LORENZO SANCHEZ v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
CASE NO. 24-62003-CIV-DAMIAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
August 31, 2025
MELISSA DAMIAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 0:24-cv-62003-MD Document 17 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2025 Page 1 of 20
Petitioner,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner, Lorenzo Sanchez’s (“Sanchez” or “Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), filed pursuant to
THE COURT has considered the Petition and the above-referenced filings, the pertinent portions of the record, and relevant legal authority and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is denied.
A. The Charges
On May 1, 2014, the State charged Sanchez with attempted first-degree murder and felon in possession of a firearm. [ECF No. 12-1 at 4–5].
B. Trial and Sentencing
Sanchez proceeded to trial. [ECF No. 11, Trial Transcripts, hereinafter, Tr. at ___]. Sanchez represented himself at trial. [ECF No. 12-1 at 31–44]. The jury found Sanchez guilty of both counts. Id. at 243–55. The trial judge sentenced Sanchez to life in prison for the attempted murder count and fifteen years for the felon in possession of a firearm count. Id. at 245, 248.
C. Direct Appeal and Collateral Proceedings
Sanchez filed a direct appeal in Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”). Id. at 287–88. On appeal, Sanchez alleged eight trial court errors: (1) denial of his discovery objections to the victim’s police statements and lab reports, Dr. Kikhudt’s disclosures as a medical, bullets, and ballistics expert, and Detective Plaska’s testimony; (2) denial of Petitioner’s special jury instruction that the State must prove that Petitioner’s killing of the victim was not justifiable or excusable; (3) denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress; (4) striking a juror for hardship; (5) limiting the cross examination of Mr. Schaefer; (6) consideration of Petitioner’s lack of remorse at sentencing; (7) comments to the jury regarding the firearm count; and (8) trial by a six-person jury. [ECF No. 12-2 at 2–74]. On March 16, 2023, the Fourth DCA per curiam affirmed without written opinion in Sanchez v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
- (1) A Giglio claim that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony from the victim and eyewitness Hanes when they testified how many times the victim was shot and the locations of the bullet wounds; and
- (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Petitioner to testify at the motion to suppress hearing to establish standing to contest Petitioner’s arrest.
During the pendency of his Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm by challenging the charging document in the 2005 drug case that rendered him a convicted felon. Id. at 205–07.
The trial court denied all of Sanchez’s claims with prejudice. Id. at 217–22. Sanchez moved for rehearing. Id. at 224–29. The court denied the motion because Sanchez failed to present anything the trial court “overlooked or misapprehended.” Id. at 159. Sanchez twice appealed, which the Fourth DCA consolidated into a single appeal. Id. at 161–99. On July 3, 2024, the Fourth DCA per curiam affirmed without written opinion and without requiring a response from the State. Id. at 200; see also Sanchez v. State, 390 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).
D. The Instant Petition
On October 15, 2024, Sanchez initiated the instant proceedings under
Claim One: The government suppressed statements of Willard Robinson that were exculpatory to the defense, contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Petition at 4.
Claim Three: The government suppressed the police report of Detective Dennis Plaska, contrary to Brady. Id. at 11.
Claim Four: Violation of Fourth Amendment when trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress because Petitioner was arrested without an arrest warrant. Id. at 14.
Claim Five: Violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when trial court limited Petitioner’s cross-examination of a witness. Id. at 18.
Claim Six: Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when trial court denied Petitioner’s requested jury instruction. Id. at 20.
Claim Seven: Violation of the Sixth Amendment when Petitioner was tried by a six-person jury. Id. at 21.
Claim Eight: Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Petitioner at the motion to suppress hearing regarding Petitioner’s warrantless arrest. Id. at 21.
Claim Nine: The government knowingly used perjured testimony, contrary to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Id. at 23.
Claim Ten: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments on grounds Petitioner was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm because the underlying felony conviction was based on an erroneous information. Id. at 34.
This Court addresses Petitioner’s claims for relief in turn below.
II. EXHAUSTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The State asserts that the Petition appears to be timely as to Claims One through Nine but argues that Claim Ten is time-barred. Response at 5. The State further asserts that Claims One through Six and Ten are unexhausted. Id. at 7. The Court considers each below.
A. Legal Standard As To Exhaustion.
Petitioner’s federal habeas case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
“Habeas petitioners generally cannot raise claims in federal court if those claims were not first exhausted in state court.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
In order to properly exhaust a claim in state court, the habeas petitioner must also raise his federal claim in the state court system in the manner and at the time dictated by the state’s procedural rules. Marshall v. Dunn, 497 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2020). If “a petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in compliance with relevant state procedural rules, the state court’s refusal to adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies as an independent and adequate state ground for denying federal review.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009). If the petitioner fails to do so, the federal habeas court must dismiss claims that either (1) have been explicitly ruled procedurally barred by the highest state court considering the claims, see e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989), or (2) are not exhausted but would clearly be barred if returned to state court. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991). See also Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a claim is procedurally barred “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present [the claim] in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claim[] procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at
B. Discussion As To Exhaustion.
1. Claims One Through Three
Claims One through Three were raised as discovery violations and trial court error under Claim 1 in Petitioner’s direct appeal: “The court erred in its rulings as to the state’s many failures to make timely discovery, and the lack of procedural prejudice does not affirmatively appear in the record.” See ECF No. 12-2 at 29–50. Petitioner headed Claim I on direct appeal as “THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S DISCOVERY OBJECTIONS.” Id. at 29. Petitioner alleged that:
The record shows repeated instances of late discovery by the state. The court overruled Appellant’s objections without complying with the legal requirements for disposition of discovery issues. The record does not show the absence of procedural prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction should be reversed.
Id. at 29.
On appeal, Petitioner alleged Claim One as “WR’s police statement and the lab report.” Id. at 35. Petitioner also alleged that the state failed to timely disclose the taped testimony of Willard Robinson, the victim. Id. at 35–38. And Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it found “there is no Discovery Violation.” Id. at 36; Tr. at 400. Despite four pages of alleged trial court errors, Petitioner failed to make any reference to the Constitution in his direct appeal. See ECF No. 12-2 at 35–39. Thus, Petitioner failed to present Claim One to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.
Petitioner alleged Claim Two as “The bullets and the ballistics expert” in his direct appeal. Id. at 42. Petitioner argued that various trial court errors and discovery violations related to the State’s ballistic expert. Id. at 42–47. Petitioner’s only reference to constitutional
Petitioner alleged Claim Three as a “discovery issue during Det. Plaska’s testimony” in his direct appeal. See ECF No. 12-2 at 47. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it found that no discovery violation occurred regarding the disclosure of Plaska’s police report. Id. at 49. Again, Petitioner’s only reference to a constitutional claim was in paraphrasing his own testimony to the trial court during Plaska’s testimony, which falls short of raising a constitutional issue. Id. at 49 (“Appellant said he had not time to investigate it and did not know bullets were recovered and did not have time to depose the witnesses with an expert, it was a violation of rule 3.220 and the state and federal constitutions.”). Thus, Petitioner failed to present Claim Three to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.
2. Claims Four Through Six
The Court addresses Claims Four through Six on the merits below.
3. Claim Ten
In Claim Ten, Sanchez seeks to attack the charging documents underlying his 2005 drug conviction, which was used as a basis for his current conviction. Petition at 34. Sanchez is no longer in custody pursuant to that conviction and, therefore, fails the “in custody” requirement for federal habeas review.
4. Conclusion As To Exhaustion
In his Reply, Petitioner alleges that he “did exhaust these claims by citing to the state court the specific provision of the constitution relied on in his Habeas petition” and by “fairly presenting in his claim the substance of [his] federal claims.” [ECF 14 at 1]. However, Petitioner cannot raise a constitutional claim by pleading his factual allegations. Snowden, 135 F.3d at 735 (“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.”) (quoting Anderson, 459 U.S. at 5–6).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that even where, as here, the claims are unexhausted and procedurally barred, the petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of the claim if petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Raleigh, 827 F.3d at 957 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1). Here, Petitioner does not establish, or even allege, cause for the default, actual prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See generally Petition. His claims are, therefore, unexhausted and procedurally barred. Because Petitioner can never return to state
The Court addresses the remaining claims below.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 2254 CLAIMS
A. Deference Under Section 2254.
Under AEDPA, federal habeas corpus review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential,’” Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642 (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)), and is generally limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011)).
The federal habeas court is first tasked with identifying the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court is not required to issue an opinion explaining its rationale, because even the summary rejection of a claim, without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011); Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018); Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961, 964–65 (2018).
Where the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in the state forum,
Because the “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court,” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013), “[f]ederal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102–03). This standard is intentionally difficult to meet. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to the assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings against them. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984). When assessing counsel’s performance under Strickland, the court employs a strong presumption that counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of that deficiency. Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, the
Regarding the prejudice component, the Supreme Court has explained “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A court need not address both prongs of Strickland if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697. Further, counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise non-meritorious issues. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001). Nor is counsel required to present every non-frivolous argument. Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013).
Furthermore, a
With the foregoing in mind, this Court addresses each of the exhausted grounds asserted in the Petition in turn.
A. Claim Four
In Claim Four, Sanchez alleges a Fourth Amendment violation on grounds the trial court denied his motion to suppress based on Sanchez’s warrantless arrest. Petition at 18. Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 58], where his claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).
Claim Four is not cognizable under federal habeas review. “[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Thus, Claim Four must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Claim Five
In Claim Five, Sanchez alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights on grounds the trial court limited Petitioner’s cross-examination of a witness, John Schaefer. Petition at 19. Sanchez alleges that he was unable to cross-examine Shaefer to show that the shooter wore a mask and that there was a “scuffle” prior to the shooting. Id.
“[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other
To the extent Sanchez seeks to question the trial court’s ruling on state evidentiary issues, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”).
C. Claim Six
In Claim Six, Sanchez contends that the jury instructions violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Petition at 20. The Eleventh Circuit has held that in order to merit federal habeas review, jury instructions must render the trial fundamentally unfair. Jones v. Dugger, 888 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]mproper jury instructions can never be the basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless the instruction rendered the whole trial so unfair as to amount to a denial of due process.” (citation omitted)).
Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 52], where his claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Sanchez has not shown that the jury instructions rendered his trial fundamentally unfair or even alleged any prejudice from the instructions. Therefore, the state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Sanchez is, therefore, not entitled to relief under Claim Six.
D. Claim Seven
In Claim Seven, Sanchez claims a violation of the Sixth Amendment on grounds he was tried by a six-person jury. Petition at 21. The Supreme Court settled this exact issue over
E. Claim Eight
In Claim Eight, Sanchez claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Sanchez at the motion to suppress hearing regarding his warrantless arrest. Petition at 21. Sanchez alleges that he should have been called in order to establish standing to object to the warrantless arrest. Id.
In Florida, a warrant is not required if an arrest is based on probable cause. Chaney v. State, 956 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Elliot v. State, 597 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). “Probable cause to arrest or search exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge sufficiently warrant a reasonable person to believe that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed.” League v. State, 778 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citation omitted). “A finding of probable cause does not require absolute certitude.” Curtis v. State, 748 So. 2d 370, 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Therefore, police needed probable cause, not a warrant, to properly arrest Sanchez.
Sanchez does not allege that, had he testified, the court would have found Sanchez was arrested without probable cause. Therefore, whether Sanchez could establish standing to challenge the warrantless arrest is immaterial—because no warrant was needed. Thus, Sanchez cannot show that, had he been called, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Claim Eight plainly fails under Strickland.
F. Claim Nine
Under Claim Nine, Sanchez argues that the State committed a Giglio violation when it presented evidence that the victim was shot six times—in the chest, arms, back and neck—but a police report did not reflect a gunshot to the neck and listed only four gunshot wounds rather than six. Petition at 21.
“In order to prevail on a Giglio claim, a petitioner must establish that the prosecutor ‘knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony,’ and that the falsehood was material.” Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 1995)). Further, “the suggestion that a statement may have been false is simply insufficient; the defendant must conclusively show that the statement was actually false.” Maharaj v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, a review of the state court records shows that Sanchez’s claim is without merit. At trial, the State questioned the officer about the discrepancy in the police report:
Q: Did he have any gunshot wound to his neck?
A: Per my report no. But when I was at the hospital they were doing all of the medical care. I am not sure of the end result if they found the wound, but mine was a quick synopsis of what I initially saw.
Q: How many wounds did he have to the back, sir?
A: I never roll the victim over when they are in a trauma hospital. He was intubated. I don’t roll the victim over. I don’t want to dislodge any tracheal tube so I leave it as is. I take the doctor’s word on what we got initially. Later down the road they will be doing surgery and things of that sort. I am not sure what’s on his back, because I never rolled him over. I just photograph what I see with the bandages on his arms, the chest, the lung, tubes, and things of that sort.
Tr. at 677. Thus, the police report reflects what the officer saw when the victim was in critical condition at the hospital. However, the medical reports Sanchez included in one of his postconviction motions show that the victim suffered “multiple gunshot wounds and is now paraplegic.” [ECF No. 12-3 at 21]. The reports also show that bullets were recovered from the victim’s neck while he was on life support: “Bullet fragments are again seen overlying the left chest and midline neck.” Id. at 30. The fact that further inspection revealed more gunshot wounds that were not readily apparent does not create false or perjured testimony.
The state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Therefore, this Court finds Claim Nine of the Petition to be without merit.
For the above discussed reasons, this Court finds that each of the grounds for relief asserted in the Petition is due to be denied. Thus, this Court must consider whether to issue a certificate of appealability.
V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when
After review of the record, this Court finds that Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. “A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to set forth an entitlement to habeas relief.2
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
- 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. - 2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
3. The Clerk of Court is INSTRUCTED to CLOSE this case. - 4. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at the Southern District of Florida, this 31st day of August 2025.
MELISSA DAMIAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: Lorenzo Sanchez, Pro Se
L58882
Florida State Prison
Inmate Mail/Parcels
7819 NW 228th Street
Raiford, FL 32026
Jessenia J Concepcion
Office of the Attorney General
1515 North Flagler Drive
9th Floor
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
jessenia.concepcion@myfloridalegal.com