Anthony L. HAUBRICH; Lecia R. Connors, formerly known as Lecia R. MacLeod; Ryan P. Connors; Gaoxee M. Yang; Daua Yang, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; MERSCORP, Inc.; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-3194.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 25, 2013.
723 F.3d 979
The Memorandum Opinion and Order and the Judgment of the district court dated June 8, 2012, are vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the Parents’ complaint as moot.
1
William Bernard Butler, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.
Peter William Carter, Michael Stinson, Brian L. Vander Pol, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellee.
Before MURPHY, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court‘s1 order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss their quiet-title claims. Following de novo review, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ complaint allegations provide no factual support for conclusory and speculative assertions concerning deficiencies in the assignment and recording of notes and mortgages preceding foreclosure proceedings. See Blaylock v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 502 Fed.Appx. 623, 623-24 (8th Cir.2013) (unpublished per curiam); Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 704 F.3d 545, 547-48 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 81 USLW 3670 (Apr. 29, 2013) (No. 12-1303). We therefore affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
Sean T. WRIGHT, Petitioner-Appellant v. Michael BOWERSOX, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 11-3886.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 26, 2013.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 12, 2013.
720 F.3d 979
Sean T. Wright, Licking, MO, pro se.
Martha E. Ravenhill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued (Chris Koster, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellee.
Before COLLOTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and ROSE,1 District Judge.
ROSE, District Judge.
Sean T. Wright was convicted of two counts of statutory sodomy in a Buchanan County, Missouri trial court and sentenced to life plus seven years. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on direct appeal, State v. Wright, 245 S.W.3d 930 (Mo.Ct.App.2008) (per curiam), and later affirmed the denial of Wright‘s
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Wright was charged with statutory sodomy in the first degree and statutory sodomy in the second degree, stemming from allegations that he had sexually abused two children of a woman with whom he was cohabitating. Wright‘s first trial resulted in a mistrial on September 16, 2004. Prior to his second trial, Wright moved to suspend the proceedings because a court in Clay County, Missouri had ordered a psychological evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial on similar charges. The circuit court denied Wright‘s motion, concluding that it was not bound by the decision in Clay County.
Wright then requested he be permitted to represent himself at trial. The circuit court conducted a hearing to ensure Wright was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to representation. During the hearing, the circuit court judge asked Wright about the pending evaluation in the Clay County proceedings. Wright stated he expected the exam to show he was competent, but had been previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had discontinued his medication while incarcerated. After the colloquy with Wright, the circuit court judge granted his request to represent himself and appointed standby counsel. Wright proceeded to trial pro se, and a jury convicted him on both counts on July 28, 2005.
Prior to sentencing, the Buchanan County circuit court was advised that the Clay County examination concluded Wright was not competent to stand trial in that case. Because of this conclusion, the circuit court postponed sentencing to determine whether Wright should undergo a competency evaluation. Following a hearing on the issue, the circuit court ordered an evaluation and held a subsequent competency hearing. At that competency hearing, three psychologists testified that, in their opinion, Wright was not competent to have stood trial or to have proceeded pro se. The remaining psychologist, Dr. Delaney Dean, testified Wright was competent to do both.
Following the hearing, the circuit court concluded that Wright was in fact suffering from bipolar I disorder, but that he was not suffering from a manic episode at the time of his waiver of counsel or trial in Buchanan County. As a result, the circuit court proceeded to sentencing and sentenced Wright to life imprisonment plus seven years. Wright‘s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. At a post-conviction hearing in February 2009, the circuit court refused to reopen the record to include testimony of Dr. Stephen Peterson, who had performed a more recent evaluation of Wright. The appellate courts upheld the circuit court‘s competency finding and the validity of the conviction.
Wright then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the standards enumerated in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA“). Because Wright‘s claims were “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” he is entitled to relief only if he shows that the state court‘s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”
III. WRIGHT‘S CLAIMS
Wright argues that the state court‘s determination that he was competent to stand trial and waive his right to counsel (1) does not find support in the record and was therefore an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence, and (2) was an unreasonable application of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We find both allegations unpersuasive.
A.
To address whether the Missouri trial court‘s competency determination was unreasonable in light of the evidence, it is necessary first to recount the proceedings in the circuit court. The state circuit court concluded Wright was competent to have stood trial and waived his right to counsel following a hearing in which four expert witnesses testified. Two of the expert witnesses—Dr. Arnaldo Berges and Dr. Jeanette Dunkin—had interviewed Wright in connection with the Clay County case and determined that he was experiencing a manic episode at the time of that interview, rendering him incompetent to stand trial. However, they “acknowledged that they had no opinion to a reasonable degree of medical or psychological certainty as to whether the Defendant was suffering from a manic episode during [the waiver of counsel hearing] or during the trial” in the case. App. at 88. Further, both conceded that if Wright had not been in a manic episode with psychotic features, he would likely not be incompetent to waive his right to counsel or stand trial. Finally, both experts agreed that the circuit court “would be in a good position to detect the features of mania and psychosis over a trial lasting several days.” Id. at 90.
Dr. Jeffrey Kline also testified at the competency hearing, having interviewed Wright nearly five months after his second trial. Dr. Kline was the only expert to conclude that Wright was affirmatively suffering from a manic episode at the time
Finally, Dr. Delaney Dean testified that the history upon which the other experts relied in reaching a diagnosis consisted only of unconfirmed self-reporting by Wright. She also concluded that the other experts’ determination of psychosis stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the complaints and pro se filings Wright made, all of which Dr. Dean thought to be fairly typical of defendants in Wright‘s position. After evaluating Wright‘s history and filings, Dr. Dean found no evidence of delusions or psychosis and concluded Wright was competent at the time of both proceedings. Based on this testimony, the circuit court concluded Wright, while suffering from a bipolar I disorder, was not experiencing a manic episode at the time of either the waiver hearing or the trial.
A state court‘s competency determination is a factual finding and accordingly presumed to be correct in a federal habeas proceeding. Elam v. Denney, 662 F.3d 1059, 1064 (8th Cir.2011) (citations omitted). Moreover, a competency determination involves “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings only if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court‘s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir.2003) (internal quotation and citations omitted). Accordingly, the state court‘s conclusion that Wright was competent to stand trial and represent himself is presumptively correct unless Wright can demonstrate the conclusion does not find support in the record. He is unable to do so.
In making its competency determination, the trial court clearly and carefully weighed the credibility of the testifying witnesses and their findings. The court found testimony and findings that rested on self-reporting by Wright to be less credible than testimony based on a more objective review of Wright‘s history and filings. The court also favored the testimony of Dr. Dean, who was intimately familiar with courtroom procedures and processes and reviewed Wright‘s motions, filings, and oral complaints within those contexts, concluding that what the other experts considered “delusional thinking” were actually typical complaints for defendants preparing to go to trial. Moreover, each of the experts testified that at least some of the symptoms of a manic episode would be readily apparent to a layperson, especially over the course of many interactions or an interaction of significant duration. However, the court had observed no indications of manic behavior: “[t]he Defendant did not exhibit hyperactive movements or an increased energy level, an angry or irritable affect, disjointed thinking, an inability to focus on issues raised or inability to adjust due to any abnormal fixation, delusional thinking, grandiose thinking, hallucinations, [or] depression....” App. at 96.
In effect, Wright contends that the conclusions of the other three experts are more persuasive than the testimony of Dr. Dean and the court‘s observations. This argument misunderstands the level of deference afforded to the state court in these circumstances. In order for the court to have made an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence, Wright
B.
Wright also argues that the state court‘s determination was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when, “in the federal court‘s independent judgment the relevant state-court decision not only applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly, but also did so unreason-ably.”4 Nicklasson v. Roper, 491 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2007) (quotation and marking omitted). Clearly established federal law “is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). At the time of the trial court‘s decision, the clearly established federal law concerning Wright‘s competence to stand trial and waive his right to counsel was outlined in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the competency required to stand trial and waive the right to counsel is the same standard.5 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399. As a result, the relevant inquiries for whether Wright was competent to waive his constitutional rights were whether he had “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and had “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. at 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The state court correctly identified Godinez as the contemporary controlling standard for whether Wright was competent to stand trial and to waive his right to counsel. Based on its factual findings, which we have already deemed reasonable, the court concluded:
At all relevant times, the Defendant had sufficient present ability to consult with an attorney with a reasonable degree of understanding. Upon his knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of counsel, he had sufficient present ability to represent himself and personally deal with the issues raised at trial with a reasonable degree of understanding. Defendant had a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Defendant was not suffering from the influences of any psychotic features associated with a manic episode such as delusional thinking during the waiver of counsel hearing or during the trial.
App. at 93. The court neither erroneously nor incorrectly applied the Godinez standard to its factual findings. To the contrary, it identified the correct standard for competency and pointed to specific facts, testimony, and evidence that reasonably demonstrated Wright met that standard. Accordingly, the state court‘s decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law.
C.
Wright also claims the district court erred because it failed to consider whether Wright was competent to waive counsel under a “new standard” set forth in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that states are constitutionally permitted to insist upon counsel for defendants found to be competent enough to stand trial but who are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379. The Supreme Court issued this decision after Wright‘s conviction and direct appeal were final, but before his collateral proceedings. Wright contends Edwards created a new rule requiring a heightened standard for determining competency to waive counsel, the rule must be applied retroactively, and, under this heightened standard, the district court should have found him incompetent to waive counsel. We disagree.
Even if Edwards retroactively applies,6 it does not change the outcome here. First, Edwards did not announce a new constitutional rule for determining competency when a defendant wishes to waive his right to counsel; it merely allows, but does not require, states to have a heightened standard. Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661, 669 (8th Cir.2011) (“[T]he Edwards Court held only that a state can insist on representation for defendants who are competent to stand trial but who still suffer from ‘severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.‘“) (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178, 128 S.Ct. 2379) (emphasis added). As a result, it would not be an unreasonable determination of clearly established federal law for the state court to decline to impose a heightened standard of competency, as Edwards announced no such requirement.
Moreover, retroactively applying Edwards does not change our conclusion that
D.
Finally, Wright contends the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his petition. Assuming this issue is properly before us,7 the district court did not err in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Evidentiary hearings in habeas proceedings are barred unless the petitioner “was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). “In that case, the decision to grant such a hearing rests in the discretion of the district court.” Williams v. Norris, 576 F.3d 850, 859 (8th Cir.2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). We review a district court‘s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing under these circumstances only for abuse of discretion. Nooner v. Hobbs, 689 F.3d 921, 938 (8th Cir.2012).
Here, Wright claims he was entitled to a hearing in the district court to rebut the state court‘s factual finding of competency. Specifically, Wright sought to offer the testimony and report of Dr. Stephen Peterson, who evaluated Wright following his post-conviction motion hearing, because it would prove he was not competent at the time of his trial and waiver of counsel. First, Wright has not established he was unable to develop his claim in state court. Wright presented evidence concerning his competency at hearings in the state circuit court prior to his sentencing and at an evidentiary hearing in state court in his post-conviction proceedings.
Second, this hypothetical rebuttal evidence, even if it were to prove Wright‘s incompetence, would still not entitle him to habeas relief on his asserted grounds. Even assuming Dr. Peterson‘s testimony demonstrated Wright to have been incompetent at the time of his trial and waiver of counsel, the testimony was not available to the state court at the time of its decision. Accordingly, this testimony would have no bearing on whether the state court‘s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts because the testimony was not available for consideration by the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398-1401, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, the testimony would have no impact on our analysis and conclusion regarding whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly estab-lished
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Javier PENA-CALLEJA, Petitioner-Appellant v. Melissa RING, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 12-3487.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
July 26, 2013.
720 F.3d 988
Javier Pena-Calleja, Fulton, MO, pro se.
Kameron Mitchell Lawson, Attorney General‘s Office, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Javier Pena-Calleja appeals the district court‘s denial of his motion to appoint counsel to represent him in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under