47 F.4th 954
9th Cir.2022Background
- In 1999 Wright fled Alaska after being accused of sexually abusing two minors; Alaska filed charges that year and arrested/extradited him in 2004.
- In 2009 he was convicted in Alaska of 13 counts of sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced to prison plus supervised probation and lifetime sex-offender registration.
- Wright completed his Alaska prison term and probation in 2016.
- In 2017–2018 Wright was federally prosecuted in Tennessee for failing to register as a sex offender, pleaded guilty, and in 2019 was sentenced to time served plus five years of supervised release.
- Wright filed a § 2254 habeas petition in the District of Alaska (2018) challenging his 2009 Alaska conviction as a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation; the question was whether he was “in custody pursuant to” the Alaska judgment when he filed.
- The Ninth Circuit, after Supreme Court guidance in Alaska v. Wright, affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding Wright failed to show Tennessee’s registration requirements amounted to custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Wright "in custody pursuant to" the Alaska judgment for §2254 when he filed? | Wright: his federal supervised-release and/or sex-offender registration obligations (imposed after his Alaska conviction) made him "in custody pursuant to" the Alaska judgment. | State: the federal supervised-release and Tennessee registration arise from the later Tennessee conviction; any link to Alaska is too attenuated to satisfy "pursuant to." | Held: No jurisdiction. Supreme Court precluded supervised-release theory; Ninth Circuit held registration duties also not "pursuant to" Alaska. |
| Do Tennessee SORNA-based registration requirements constitute a restraint on liberty "pursuant to" the Alaska judgment? | Wright: Tennessee registration is a severe, ongoing restraint directly attributable to his Alaska conviction. | State: even if burdens exist, they stem from Tennessee’s enforcement and the later conviction; mere but-for causation is insufficient. | Held: The nexus is too attenuated; the court did not reach whether Tennessee's laws are a restraint because they are not imposed "pursuant to" the Alaska judgment. |
| Should relief instead be sought under §2255 for custody based on the federal sentence? | Wright: sought §2254 review attacking the Alaska predicate conviction. | State: if custody were federal, §2255 in the federal court would be the proper vehicle. | Held: Ninth Circuit previously noted §2255 issue but on remand dismissed for lack of §2254 jurisdiction; Supreme Court’s ruling made §2254 unavailable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (expired sentence does not keep petitioner "in custody" for habeas)
- Alaska v. Wright, 141 S. Ct. 1467 (per curiam) (predicate role of prior state conviction in later federal conviction does not make petitioner "in custody pursuant to" the state judgment)
- Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att'y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (Lackawanna exception where an expired conviction enhances a current state sentence under narrow circumstances)
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (custody can include restraints beyond physical confinement)
- Veltmann-Barragan v. Holder, 717 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.) (need for restraints "not shared by the public generally" to establish custody)
- Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.) (test whether later custody is "positively and demonstrably related" to challenged conviction)
- Dominguez v. Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.) (requirement that challenged judgment be the source of the petitioner's custody)
- Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.) (supervised release can, in some circumstances, amount to custody)