Santos v. WoodSantos v. Wood
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Lawrence E. Kahn
I. INTRODUCTION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a pro se civil rights complaint filed by plaintiff Francisco Santos pursuant to
II. IFP APPLICATION
”
Having reviewed Plaintiff‘s IFP Application and Inmate Authorization Form, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient economic need to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s Second IFP Application is granted.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action IFP, and because Plaintiff seeks relief from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the Complaint under
Similarly, under
B. Summary of the Complaint2
The incidents that form the basis for the Complaint allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was confined at Clinton Correctional Facility (“Clinton C.F.“), Attica Correctional Facility (“Attica C.F.“), Southport Correctional Facility (“Southport C.F.“), Elmira Correctional Facility (“Elmira C.F.“), and Auburn C.F. See Compl. Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Complaint.
As background, Plaintiff underwent surgery in 2009 for a broken right leg and had a metal rod and screws inserted into his femur. Compl. at 7–8.3
From March 2013 until March 2016, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Clinton C.F. Compl. at 9. In December 2015, Plaintiff underwent surgery to remove and replace hardware in his right leg. Id. at 11. After surgery, the medical providers refused to provide Plaintiff with pain medication due to an “unwritten policy” authorized by defendant DOCCS Commissioner Anthony J. Annucci. Id. at 11–12. The policy held that “[i]nmates . . . held under the Custody of DOCCS and in General Population shall not be provided with opioid, narcotic, and/or abusive potential medications.” Id. at 11. Additionally, Plaintiff was not permitted to attend appointments for radiological studies or neurological and pain clinic consultations. Id. at 12.
2. Attica C.F. and Southport C.F.
From March 2016 until October 2018, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Attica C.F. Compl. at 9. In October 2018 and November 2018, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Southport C.F. Id. While confined at Attica C.F. and Southport C.F., the medical staff refused to provide Plaintiff with pain medication due to Annucci‘s “unwritten policy.” Id. at 13–14. Additionally, Plaintiff was not permitted to attend appointments for radiological films or neurological and pain clinic consultations. Id.
3. Elmira C.F.
From November 2018 until April 2019, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Elmira C.F. Compl. at 10. The medical staff refused to provide Plaintiff with pain medication due to Annucci‘s “unwritten policy.” Id. at 14–15. Furthermore, Plaintiff was not permitted to attend appointments for radiological films or neurological and pain clinic consultations. Id.
In January 2019, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Elmira C.F. Superintendent accusing John Doe of harassment and threatening behavior. Id. at 18–19. From January 2019 until March 2019, Wood and Learn verbally harassed and threatened Plaintiff. Id. at 19.
On March 15, 2019, Plaintiff was working as a porter on G-Block when he saw Wood and Learn speaking with defendants Correction Officers Timothy A. Perry and J. Hartman. Id. at 19–20. Wood directed Plaintiff to go to the entrance of the of the cell block, where the defendants were gathered. Id. at 20. Plaintiff complied and Perry conducted a pat frisk. Id. At the conclusion of the search, Hartman told the other defendants that “the cry baby is clean,” but stated that “John Doe #1 wants to send him to the box.” Id. Perry directed Plaintiff to “lock in” his cell and he complied. Id. at 21. Plaintiff then observed Wood, Perry, Hartman, and Learn gather inside the “First Officer‘s” office. Id.
Shortly thereafter, Learn returned to Plaintiff‘s cell and directed him to place his hands around his back. Id. at 21. Learn directed another officer to escort Plaintiff to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU“). Id. When Plaintiff asked why he was going to the SHU, Learn responded, “you should ha[ve] thought of that before complaining to the Superintendent[.]” Id.
On March 17, 2019, Perry and Learn issued a false misbehavior report charging Plaintiff with possessing a weapon and smuggling. Id. at 21, 23, 27. On March 21, 2019, defendant
During this period, from January 2019 until March 2019, Plaintiff continued to complain of pain and asked the medical staff for pain killers and for information related to his scheduled medical appointments. Id. at 29. When Plaintiff‘s informal complaints and requests went unanswered, Plaintiff “started submitting letter complaints” to Annucci, defendant DOCCS Deputy Commissioner/Chief Medical Officer John Morley, and defendant Regional Health Services Administrator Danielle Snider. Id.
On March 29, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by defendant Dr. Kevin W. Ott. Id. at 29. Plaintiff complained to Ott of pain in his back and right leg. Id. at 29–30. Ott informed Plaintiff that he was scheduled for radiological studies and for consultations at the neurosurgical and pain clinics. Id. Plaintiff told Ott that he was unable to receive pain medication treatment due to the “unwritten policy.” Id. at 30. Immediately upon hearing Plaintiff‘s complaints, Ott canceled the scheduled appointments. Id. Ott stated, “[s]ince you remind me, I don‘t even know how you got placed on scheduled appointments for [these] studies, when we are not even allow[ed] to provide you with narcotic medication. Th[e] scheduled appointments will be redundant, [and a] waste of time and money.” Id. at 31.
4. Auburn C.F.
In June 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Auburn C.F. Compl. at 10. Upon transfer, Plaintiff “immediately continued to constantly complain” to Auburn C.F. medical staff about pain and muscle stiffness in his back and leg. Id. at 33. On August 8, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to an outside hospital for a CT scan, which revealed a “[r]ight sided paracentral disc herniation.” Id.
On August 12, 2019, defendant Dr. Deborah Geer reviewed the results of the CT scans and scheduled Plaintiff for a neurosurgical consultation. Id. at 33. Geer prescribed Meloxicam and provided a “flats” permit, but denied Plaintiff‘s request for Tylenol with Codeine in accordance with Annucci‘s policy. Id.; Exs. at 7.
On September 25, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by a neurosurgical specialist. Compl at 34.; Exs. at 23. The specialist noted that Plaintiff was currently prescribed Cymbalta and Mobic. Id. The specialist also recommended MRI studies, an EMG, a consult with a pain specialist, and a neurosurgical follow up appointment. Id.; Compl. at 34. When Plaintiff returned to Auburn C.F., the medical staff scheduled the appointments. Id. However, Snider then canceled the appointment for MRI films and ordered another CT study. Id.
On October 15, 2019, an EMG was performed of Plaintiff‘s lower extremities. Exs. at 19, 40. Then, on October 17, 2019, Plaintiff was seen at the pain clinic for complaints of pain and stiffness in his back and right leg due to herniated discs. Id. at 35. The specialist suggested a treatment plan consisting of pain medication and muscle relaxers or, alternatively, “injections” every month. Id. After contemplating the side effects of each plan, Plaintiff opted for the medications. Id. On October 22, 2019, defendant Nurse Laura Oskia-Michales submitted a prescription for Topomax and noted that Plaintiff refused injections. Id. at 36. Snider
On December 10, 2019, Plaintiff was treated at sick call. Exs. at 27. The provider put Plaintiff on a “call out” for “TENS pads and battery.” Id. The provider also noted that Plaintiff was scheduled for a neurosurgical consult and a consult with the pain clinic on December 11, 2019 and December 14, 2019. Id.
On December 11, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to an outside hospital for a neurosurgical follow-up appointment. Id. at 40. The specialist informed Plaintiff that he could not provide a course of treatment without MRI films. Id. The doctor also suggested an appointment with a pain specialist, physical therapy, and a follow up visit. Id. On December 12, 2019, Oskia-Michales scheduled Plaintiff for MRI studies and a pain therapy consult. Id.
On December 19, 2019, Plaintiff was seen by defendant Nurse Jane Doe. Id. at 41. Jane Doe took Plaintiff‘s vitals and abruptly returned him to his cell. Id. Plaintiff asked her why she was “kicking him out of her office” and she responded, “because [you] are done.” Id. at 41–42. In Plaintiff‘s ambulatory health record, Jane Doe noted that Plaintiff requested medication and that she “tried to explain to IM [inmate] that per DOCCS we cannot give opioids for chronic back pain[.] IM states he is going to ‘talk to his people’ about this.” Exs. at 29. Jane Doe also reminded Plaintiff of his upcoming appointments. Id.
On January 16, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by a specialist at the pain clinic. Id. at 42; Exs. at 40. The physician reiterated the different treatment plans available and Plaintiff chose the plan that encompassed medications rather than injections. Id.; Compl. at 43. On January 17, 2020, Oskia-Michales scheduled a follow up visit for the pain clinic, but did not provide “muscle relaxers due to abuse potential.” Exs. at 43, 51.
On February 4, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by Oskia-Michales. Compl. at 44; Exs. at 46. Oskia-Michales noted in Plaintiff‘s medical records that he took Flexeril for seven days, without relief, and that he was previously prescribed Mobic, Elavil, and Cymbalta. Exs. at 46. She also noted that he refused injections and was argumentative. Id. She concluded that he was “over exaggerating” his pain. Id. Oskia-Michales directed officers to “remove” him from her office. Id.
On February 14, 2020, Morley again responded to Plaintiff‘s “recent letters” to Annucci. Compl. at 38, 39; Exs. at 44. Morley concluded that Plaintiff ‘s medical care was “appropriate and ongoing” and referenced the December 19, 2019 appointment with Jane Doe, the January 16, 2020 pain consultation, recently completed CT and EMG studies, and a physical therapy evaluation. Exs. at 44. Morley advised Plaintiff to continue to bring his medical concerns to the medical staff as they arose. Id.
On February 21, 2020, Plaintiff was treated at sick call. Exs. at 48. The medical provider noted that Plaintiff did not want pain injections and that he was “supposed to see neurosurgery” on March 5, 2020. Id. The provider also refused Plaintiff‘s request for pain medications “which are not given here[.]” Id.
5. Causes of Action
Construed liberally,4 the Complaint contains the following: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims against Annucci related to Plaintiff‘s medical treatment at
In addition to money damages, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, including: (1) an order directing Geer, Oskia-Michales, Jane Doe, Slagler, Snider, Morley, Ott, and Annucci to provide him with medical treatment; (2) an order directing Annucci, Morley, and Snider and to rescind the unwritten policy; and (3) an order directing Annucci, Morley, and Snider to put a policy in place that would safeguard medical records and prevent the destruction of or tampering with medical records. Id. at 49–52. A more complete statement of Plaintiff‘s claims can be found in the Complaint.
C. Nature of Action
Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Severance and Transfer of Claims Arising in the Western District of New York
In this suit, Plaintiff asserts claims related to alleged wrongdoing that occurred while he was confined at Attica C.F., Southport C.F., and Elmira C.F. Compl. These facilities are located in the Western District of New York.
(1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; (2) whether the claims present some common questions of law or fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted; and (5) whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the separate claims.
Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 556, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
“A claim may be severed based upon lack of a significant relationship between defendants or solely for the purpose of facilitating transfer. Where the administration of justice would be materially advanced by severance and transfer, a court may properly sever the claims against one or more defendants for the purpose of permitting the transfer of the action against other defendants.” Cain v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 630 F. Supp. 221, 225–26 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted). “A decision to sever lies within the discretion of the Court[.]” Id. at 225 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff‘s claims related to alleged wrongdoing that occurred while Plaintiff was confined at Attica C.F., Southport C.F., and Elmira C.F. are more appropriately heard in the Western District of New York. Plaintiff‘s claims arising out of his incarceration at those facilities are separate and distinct from the claims arising out of alleged wrongdoing that occurred while Plaintiff was confined at Clinton C.F. and Auburn C.F. and will require different witnesses and documentary proof.
Thus, pursuant to
B. Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from suing a state in federal court, under the principle of “sovereign immunity.”
Plaintiff‘s claims for monetary damages against defendants, in their official capacity, are dismissed pursuant to
C. Eighth Amendment
Claims that prison officials have intentionally disregarded an inmate‘s medical needs fall under the umbrella of the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 104 (1976). The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and is incompatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Id.; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citations omitted). While the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons . . . neither does it permit inhumane” treatment of those in confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).
“In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove ‘deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.‘” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). “First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious,” Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), “in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists,” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996). “Second, the defendant must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. This second element is satisfied if the defendant “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
An inmate who disagrees with the physician over the appropriate course of treatment has no claim under § 1983 if the treatment provided is “adequate.” Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. “[D]isagreements over medications, diagnostic techniques (e.g., the need for X-rays), forms of treatment, or the need for specialists or the timing of their intervention are not adequate grounds for a section 1983 claim.” Sonds v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Corr. Health Servs., 151 F. Supp. 2d 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
1. Clinton C.F.
a. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims arising out of his confinement at Clinton C.F. between 2013 and 2016. In § 1983 actions, the applicable statute of limitations is the State‘s “general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989)). In New York, a three-year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and, thus, to § 1983 actions. Id. Although State law provides the relevant limitations period, federal law determines when a § 1983 action accrues, which has been held to be the time “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the harm.” Connolly v. McCall, 254 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Hence, in determining when a particular claim accrues, courts must focus on when a “plaintiff becomes aware that he is suffering from a wrong for which damages may be recovered in a civil action.” Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 1980). In “rare and exceptional” cases, the doctrine of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel may be invoked to
Plaintiff initiated this action, at the earliest, on March 26, 2020.6 Compl. at 52. Insofar as Plaintiff alleges wrongdoing that occurred at Clinton C.F. prior to March 26, 2017, those claims must be dismissed as untimely unless Plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the limitations period should be tolled. Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640–41. Here, Plaintiff has not presented allegations suggesting that the statute of limitations must be tolled. See Compl. However, it is possible that Plaintiff could allege facts suggesting that the equitable tolling applies to preserve these claims. Therefore, Plaintiff‘s claims regarding the alleged misconduct at Clinton C.F. are dismissed with leave to amend.
b. Personal Involvement
Even assuming that Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment claims arising out of events that occurred at Clinton C.F. were timely, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts suggesting that Annucci was personally involved in Plaintiff‘s medical treatment there.
“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991)). “[A] Section 1983 plaintiff must ‘allege a tangible connection between the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.‘” Austin v. Pappas, No. 04-CV-7263, 2008 WL 857528, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (quoting Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986)) (other citation omitted). “[V]icarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
c. Injunctive Relief
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his confinement at Clinton C.F., “[i]t is settled in this Circuit that a transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring facility.” Candelaria v. Greifinger, No. 96-CV-17, 1998 WL 312375, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 1998) (quoting Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996)); Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating that the transfer of an inmate Plaintiff complaining of civil rights violations out of the prison facility in which those violations were alleged to have occurred moots any claim for injunctive relief against prison officials of the transferring facility). Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s claims for injunctive relief related
2. Auburn C.F.
Plaintiff alleges that the Auburn Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they implemented the “unwritten policy,” formulated by Annucci, that prohibited inmates in the general population from receiving opioids to treat legitimate medical needs. See Compl. at 33, 36. Plaintiff also claims that these same defendants failed to provide him with adequate medical treatment because they refused to provide pain medication, failed to adopt the specialists’ recommendations, and made false entries in his medical records. See id. at 34, 36–38, 40–42, 44.
Even assuming that Plaintiff suffered from a sufficiently serious medical condition, the Complaint is devoid of any allegations that plausibly suggest that the Auburn Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‘s medical needs. With respect to Plaintiff‘s allegations related to the Auburn Defendants’ failure to adequately treat him, differences in opinions between a doctor and an inmate as to the appropriate pain medication do not support a claim that the doctor was deliberately indifferent to the inmate‘s serious medical needs. See, e.g., Evan v. Manos, 336 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that an inmate‘s view that the doctor should have prescribed something stronger than Advil does not give rise to an issue of fact as to whether his constitutional rights were violated); Veloz v. New York, 339 F. Supp. 2d 505, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (concluding that an inmate‘s disagreement with his medical provider about whether he needed something stronger than Tylenol for his back pain did not constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need); Morrison v. Mamis, 08-CV-4302, 2008 WL 5451639 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2008) (holding that a doctor‘s refusal to switch an inmate‘s pain-
Moreover, the facts and exhibits submitted by Plaintiff do not suggest that Defendants acted with the requisite level of culpability. From June 2019 through February 2020, Plaintiff received regular medical treatment for his complaints, including sick call visits, consultations with various specialists, radiological studies, and prescription medication.
For these reasons, Plaintiff‘s medical indifference claims against Geer, Jane Doe, Oskia-Michales, and Slagler are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to
With respect to Morley, Snider, and Annucci, the Court concludes that, because Plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable denial of medical care claim against any staff at Auburn C.F., his supervisory claims against Morley, Snider, and Annucci must also be dismissed. See Toole v. Connell, No. 04-CV-724, 2008 WL 4186334, at *1, 7 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 10, 2008) (noting that a supervisory defendant cannot be liable for failing to investigate or correct conduct that has already been found to be not actionable under § 1983); Linares v. Mahunik, No. 05-CV-625, 2006 WL 2595200, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff could not “sustain a supervisory liability claim as there was no wrong for [the supervisor-defendant] to remedy since there [was] no constitutional violation“).
V. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff moves for a preliminary order directing Annucci, Morley, Snider, Oskia-Michales, Geer, and Jane Doe to provide him with “adequate pain killer and muscle relaxer medication,” to reschedule Plaintiff‘s appointments for MRI studies, and to schedule follow-up appointments with pain and neurosurgical clinics.9 Mot. for Preliminary Injunction at 2.
Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable harm and either a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping
In this instance, without a claim that survives § 1915 sufficiency review, Plaintiff cannot establish that he has a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward him. See Fontaine v. Young, No. 07-CV-634, 2007 WL 4180712, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2007) (denying request for preliminary injunction because, under § 1915 review, “the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted“). Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff‘s motion for preliminary injunctive relief without prejudice to file a new motion after Plaintiff has submitted an Amended Complaint and it has been accepted for filing by the Court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Plaintiff‘s IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED;10 and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court provide a copy of Plaintiff‘s Inmate Authorization Form to the Financial Deputy of the Clerk‘s Office; and it is further
ORDERED, that pursuant to
ORDERED, that no ruling is made as to the sufficiency of the Complaint with respect to the claims that have been severed and transferred to the Western District, leaving that determination to the Western District of New York; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk shall advise the Clerk of the Western District of New York, in writing, of the entry of this Decision and Order and provide the Clerk with a certified copy of this Decision and Order and of the docket report for this action, together with all information necessary for the Clerk of the Western District of New York to electronically access the documents filed in this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that the fourteen-day waiting period provided for in Local Rule 83.6 is hereby waived; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims against Geer, Slagler, Jane Doe, Oskia-Michales, Morley, Snider, and Annucci related to Plaintiff‘s medical treatment at Auburn C.F., and his Eighth Amendment deliberate medical indifference claims Annucci related to his medical treatment at Clinton C.F., are DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff‘s official capacity claims against Geer, Slagler, Jane Doe, Oskia-Michales, Morley, Snider, and Annucci are DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff‘s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that if Plaintiff wishes to proceed with this action, he must file an Amended Complaint as set forth above within thirty days from the date of the filing of this Decision and Order;12 and it is further
ORDERED, that if Plaintiff timely files an Amended Complaint, this matter be returned to the Court for further review; and it is further
ORDERED, that if Plaintiff fails to timely file an Amended Complaint as directed above, the Clerk shall enter judgment indicating that this action is DISMISSED without
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Lawrence E. Kahn
Senior U.S. District Judge
DATED: June 15, 2020
Albany, New York