CITY OF SOUTH EUCLID, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANTHONY DATILLO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 109180
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
October 22, 2020
2020-Ohio-4999
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J.
Criminal Appeal from the South Euclid Municipal Court Case No. CRB 1700037
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 22, 2020
Appearances:
Michael P. Lograsso, South Euclid Director of Law; Nicola Gudbranson & Cooper, L.L.C., and Michael E. Cicero, for appellant.
Michael A. Heller, for appellee.
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J.:
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant city of South Euclid (“the City”) appeals the municipal court’s ruling that granted defendant-appellee Anthony Datillo’s
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On January 11, 2017, the City filed criminal charges against Datillo under
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} On February 27, 2017, Datillo pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges. Datillo subsequently filed а motion to dismiss that argued
{¶ 5} The City opposed Datillo’s motion to dismiss but on October 10, 2017, the municipal court granted the motion. The City appealed that judgment on October 26, 2017. In S. Euclid v. Datillo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106687, 2018-Ohio-4711, we refrained from ruling on the merits of the case but reversed on рrocedural grounds:
[T]he municipal court’s journal entry, consisting of a single sentence, provided no indication of its reasoning for the dismissal of the charges. As such, it was insufficient to comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 48(B). Under Crim.R. 48(B), the municipal court must state on the record its finding of fact and reasons for the dismissal.
{¶ 6} The South Euclid Municipal Court reactivated the case on January 28, 2019. Datillo, on June 25, 2019, filed a motion that requested the trial court to execute a revised journal entry in compliance with Crim.R. 48(B). On July 1, 2019, the City filed a renewed brief in opposition to Datillo’s motion to dismiss. The South Euclid Municipal Court journalized a nunc pro tunc journal entry on
This court finds that the City of South Euclid lacks the legal authority to withhold an occupancy permit from the defendant where the basis rests on the fact that the defendant has failed to satisfy a tax obligation to another governmental entity — in this instance, Cuyahoga County. Further, where that governmental entity has an adequate remedy at law to collect upon said outstanding tax debt, it is both unreasonable and unnecessary for the City of South Euсlid to substitute itself as the collection authority.
Further, this court finds that the City of South Euclid’s enforcement of Codified Ordinance 1409.01 in the within case is unconstitutional as applied because it creates penalties, for actions where under Ohio Revised Code chapters 5707 and 5713 which regulate the рayment of property taxes that have no penalty at law.
* * *
{¶ 7} The City filed a timely appeal on October 7, 2019, and raised, verbatim, this single assignment of error:
The trial court erred by dismissing the criminal complaints against Appellee over the City’s written objection, as South Euclid Codified Ordinance [Sections] 1409.01(c), 1409.02 and 1409.05 are valid exercises of the Home Rule Power pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 8} We review a trial court’s dismissal of criminal charges for an abuse of discretion. State v. Coon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97280 and 97281, 2012-Ohio-1057, ¶ 9, citing State v. Busch, 76 Ohio St.3d 613, 616, 669 N.E.2d 1125 (1996). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconsciоnably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). An unreasonable decision occurs when no sound reasoning process supports that decision. AAAA Ents. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). An abuse of discretion also occurs when a court “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legаl standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). “When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Grisafo v. Hollingshead, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107802, 2019-Ohio-3763, ¶ 17, citing AAAA Ents. at 161.
B. Home Rule
{¶ 9} The City argues that its enforcement of SECOs 1409.01(c), 1409.02, and 1409.05 is a valid home-rule power and, therefore, the trial court erred when it dismissеd the criminal charges against Datillo. Datillo contends that SECOs 1409.01(c), 1409.02, and 1409.05 conflict with general laws of the state of Ohio and, therefore, are in contravention with the Ohio Constitution and its delegation of home-rule authority.
{¶ 10} The City asks this court to assess whether SECOs 1409.01(c), 1409.02, and 1409.05, which are part of the City’s housing cоde, are valid exercises of its home-rule authority. In the lower court, Datillo’s motion to dismiss argued that only
{¶ 11} The Home Rule Amendment, conferred under
{¶ 12} Ohio courts have adopted the Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, three-part test to determine if “a municipality has exceeded its powers under the Home Rule Amendment. ‘A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-governmеnt, and (3) the statute is a general law.’” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17, quoting Canton at ¶ 9. The Ohio Supreme Court has pointed out that the Canton three-part test should not be analyzed in sequential order:
Although it may seem that the three issues should be taken in sequence as stated, we must examine the two legislative enactments before determining whether a conflict exists. Thus, the Canton test should be reordered to question whether (1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.
To qualify as a general law, a statute must “(1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporаtion to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus.
{¶ 14} Datillo and the trial court cited to
{¶ 16} In his motion to dismiss, Datillo referenced
{¶ 17} “The power conferred upon municipalities to enforce within their limits local police, sanitary and other similar regulations is only limited by general
Necessarily the conflict which limits the municipal local self-government must relate to a conflict with state legislation on the same subject matter. * * * If by processes of interpretation this court should establish a rule that any and all municipal legislation relating to “local police, sanitary and other similar regulations” should first be found to be wholly free from conflict with all state legislation, even though the same should not be even remotely related to the same subject-matter, municipal councils would be seriously handicapped in maintaining law and order, and it is doubtful if any such acts could be made to meet the test. This court has repeatedly declared that any alleged conflict must relate to the same subject-matter. Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St., 338, 103 N. E., 512, Ann. Cas., 1915B, 106; City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St., 468, 118 N. E., 114; Heppel v. City of Columbus, 106 Ohio St., 107, 140 N. E., 169; Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St., 263, 140 N. E., 519.
Youngstown at 346-347. Similarly, no conflict exists here between the local ordinances and
{¶ 18} The trial court also found the local ordinance unconstitutional because
{¶ 19} Further, in applying the contrary directives test that reviews whether an ordinance permits that which the general law forbids or vice versa, we find no conflict between
{¶ 20} Inherent in the Canton analysis and the determination whether an ordinance is within a municipality’s home-rule authority is the consideration of the statewide-concern doctrine. “[T]he term ‘statewide concern’ describes ‘the extent of state police power which was left unimpaired by the adoption of the Home Rule Amendments as well as * * * those areas of authority whiсh are outside the outer limits of ‘local’ power, i.e., those matters which are neither ‘local self government’
{¶ 21} In considering the doctrine, we find
{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we find that
{¶ 23} Judgment reversed and remanded with the directive that
{¶ 24} Judgment is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceеdings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_______________________________________
RAYMOND C. HEADEN, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR