Local 1494 of the International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur D'Alene

586 P.2d 1494 OF the INTERNATIONAL

LOCAL FIREFIGHTERS, OF ASSOCIATION Petitioners-Respondents, Cross-Appel

lants, d’ALENE, Idaho, Re

CITY OF COEUR Cross-Respondent. spondent-Appellant,

No. 12774.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Sept. 18, 1978.

Rehearing Dec. Denied Miller, McFarland,

L.E. Wm. D. Glen E. Walker, d’Alene, City Atty., Coeur for City of Coeur d’Alene. Wilde,

James M. English Larry A. d’Alene, Coeur for Local 1494. BISTLINE, Justice.

This dispute case involves between the City (the City) Coeur d’Alene and Local 1494 of the International Association of (the Firefighters firefighters), union the collective bargaining agent for 17 fire- fighters who were terminated for their par- ticipation (a strike) in a concerted action against City. existing

An bargaining collective contract between the expired union 31, 1976, December after which time the continued work without a - impasse negotiations contract. An district court’s entry judgment reversing 5,1977, January reached on and the remain- order, mandating commission reinstate- issues were submitted to a fact ment and ordering fur- pursuant to I.C. 44-1805 to negotiations. ther faith 1810. Relations between Appeals Hearing. during deteriorated long delay awaiting release of the fact finders’ part, In relevant pro I.C. 50-1609 § report. firefighters went out on strike vides that when an appeal is taken from an 6, 1977, May joining on and all those in the judgment order or of the Civil Service Com discharged

strike were within the next two mission, days. original juris- The court of and unlimited Thereafter, firefighters applied diction in thereupon civil suits shall pro- district court for a writ of mandamus to ceed to appeal hear and determine such compel City to reinstate them. The manner; summary . 24, 1977, district court ruled on May that That all parties to this action understood procedures by City followed fully complied provision with this process rights violated due of the fire- the appeals hearing is beyond dispute. fighters and ordered their reinstatement. advance appeal court, of the to district at- City repeated discharge process, torneys City for the complying this time with the relevant statu- entered into a stipulation which states: tory provisions of the Idaho Code and the hearing shall not be a trial de Civil Rules of the of Coeur Service novo, but shall be in the nature of re- d’Alene. The Civil Service Commissionheld viewing the decision of the Coeur d’Alene 7, 1977, and, on public hearing on June light Civil Service Commission in of the 1977, June issued its decision legal arguments presented appellant’s on illegal the strike was and that appeal. justified. was IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that the firefighters appealed the commis- Civil Hearing Service Commission tran- pursuant sion’s decision to court district script and all presented exhibits in the I.C. 50-1609. The district court concluded Civil hearing Service Commission shall be though that even the strike the fire- Judge reviewable the District in mak- law, fighters illegal was under Idaho ing a determination. order of the Civil Service Commission ter- That the district hearing court held on minating the not based on firefighters “was 27, 1977, June was in keeping evidence, substantial arbitrary, was stipulation above is manifest from the court discretion, abuse of and was not made in which begin minutes as follows: good faith and for cause.” The district explained Court session. It is from the court judgment requiring entered the City bench today’s hearing trial, is not a new reinstate the and resume there will testimony, just be no this is bargaining. faith review. the City appeal. Ap- Both and the union argument The trial court heard oral pellant City argues of Coeur d’Alene that in counsel, minutes, which consumed 30 fol- hearing appeal from the Civil Service lowing court, which the district within the Commission, the district court “assumed chambers, of his confines made his review jurisdiction” and exercised de novo in viola- the appeal period record over a of time alleged tion of what is express to be an 27,1977, extending from June to August restriction contained in I.C. 50-1609. An- then, clear, 1977. It is alytically, argument the district can focused precisely by proceeded “summary” more manner directing attention to required separate aspects appeal proce- three dis- (1) trict court: the manner in which the dure was that which the envisioned heard; appeal (2) required stipula- standard re- said section and their court; (3) view exercised the district tion. whether, in District Scope law,

2. The Review Court. as a matter of the tribunal acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capri- Appellant City assigns next as error ciously, whether the administrative order alleges what it was the district court’s im substantially supported by evidence, own procedure entering find proper and whether the tribunal’s action was conclusions of law. After ings fact and within scope of its authority. appellant judg entered its the district court ment, the court’s moved strike Kansas State Bd. Foote, of Healing Arts v. findings of fact and conclusions law 200 Kan. 436 P.2d grounds were in violation Controversy usually centers around the def- 52(a). requires That rule I.R.C.P. inition of what evidence is “substantial” findings district court make of fact and enough to support the commission decision. situations; law conclusions of in certain The “substantial evidence rule” is said to be doing prevent does court from so a “middle position” which precludes a de Despite City’s others. the weakness of the novo hearing but which nonetheless re- underpinnings, assignment of theoretical quires a serious review goes which beyond point is not It errоr frivolous. the mere of procedural ascertainment regu- very genuine a concern regarding voices larity. scope of a appropriate review which district Nonetheless, in the case most strongly hearing must exercise in appeals court from appellant relied City, a of majorjty service commission. civil Supreme Court of the neighboring state governing statute provides little of Washington 1966 showed itself satis- guidance. 50-1609 states fied with rule, the “scintilla of evidence” upheld such order judgment If or be five members of the nine-member court commission, majority of the the accused saying, may appeal therefrom to the court of We conclude that neither superior original jurisdiction and unlimited in civil court nor this court can consider county suits of the wherein he resides. weight or sufficiency of the evidence. original court and juris- unlimited State ex Perry rel. Seattle, V. 69 thereupon diction in civil suits shall pro- 816, 704, Wash.2d 420 P.2d 706 For and ceed hear determine appeal such standard the Washington court manner; summary provided, however, reached back to 1937 and its earlier opinion hearing that such shall confined to the in State ex v. City Seattle, rel. Littau 189 as determination to whether the judg- 64, (1937), Wash. P.2d 63 515 from which it removal, or ment order discharge, de- quoted and wherein suspension commission, the court had

motion or stated it cause, inquire was made in faith could into weight and for or appeal sufficiency and no to such court shall be evidence “compe- taken where except upon ground grounds. or tent produced evidence has been tending, in least, some at prove measure the charges requires The statute thus the district court . . . .” (em- made Id. 420 at P.2d 707 appeal “to hear and determine such in a phasis added). summary manner” restricts court re- is, particular view to two issues.1 It how- strong A dissent authored the Chief ever, silent to which standard of review majority Justice opinion assailed in Per- employ disposition the court is to or what ry being keeping times, as not may order. relying upon quoting the dissent from Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera guidance turn for gen We Bd., 474, v. Corp. Natn’l Labor Rel. law 340 U.S. principle eral administrative (1951), 95 L.Ed. 456 proper holds a court’s function in re S.Ct. for the viewing agency proposition actions to consider that the “scintilla” “any” evi- Clearly proc- the two issues are not exhaustive. eration of constitutional violations due not, legislature example, could ess. intended to court exclude from district consid- Act, dence rule was not commensurate with the dure 60 Stat. 5 U.S.C. 1001 et judicial function and duty seq., to review the where the substantial evidence rule entire record to ascertain if the already prevailed, evidence order to clarify “[i]n that “record as a statute, whole” is found to be however, ambiguity Perry substantial. State ex rel. ‘questions committee inserted the words Seattle, (Rosellini, supra, fact, 420 P.2d at 711 C. if supported by substantial evidence on ” * J., dissenting). the record considered as a whole *.’ at (emphasis U.S. S.Ct. Justice Frankfurter pains- conducted a original). noteworthy compelling, It is taking history review of the and analysis as controlling, if not language functioning, to how courts had been Idaho Administrative Procedure Act is simi- how henceforth should function in lar to that which was used in that amend- making appellate agency reviews of deci- brought Taft-Hartley pro- ment which years sions. He did so in some 14 judicial vision of review standards into ‍​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‍con- Washington opinion after the court’s in Lit- formity with the federal Administrative tau, during period of time the admin- Procedures Act. The United States Su- expanded istrative field had manifold. We Court, Camera, preme in Universal stated unpersuaded ourselves find the Wash- provisions that under those Congress had ington Perry, decision in which continued to made it reviewing clear that a uphold the “scintilla” rule of Littau almost setting not barred from aside Board later, reject years expressly and we decision when it cannot conscientiously narrow doctrine. find that the evidence supporting that doing impressed by In so we are substantial, decision is when viewed in legislative language of Idaho’s Administra- light .the the record in entirety Act, particularly tive 67- Procedure I.C. § furnishes, including body of evidence section, appli- 5215(g)(5). though This opposed to the Board’s view. is not cable here —since our concern here 488, Id. at 71 at 465. S.Ct. agency of a state or com- actions simply, Put the substantial evidence rule legisla- us of the mission —serves advise requires a court to determine “whether [the provisions clearly tive intent. Its har- agency’s] findings of fact are reasonable.” teachings of monious with the Universal Davis, 4 Administrative Law Text 29.01- § Bd., Corp. Camera v. Natn’l Labor Relations 02 at 525-530. supra. expla- In that case is found the best standard, nation of the now discredited “scintilla of according to Professor Da- vis, evidence rule”: is application flexible with its depend- ing on such factors as obliged the courts are said to be to sus- tain the decision without reference character of the administrative _ [t]he heavily countervailing how evidence agency, problems the nature of the preponderate deals, may indeed the which it the nature and conse- —unless stage arbitrary quences action, decision is reached. of the administrative interpretation, won, the courts need agency Under this confidence which the has and, only degree to read one side of the case if to which the review would inter- there, any evidence the admin- agency’s find fere with the functions or bur- courts, is to be sustained and the proceed- istrative action den the the nature of the ignored. is to be contrary ings record to the before the agency administrative 481, 340 71 at 461. U.S. S.Ct. Id., 30.08, (1958), quoting at 240 the At- § therein, Congress out pointed As had en- torney General’s Committee on Administra- the Taft-Hartley acted an amendment (1941). tive Procedure 91

Act, Ill) (Supp. 141 61 Stat. U.S.C. § seq., seq., whereby 141 et et U.S.C.A. Several of the factors mentioned militate judicial review standard of that Act of the sub- application favor of a liberal corresponding to conform to the was made stantial evidence rule in this case. For one thing, section of the federal Administrative Proce- “the character of the administrative agency,” significantly justice this case differs disinterested give alone can major from that of the commissions with weight authority. jurisdictions. may very statewide This case anomaly procedure This makes it well have been Coeur d’Alene Civil Ser- necessary vitally reviewing ad- exposure vice Commission’s first prob- zealously ministrative decisions courts ex- magnitude. The lem of such commission protect- amine the record with a view to appears performed to have its functions rights parties fundamental staff, any legal without the benefit of investigative; determining the standard Education, Ging ex rel. State Bd. of court, review in district realities Minn. N.W.2d cannot overlooked. As Professor Davis case, present the commission up is one made remarks: of local appointed electors who have been Perhaps meaningful more than word mayor with the advice and consent formula about type review the ob- of the city very people council —the who are Attorney servation made General’s real dispute. interest in the Committee on Administrative Procedure: Furthermore, I.C. 50-1609 envisions a respect “The that courts have for the whereby situation the commission is en- judgment specialized tribunals which (after trusted with reviewing a full hear- carefully the problems considered ing) judgment (made its own earlier legislated and the evidence cannot be first strength instance on the away.” proposition The converse of this City’s case, accusation). In this fail- though equally responsibility sound: The ing to follow procedures the certification general jurisdiction courts of have for mandated assuring that miscarriages jus- serious appears to a predetermination have made tice are corrected likely prevail over on the merits of the discharges before hold- words that are written in statutes ing its investigative hearing. May On legislators who did not have in mind the 1977, the commission had issued the follow- facts and circumstances particular ing letter “TO IT WHOM MAY CON- case in which judges conscientious believe CERN”: step need to in. It is the opinion unanimous of the Civil Davis, supra, 4 29.02 at 125. Services a Commission that strike was Another factor which serves vary by instituted the firemen members of intensity of district court review of agency IAFF Local midnight, 6, 1494 at May is decisions the structural make-up and 1977. This action inis violation of Civil function agency. At the one ex- Service Rule 12 which in its intent states treme there agencies exist like the Industri- employee goes an on who strike un- which, al by statute, Commission are bal- der circumstance shall be deemed to anced to reflect the conflicting interests longer be no employed by City. they routinely adjudicate which and which City Administration has terminat- degree of function a detachment from ed the above mentioned employees ac- proceedings parallels earlier which that of cordance with Civil Service Rule 12. judiciary extreme, itself. At the other Though purporting to be “the unanimous agencies there exist elected such as school opinion Commission,” of the Civil Services occasionally boards which must serve in the only the letter was signed chairman; complainant, combined roles of prosecutor produced minutes were indicating that a judge daily have familiarity meeting full commission was ever dispute. to a While there convened for consideration of the matter of nothing constitutionally impermissible discharges. structure, about such a a district court will not be blind to distinction: commission, character of this roles, As a result of this statute, combination of roles committed it agency’s] its adjudication final often manner in which the [the commission functioned stamp case, impartiality lacks that of and of in this required a most careful scruti- 636

ny of the whole record both the district Such is the full exercise of judicial power, and, turn, by power court Court. in this state can be exer- cised one of the enumerated may vаry A further fact which serve to (Emphasis added.) courts.” judicial the standard of review is the nature of Big Electors Butte Area Bd. of v. State being present of the issue reviewed. In the Educ., 602, 610, 225, 78 230 Idaho 308 P.2d case, the is not with concern an administra (1957) (quoting from Laisne v. Bd. of State tive/legislative type (e. g., decision rate- 831, Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 123 P.2d 457 making) expertise specializ within the (1942)). 452, Walus, See Foster 81 Idaho agency, ed but rather with what the district (1959); Finch, 347 P.2d 120 State v. right “the court referred to as to a continu (1957). Idaho 315 P.2d 529 employment” employ al of 17 civil service City, posi again Perry, ees—three whom held their ar- reliance on years. gues for We have district court committed tions more than here per a se amounting such a a consti violation to reversible recently stated that by entering findings error his own of fact tutionally protected property interest. Fer In particular, and conclusions of law. Cty. v. Bd. Trustees Bonner guson relies Perry majority for the Dist. No. 98 Idaho 564 P.2d School proposition that: (1977); Grange Buckalew v. ville, find-finding agen- P.2d The court neither a cy, body, hiring a policy-making nor a legislature While may properly hall. Its testing function is limited to agency allocate to an or commission legality of procedure. the administrative making findings task of fact and the 420 P.2d decision, does so many initial instances, City, increasing as we understand its reliance on would not be consti Perry case, it as tutionally permissible standing reads legislature (our thorough proposition superior that because the deny employee and effective review, district) court, findings appellate deci on its does review those and of that proven not sit determine what facts are sion. exist, it was error for the сourt superior a body other than one of the enu- “[I]f disregard findings to discard or of fact fact, findings merated courts makes arrived at the commission and make those findings provi- determines that findings. own We are to see that unable sions of certain statute have been vio- place, Perry such took either lated, and issues order or renders Washington Supreme instant case. The judgment depriv- has the effect applied the rule merely Court scintilla ing person right, a valuable property whereas the not. The superior aggrieved party such action denies the Washington Supreme Court not inti- did guaranteed him process the due of law mate that had been findings Constitutions, by the state and federal discarded, superior or that court body may be unless such action such supplant made its own of the com- those a court of It should questioned in law. mission. mind evil of always kept in that action must be administrative City’s response The to the fact-finding is not guarded against Perry findings use of that of contend the fact- power, but the conclusiveness of the Coeur d’Alene commission were at best finding power coupled with the order “mixed on the dis- findings-and-conclusions issues,”2 findings made which would 2 Am. charge citing based on the and strike (1962): property right. Jur.2d Law deprive person Administrative Perry, found at further and con- 2. The commission decision in Commission finds P.2d, findings independent judgment or conclu- cludes as its 706 of 420 stated * * * sion, only couched matter [re- ultimate determination that the dismissal of spondent] just language: of was for cause. The action in this peals responded be a purports Where what there contention of error, here, City such as makes that upon question of fact so involved pеr did dependent upon questions with the trial court not err se enter- and but, findings in making these our law as to be in substance and effect a record, independent review of the we will, latter, of the court decision agree must determine whether we with legal question, order decide the exam- findings, court’s merely trial not record, evi- including ine the entire findings supported by whether are dence, necessary. if evidence. substantial court in its review has Where the district original). Id. P.2d at 431 (emphasis record, the entire as is here the examined City’s Perry misplaced. reliance on case, findings where commission are First, out, we point nothing Perry as incomplete, as is eonclusory here contention substantiates the Wash- case, say formulation ington Supreme Court superior reversed the facts, on in contest or points replaced having the commission established, necessary by the dis- found findings with Secondly, its own. we read properly perform before could trict court Perry as a holding case trial court function. We believe that the review appellate review is confined to a determina- applicability and is best persuasion Perry tion of whether there was evidence to Washington the later case of determined uphold And, the commission’s conclusions. County Eiden v. Snohomish Civil Service thirdly, seeing upon the need rule Comm’n, 13 Wash.App. 533 P.2d 426 applied judicial standard to be review case,3 as not appear does to which a trial court makes of commission court, Perry, superior upon be so in its determination, rejected we have the “scin- review, findings did enter own fact tilla of evidence” rule in favor rule law, and conclusions of some the review be made ascertain if to be verbatim found footnotes there is substantial evidence on the basis of throughout opinion. Ap- The Court examination of the whole record. City Chief Police Ramon is therefore sustained. of Coeur d’Alene sustained the bur- (Italics theirs.) proof foregoing, den of and in view of the it is case, ruling The ultimate conclusions in the instant of the Civil Service Commission Fact, City

captioned Findings that the of Coeur read: d’Alene has acted in accordance with Civil Service We Find: Rules following religious political named mem- 1. There are no reasons up- bers City [names is confirmed and omitted] for the actions taken of Coeur held. according to d’Alene the evidence introduced hearing. at the County In Eiden v. Snohomish Civil Service City’s 2. The cause for the action was insub- Comm’n, supra, Perry, there was as here and in ordination, willful of a direct only decision, disobedience to-wit: order, against and unlawful concerted action study testimony given After hearing, all of Coeur acted d’Alene. made, seconded, a motion was justification insofar as due cause under unanimously carried that it is the determina- Civil Rules This is Service are concerned. Commission, tion of the Civil Service based upon shown the evidence that oral and presented Investigation evidence at the duty report written orders to the Firemen 28, 1971, Hearing August and discharge held individually comply agreed refused approved. of James A. Eiden is not strike, group to unlawful concert- is That it is further determined that said James action, ed insubordination disobedience grade A. Eiden be reduced in to the rank of under Service Rules. direct orders Civil Deputy First Class duty and that he be returned to tеstimony City 3. There is to conclude the 8, 1971, September On rank good acted in in their decision made on pay faith period, loss for the interim and that May discharge to The Fire- Secretary 6th the Firemen. the Chairman and be authorized adequately men the con- certify were informed as to and directed to so to the Sheriff and to sequences City of their intended action. The Mr. Eiden. responded 428, appellate to the Union’s action in conform- 533 P.2d at which decision the specifically any ance to Civil Service Rules and in the did not accord status as amounting findings. interest. 638 dissenting opinion judicial Further, governing two the sitúa- strike. The rules ‍​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‍teachers’ test the the issue in Oneida case.

639 Our observing interpretation trict court was that it own correct in of this stat guided by was “still faced with the decision of wheth- ute is the principles established (and statutory er or not Civil Commission of Service construction: City) its and not abused discretion did statute, construing duty In it is the firefight- make its decision to this court to ascertain the legislative in- ers in faith and cause.” As the tent, and give effect In thereto. as- noted, district court neither the nor the intent, certaining this must only opin- had access to the Oneida literal wording of the statute exam- 22, (which July ion was not until released ined, but also account must be taken of 6, 1977) May when strike occurred on matters, context, other “such as the 1977. object view, remedied, the evils to be history of the times legis- and of the all-important 44- statute I.C. § subject, lation public poli- same 1811, reads in full: cy, construction, contemporaneous prohibited during contract. Strikes the like.” In re Gem Academy State —Upon during consummation Bakery, 529, 70 Idaho 224 P.2d agree- term written contract or of thе 535 [1950]. ment, firefighter recog- strike or shall Messenger Burns, 26, 29-30, v. 86 Idaho nize a line labor picket organiza- 913, (1963). P.2d performance tion of his official while duties. with, then, begin To “the literal wording of the statute must be examined.” strike, At the of the time office of candor, In all it must be stated that Attorney had twice written ad- General statute not a of clarity.6 model Literally, subject vice on point and each side could course, the statute expressly prohibits to a supporting interpretation letter its own “upon strikes consummation during 1975, language. 18, April above On term of the written contract or agreement.” an Attorney Assistant General had written Regarding period expiration after to a official interpreting union 44- I.C. § the contract agreement, the statute is that, 1811 to mean “If contract has circumstances, jurisdic silent. expired, implicit there exists an assumption tion has generally subscribed to rule that firefighters right have a to strike and states, statutory construction which expres 24, picket.” September 1976, On a differ- sio unius est exclusio alterius: Attorney ent Assistant General reached the opposite Furthermore, conclusion in another letter universally “It is a recog- same union official: “it is not proper that, rule nized of the construction where Code, 44-1811, draw prohibit- from Idaho specifies constitution or statute certain contract, during the of a things, strikes term designation things of such ex- authorization to strike State, after the termina- cludes all Peck others.” 63 Ida- 375, 820, 822; tion of such contract during negotia- ho 120 P.2d Drainage Dist. tions on a new contract.”5 778, County, No. v. Ada 38 Idaho recognized being part been tions have participate distinct. refusal on the Corp. negotiations. See Mastro Plastics v. National Labor Board, Relations 350 U.S. S.Ct. (1956); L.Ed. 309 Rockwell v. Board 6. of Educ. In the words of the district court: Crestwood, School Dist. 396 Mich. of All the statutes in the State of Idaho are N.W.2d 736 silent as to the to strike if collective bargaining breaks down. letter, terms, position its own dealt fireman in State rights legislature, “after termination not much better and our during negotiations think, prob- of such a neglected contract and on a and ducked purport time, something new contract." It long did not to address lem for a it’s they problem, legislative situation the found themselves It’s should tackle. 6, 1977, May it, you after the termi- and because haven’t tackled find explicit yourself you nation of contract but also after an when shouldn’t be. 290; Goldman, statute, v. 1 Idaho enact an absolute no-strike People P. with its for provision correlative conflict resolution arbitration, by way compulsory Idaho 322, 330-331,132 Hollar, 64 Idaho Poston might be said to have thus east its lot with case, present In the P.2d recog- those states which are said to have the conclu- of that rule leads to application granted public employees nized or their prohibiting by strikes by expressly sion that Alaska, contract, right,” including “limited strike Ha- during the term of a waii, Minnesota, Montana, recognized legislature impliedly Oregon, Pennsyl- either expiration after of the right their to strike Employee vania and Vermont. See Public or, minimum, the door opened at a ¶ contract seq. (CCH 1977). 6500 et Bargaining agreement par- as the to such contractual reading Such a of I.C. 44-1811 is reen- § regard. might ties reach in that legislative history forced of the Idaho wording That of the the literal statute, present given which was to the an inter- readily statute to such lends itself in the appeal record for comparison pretation is seen from review the district court. The history is Those states those of other states. illuminating regard both with to what the strikes against have an absolute ban statute includes and what it omits. In their position have made that public employees presentation commission, to the both Revised clear. The Statutes unmistakably cognizant importance were of evi- example, contain the fol- Kentucky, for bearing upon legislative dence intent as a lowing language: determining factor for consideration in Fighter 345.130. Fire or Labor Or- Sec. construction interpretation of a statute. Participate Not Strike. ganization Arlen legisla- James Martinez testified as to in, fighter engage —No fire shall intent, having tive been called to the stand organization spon- shall fighter fire labor firefighters. president He had been any strike. sor or condone Firefighters of the Idaho State Council policy also states its “strike ban” Oklahoma years, prior presi- for 7 he was though in somewhat more unequivocally, dent of a local unit in Boise. At the time of expanded form: his he was an testimony, international vice- health, safe- protection president encompassing for the district Ida- the perma- and welfare demands that ty ho, Montana, Washington and Alaska. any paid depart- fire nent members According unchallenged to his testi any city, police department ment or Martinez, mony, president Mr. as not be accorded the municipality town or Council, lobbyist in in 1969 was the engage any work to strike charge push of the 1969 for collective bar or slowdown. stoppage gaining legislation; he identifiеd Senate 13F, tit. ch. 548.2. States Okl.Stat. part Bill which is a of the record. frequent- strike ban have an absolute prohibited any striking,7 pro This but bill procedures with elaborate combine this ly binding compulsory vided for arbitration in disputes, resolving practice unfair labor 345.070, impasse. According the event of an to his as some form of Ky.Rev.Stat. § arbitration, ch. testimony, passed tit. the bill in the Senate binding Okl.Stat. 13F, vote, get 548.9. but failed to out commit tee in the House. He stated that in 1970 legis- adopted by the Idaho language changed the bill was so as to eliminate the in stark 44-1811 stands in I.C. lature compulsory binding arbi provision in abso- language contained contrast tration, containing and a new By refusing to bill ban statutes. lute strike recognize No fireman shall strike or Bill 1059 read picket title of Senate part, 7. The organization while in the FIRE- line labor Section 12: PROHIBITING applicable of his official duties. RECOGNIZING performance STRIKING OR MEN FROM THE PERFORM- WHILE IN LINES PICKET Section THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES. OF ANCE of the bill reads: 12 of the text may was extrinsic aids be used to language leg of I.C. 44-1811 resolve present duly enact- legislature to the and ambiguities, submitted N. J. islative Pharmaceutical following exchange testified to Furman, 121, 130, ed. He Ass’n v. N.J. 33 162 inquiring sen- place took between which (1960); Westinghouse A.2d 839 Electric 1970 bill: proponent ator and Review, Corp. 221, Board 25 N.J. one of the was asked question 226, (1957); Fisher-Stevens, 135 A.2d 489 senators, “I the no-strike notice Director, Taxation, Inc. v. Division of 121 original law was removed from the clause 513, 517-518, N.J.Super. 77 298 A.2d legis- had before this (App.Div.1972), 575, den. certif. 62 N.J. lature, wording is differ- present and the (1973), 328 they 303 A.2d may appro also ent.” priately supply reassuring confirmation legislation the introducer of the And literally apparent meaning, as is here said, they And dis- “That is correct.” Deaney Co., case. v. Linen Thread give you length. it at some I can’t cussed 585, 118 N.J. (1955). A.2d 28 Nor do discussion, verbatim word-for-word we it is improper think to consider mate that the quite am sure my mind but rials may legis never have met the they was there because intent legislative eye. lative proposed While a enactment removed clause was knew no-strike may first see the light day legisla place of it. wording was added and chambers, tive conception prepa and that it to the commission City indicated ration have frequently taken place else legisla- the record as supplement would where. is normally This true of adminis testimony deposition or tive intent tration proposals. Of course such materi from Gary Ingram, Representative State als be carefully must scrutinized and Two, objec- no to which there was District their weight evaluated, and authenticity response Ingram only that Mr. tion but we see no merit a demanding in rule legis- a might not have been member of their total exclusion judicial from consid However, in 1970. did not lature eration. supple- Ingram, nor did it seek call Mr. All the analysis lines of converge. deposition his testimo- ment the record with The literal and, wording 44-1811, Hence, turn, of I.C. ny. general rules left with of statutory the trial court and Court are interpretation, indicating legislature testimony and the legislative history strongly suggest after the failure of a passed that the present statutory wording a re absolute previous bill which contained an sult of the above-mentioned compromise. testimony is entitled to strike ban. Such prohibited Strikes are after consummation consideration. See National R.R. serious during the term aof written contract. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R.R. In period of time after the old contract 458, 94 Passengers, 414 U.S. S.Ct. expires before the new one is consum Data Access See also L.Ed.2d mated, they are prohibited par State, Securities, 63 Systems, Inc. v. Bur. of ties are to negotiate free way one or anoth where, (1973), N.J. 305 A.2d er depending upon their relative economic extrinsic material which was offered strengths. particular interpretation to aid case, present it is clear both statute, Jersey Court New Supreme they understood that could con- so said: tract they and that V of did so. Article meaning conclusion as to the Our agreement collective bargaining be- statute is reached with- true intent of the tween of Coeur d’Alene and Local any extrinsic materials. out reference 1494 of the International Association of really ambiguity no enact- There Firefighters following provi- contained the compelling no need to ment and hence sion: aids. The interpretative value resort During Agreement in this lies in the term of this materials case these Not bring. only fire fighters recognize confirmation shall strike a 31, 1976, organization labor December picket line performance of his official while in the residual to strike. To hold the con- agree- sign subsequent Failure to duties. we have to hold that fire- trary, would (Emphasis cause for strike. ment is fighters any right were without to strike. added.) holding would be Such tantamount contract, legislature was saying engaged During the 1977 negotiations for meaningless both and useless endeavor when it provision approved by similar sides, we singular provided interest here and this decline enacted I.C. § engage City that would not in lockouts: the to do. that Employees agree and the Union controlling conclude that the We Agreement, they during the term of this prohibit the statutes do not cause, encourage, participate will in not so, being That the was striking. from door support any picketing against or strike firefighters to City for open the any the or on slowdown or other City strike, to recognize right a contractually the interruption of or interference with hold, therefore, We that did. will the nor City, normal functions of ruling the court erred in that the district City, con- any there be lockouts the “illegal in an engaged were to any subject which is cerning matter and, illegal not if The strike was strike.” procedure. the grievance The Union City, would not challenged in court the during agree, Employees further that enjoinable. have been firefight- Agreement of this term to remains as whether question A final recognize picket ers will a line includes, as firefighters’ right to strike perform- in organization while labor elements, dis- right a be one of its Failure to ance of his/her official duties. This occurs. charged the event a strike sign subsequent shall be agreement, by either not been addressed

only (Emphasis question has grounds for a strike. although it was added.) firefighters, City or the Mr. Martinez argument when subjected to that, it provisions make clear above on under cross-examination.8 the stand parties, expi- after contemplation of the gleaned from Its is not be answer bargaining agree- ration of the collective is the intent statutes. Nor language of the City ment and the union between say depends Martinez, respect legis- what the A. I would Q. Mr. with to the you and the contract. state law said to and lation which made reference that, your Q. a there, there state law And is copy who a 1 didn’t understand directly gives public еmployees opinion, legislation. authored deprives public right to strike and Asso- The author was the International A. employer right him? to fire Firefighters, Idaho ciation of State Council public gives em- A. is no law that There Firefighters. anything. gives ployees firefighters— There is a law that you agree pri- Q. me Do with public employ- Firefighters, they Q. are legis- private employer, a absent vate sector ees, they not? per- contrary, a to the could terminate lation (Nods head.) A. striking? son for my your question Q. is answer So language in the contract? A. Absence -of what, sir? Right. Q. question again. me the A. Ask Q. A. Yes. you asking agree if with me that I’m you position Q. absent Do take nothing deprives a law that there is contrary public employee language to the public employer, absent contract not so restricted? right firefighter contrary, to fire a for you agree ato A. I would have to going on strike? particu- point, language I think in this but contract, of state law or a A. Absence contrary. lar contract agree would with that. then, sir, prob- you telling Q. me Are Q. anything there in the state law Is right ably public employer to termi- has a public knowledge your deprives the em- striking person there unless nate a language right? ployer contrary? in the contract particular time. A. Not at “good language faith.” The district clear from court’s summary pro- their contract. absence of the City’s dealings coincides with our contract, it language tective would reading own of this record: appear firefighters’ to follow that the re- making City, early determina- report fusal to to work when ordered to do Firefighters, tion that the em- un- gave discharge so “cause” ployees, strike, did not havе the der I.C. 50-1609. did not act in faith in the bargain- deciding Assuming without that such ing process, but pursued ap- hard line existed, we turn to the district “cause” proach to problem, effect of ruling court’s that there was no substantial Firefighters drove the to the wall support evidence to commission’sfind- and into the Firefighters a strike ing that the made in had been justified, believed not but also “good faith.” The district stated that legal in Idaho. had not acted faith in the reject To summarize: We the approach of following particulars: the City that it refuse to bargain could benefits, By withdrawing especial- A. good faith, secure in the belief that the ly Firefighters the food allowances from right had no strike. We find finding process. during the fact no prohibition in relevant statutes. Firefighters By advising B. that We reject likewise viewpoint extreme into, even if a new contract were entered opposite at the spectrum, end of the name- the same be retroactive would not to Jan- ly, were, that the firefighters absent their uary 1, Firefighters leaving the to believe having provisions effect, contractual to that that benefits withdrawn would be discharge insulated from if chose to forever lost. exercise their right view, to strike. In our long C. The delay Finding Fact cards, neither side holds all the and that is a report Commission return cannot be as it the City should be. If refuses to City. considered the fault of the How- bargain faith, in it cannot discharge ever, City it is obvious that used such the firefighters even in face of a strike. If advantage delay to its in steadfastly re- there are provisions no contractual to the fusing negotiations to pursue any without contrary, City would have “cause” to a report refusing written to accept dischargе strikers, and the firefighters even a verbal from report the Fact Find- could not negotiate themselves refuse to in ers to be used as basis continuing good faith, secure the knowledge in that negotiations. they had a fully protected right to strike. strike, D. anticipation In determined that the course of con- The judgment of the district court is af- duct was to discharge Firefighters in firmed. Costs to respondents. Injunctive order to hire new ones. relief valid, was not considered as alternative BAKES, JJ., McFADDEN and concur. solution. McFADDEN, Justice, specially concur-

The court also made reference to the nu- ring. procedural merous at the errors time of the I concur in the opinion by authored Jus- attempted discharge first of the firefighters However, tice Bistline. reason of state- early May in as an index of the “bad faith ments made in dissenting opinion permeated affair.” the entire Chief Shepard, compelled Justice I feel the record in Our review of explain my in position regard to School case leads us to conclude that the district Ass’n, Dist. No. 351 v. Ed. Oneida 98 Idaho court, acting capacity, in its appellate was (1977), opinion P.2d 830 ruling correct in was no that there substan majority. concurred with the tial support evidence to Civil Service In Commission’s Oneida was dealing this court solely the firefighters was made problems a group of school and had before it teachers the issue of ers and school boards. It would not be an injunctive granted by relief court. trial appropriate judicial function fault the Basically, case involved consideration legislature in those determinations. interpretation seq., I.C. 33-1271 et (emphasis Id. 567 P.2d at 834-835 the Idaho Ne- enacted Professional original). gotiations opinion Act. this court Admittedly, Oneida did not involve an pointed out that strike, actual but rather the validity of court law The trial ruled as matter of injunction prohibit issuance of an injunction and we should issue Nevertheless, threatened strike. the Court assume, must in the absence of evi- necessarily right treated the issue of the record, he concluded that a dentiary strike contrary position and held As- illegal strike teachers is Idaho. asserted by the teachers there asserted suming deciding that was cor- without he majority opinion today. In Oneida conclusion, nevertheless, mere rect the Court clearly held that em- require does not illegality of act ployees right guaranteed to strike injunction. of an automatic issuance constitution. The Court also held in Onei- is evident that By this statement contra to position the teachers’ scope of its limiting this court da right denial of the to strike them denied beyond of issues ruling, and discussion equal protection since employees pri- considered dicta. holding must be limited vate sector did to strike. the issue before case In this instant importantly, Most in Oneida the re- Court the results of firemen and dealt with jected the position of the teachers that the case where strike, unlike the Oneida their “inferentially Act grants public school firemen, peculiar to statute the neither teachers right in the state of Idaho the to a was (I.C. 44-1811), nor strike them right strike the since to strike is not ex- involved. pressly prohibited in that act.”

SHEPARD, Justice, dissenting. Chief majority today the asserts that since holding right the of to is expressly prohibited by with strike a am much troubled I today clearly establishes during statute majority term of a collective bar- right to strike. firefighters had that gaining agreement, it follows necessarily that much greatly am also troubled such right prohibited to strike is not at like- arriving holding at that said in Such, my other time. in opinion, is left unsaid. This with much that wise clearly holding contra to express No. 351 year in District last School Court holding today, Oneida. The the majority Ass’n, County v. Oneida Ed. 98 Ida- Oneida Oneida, expressly overruling without can held, (1977), by albeit a 567 P.2d ho only add unequal confusion and treatment Court, right existed that there divided already disorganized to an and unclear field majority public employee to strike. The a of law. after ac- assuredly, today’s Most Oneida, arriving holding, at its noted: in in tion, strike, may at school firefighters times right to strike private In the sector may teachers not. necessary integral as an is viewed The majority in Oneida stated: bargaining process. collective part of the Appellants legislature has assert that However, sector the denial by firefight- expressly prohibited strikes to has the effect of right strike ers, argue therefrom heavily the scales in favor weighing legislature must intended have bar- during collective government teacher-public em- permit by strikes our legislature In Idaho gaining process. prohibit- would have ployees, otherwise it judgment as to the policy has made by as prohibited ed those strikes it strikes providing public employees merits not . . . Rather, it has [Citation omitted] right strike. well legislature may have believed processes alternative developed statutory difference between teach- the substantial between disputes labor to resolve where, they right only if performed by vis have strike the duties here, legisla- majority asserts that the em- required express vis teachers bargain in against ployer good strikes fire- failed faith. On prohibition tive hand, common law reme- the other fighters public employees and that the do teachers against strikes to strike unencumbered dies available teach- showing employer strikes that the has adequate were following prohibited but failed to bargain ers could be faith? Who is determination; hearings. make that adequate employees do the possess the authority unilaterally deter- added). (emphasis P.2d at at Id. mine that employer has failed to bar- reasoning majority adapt To gain Correlatively, faith? may the circumstances, we instant Oneida employer unilaterally determine that legislature engaged believe must employees bargain have failed to in good attempted to and did gesture, empty an faith and thus lock out the employees? nothing its enactment of Title accomplish majority opinion postulates Code, where at- it number Chapter holding of bases for its bargaining take dis- tempted to collective possess right here majority out of the to strike. The firefighting sector putes in the labor man- first hurly-burly private prohibiting sector examines the statute during disputes. my judgment, strikes the term of a contract and agement just the case of as it did in arrives at the conclusion legislature, that since strikes strikes, teachers, possibility of replaced prohibited are ipso other times facto coercion, lockouts, firing, retire- permitted. economic are clearly Such is con- like, quarrels, and the system benefit trary ment holding the Court’s and rationale mandatory statutory requirement with a expressed in Oneida. If we to depart as- I would not disputes. for resolution from that recently case, it announced legislature, useless such a action cribe clear, should be done so in explicit language to the reason- continue to adhere which, but would judgment, in my in today’s absent majority opinion Oneida majority opinion. imposition held wherein majority next the legisla- examines mandatory statutory negotiations was tive intent demonstrated solely the “un- balance the scales otherwise attempt challenged testimony” of “the in lobbyists the weighed employer on the side of heavily charge of push the 1969 for collective bar- an element forbidding of strikes as gaining legislation;” “testimony” bargaining process. presented in an type hearing informal be- legislature A indication that the further Commission, fore Civil Service in which by public not intend to authorize strikes did it was announced that rules of evidence employees, particularly firefighters, would not control nor be observed and 72, 14, Chapter of Title enactment which was hearsay conclusory rife with yet legislature removed There Code. posit statements. To that such comments in private item which sector another persuasive, binding, are passing or even of bargaining process. left would be interest to this Court in its determination thereby provided has a man- legislature The is, me, legislative intent a new and novel system ‍​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‍firefighters for the dated retirement rule of In my judgment, law. the cases questions left unan- Idaho. One in cited in majority support of such majority whether in by the swered ruling compelling, per- ^ere neither nor support of the bar- strike their suasive, applicable. nor In Rail- National firefighters may assert process, gaining Passenger road v. National Associa- Corр. higher retirement benefits for demands 453, Passengers, tion Railroad 414 U.S. legis- in the pertinent contained than those Court, 646, 94 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d lation. intent, legislative search cited the for congressional em- public appropriate interest It will also be of records therein of testimony state to learn committees and the groups in the of Idaho ployee Systems, jobs officers. In Data Access could return to their there- cabinet Securities, “However, v. Bureau of 63 N.J. corporate agent may Inc. State after. affidavits, (1973),certain 305 A.2d 427 replace striking firefighters with re- including attorney general, the state that of placements. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. pur- amicus curiae had been submitted NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 He does not legislative intent. The porting clarify have a duty replacements therein, conclusively stated “Our con- court during provide hired the strike in order to meaning as to the and true intent of clusion striking positions firefighters for after the without reference to the statute is reached Mackay strike is over. NLRB v. Radio & Id. 305 A.2d at extrinsic materials.” Co., Tel. 82 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. (1937).” by majority, city voiced As stated major- I turn now to the discussion sitting legislator its desire to call a then grounds discharge by the ity of the Civil legislative intent. give opinion his as to Commission. Service Such, judgment, provided would have my my opinion, majority opinion ig- In spectacle of two no more than the ridiculous express provisions nores the of the statute intent of the arguing about the persons provides that the action the com- within and one from legislature, one from will reviewed the district mission “testimony” would without. All of such if solely to determine it was “made been based on obviously have had to have * * good faith and for cause There- sрeculation. hearsay, conclusions and after, provided it is that no court review also makes refer- majority opinion except upon undertaken those shall be language contained ence to certain grounds. my judgment, clearly, contract between issue before the commission and before the expired before the city. contract had Such whether the refusal of district court was no theo- of here. I find complained actions to follow a direct order and theorized that a upon which it can be ry a violation of the go on strike constituted between two agreement contract regulations city pertinent action otherwise legitimizes authorizes was therefore Civil Service Commissionand always believed by law. prohibited grounds discharge. Clearly, the fire- would be held provision such a contract fighters respond did refuse to to a direct public policy. as a violation invalid order and went on strike and such action points also to various corre- majority pertinent regula- was in violation of the of the At- from the then Office spondence Hence, existed, my good tions. cause purporting to construe torney General judgment, for the order of the commission. pertinent statute. provisions of majority opinion, rather than exam- majority indicates commission, ining faith of the placing re- have been reasonable might to examine the faith of the proceeds opining the first letter liance Even con- city bargaining process. Even right had a to strike. firefighters city during sidering that the actions of the attorney general is au- assuming that the process were relevant to a bargaining private legal advice to thorized to furnish court, by the district I must determination dispute, in relating to matters persons be noted here that the disagree. It should ignores spe- reasoning, judgment, in my impasse reached an in their had second letter provisions of the cific and the issues had been sub- negotiations judg- legal clearly that an error stated which was on finding body mitted to a fact that the conclu- ment had been made and findings and actual- verge making its What was in error. sion of the first letter findings May make its dated 9-10. ly did us is that does not tell majority again report by As noted an addendum to the attor- opinion by issued even in the first May dated the fact office, firefighters were ney general’s . . . entitled “CLARIFICATION: they that in the event specifically advised paragraph The last sentence in one reads as strike, requirement no go on there was did addition, Allow- this must decide. In assuming are the Food Court ‘We follows: Cqurt The statement of this the substantive interpret will be restored’. should ance mean to include intended to restoration 50-1609 and I.C. 44- language I.C. § §§ management to the date that retro-active through 44-1811 which sets forth the bene- unilaterally decided discontinue determining city standards for whether the fit.” statutory obligations and fulfilled legally were dis- whether agree the record cannot demon- I charged. bargain city strates that refused agree Neither can I “if there good faith. I provisions no contractual to the con- are city to dis- trary, would have ‘cause’ jurisdiction I au- first address charge strikers and the could thority questions, which turn on inter- negotiate not themselves refuse to pretation of 50-1609. From this stat- I.C. faith, knowledge they secure in the procedural ute it determined what must be protected fully had strike.” I steps when a civil must be followed service agree expired cannot the terms of an employee discharged and also what obli- govern contract should as to whether the gations, authority, jurisdiction pos- strike, by city, reason by civil employer, sessed service discharge. cause to Commission, Civil Service courts opinion note that the majority gives I Any under this statute. over the confusion problem consideration to the resolution of a meaning of I.C. 50-1609 is understanda- obviously following today’s which will arise ble. extremely ambiguous The statute is decision. What is to happen present confusing. employees depart- of the Coeur d’Alene fire Idaho Code is set out § 50-1609 below. demonstrates, ment? Insofar as the record To quick facilitate reference to the lan- employees are civil service entitled to guage in I have taken the rights by all and benefits held other liberty numbering the individual sen- They employees. civil service cannot be tences contained in the statute. discharged except for cause and in 50-1609. Suspensions—Ap- civil regulations faith. The service out spell Removals — peals Hearings.—[1] persons All in detail those reasons for discharge which — subject classified civil service shall be constitute “cause.” Nowhere therein is suspension provision employment from office or employee there to forfeit job the head replaced by department his employ- former for miscon- gone duct, who ee has on strike and incompetency properly been dis- or failure to charged. observe the rules of the department. ^[2] Upon suspension by de- the head

DONALDSON, Justice, dissenting. partment appointing or accusation power, imрortant taxpayer, citizen or questions written Several are raised statement appeal suspension which I feel of such properly are not accusa- tion, terms, majority. general addressed addition shall be served the duties of feel the Civil Service the accused duplicate and a filed properly Commission should be delineated commission; provided, the head guidance. for future department may suspend a mem- ber pending of the sus- confirmation question presented ap- The initial pension by appointing power, which peal procedural jurisdic- concerns the and (3) confirmation must three be within aspects of My tional 50-1609. deci- § sion this threshold issue forces me to days. ^[3] of the civil service upon charges commission be said shall think the decision of the district court department be reversed and case certified to the head of should remanded. Other issues also been raised shall concern- and forthwith be enforced and fol- public employee strikes which feel lowed him. ^[4] aggrieved party shall, however, have the within ten to such court shall be taken except (10) days removal, from his ground grounds. the time of such or case such mination of the commission shall be provisions pearing shall be afforded an hearing. At such made lic gious accused a ^[5] suspension, presenting his defense. therefrom to the court of ment and written hearing commission, may for removal, suspension, or order be reasons, by the conducting of the cause. be, was made for of this demand for an after demotion or person to file with the commission or was time and the accused reasonable question upheld by sectiоn shall such ^[6] confined hearing or made in opportunity All investigation, ^[7] discharge political pursuant toas place investigations investigation. If demotion or notice to the counsel original and the accused may appeal majority of be such whether of by pub- or reli- of as the deter- judg- faith such and ap- that a civil service outlined in I.C. removal, line from his observe the though best analysis My duct, suspension could second ly 50-1604 sets forth The first sentence of the statute I feel the head the reasons reasons be a written incompetency be should reasons sentence explained of I.C. § office suspended discharge, by the first sentence rules of the for be the decision statement of for the or for of I.C. reversal and remand 50-1609. in a reversed and remanded. employment department head of the suspension, 50-1604.1 Idaho Code employee for in or failure to and sentence detail the causes suspension any department.” suspension. attempts of the district an “for miscon- department suspension subject to employee sentence properly provides provides must be implicit- reasons out- will Al- for suits of the jurisdiction in civil unlimited suspended employee served on the county wherein he resides. ^[8] The court duplicate filed Civil Service Com- original jurisdiction unlimited provides mission. second sentence also thereupon suits shall to hear proceed civil origi- against employee an can charges appeal summary determine such appointing (the city, power nate from the manner; however, such provided, merely department rather than a head of a hearing shall the determi- be confined to city), citizen, If taxpayer. within the or a as to whether or judgment nation originate appoint- the accusations from the removal, citizen, discharge, demotion or ing power, order or these accu- taxpayer, commission, suspension by was made sations must also be filed with the Commis- cause, appeal employee. faith and for and no sion That portion any 1. 50-1604. other willful violation of the civil service Qualifications Examinations — removal, discharge regulations; applicants or rules and —Causes (c) suspension physical posi- or incumbents. —. Mental unfitness for the holds; employee tion which the ap- applicants All incumbents and thereafter Dishonest, (d) disgraceful, preju- immoral or office, pointed place, position shall or em- hold conduct; dicial behavior, ‍​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‍any ployment during good (e) intoxicating Drunkenness or use of li- removed, person may discharged, sus- narcotics, quors, any forming or other habit rank, demoted, pended pay, without reduced drug, liquid preparation or to such extent special deprived privileges other of vacation or efficiency the use interferes with thereof or reasons, privileges any following sub- physical employee mental or fitness of or ject facts in each the determination of the prevents employee properly from case the'commission: performing po- any the functions and duties of (a) Incompetency, inefficiency or inattention service; civil sition under to, duty; or dereliction of (f) felony Conviction or a misdemeanor (b) Dishonesty, intemperance, immoral con- turpitude; involving moral duct, insubordination, treatment discourteous (g) Any act, act or other failure to public employee, or or a fellow other judgment of the civil service commissioners tending injure omission or commission act to show sufficient the offender to be service; part public on the willful failure person employed in unfit unsuitable and to be himself, employee properly conduct service. actually leaves us at a loss as who has sentence of I.C. 50-1609 which § second remove, discharge, the or authority limits the sus- de- appears after the semicolon power department deprive mote an or otherwise the given employee head. pension language provides any employee Additionally, of some benefit. suspension This by only is the statute does not indicate who makes the department temporary head and, continue, going must be confirmed in decision as to what of action is course days by appointing power, against employee. three the i. e. the to be taken the Both city. The third sentence of I.C. 50-1609 50-1609 provide 50-1604 and for § § § removals, the Civil Service provides discharges, suspension, Commission etc. for statutes, to make the findings charges however, is on certain conduct. The do lodged against been the employee clearly the specify where decision mak- findings these are to “be authority concerning certified to lies sanctions or the head of the department and . who has the to decide what course authority by enforced and followed him.” against action is to the employ- be taken ee, requires findings Code 50-1604 also i. e. by employee § whether will the be dis- charges the made against charged, demoted, Commission an merely dеprived or employee. some particular benefit any for course of conduct. juncture

It is at this that some confusion (1) provides arises. The statute for suspen- The following logical is the most con- cause, (2) filing sions for the of a written struction of the statute and what I believe accusation, statement of or suspension legislature the It intended. is obvious that (3) findings charges by on the the Commis- against initiative for action a civil statute, however, sion. The does not an- service employee must come from the em- questions. swer several ambigui- first ployer, a taxpayer, Thus, or a citizen. ty is that regarding findings by the Com- would follow that the decision as to what At stage, mission. this punishment evidence or or what action should be taken material before the Commission is against the writ- employee must lie with the em- ten statement which has been ployer. filed Additionally, although the Commis- employee’s Although accusers. both the sion obligated some to take action after third sentence of I.C. 50-1609 filed, apparent written statement it is language require findings, is not obligated Commission Commission very has little information conduct investigation an intensive from which it can findings findings make and what make detailed of fact before an little information the investigation Commission does have requested. The statute solely comes employee’s merely from the contemplates cursory accusers. review of extremely It would be difficult the charges by for the Commission at findings point. Commission to make based entirely stage, At Commission is merely this one-sided written statement. examine obligated charges It pointed stage must be out that at this for discharge, determine if cause sus- given pension, demotiоn, Commission is vehicle or mecha- etc. would exist were gathering allegations for there support nism additional information facts to made against does employee. stage evidence. The statute not contem- At this investigation requested unless it is Commission must there plate assume charges. employee. support the accused second ambi- facts to If the Com- authority exist, guity discharge. relates to the mission finds that cause would findings first of I.C. their two sentences 50-1609 Commission certifies back to suspensions employer. for cause After the Commission provide has sentence, The third employer. employer, civil service certified the matter back findings providing employer in addition to then issues formal order Commission, specifies findings by against employee(s). decision as to charges are exactly the Commission on the to be what action is to be taken against head and department employee logically certified to fol- must lie language by employer. lowed him." This itself questions agency an preliminary findings

With these out must make which are remaining sufficiently to lan- way, proceed extensive and exacting sup- for my port Davis, 50-1609 and reasons its guage I.C. conclusions. K. § Adminis- 16.01, procedure and remand. The trative Law Treatise reversal at 435-37 § initially (1958). was followed previous is outlined above not This Court on occasions immaterial, however, case but this is has indicated the and desirability in this also need ac- eventually, findings agencies. after the mandamus of such because Boise Water Corp. steps Comm’n, tion were taken which were sufficient v. Idaho Public Utilities (1976); satisfy procedure requirements. these 555 P.2d Mountain Co., View Tel. Rural Co. Interstate Tel. in I.C. 50-1069 in language The critical § 55 Idahо 46 P.2d 723 appeal begins with the fourth sentence. days necessary It provides point that within ten is out the distinction This sentence demotion, removal, dis- between “ultimate” and “basic” suspension, of his or facts. “An employee usually expressed can demand ultimate fact charge aggrieved language statutory The of a standard.” K. investigation by an Commission. Davis, 16.06, provides conducting supra example, at 450. For sentence § fifth de- I.C. sets forth certain investigation, the Commission must 50-1609 ultimate § removal, suspension, facts which must determined whether Civil termine (1) demotion, discharge was discharge politi- was made for Service Commission: or reasons; (2) political religious for religious good or was made in cal or reasons faith; good (3) stage discharge made and It at faith and for cause. was the for cause. “Basic” find- finding obligations the actual fact ings “are those on the ultimate find- investigation Commission arise. Once rest; findings ings the basic are more de- must hold requested, the Commission findings than the but less tailed ultimate hearings receive evidence from both and summary detailed than a of the evidence.” his At the con- employee accusers. 16.06, Davis, supra Principles 2 K. § investigation, Commis- of this clusion agencies require law administrative sufficiently detailed find- sion must make findings from first make basic the evidence regarding questions ings of fact each facts. deciding ultimate The basic before fifth In mak- enumerated in the sentence. as a foundation findings serve for ulti- ing is obli- findings these Commission findings. mate conflicting evidence and gated resolve reasons for practical requiring ad- operative set forth in sufficient detail the findings powerful are so ministrative upon in its reaching it relied ultimate facts requirement has imposed been with regarding religious political conclusions uniformity by virtually remarkable all overtones, faith, and cause. courts, irrespective federal and state problem appeal in this is that statutory requirement. The reasons have to make Commission failed Civil Service review, facilitating judicial do required by findings of fact sufficient avoiding judicial usurpation of adminis- findings issued I.C. 50-1609. § functions, assuring trative more careful investigation in- after the were Commission consideration, helping par- administrative only a findings amounted to adequate. The rehearings plan ties their cases for ultimate statement of the Commission’s review, agencies judicial keeping conclusions, e. were i. jurisdiction. within their reasons; religious discharged political or for Davis, 16.05, supra 2 K. at 444. § discharg- faith city had acted eighth sentences I.C. firefighters; seventh and judicial review of provide because discharged for cause were ille- After decisions of Commission. been absent work because from decision, the fire- findings were rendered its Commission gal strike. The Commission’s pur- fighters appealed to the district court findings supporting void of basic Rather than re- well estab- suant to I.C. 50-1609. It is a ultimate conclusions. manding the action to the Commission law principle lished of administrative facts, district under detailed statement of Thus the Civil Ser- proceeded appeal. hear the vice is the body. Commission fact “is limited judiciary’s function to deter- Court has been Although this not before whether mining opportunity given an was jurisdic- obligated to outline duties and competent to be heard and whether evi- tion of Service Commission and the Civil Id. 420 P.2d charge.” supported dence matters, civil serviсe courts judiciary at 708. Washington neighboring from our State of these I find questions. have addressed of the of the inadequacy Because Civil decisions, statutory lan- these involve findings, Service Commission’s believe guage pertinent part comparable that the district court should have remand- 50-1609, persuasive. § ed the cause with instructions to the Civil Seattle, adequate Service Commission to make find- Perry of In State ex rel. v. ings. give The district court must the Civil 70 Wash.2d (1966), 420 P.2d opportunity Service Commission the Washington Supreme Court that af ful- stated investigation obligations ter an has fill its requested by been and it is after these aggrieved employee, becomes finding obligations “it then fact are met the function the civil service commission court can review properly district the deci- investigate,

. hearing, to hold a sion of the Civil Service Commission. and to upon reach a conclusion the merits of . II dismissal. commission is Id. fact-finding . . . body.” are requirements There two set forth in P.2d at 707. I.C. 50-1609. important empha- It is § commenting judiciary’s func- size that I.C. 50-1609 mandates any § reviewing

tion when decisions from Civ- employee of a civil service must Commission, il Service the court stated that be made both “in faith” good and “for judiciary cannot Before cause.” the Civil Service Commis- weight sufficiency consider the or discharge any sion can civil service employ- Appellate evidence. review is not trial ee the Civil Service Commission must first . de novo. . The court is neither a “good find both faith” and “cause” finding agency, fact a policy-making existed. body, hiring or a hall. Its function is testing limited to legality of ad A procedure. ministrative . . . GOOD FAITH question crucial whether or there is A complete comprehensive definition supрort evidence to the commission’s con “good faith” requirement of I.C. finding clusion. A or a conclusion made it, possible practical. 50-1609 is neither nor is, § without support evidence to course, arbitrary Generally, this language . . . it is not means that civil but capricious arbitrary employer arbitrary or if made due service be cannot consideration presented evidence capricious. “good requirement faith” hearing. at . . . Neither employer means must deal with trial court nor court can substitute fair, honest, employees in a and reasonable judgment judg the independent general manner. Aside from “good civil ment of the service commission. requirements 50-1609, faith” of I.C. § addi- Hahn, Appeal good obligations tional faith are Wash.App. imposed from State ex (1974) (quoting P.2d a civil service employer firefighters by Seattle, rel. Perry supra, 420 P.2d through I.C. 44-1801 particularly § 706). 44-1802 through 44-1804.2 These bargaining rights bargain 44-1802. Collective of fire- shall have the collec- agent. fighters Representation bargaining tively cities, counties, respective with their fire — city, county, political —The fire dis- rep- districts subdivisions and to be political bargaining agent trict or other subdivision in the state resented in such collec- provisions give finding collec- to a fact statutory issues shall submitted civil ser- bargaining rights obligate negotiate tive refusal to fur- commission.” The aspects meet and have employers vice “to confer ther after all contract bargaining agree- agreed upon except those submitted faith” when collective been Thus, finding does not neces- negotiated. when the fact commission being ments a dilatory faith or determining sarily amount bad the Civil Service Commission finding If the fact tactic. firefighters’ discharge, legality of the appears might it have been in dilatory, as special must find that the the Commission case, both should worked obligations “meet and confer in faith” the fact com- compel in concert to were satisfied in addition mission to reach a decision. requirements faith of I.C. general good the 50-1609. § B circumstances, withdrawal In certain the exist- expiration benefits after the of an of CAUSE of bad may constitute acts ing contract If the Civil Commission deter- Service the withdrawn when If benefits are faith. general that the has satisfied the city mines is the following presented, fact situation imposed good obligations faith I.C. (1) act faith: may be an of bad withdrawal obligations good and the faith of 50-1609 § fully per- continue to public employees the through 44-1801 the Com- I.C. § duties; (2) question there is no their form question must to the mission then turn con- exist once the the benefits would again important reempha- It is to “cause.” consummated; is negotiation under tract question that the of “cause” need not size to believe (3) justifiable reason there is no if considered the Commissiondetermines be the when payment benefits city good did act in This that the not faith. in would be is contract existence there no “cause” to is so because even if existed re- public employees illegal; (4) other they firefighters, could not be employed when not ceive similar benefits act discharged good if the did not in city employment bargaining a collective under faith. contract. cross-appeal, firefighters In their ar- did city claim that the firefighters The gue that “cause” did not exist which would faith, among other good act in in not discharge. warrant The firefighters their period refusing negotiate in things, this premised argument on contention was de- finding when fact “right have they strike.” 3 provides liberating. Idaho Code 44-1805 § allege I.C. firefighters 44- § The agree- if cannot reach “during 1811,4 strikes prohibits contract, “any ment on a and all unresolved (10) receipt agent days ten after writ- bargaining process wages, within tive rates of agent bargaining from said pay, working ten notice conditions and all other terms employment. meeting firefighters and conditions of for a request obligation bargain- Recognition bargaining purposes. This of exclusive 44-1803. collective agent. organization agreement ing majority duty selected to cause include shall —The fighters any city, county, negotiations of the fire the bar- resulting between from political corporate subdivision shall be rec- proper fire district or agent authori- gaining and the bargaining ognized as the sole and exclusive contract. a written to be reduced to ties fighters agent for the fire in the fire all of finding of issues fact 44-1805. Submission 3. recognition department, of of unless until bargaining that the the event commission.—In bargaining agent vote such withdrawn unable, corporate agent authorities are fighters depart- majority of the fire of such (30) including thirty days from and within ment. agree- meeting, to reach an of their first date Obligation corporate authorities 44-1804. contract, any and all unresolved aon ment bargain Entering written into faith— a fact com- be submitted to shall issues city, obligation of the contract.—It shall be mission. county, political or other subdivi- fire district authorities, corporate through proper sion to meet and confer during prohibited contract. repre- 44-1811. Strikes faith with during —Upon bargaining term of represеntatives consummation sentative or Act, 152(3) (1974). term of com- agree- written contract or U.S.C. Absent [a] inferentially “right gives legislation ment” them state in the area prehensive when relations, adopt strike” no contract existence. all labor Court cannot negative pregnant which results from rights normally attached language of this that strikes statute is legislation when federal “right to strike” enjoined not could when a collective To involved. do so would be the exercise agreement bargaining is not existence. does power which this Court legislative however, question injunctions, is not possess. not presented issue Even if appeal. did say This is not were and con- question we to address this labor. withhold their have con- strue statute as the Const, right. constitutional This is a U.S. tend, bearing such ruling would have 1; XIII, Williams, 322 Pollock v. amend. question on the of “cause.” (1944); 64 S.Ct. 88 L.Ed. 1095 U.S. ask us to hold Right Jennings, to Strike: Concerted “right to strike” because Act, Taft-Hartley Under Activity inference 44-1811. negative found Cal.L.Rev. the absence If we were to hold that did I.C. § legisla comprehensive labor relations rights on these firefighters, bestow however, tion, firefighters guar had no right would not include the to with- rights they discharged antee that would not be labor and services fear of be- hold without when withheld their labor serv they ing discharged. rights the fire- protective leg ices. Without benefit of fighters would receive if the statute were islation, anyone the common law rule is that they to be construed as contend would be subject discharge. who to work is refuses right engage labor activ- concerted County Sacramento, Almond v. 276 Cal. including ity, right employ- to withhold App.2d Cal.Rptr. (1969); New ment, injunction. free from court Regents marker of University of Califor arguing nia, (1958); Cal.App.2d P.2d 558 gives construction above of I.C. Union, Pierce v. Stablemen’s Local No. strike,” “right them the claim that 8760, 156 (1909). 103 P. 324 Cal. Suffice to strike” “right rights includes all “cause,” say contemplated by as generally “right associated with the 50-1609, discharge I.C. would exist to phrase strike” is used and under- if report refused to stood in federal cases with federal dealing being specifically work after to do ordered legislation relations state labor or in cases employer. so their Whether the dealing with state to feder- statutes similar firefighters refused report to work is a legislation. argue The firefighters al question of fact which should be decided “right inferential to strike” found in the Civil Commission. Service 44-1811 includes to with- Because Commission did not make hold labor and services terminating without findings sufficient detailed sup- of fact employment their fear of being without port “good part faith” on the discharged. argument might This be valid and also city that “cause” existed to legislation if Idaho to federal similar the case should be Management enactments such as the Labor reversed and district court re- should Act, Relations U.S.C. 151- §§ mand the case back to the Civil Service 158, 159-167, 171-183, 185-187, 191-197, for specific Commission findings. comprehensive These federal expressly provide employ- enactments who cease to apply

ees work in concert

pressure on their not cease to employers do ‍​​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‍employees actually and are quitting jobs.

their Labor Management Relations firefight- performance organization agreement, while in the labor the written contract or recognize picket line of er shall strike or duties. his official the notes On review of a civil service While determination, the “problem appeal” occasioned district court is a full required of the commission make suffi to conduct review of the failure and, whole record where the findings prefers cient of fact and commission’s conclusions unsupported by are substantial district court “should have remanded to the evidence, stating, its function adequate encompasses Civil Service Commission make both for the benefit of the findings,” forgets the dissent Court, reasoning its and conclusions which has not raised issue whatever very may well but need not take form regard, evidencing its thereby own satisfac findings exactly and conclusions. That is stating only tion with decision ulti present what the trial court did in the case. mate conclusions of the commission. Even court, rendering That the trial its appel ordinary an case this Court would be decision, way so by late did of enumerated grant a reversal ill-advised findings, conclusions and enumerated rath argued by an raised nor it. issue neither form, appellate er than in is opinion with 47, Ramseyer, v. 98 Ramseyer Idaho 558 significance. out City’s assignment Barron, 26, (1976); Bair v. 97 Idaho P.2d 76 error on this score focuses on form rather (1975). not presented 539 P.2d 578 Issues than substance and is without merit. will not be con simply the district court 95 Baugh, on Dunn v. Ida appeal. sidered Disposition in District Court. 236, (1973). ho 436 This is not an 506 P.2d Civil Service Commission in firefighters Here ordinary case. 1977, 13, decision June determined that months, gain 18 discharged been for almost discharged were not for ing a district court order for their reinstate reasons; political or religious city discharged second time. ment be “good acted in faith” in discharging readily see as An able trial court could as firefighters; were findings were can we that the commission discharged for “cause” in that detailed as is desired. as while conducting been absent from work Hospital illegal in Olathe Founda strike. district court conducted was said As Inc., 546, tion, Extendicare, Kan. review of the whole record and concluded v. 217 Inc. up order Civil Service Commission 1, (1975), the law nor 539 P.2d 15 “[n]either firefighters, holding that this matter sent requires sense evidence, was “was not based on substantial go- the commission another back” to arbitrary, an abuse of discretion and does not controlling statute around. The cause.” On not made in faith and, on findings, I.C. § mandate it our to make same appeal, task it, relatively undisputed record before as did the review of commission’s action we, fit, nor do did not see the district court wheth court in order determine district However, our a final decision. to avoid er, record, the commission’s on whole interpreted negat not be should decision substantially supported by decision was findings of fact requirement law. by applicable evidence and governed proceedings are agencies whose court, addressing legality Act Administrative Procedure The district strike, “Un- require. Ag obliged conclude: See felt explicitly so statutes authority the case [School v. Utah Power & der Corp. Products ricultural v. County Oneida 351 Oneida (1976); District No. Co., Light 98 Idaho 557 P.2d Ass’n, 567 P.2d 830 Idaho Education Williamson, 257 P.2d Swan conclusion that the the Court’s (1977)], desirability of (1953). general As to to strike not have firefighters did all administra of fact findings detailed of whether Regardless May 1977.” Davis, Administrative agencies, tive see here,4 the dis- case relevant the Oneida 16.05, Law Treatise § strike, not, below, an economic gov- in that case was strike 4. As mentioned practice pro- alleged, here an unfair labor by specific as is which were not at statutes erned

Case Details

Case Name: Local 1494 of the International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur D'Alene

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 26, 1978

Citation: 586 P.2d 1346

Docket Number: 12774

Court Abbreviation: Idaho