SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Petitioner-Respondent, v. GOODING COUNTY and The Board of Gooding County Commissioners, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 42243
Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, June 2015 Term.
Sept. 4, 2015.
356 P.3d 377
Chief Justice J. JONES, Justice EISMANN, BURDICK and Justice Pro Tem WALTERS concur.
Elam & Burke, Boise, for respondent. Robert A. Berry argued.
BURDICK, Justice.
Gooding County appeals the district court‘s decision reversing the Gooding County Board of Commissioners‘s (BOCC) decision affirming the denial of a third-party medical indigency application. On August 27, 2013, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (Hospital) submitted a third-party medical indigency application to the Department of Health and Welfare (Department) on behalf of a patient who had been hospitalized at its facility since July 27, 2013. The County Clerk denied the application on the basis that it was untimely filed, and the BOCC affirmed. The Hospital appealed that decision to the Gooding County district court, which reversed the decision and remanded for further proceedings. Gooding County then appealed to this Court. On appeal, Gooding County asserts that the district court erred when it held that the date of admission is excluded when calculating an application‘s deadline under
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2013, D.J.W. (Patient) was admitted to the Hospital and hospitalized due to injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident. On August 27, 2013, the Hospital filed a First Party Combined County Medical Assistance Application with the Department on Patient‘s behalf. The County Service Director investigated the application and ultimately concluded that the application should be denied as untimely. On September 9, 2013, the County Clerk issued an initial determination denying the application on the basis that it was not timely filed.
The Hospital subsequently appealed the initial determination to the BOCC, arguing that the County Clerk incorrectly counted the date of admission as day one of the thirty-one day application deadline. Following a hearing, the BOCC issued its Findings of Fact Conclusion and Decision, which affirmed the denial of the application on the basis that it was untimely filed.
The Hospital then petitioned the Gooding County district court for review. The district court concluded that the BOCC erred when it included the date of admission in calculating the application deadline. Consequently, the district court reversed the BOCC‘s decision and remanded to the BOCC to approve the application. Gooding County then moved the district court for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Gooding County timely appealed to this Court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs this Court‘s review of a county board of commissioners‘s denial of an application for indigency benefits.
III. ANALYSIS
The only issue on appeal is whether the Hospital timely filed the application for indigency benefits under
The policy behind Chapter 35 is to encourage personal responsibility for medical care and to charge counties with the duty to care for individuals that cannot meet this responsibility.
31-3505. Time and manner of filing applications for financial assistance.
Applications for financial assistance shall be filed according to the following time limits. Filing is complete upon receipt by the clerk or the department.
. . . .
(2) A completed application for emergency necessary medical services shall be filed with the clerk any time within thirty-one (31) days beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical services from the provider, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
(3) In the case of hospitalization, a completed application for emergency necessary medical services shall be filed with the department any time within thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 426, 50 P.3d 439, 441 (2002). The object of statutory interpretation is to derive legislative intent. State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011). Interpretation of a statute begins with the statute‘s literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). The statute should be considered as a whole, and
However, if the statute is ambiguous, this Court must engage in statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Id. To ascertain the legislature‘s intent, this Court examines the literal words of the statute, the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and the statute‘s legislative history. Id. Courts must construe a statute “under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed.” City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Finally, Idaho has recognized the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius-“where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others.” Local 1494 of the Int‘l Ass‘n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d‘Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978).
The BOCC concluded that the Hospital‘s application was untimely. Specifically, the BOCC stated:
[A]s a matter of law, both
Idaho Code section 31-3505(2) and31-3505(3) clearly and unambiguously require a filed application within 31 days of emergency care or hospitalization. This patient began emergency care and was hospitalized the same day; therefore, both subsections (2), “beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical services from the provider” and (3), “within thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission” apply and both subsections of the statute require a “completed application . . . filed . . . within thirty-one (31) days.” In addition, because both subsections (2) and (3) apply, there is no ambiguity as to when the count begins. The Board concludes the application was untimely.
The district court, relying on legislative history and case law interpreting similar language in other statutes, held that the BOCC erred when it included the date of admission in determining the application deadline. The district court did not explicitly state that
Gooding County asserts that despite the absence of the “beginning with” language, subsection (3) still unambiguously requires the date of admission to be included in calculating the application deadline. Gooding County asserts that the language “within thirty-one days of the date of admission” clearly indicates that the clock begins to run on the date of admission to the hospital. Gooding County reasons that had the legislature intended the date of admission to be excluded, it would have used words such as “following” or “after” the date of admission. The Hospital, on the other hand, asserts that
Although
As discussed above, the policy behind Chapter 35 is to encourage personal responsibility for medical care and to charge counties with the duty to care for individuals who cannot meet this responsibility.
The legislative history of
(2) An application for emergency necessary medical services shall be made any time within thirty-one (31) days beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical services from the provider or in the case of hospitalization, thirty-one (31) days beginning with the date of admission, or if a request for medicaid eligibility determination has been denied by the department pursuant to section 31-3503E, Idaho Code, within thirty-one (31) days of receiving notice of the denial.
(2) A completed application for emergency necessary medical services shall be filed with the clerk any time within thirty-one (31) days beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical services from the provider, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
(3) In the case of hospitalization, a completed application for emergency necessary medical services shall be filed with the department any time within thirty-one (31) days of the date of admission.
The foregoing illustrates that the amendment changed both the manner of, and time for, filing applications for financial assistance related to indigent medical care. Indeed, prior to the amendment, all applications had to be filed with the county clerk. However, after the amendment, applications for emergency necessary medical expenses must be filed with the county clerk, while applications for emergency necessary medical services requiring hospitalization must be filed with the Department.
The committee notes from the 2011 amendment do not explain why the legislature struck the “beginning with” language from subsection (3) while leaving it in subsection (2). Gooding County argues that the legislature merely deleted excess words from subsection (3) without changing the statute‘s meaning or the calculation for the application deadline. Thus, Gooding County asserts that the legislature likely intended the “within thirty-one (31) days of” language in subsection (3) to be interpreted the same as the “within thirty-one days beginning with” language in subsection (2). Gooding County reasons that it would be illogical to interpret the two subsections to have different calculations because they apply to nearly identical
This Court has recognized that the “[l]anguage of a particular section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be construed together so as to determine the legislature‘s intent.” Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley Cnty., 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (quoting Lockhart v. Dep‘t of Fish & Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897, 828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Constructions that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored.” Spencer v. Kootenai Cnty., 145 Idaho 448, 455, 180 P.3d 487, 494 (2008). The discrepancy between
However, this Court has been reluctant to second-guess the wisdom of a statute and has been unwilling to insert words into a statute that the Court believes the legislature left out, be it intentionally or inadvertently. See Boise Street Car Co. v. Ada Cnty., 50 Idaho 304, 296 P. 1019 (1931) (declining to read the words “and less than five thousand pounds,” that were claimed to have been inadvertently omitted from a provision fixing license fees for motor vehicles “weighing more than two thousand pounds“); see also Manary v. Anderson, 176 Wash. 2d 342, 352, 292 P.3d 96, 103 (2013) (“Where the legislature omits language from a statute, intentionally or inadvertently, the Supreme Court will not read into the statute the language that it believes was omitted.“); Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it includes language in one section but omits it in another.“). Indeed, as this Court stated in Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962), “[t]he wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute are questions for the legislature alone.” Interpreting subsection (3) to include the date of admission would essentially constitute revising the statute to add the “beginning with language” that was deleted, albeit possibly inadvertently, in the 2011 amendment. This Court has recognized that it does not have the authority to do so, as the legislative power is vested in the senate and house of representatives,
Rather, we presume that the legislature was aware of the statute‘s language when it made the 2011 amendments. Indeed, “[i]t is the long standing rule in this state that when the legislature amends a statute it is deemed, absent an express indication to the contrary, to be indicative of changed legislative intent.” Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, 23 (1987) (emphasis added); see also, Lincoln Cnty. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 491, 632 P.2d 678, 680 (1981) (“When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.“). The omission of the “beginning with” language indicates that the legislature intentionally left it out of subsection (3). This argument has particular weight considering the language the legislature inserted at the end of subsection (2), which states that the application must be filed with the clerk within thirty-one days “beginning with the first day of the provision of necessary medical services from the provider, except as provided in subsection (3).”
We also point out that the statement of purpose for the 2011 amendment reads that the bill “clarifies [the] timeframe for filing applications, that completed applications must comply with the process and timeliness
What is more, this Court has recognized that “in determining time computation, the general rule is that the first day is excluded and last day is included.” Harris v. Beco Corp., 110 Idaho 28, 29, 713 P.2d 1387, 1388 (1986) (citing
§ 73-109 COMPUTATION OF TIME
The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last unless the last is a holiday and then it is also excluded.
As the district court pointed out, consistent with
Similarly, in IHC Hospitals, Inc. v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 188, 191, 75 P.3d 1198, 1201 (2003), this Court discussed the deadline for filing a notice of appeal from a denial of an application for financial assistance under
The County denied the application of financial assistance for Patient on December 11, 2000. The Hospital had twenty-eight days to file a written notice of appeal with the County in order to appeal the initial determination.
I.C. § 31-3505D . Pursuant toI.C. § 31-3505D , the initial determination became final on January 8, 2001, because the Hospital did not file an appeal within the required time.
Id. n. 2. Thus, the Court excluded the first date-the date of the initial determination-in calculating the time to file a notice of appeal under
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court‘s decision reversing the BOCC‘s determination that the Hospital did not timely file its application. Costs to the Hospital.
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON concur.