Okocha v. Trans Union LLC

Nov 29, 2012
11-1783
Versions:488 F. App'x 535

pital argues that the state‘s actions taken to implement the new payment methodology fail to comply with the procedural or substantive requirements of the Medicaid Act, conflict with federal law, and are therefore preempted. However, as the district court properly found, the Hospital failed to plead that a Vermont law conflicts with a federal law, but instead pleads that the DSH rate calculation, made by a division of Vermont‘s executive branch, fails to comply with federal law. The Supremacy Clause claim was properly dismissed. Moreover, the Hospital cannot maintain an action for a declaratory judgment without an underlying federal cause of action. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 731 (2d Cir.1993) (no independent cause of action grounded in the Declaratory Judgment Act). A prayer for relief, standing alone, simply does not satisfy the requirement that a case or controversy exist. Id. at 731; see also National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Karp, 108 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir.1997).

We have examined the remainder of the hospital‘s arguments and find them to be without merit. While we are not unsympathetic to the Hospital‘s lack of a remedy, we are bound by the law Congress creates, as well as our own precedent.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.

Osita Emmanuel Okocha, pro se, Far Rockaway, NY, for plaintiff-appellant.

Timothy P. Creech; Kogan, Trichon & Wertheimer, P.C., Philadelphia, PA., for Trans Union LLC.

Nicholas W. Haddad; Jones Day, New York, NY, for defendants-appellees Experian Information Solutions Inc.

Barry Goheen; King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, GA, on the brief, for Equifax Information Services LLC.

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, CHESTER J. STRAUB, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Osita Emmanuel Okocha, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s grant of summary judgment, dismissing his complaint alleging various violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and New York law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon such review, we conclude that Okocha‘s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order. Okocha v. Trans Union LLC, No. 08-cv-3107, 2011 WL 2837594 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011). We have considered all of Okocha‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.