SEAN WRIGHT v. STATE OF ALASKA
No. 19-35543
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
August 31, 2022
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-00056-JKS; Argued and Submitted March 24, 2022 Pasadena, California
Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and Johnnie B. Rawlinson and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Chief Judge Murguia; Concurrence by Judge Rawlinson
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska
James K. Singleton, District Judge, Presiding
OPINION
SUMMARY*
Habeas Corpus
The panel affirmed the district court‘s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Sean Wright‘s habeas corpus petition—filed under
In 1999, Wright was accused of sexually abusing two young girls, and fled Alaska soon after. The State of Alaska filed an information that same year, but Wright was neither apprehended nor charged by indictment until 2004, when an employment background check in Minnesota alerted Alaskan authorities to Wright‘s whereabouts, leading to his arrest and extradition. Wright completed his prison sentence and probation in 2016.
Wright challenged the 2009 conviction as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because of Alaska‘s delay in apprehending and indicting him after he fled. Before he filed this habeas petition, Wright was convicted in federal court in Tennessee for failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to its laws.
At issue in this appeal was whether Wright was “in custody pursuant to” the Alaska judgment he challenges when he filed his
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
When Wright first filed his petition, he argued that he was “in custody pursuant to” his Alaska conviction on two theories: (1) because he was serving a five-year term of supervised release by virtue of his Tennessee conviction, which he contended was a consequence of his 2009 Alaska conviction and rendered him in custody; and (2) Wright was subject to Tennessee‘s sex offender registration requirements, which he maintained were a restraint on his liberty and directly attributable to the Alaska judgment.
The Supreme Court squarely rejected Wright‘s first theory in Alaska v. Wright, 141 S. Ct. 1467 (2021) (per curiam), and Wright‘s briefing on remand from the Supreme Court acknowledged the Supreme Court‘s holding that his “subsequent federal conviction and sentence did not constitute ‘custody’ for purposes of challenging the predicate Alaska sex offense conviction.” The panel therefore turned to Wright‘s second theory.
The panel explained that Wright failed to establish jurisdiction under his restraint-on-liberty theory for reasons similar to the Supreme Court‘s rejection of his supervised release theory, that is, because Wright does not demonstrate that Tennessee‘s sex offender registration laws establish custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment. The panel noted that Wright in no way argued that he is significantly restrained by the sex offender registration laws of Alaska. The panel wrote that even if Wright‘s duty to register as a sex offender in Tennessee is in some sense causally related to his Alaska judgment, the nexus is highly attenuated. The panel wrote that Wright‘s Tennessee conviction and registration requirements are both consequences that would not have arisen without his prior sex offense conviction, and if one is too remote to justify the “pursuant to” requirement, then so too is the other; mere but-for causation is not enough.
Because the connection between the Alaska judgment of conviction and Tennessee and its sex offender registration laws is attenuated, the panel did not consider whether Tennessee‘s registration requirements are a restraint on his liberty.
Concurring only in the judgment, Judge Rawlinson wrote that because this court is bound by the Supreme Court‘s determination that Wright was not in custody when he filed his habeas petition under
COUNSEL
Daniel Poulson (argued), Legal Writing and Research Assistant; Rich Curtner, Federal Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Anchorage, Alaska; for Petitioner-Appellant.
Donald Soderstrom (argued) and Timothy W. Terrell, Assistant Attorneys General; Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General; Office of Criminal Appeals, Office of the Attorney General, Anchorage, Alaska; for Respondent-Appellee.
MURGUIA, Chief Circuit Judge:
The facts of this case span a nearly 25-year period. Indeed, this case comes to us a second time, but we are hardly the first to consider its claims. See Wright v. State, 347 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) (“Wright I“), rev‘d, 404 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2017) (“Wright II“); United States v. Wright, No. 1:17-cr-00112-HSM (E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2017) (“Wright III“); Wright v. Alaska, No. 3:18-CV-00056-JKS, 2019 WL 2453641 (D. Alaska June 12, 2019) (“Wright IV“), rev‘d and remanded, 819 F. App‘x 544 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Wright V“), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 1467 (2021) (per curiam) (“Alaska v. Wright“).
In 1999, Appellant Sean Wright was accused of sexually abusing two young girls. Wright fled Alaska soon after. The State of Alaska filed an information charging Wright with sexual abuse of a minor that same year, but Wright was neither apprehended nor charged by indictment until 2004, when an employment background check in Minnesota alerted Alaskan authorities to Wright‘s whereabouts, leading to his arrest and extradition. In 2009,
Now before us is Wright‘s 2018 habeas petition—filed under
To demonstrate that he was “in custody pursuant to” the Alaska judgment, either Wright must show that he was serving a term of incarceration or probation pursuant to his Alaska conviction, see Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (per curiam), or Wright must have suffered from “other restraints on . . . [his] liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally” pursuant to his Alaska conviction, Veltmann-Barragan v. Holder, 717 F.3d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963)). Wright contends that he was “in custody” at the time he filed his
Wright‘s arguments are unpersuasive. Wright attempts to establish custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment of conviction based on an attenuated connection to Tennessee and its sex offender registration laws. The district court‘s judgment dismissing the habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is therefore affirmed.
I.
In February 1999, Wright moved out of his home in Alaska after his then-wife told police that he had sexually assaulted two minors. Wright I, 347 P.3d at 1003. Wright evaded arrest for approximately five years, living in Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Minnesota until his arrest in, and extradition from, Minnesota in September 2004. See id. at 1004; Wright II, 404 P.3d at 168.
In 2009, Wright was convicted in Alaska state court of thirteen counts of sexual abuse of a minor and was thereafter sentenced to twelve years in prison and ten years of supervised probation. Wright I, 347 P.3d at 1005. As a result of his conviction, Wright was also required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. Id.; see also
In September 2016, Wright completed his prison sentence and term of probation due to good time credit earned during his incarceration, terminating his physical and probationary custody. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491 (noting that physical confinement and post-release requirements like parole establish custody pursuant to
Then, in July 2017, Wright was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on federal charges of failing to register as a sex offender. Wright pleaded guilty in February 2018. See Minute Entry for Change of Plea Hearing, Wright III, No. 1:17-cr-00112-HSM, ECF Nos. 39–40.
While his federal charges were pending in Tennessee, Wright filed a federal habeas petition under
In March 2019, the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Wright to time served and five years of supervised release on his federal failure-to-register conviction.
The Alaska district court subsequently dismissed Wright‘s habeas petition for failure to satisfy the “in custody” requirement of
We reversed the district court. Because Wright‘s
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that “a habeas petitioner does not remain ‘in custody’ under a conviction ‘after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely
Applying this reasoning to Wright‘s case, the Supreme Court held, “[t]hat Wright‘s state conviction served as a predicate for his federal conviction thus did not render him ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court’ under
If Wright‘s second conviction had been for a state crime, he independently could have satisfied
§ 2254(a) ‘s “in custody” requirement, see Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401-402 (2001), though his ability to attack the first conviction by that means would have been limited, see id. at 402-404.1 Wright could not satisfy§ 2254(a) on that independent basis for the simple reason that
his second judgment was entered by a federal court.
Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court to consider its new guidance and expressed no view on “the other theories Wright advanced before the District Court for meeting the requirements of
II.
We review de novo a district court‘s dismissal of a habeas petition under
III.
Section 2254 states:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
When Wright first filed his petition, he argued that he was “in custody pursuant to” his Alaska conviction on two theories: (1) because he was serving a five-year term of supervised release by virtue of his Tennessee conviction, which he contended was a consequence of his 2009 Alaska conviction and rendered him in custody, see Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that supervised release may establish custody under
The Supreme Court squarely rejected Wright‘s first theory in Alaska v. Wright, 141 S. Ct. at 1468. Indeed, Wright‘s briefing on remand acknowledges the Supreme Court‘s holding that his “subsequent federal conviction and sentence did not constitute ‘custody’ for purposes of challenging the predicate Alaska sex offense conviction.” Accordingly, we turn to Wright‘s second theory.
Wright fails to establish jurisdiction under his restraint-on-liberty theory for reasons similar to the Supreme Court‘s rejection of his supervised release theory, that is, because Wright does not demonstrate that Tennessee‘s sex offender registration laws establish custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment.
Significant restraints on liberty establishing custody “rely heavily on the notion of a physical sense of liberty—that is, whether the legal disability in question somehow limits the putative habeas petitioner‘s movement.” Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Wright argues that he is “in custody” because his Alaska conviction requires that he “register as a sex offender for life,” and Tennessee‘s sex offender registration requirements are a substantial restraint on his liberty. But Wright asks us to consider whether Tennessee‘s registration requirements are a restraint on his liberty even after acknowledging the Supreme Court‘s holding that his Tennessee conviction and sentence for failing to register did not constitute “custody pursuant to” his Alaska conviction. We decline to do so.
First, it bears mentioning that Wright in no way argues that he is significantly restrained by the sex offender registration laws of Alaska. When Wright filed this habeas petition, he was living in Tennessee; in fact, his briefing lists only Tennessee‘s post-SORNA registration requirements when detailing the purported restraints on his liberty. He does not argue that Alaska‘s implementation of SORNA is similarly restraining. Nor could he, as he does not reside in Alaska and apparently has not since completing his term of imprisonment and probation in 2016.2
to register in Tennessee is no more direct than the nexus between the Alaska judgment and Wright‘s supervised release, which was imposed because of his failure to register in Tennessee. Wright‘s Tennessee conviction and registration requirements are both consequences that would not have arisen without his prior sex offense conviction, and if one is too remote to satisfy the “pursuant to” requirement, then so too is the other.
Wright points out correctly that his obligation to register as a sex offender in Tennessee was in some sense attributable to the Alaska judgment, because but for the 2009 Alaska convictions, he would not have been subject to Tennessee‘s registration requirements. But mere but-for causation is not enough to establish custody “pursuant to” a state court judgment. In Maleng, 490 U.S. 488, petitioner Mark Edwin Cook was first convicted of robbery in 1958 in Washington state court. Id. at 489. He was convicted of several subsequent crimes in 1976, again in Washington state court. Id. During Cook‘s 1978 sentencing, the court imposed a sentencing enhancement based upon the prior 1958 conviction. Id. at 490. Cook filed a
IV.
Translated from Latin, habeas corpus means “show me the body.” The heart of habeas, as it pertains to judicial review, requires a custodian to produce an individual under its custody or control. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.“). But in this case, Wright does not argue that Alaska has custody or control over him.3
Wright attempts to establish custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment of conviction based on an attenuated connection to Tennessee and its sex offender registration laws. Consequently, we do not consider whether Tennessee‘s registration requirements are a restraint on his liberty. And because Wright does not argue that Alaska‘s registration requirements are a restraint on his liberty, we decline to consider them as well.
The district court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Wright‘s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, so its judgment dismissing the instant habeas petition is
AFFIRMED.
RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the majority that Appellant Sean Wright (Wright) was not in custody when he filed his habeas petition under