all applicable statutory and regulatory obligations under the FCRA, regulations promulgated thereunder, and equivalent state laws and regulations. (Id. ¶ 69.) Importantly, per the agreement, data are also supposed to be furnished in a particular way, namely an industry-wide format called “Metro2,” (id. ¶ 74), which “allows a furnisher to report a balloon payment obligation for any type of account with a deferred payment obligation, including an auto lease,” (id. ¶ 41).
After TransUnion credentials and signs an agreement with a furnisher, it “conducts an onboarding process ... with a furnisher to test and verify the integrity of the data the company intends to furnish.” (Def.‘s 56.1 ¶ 75.)2 Once the data furnisher begins providing TransUnion with information, the company continues to monitor, screen, and validate the quality and integrity of data furnished, including using proprietary techniques and strategies. (See id. ¶¶ 76–82.)
3. Plaintiff‘s Car and Debt Instrument
In November 2018, Plaintiff leased a Subaru Forester from Linear Motors, which was financed by HVFCU.3 (See id.
Notwithstanding the lease‘s terms, the Parties agree that “[t]he data [HVFCU] furnished to [TransUnion] indicated that Plaintiff owed a . . . payment of $19,444.00 . . . that was due on January 1, 2022,” which is referred to as a “balloon payment.” (Pl.‘s 56.1 Counterstatement ¶ 8.)4 HVFCU “also furnished information to [TransUnion] indicating that the ‘High Balance’ amount for her account was $25,928.60.” (Id. ¶ 13 (citation omitted).) It is also undisputed that HVFCU furnished data regarding the lease in Metro2 format. (Id. ¶ 35 (citations omitted).)
4. TransUnion‘s and HVFCU‘s Actions and Interactions
TransUnion credentialed HVFCU. (See id. ¶ 67 (citations omitted).) TransUnion
During the time period in which the balloon payment appeared on Plaintiff‘s credit report, TransUnion did not receive any “hard” credit inquiries regarding Plaintiff, meaning Plaintiff did not make a formal application for new credit. (See id. ¶¶ 44, 49.) Throughout this time, though, TransUnion sent 13 credit reports to JP Morgan Chase Bank, Plaintiff‘s Bank. (See id. ¶ 50.) Prior to the initiation of this suit, Plaintiff had “never spoken with anybody [representing TransUnion] about [her] Hudson Valley account.” (Id. ¶ 61 (citation omitted).) According to Plaintiff, she instead “disputed the balloon payment information with her lessors multiple times.” (Id. ¶ 60.)
B. Procedural History
The original Complaint was filed on October 25, 2019. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) Six days later, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint. (See FAC (Dkt. No. 4).5) Following an extension of time to answer the Complaint, (see Dkt. No. 20), HVFCU requested a pre-motion conference preceding a motion to dismiss the action, (see Dkt. No. 21). Plaintiff opposed this request. (See Dkt. No. 27.) The Court ordered HVFCU to respond to Plaintiff‘s request. (See Dkt. No. 28.) HVFCU did so, (see Dkt. No. 29), and the Court ordered a pre-motion conference on February 13, 2020, (see Dkt. No. 31). Pending the pre-motion conference, motion practice and correspondent deadlines were stayed. (See Dkt. No. 35.)
Notwithstanding the stay, on January 7, 2020, Linear Motors filed an Answer with crossclaims against all other Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 43.) The following week, CULA similarly answered Plaintiff‘s Complaint and asserted crossclaims against all other Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 48.)
On January 28, 2020, TransUnion filed an Answer to Plaintiff‘s Amended Complaint, (see Dkt. No. 52), as well as an Answer to Linear Motors’ crossclaims, (see Dkt. No. 53). Five days later, on February 3, 2020, TransUnion filed an Answer to CULA‘s crossclaims. (See Dkt. No. 56.)
Following these submissions, the Court held its pre-motion conference as scheduled on February 13. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Feb. 13, 2020).) Two weeks later on February 27, 2020, the Court adopted a case management plan that bifurcated the validity of Plaintiff‘s claims and follow-on issues relating to class certification, staying the latter until motions regarding the former were fully briefed and adjudicated. (See Dkt. No. 67.)
The following month, on March 4, 2020, HVFCU filed an Answer to CULA‘s crossclaims and asserted its own crossclaims. (See Dkt. No. 69.) On March 9, 2020, Linear Motors filed an Answer to HVFCU‘s crossclaims. (See Dkt. No. 70.) Finally, CULA filed an Answer to HVFCU‘s crossclaims the following day. (See Dkt. No. 71.)
On October 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of preliminary settlement between
Plaintiff and TransUnion, the only non-Lessor Defendant and the only Defendant with whom Plaintiff had not settled, then sought and received two subsequent discovery extensions. (See Dkt. No. 93; Dkt. No. 94; Dkt. No. 97; Dkt. No. 98.) Thereafter, the Court held a pre-motion conference on May 20, 2021, and adopted a briefing schedule. (See Dkt. (minute entry for May 26, 2021).)
On July 1, 2021, TransUnion filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment alongside accompanying papers and exhibits as well as a Rule 56.1 Statement. (See Not. of Mot.; Def.‘s Mem.; Def.‘s 56.1; Decl. of Maxwell J. Eichenberger (Dkt. No. 114).) On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Opposition to the Motion with the accompanying Memorandum of Law, exhibits, and a response to TransUnion‘s Rule 56.1 Statement. (Pl.‘s Mem.; Sessa Decl.; Pl.‘s 56.1 Counterstatement.)
On October 1, 2021, TransUnion filed its Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Defendant‘s Reply Mem. of Law. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.‘s Reply Mem.“) (Dkt. No. 131).)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“However, when the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant‘s claim,” in which case “the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” CILP Assocs., L.P. v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[t]o survive a [summary judgment] motion . . . [a nonmovant] need[s] to create more than a ‘metaphysical’ possibility that his allegations were correct; [s]he need[s] to ‘come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,‘” Wrobel v. County of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)), “and cannot rely on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings,” Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 45 F. Supp. 3d 310, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quotation marks omitted);
“On a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep‘t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 746 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). At this stage, “[t]he role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Brod, 653 F.3d at 164 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a court‘s goal should be “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24). However, a district court should consider only evidence that would be admissible at trial. See Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 746 (2d Cir. 1998). “[W]here a party relies on affidavits . . . to establish facts, the statements ‘must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is competent to testify on the matters stated.‘” DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
B. Analysis
“Congress enacted [the] FCRA in 1970 to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (citing
Plaintiff‘s FCRA claim falls under
To succeed on a claim under this section, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the consumer reporting agency was negligent in that it failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of its credit report; (2) the consumer reporting agency reported inaccurate information about the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff was injured; and (4) the consumer reporting agency‘s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injury.
Ogbon v. Beneficial Credit Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-3760, 2013 WL 1430467, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2013) (quoting Gorman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 07-CV-1846, 2008 WL 4934047, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2008)).6,7 Because there
1. FCRA Accuracy Requirements
While commonly articulated as the second element in an FCRA case, the Court reviews the accuracy of TransUnion‘s report regarding Plaintiff first because reporting accurate information absolves a CRA of liability. See Wimberly v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 18-CV-6058, 2019 WL 6895751, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2019) (noting that “if the information is accurate, no further inquiry into the reasonableness of the consumer reporting agency‘s procedures is necessary.” (quoting Khan v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 18-CV-6367, 2019 WL 2492762, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019))); see also Watson v. Caruso, 424 F. Supp. 3d 231, 244 (D. Conn. 2019) (same); Neclerio v. Trans Union, LLC, 983 F. Supp. 2d 199, 209 (D. Conn. 2013) (same); Collins v. Experian Credit Reporting Serv., 494 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Every circuit to consider the question has agreed that this threshold showing is fundamental to the success of a claim under
Unfortunately, however, “[s]ection 1681e(b) does not explain what it means to be ‘inaccurate,’ nor does it draw a line between factual and legal accuracy.” Denan v. TransUnion LLC, 959 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2020). As discussed more fully below, the Second Circuit has not offered guidance on these questions, though other circuits as well as district courts in the Second Circuit have weighed in on both of these issues. See, e.g., Wenning v. On-Site Manager, Inc., No. 14-CV-9693, 2016 WL 3538379, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016). That universe of caselaw leads the Court to the conclusion that “inaccurate” for purposes of sustaining an FCRA claim comprises: 1) a less-than-comprehensive view of one‘s credit worthiness via omitting or obscuring details or reporting information different than that furnished by creditors; and 2) has no bearing on legal accuracy, only factual accuracy.
a. Standards Regarding Substantive Accuracy
“Although the Second Circuit has yet to address the issue, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that a credit report is [substantively] inaccurate either when it is patently incorrect or when it is misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to have an adverse effect on credit decisions.” Scott v. Synchrony Bank, No. 20-CV-06524, 2021 WL 2021575, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2021) (quoting Grayson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., No. 18-CV-6977, 2021 WL 2010398, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (collecting cases)). This flexible interpretation stands opposed to one of “technical accuracy.” Fitzgerald v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 10-CV-4148, 2011 WL 9195046, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2011).8
credit reporting industry . . . of inaccurate or misleading information.‘” Kilpakis v. JPMorgan Chase Fin. Co., LLC, 229 F. Supp. 3d 133, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Koropoulos, 734 F.2d at 40 n.4). To effectuate congressional intent behind the FCRA, the Court follows the weight of authority and adopts the flexible standard. In adopting and applying this standard, though, the Court must determine what constitutes a “misleading” or “patently incorrect” report. Scott, 2021 WL 2021575, at *5 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Courts that found credit reports misleading have zeroed in on two types of infractions: (1) if it “omitted information [that] resulted in a misunderstanding on the part of the recipient,” Elsady, 2010 WL 2740154, at *6; Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding a report may be misleading if it is “incomplete“); Kilpakis, 229 F. Supp. 3d at 142 (observing a report can be misleading if it “told only part of the story“), or (2) if it obscured certain facts in such a way leaves it “open to an interpretation that is directly contradictory to the true information,” which would in turn lead the report‘s recipient to misperceive the individual‘s credit worthiness, Wagner v. TRW, Inc., 139 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Dickens, 18 F. App‘x at 318.
Caselaw finding a CRA‘s report to be “patently incorrect” is scarce.9 Courts have simply hypothesized that facially incorrect information would include “inaccurate amounts, tradeline items not immediately removed once vacated, and inaccurately updated loan terms.” Rodas v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 19-CV-07706, 2020 WL 4226669, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2020), aff‘d sub nom. Chuluunbat v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 4 F.4th 562 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing
Zahran v. TransUnion Corp., No. 01-CV-1700, 2003 WL 1733561 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2003)). Thus, under the prevailing flexible standard, for a CRA‘s report to be deemed substantively “accurate,” it must give its recipient a fulsome picture of one‘s credit worthiness by avoiding glaring omissions or typographical errors that would otherwise skew such a determination.
b. Standards Regarding Factual and Legal Accuracy
All circuit courts to have opined on whether accuracy in the FCRA context includes legal inaccuracies are unanimous: “The claimed inaccuracy must be factual,
Aside from the persuasive value of the Second Circuit‘s summary order, several convincing arguments underpin the conclusion that accuracy with respect to FCRA claims applies to factual but not legal accuracy. First, under the FCRA‘s statutory scheme, “[o]nly furnishers are tasked with accurately reporting liability.” Denan, 959 F.3d at 295 (citing
Second, and relatedly, having charged a furnisher with the duty to review the legal validity of a debt via applicable regulation, Congress and the CFPB clearly knew what language would charge CRAs with an identical duty. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163 (1973) (“If Congress had meant to [obligate CRAs to make legal determinations and hold them liable for such determinations,] ‘it knew how to use express language to that effect.‘“) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 (1970)); see also NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 600 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“If the [legislature] had thought [to enact a given scheme], they would have known how to do so.“). That there is no analogous charge on CRAS therefore militates towards absolving CRAs from this responsibility.
Third, policy positions also support this understanding. Creditors are “in a better position to determine the validity” of a debt instrument they themselves hold than CRAs. Brill, 838 F.3d at 921; see also Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “the furnisher of credit information stands in a far better position to make a thorough investigation of a disputed debt than the [consumer reporting agency]“). Moreover, putting such a burden on a CRA “would substantially increase the cost of their services,” forcing CRAs “to pass on the increased costs to their customers and ultimately to the individual consumer.” Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). Cf. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 52 (noting Congress‘s intent to “promote efficiency“).
Numerous federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels have come to this conclusion and subsequently dismissed claims against or granted summary judgment for CRAS in cases wherein creditors asserted claims of inaccuracy based on purportedly incorrect legal determinations, which influenced debt obligations. See, e.g., Denan, 959 F.3d at 295–96 (affirming dismissal because plaintiffs’ arguments “amount[] to non-adjudicated legal defenses to their debts“); Humphrey v. Trans Union LLC, 759 F. App‘x 484, 488 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming summary judgment for CRA Defendants because “CRAs are not a tribunal sitting to resolve legal disputes“); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying a rehearing and rehearing en banc because FCRA “claims are not the proper vehicle for collaterally attacking the legal validity of consumer debts“); Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment where no “factual inaccuracies” were stated, only legal disputes); DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 68 (affirming summary judgment where a disputed debt obligation was considered “a legal issue that a credit agency such as Trans Union is neither qualified nor obligated to resolve under the FCRA“); Chijioke-Uche v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 19-CV-4006, 2021 WL 2005499, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2021) (granting summary judgment on a
2. TransUnion Reported Factually Accurate Information
The Parties dispute the accuracy of the report rendered. In broad strokes, Plaintiff argues that TransUnion furnished an
TransUnion is correct. Even when read in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must, because TransUnion reported the exact information it received from a data furnisher without omitting salient details or presenting the information in a misleading fashion, Plaintiff cannot establish as a matter of law that TransUnion reported inaccurate information. Accordingly, there exists no genuine issue of fact as to whether TransUnion violated the FCRA, and the Court must grant TransUnion‘s Motion.
The sole dispute turns on whether Plaintiff in fact owes a balloon payment at the culmination of the lease term. Yet, Plaintiff admits that “[t]he data Hudson Valley furnished to Trans[]Union indicated that Plaintiff owed a balloon payment of $19,444.00 . . . that was due on January 1, 2022.” (Pl.‘s 56.1 Counterstatement ¶ 8 (citations omitted).) This fact alone sustains TransUnion‘s argument, as Plaintiff‘s concession is all Defendant needs to undermine Plaintiff‘s claim and absolve itself of FCRA liability. See Frydman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 14-CV-9013, 2016 WL 11483839, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-9013, 2016 WL 5661596 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (“As a threshold matter, to assert a successful claim under []
Unfortunately for Plaintiff, her assertions, even if true, miss the mark and fail to cure her claim‘s infirmity for one clear reason: they do not disprove the fact that the credit report Defendant published accurately reflected the data furnished by HVFCU. Cf. DeAndrade, 523 F.3d at 67 (“At the very least, it is difficult to see how a plaintiff could prevail on a claim for damages under [the FCRA] without a showing that the disputed information disclosed by the credit agency was, in fact, inaccurate.“)
It may be the case that the terms of the lease contradict the data HVFCU furnished—though, to be clear, the Court is in no way opining on this question. But Plaintiff cannot reframe this purportedly “implausible interpretation[]” as a matter of fact. (Pl.‘s Mem. 9.) This is at its core “a contractual dispute,” Batterman, 829 F. App‘x at 481, and one not before this Court. “[A]bsent prior notice from the consumer that the information may be inaccurate,” Henson, 29 F.3d at 285, or a ruling from a court or neutral arbitrator to that effect, see Scheel-Baggs v. Bank of Am., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1042 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (concluding that “after the arbitrator dismissed FIA‘s claim against plaintiff, the legal question was resolved[,] [so] she no longer owed the debt and any credit report stating the contrary was factually inaccurate.“) (italics omitted), so long as TransUnion disseminated the information as it was furnished by HVFCU, it cannot be held to account for another participant‘s legal determination.
Plaintiff tacitly concedes that this is a legal dispute, as Plaintiff describes TransUnion as having taken a “position” by “rel[ying] on [] interpretations” of the debt instrument. (Pl.‘s Mem. 9.) Plaintiff then goes on to attack TransUnion‘s “interpretation” of the contractual obligation. (Id. at 10.) These are, simply put, legal terms, which bespeak legal arguments regarding the debt‘s legal validity, not factual disputes regarding whether Defendant reported accurate numbers. So, too, is Plaintiff‘s argument with respect to the “sham” loans telling. One must make a legal interpretation of the loan‘s terms and their application to the statutes in question to even countenance this argument. Thus, by her own verbiage and arguments, Plaintiff confirms TransUnion‘s position that any purported inaccuracy—to the extent one exists—is solely borne of legal interpretation for which TransUnion may not be held liable. See supra II.B.1.ii.
Plaintiff does not raise any other allegations of inaccuracy. Plaintiff does not suggest that pertinent or material information was missing or omitted in TransUnion‘s credit reporting regarding Plaintiff, nor does Plaintiff suggest that furnishers, the credit rating agency, and third parties were misaligned in their understanding of the obligation due to strange verbiage or errant annotation. Thus, TransUnion‘s report cannot be said to be misleading or patently inaccurate.
Because “[P]laintiff[‘]s[] complaint pleaded only speculative legal inaccuracies,” Denan, 959 F.3d at 297, Defendant‘s report is considered accurate pursuant to the FCRA, and as a result, Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim thereunder. For this reason, the TransUnion‘s Motion for summary judgment must be granted.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motion, (Dkt. No. 111), enter judgment for Defendant, and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 20, 2021
White Plains, New York
KENNETH M. KARAS
United States District Judge
Notes
Section 14 of the lease purports to release Plaintiff from any obligation following the termination of liability assuming Plaintiff had performed by the terms of the contract. (See id. at 3.) Per Section J of the lease, Plaintiff had “the option to purchase the Vehicle . . . at the end of the Lease Term for the Residual Value, assuming all payments are made on the exact scheduled date, plus a Purchase Option Fee of $325 and applicable fees and costs.” (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff disputes this characterization. (See Pl.s‘s Mem. 15.) For the reasons discussed below, this semantic difference does not come to bear. And where the Parties disputed facts with purely semantic objections or by asserting irrelevant facts that do not materially challenge the substance described, the Court will not consider them as creating disputes of fact. See Ocampo v. 455 Hosp. LLC, No. 14-CV-9614, 2021 WL 4267388, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021) (“Where the Parties identify disputed facts but with semantic objections only or by asserting irrelevant facts, which do not actually challenge the factual substance described in the relevant paragraphs, the Court will not consider them as creating disputes of fact.“); Baity v. Kralik, 51 F. Supp. 3d 414, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Many of [the] [p]laintiff‘s purported denials—and a number of [its] admissions—improperly interject arguments and/or immaterial facts in response to facts asserted by [the] [d]efendant[], often speaking past [the] [d]efendant[]’ asserted facts without specifically controverting those same facts. . . . [A] number of [the] [p]laintiff[‘s] purported denials quibble with [the] [d]efendant[‘s] phraseology, but do not address the factual substance asserted by [the] [d]efendant[].“); Pape v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 07-CV-8828, 2013 WL 3929630, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) (explaining that the plaintiff‘s 56.1 statement violated the rule because it “improperly interjects arguments and/or immaterial facts in response to facts asserted by [the] [d]efendant, without specifically controverting those facts,” and “[i]n other instances, . . . neither admits nor denies a particular fact, but instead responds with equivocal statements“); Goldstick v. The Hartford, Inc., No. 00-CV-8577, 2002 WL 1906029, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2002) (noting that plaintiff‘s 56.1 statement “does not comply with the rule” because “it adds argumentative and often lengthy narrative in almost every case[,] the object of which is to ‘spin’ the impact of the admissions [the] plaintiff has been compelled to make“). Therefore, for purposes of this Opinion, the Court adopts the more common parlance of “lease” with respect to a debt instrument to temporarily rent a car.