KRYSTAL SADLER оn behalf of herself, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. TARGET CORPORATION et. al
Civil Action No. 23-00030
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
January 29, 2025
O‘HEARN, District Judge
ECF No. 82 | PageID: 1684-1696
Matthew A. Luber
Tyler J. Burrell
Charles Joseph Kocher
Williams L. Carr
MCOMBER MCOMBER & LUBER, P.C.
39 E. Main Street
Marlton, NJ 08053
On behalf of Plaintiff Krystal Sadler.
Jacqueline R. Barrett
OGELTREE DEAKINS
1735 Market Street
Suite 3000
Philadelphia, PA 19103
On behalf of Defendant Target Corporation.
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Krystal Sadler‘s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Certify Class. (ECF No. 56). The Court did not hear oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff‘s Motion to Certify Class.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a class action lawsuit commenced by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated hourly employees, alleging that Defendаnt Target Corporation (“Defendant”) violated the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”),
Defendant operates three distribution centers in New Jersey—located in Burlington, Logan, and Perth Amboy—which collectively spans over two million square feet. (Id. at ¶ 9). Plaintiff alleges that all hourly, non-exempt warehouse employees at these facilities, including herself, were subject to uniform policies and practices that required them to engage in unpaid work-related activities before and after their shifts. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 11–13). Specifically, employees
Plaintiff worked at Defendant‘s Logan warehouse as a non-exempt hourly worker from September 8, 2022, to November 22, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 4). During her employment, Plaintiff alleges thаt she was not compensated for the time spent on these activities, which she contends are compensable under the NJWHL. (Id. at ¶¶ 26–35). She asserts that this practice violated state wage laws by underreporting hours worked and failing to pay the proper regular and overtime wages. (Id.).
Defendant denies Plaintiff‘s allegations, arguing that the activities in question are not compensable under New Jersey law. (Am. Answer, ECF No. 34). Nonetheless, Defendant has acknowledged that its records identify over 8,100 hourly, non-exempt workers who may be included in the putative class, which as defined initially spanned from November 30, 2016, to the present, (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1, ¶ 13), but was later modified to span from August 6, 2019, to the present.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 30, 2022, (ECF No. 1-1). Defendant removed the action to this Court on January 4, 2023, (ECF No. 1). On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 33). On June 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Certify Class presently before this Court, (ECF Nos. 56–59), which Defendant opposed on July 17, 2024, (ECF No. 66). Plaintiff filed a reply on July 31, 2024. (ECF No. 71). The proposed class sought via Plaintiff‘s Motion includes:
All Progression Team Members who have been employed as hourly, non-exempt workers at any of Target‘s New Jersey distribution centers at any time from August 6, 2019 through the date of final judgment in this matter.
(Pl. Br., ECF No. 58 at 13).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The requirements for class certification are set forth in
The four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied when:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Upon satisfying Rule 23(a), the moving party must then show that the putative class falls under at least one of the subsections of Rule 23(b). Id. at *18. In the present case, Plaintiff brings claims under
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Courts deciding whether to certify a class under Rule 23 must undertake a “rigorous analysis” and consider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2008). Decisions tо certify a class require “findings by the court, not merely a threshold showing” by the moving party, that the requirements of Rule 23 are met. Id. at 307. The Court “must resolve all factual or legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the merits,” id., and those factual determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence, Reyes v. NetDeposit L.L.C., 802 F.3d 469, 484 (3rd Cir. 2015); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch, 174 F.R.D. 332, 339 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that it may be necessary for the court “to analyze the elements of the parties’ substantive claims and review facts revealed in discovery in order to evaluate whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves for class certification on behalf of a class of hourly workers who, since August 6, 2019, have been employed by Target under the NJWHL and NJWPL. (Pl. Br., ECF No. 58 at 1). Plaintiff is challenging Target‘s cоmpany-wide policy of failing to pay hourly employees for time associated with: (1) pre-shift travel within the distribution center to employees’ assigned departments; and (2) post-shift travel time to exit through Target‘s security screening measures. (Id. at 5). Defendant maintains that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that her claims and defenses at issue predominate and that a class action is superior to the usual course of conduct. (Def. Br., ECF No. 66 at 18–19). For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff‘s Motion to Certify Class. (ECF No. 56).
A class is ascertainable if it is (1) “defined with reference to objective criteria; and (2) there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.” Byrd v. Aaron‘s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015). Further, “a plaintiff [need not] be able to identify all class members at clаss certification—instead, a plaintiff need only show that class members can be identified.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff proposes the class as
All Progression Team Members who have been employed as hourly, non-exempt workers at any of Target‘s New Jersey distribution centers at any time from August 6, 2019 through the date of final judgment in this matter.
(Pl. Br., ECF No. 58 at 13). Defendant does not specifically address this prong and thus implicitly does not contest it. Nevertheless, given the proposed class—All Progression Team Members who have been employed as hourly, non-exempt workers at any of Target‘s New Jersey distribution centers at any time from August 6, 2019 through the date of final judgment in this matter—and the availability of payroll and timekeeping records, a class of employees is easily ascertainable. See Ramcharan v. A.F.L. Quality, Inc., No. 12-7551, 2014 WL 4388579, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2014) (noting payroll data at the class certification stage permits the class members to be objectively ascertained by providing evidence of who was employed by the defendant as of the relevant date). The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the ascertainability requirement of Rule 23(a).
B. Numerosity
There is no certain minimum number of plaintiffs required in order to bring a class action suit. Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2001). However, “generally if the nаmed plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Id. at 226–27. Here, Plaintiff maintains that Target acknowledged in its
C. Superiority
In the superiority inquiry, courts must “balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of alternative available methods of adjudication.” Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir. 1996), aff‘d sub nom. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). Courts should also consider four nonexclusive factors: “(1) the interest of individual members of the class in controlling the prosecution of the action; (2) the extent of litigation commenced elsewhere by class members; (3) the desirability of concentrating claims in a given forum; and (4) the management difficulties likely to be encountered in pursuing the class action.” Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, the Court finds that judicial efficiency weighs in favor of certifying the class. In this case, each putative class member‘s case turns on whether their walking time constitutes hours
D. Adequacy of Representation
The аdequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Windsor, 521 U.S. at 625. Two inquiries must be made to determine adequacy: the first looks at the qualifications of the counsel that is representing the class and the second looks at whether there are conflicts of interest between the representatives and the сlasses. In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 602 (3d Cir. 2009).
Here, Plaintiff represents that her counsel are “qualified, experienced, and able to conduct this litigation” and points to cases in which they have previously been approved to represent classes. See, e.g., Hall v. Adelphia Three Corp., No. 21-01106 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2023) (approving
As to potential conflicts, Defendant spends much time in its brief focusing on Plaintiff‘s expert and related opinions as to the merits of the Plaintiff‘s claims. (Def. Br., ECF No. 66 at 13–16, 25–26, 34). At bottom, Defendant summarily argues thаt Plaintiff is not an adequate representative because “she has not spoken with an expert, nor has she discussed her claims with anyone at the Logan distribution center where she worked or employees at the Perth Amboy and Burlington distribution centers.” (Def. Br., ECF No. 66 at 34–35). Not only does Plaintiff represent that they have an expert, but she also notes that expert reports were not yet due at the time this motion was filed. (Pl. Reply Br., ECF No. 71 at 3–6). Moreover, Defendant‘s contention regarding alleged criticisms with respect to the retention of experts and/or the expert‘s opinions, or alleged deficiencies in representation in this regard are simply irrelevant at this stage and does not in any way suggest that there is a conflict between Plaintiff and the class in any way. As suсh, the Court finds that Plaintiff can satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Rule 23(a).
E. Commonality, Typicality, and Predominance
Because both commonality and typicality “serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff‘s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence,” courts may consider them
First, to meet the commonality requirement, Plaintiff must show that she “share[s] at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” In re Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 597.
Second, to determine whether Plaintiff has demonstrated typicality, courts ask “whether the named plaintiff‘s claims are typical, in common-sense terms, of the class, thus suggesting that the incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class.” Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Stewart, 275 F.3d at 227 (“The typicality inquiry centers on whether the interests of the named plaintiffs align with thе interests of the absent members.”). The Third Circuit has stated the following regarding typicality:
[T]he proper consideration in assessing typicality ... include[s] three distinct, though related, concerns: (1) the claims of the class representative must be generally the same as those of the class in terms of both (a) the legal theory advanced and (b) the factual circumstances underlying that theory; (2) the class representative must not be subject to a defense that is both inapplicable to many members of the class and likely to become a major focus of the litigation; and (3) the interests and incentives of the representative must be sufficiently aligned with those of the class.
Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 599. “[I]n instances wherein it is alleged that the defendants engaged in a common scheme relative to all members of the class, there is a strong assumption that the claims of the representative parties will be typical of the absent class members.” Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 140 (D.N.J. 2002) (citation omitted), aff‘d 84 F. App’x 257 (3d Cir. 2004). “A claim ‘framed as a violative practice can support a class action embracing a variety of injuries so long as those injuries can all be linked to the practice.‘” St. Louis Chiropractic v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 07-03110, 2008 WL 4056225, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2008) (quoting Baby Neal, 43
Third, a plaintiff proceeding under Rule 23(b)(3) must also show “that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”
Here, Plaintiff allege that Defendant does not pay the class members for the time they spend traveling to their time clock before their scheduled shift starts and the post-shift time within the facility after class members clock out to go through security screening measures. (Pl. Br., ECF No. 58 at 8–9). At the outset, Plaintiff makes a strong case for the commonality and typicality of the class members. All putative class members were employed by Defendant as hourly workers and the unifying and overriding legal question is whether the time spent by the class members in pre- and post-shift activity constitutes hours worked. Here, clearly, resolution of the class claims requires the Court to determine whether this time should have been compensated. See Davis, 2023 WL 8373162, at *3 (finding commonality prong met given that “the class members share the important common question of whether time spent walking from the building entrance to the time clocks and back again is compensable under the [Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act]”).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff‘s Motion to Certify Class, (ECF No. 38), is GRANTED pursuant to
Christine P. O‘Hearn
United States District Judge