RONALD WASTEWATER DISTRICT, а Washington municipal corporation, Petitioner, v. OLYMPIC VIEW WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT, a Washington municipal corporation; TOWN OF WOODWAY, a Washington municipal corporation; and SNOHOMISH COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondents, KING COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, Petitioner, CITY OF SHORELINE, a Washington municipal corporation, Defendant.
No. 97599-0
Supreme Court of Washington
October 15, 2020
JOHNSON, J.
En Banc. Filed October 15, 2020. Susan L. Carlson, Supreme Court Clerk. Filed in Clerk‘s Office Supreme Court, State of Washington October 15, 2020. Chief Justice Steven C. González signature.
FACTS
This dispute focuses on two specific properties within Point Wells, the former Standard Oil petroleum plant and Daniel Briggs‘s residential property. Both are located within Snohomish County and Olympic. In addition, the Briggs property is located within the town of Woodway. For the purposes of this case, references to Point Wells include both properties, unless otherwise noted.
The sewer system subject to this dispute is known as the Richmond Beach sewer system (RBSS). Initially, RBSS was operated by King County Sewer District No. 3 (KCSD #3) and exclusively served King County. In 1970 and 1971, KCSD #3 contracted with Standard Oil to construct a lift station and provide sewer service to Standard‘s petroleum plant located within Point Wells. King County then requested permission from Olympic to provide water service to the Point
In the 1980s, King County sought to divest its sewer operations and transfer them to local water and sewer districts. To facilitate its divestment plan, King County lobbied for the creation of the transfer annexation process, eventually codified as
King County initiated the transfer of RBSS to Ronald per the newly established method under
After holding a hearing, the superior court issued the 1985 Order, which is the subject of our review. The order approved the transfer of the RBSS from King County to Ronald. The court found that the “transfer agreement is legally correct and that there are no owners of related indebtedness to be protected.” CP at 1082. It also stated:
2. The transfer оf the System is to be accomplished in accordance with the transfer agreement effective as of January 1, 1986.
3. As provided in the transfer agreement, the area served by the System shall be annexed to and become a part of the District on the effective date of the transfer.
CP at 1083. Ronald has exclusively served the Point Wells area since the transfer became effective in January 1986.
In 2009, the Snohomish County Council redesignated Point Wells as an urban center. The current property owner, BSRE Point Wells LP, began planning a large mixed-use urban development for the area. In 2010, Ronald incorporated the proposed development in its sewer plan. Snohomish County approved Ronald‘s 2010 sewer plan and incоrporated it into its Growth Management Act (GMA),
Ronald then filed this current action, in part, seeking a declaratory judgment to confirm its corporate boundary. Ronald claims that its corporate boundary includes Point Wells, based on the 1985 Order‘s valid annexation of the Point Wells service area to Ronald‘s
Olympic and Woodway appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the 1985 Order was erroneous and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals interpreted
ANALYSIS
We review summary judgment orders de novo. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). It is undisputed that the service territory within King County‘s boundary was validly transfеrred and annexed to Ronald. The issue is whether the Point Wells area was properly annexed; that is, who—Ronald or Olympic—has the right to provide sewer service to the Point Wells area. Point Wells has received sewer service from King County and Ronald but lies within the corporate boundaries of Snohomish County, Olympic, and Woodway. Olympic, Snohomish, and Woodway argue that to the extent that the order purports to annex Point Wells to Ronald, it is erroneous because King County could not transfer what it did not have. Ronald and King County ask us to uphold the 1985 Order based on the “first in time” principle and the authorization of sewer districts to operate across jurisdictions. We hold that to the extent that the 1985 Order annexed Point Wells to Ronald it is void beсause under the limited authority of
I. Sewer district authority–former Title 56 RCW
First, we analyze the provisions within
Notably, sewer districts have the authority to serve multiple counties.
A sewer district may enter into contracts with any county, city, town, sewer district, . . . [and may] exercise sewer district powers . . . in areas within or without the limits of the district: Provided, That if any such area is located within another existing district duly authorized to exercise sewer district powers in such area, then sewer service may not be so provided by contract or otherwise without the consent by resolution of the board of commissioners of such other district.
Consistent with these statutes is the underlying policy that absent permission, districts may not infringe on areas within
Ronald asserts that Alderwood does not control under these circumstances because the transfer annexation process of
Where a sewer district seeks to annex a territory within another district, the territory must first be withdrawn from the original district.
In particular, Olympic did not consent to the annexation of Point Wells. Within their borders, sewer districts possess the primary authority to operate and regulate a sewer system.
II. Annexation under former RCW 36.94.410-.440
The remaining inquiry is whether the unique transfer annexation process under
A system of sewerage, system of water or combined water and sewerage systems operated by a county under the authority of this chapter may be transferred from that county to a water or sewer district in the same manner as is provided for the transfer of those functions from a water or sewer district to a county in
RCW 36.94.310 throughRCW 36.94.340 .
(Emphasis added.) The procedure follows the process of
Uniquely, the transfer from a county to a sewer district, under
The crux of the dispute is whether the subject of annexation, the “area served,” may include territory that is outside of the transferring county‘s borders and within another district‘s geographicаl area, where the original district did not consent. Ronald and King County argue that the statute allows a county to unilaterally transfer area outside its own territory. They rely on the ordinary meaning of “area served” as simply the areas receiving sewer service from the system. They contrast it with the language in
The statutory context and related statutes support the conclusion that the “area served” is limited to territory within the transferring county‘s geographic boundaries. A county cannot transfer the primary service right via annexation to an area outside of its borders where it provides service by contract.2 Related statutory provisions support this reasoning because (1) permission is needed whenever districts or counties provide service within another‘s geographic boundary and (2) the statutes distinguish between full jurisdiction and contractual provisions of service.
First, the statutes authorizing districts and counties to provide sewer service outside their boundaries require permission from the original entity. Sewer districts may serve areas within multiple counties, cities, towns or other political subdivisions with approval from the оriginal entity, as occurred in this case.
In contrast, the annexation procedure of
Second, the statutes draw a key distinction between temporary contractual service and full jurisdiction. As occurred here, sewer districts may contract with other entities for the provision of services.
Further, the identified subject of the underlying transfer under
The plain meaning of the “area served” subject to transfer and annexation under
However, under the transfer agreement, a county may transfer its existing contractual obligations, which may include the provision of services to areas within other districts.
Ronald and King County assert that the time to properly challenge the order has passed. They argue that becаuse this is a collateral challenge, even if the 1985 Order is erroneous, it was entered with proper jurisdiction and is merely voidable. Olympic, Snohomish County, and Woodway claim that the order is void for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and can be struck down at any time. The parties further dispute the circumstances under which an order may be declared void.
Relevant to the issue here, our jurisprudence has established that
“[t]here are in general three jurisdictional elements in every valid judgment, namely, jurisdiction of the subject matter, jurisdiction of the person, and the power or authority to render the particular judgment. For the absence of any one of these elements, when properly apparent, the judgment may be vacated at any time.”
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196 Wash. 357, 370, 83 P.2d 221 (1938) (quoting 1 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 226 (5th ed. rev. 1925)). Here, the latter two jurisdictional elements are implicated: personal jurisdiction and authority to render a particular judgment, which in modern cases has been recognized as a component of subject matter jurisdiction. The 1985 Order is flawed in both ways.
First, Snohomish County, Olympic, and Woodway were not parties to the 1985 superior court action, so the court did not have the authority to enter an order affecting their sewerage service rights. These entities were not joined as necessary parties under CR 19 or given personal notice of the 1985 action. To determine whether joinder is needed for a just adjudication, courts engage in a three-step analysis. Courts determine whether the absent party is necessary, whether joinder is feasible, and, if joinder is unavailable, whether the action should still proceed without the party. Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, 175 Wn.2d 214, 221-22, 285 P.3d 52 (2012). An absentee is a necessary party where they claim a legally protected interest in the action and their ability to protect that interest will be impaired or impeded by adjudication in their absence. Auto. United, 175 Wn.2d at 223. Point Wells was located within the geographic boundaries of Snohomish County, Olympic, and Woodway. The purported transfer and annexation of the Point Wells service area to Ronald directly implicated their interests in the provision of sewerage service to Point Wells. In particular, Olympic possessed the primary authority to provide service tо Point Wells, and the 1985 Order purports to extinguish and reassign that authority. Snohomish County, Olympic, and Woodway were necessary parties and joinder would have been feasible.
Ronald and King County assert that the 1985 action was an in rem proceeding and is binding on nonparties. They claim that they followed the required notice procedures of
There were two layers of notice required here. At minimum, due process requires that in “any proceeding which is to be accorded finality” notice must be given and “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) (emphasis added). Further, to obtain personal jurisdiction over a party, Washington law requires that “‘[b]eyond due process [requirements], statutory service requirements must be complied with in order for the court to finаlly adjudicate the dispute between the parties.‘” Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d 726, 734, 903 P.2d 455 (1995) (second alteration in original) (quoting Thayer v. Edmonds, 8 Wn. App. 36, 40, 503 P.2d 1110 (1972)). Ronald and King County failed to comply with these requirements. Notices of the King County Council hearing and 1985 court hearing were published in the newspaper. Assuming these notices were constitutionally adequate, service by publication remained unavailable. Service by publication is reserved for those instances where the party cannot be found within the state.
We previously held that the municipal court lacked the authority to issue relief that implicated the interests of a nonparty. City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d 492, 502, 909 P.2d 1294 (1996). The municipal court declined to оrder the State to reimburse the litigant under
Similarly, in this case Snohomish County, Olympic, and Woodway were not made parties to the 1985 action, although they possessed a legally protected interest over sewerage service in Point Wells. The 1985 court failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over these parties and, thus, lacked the authority to issue an annexatiоn order that implicated their rights and interests. To the extent that it did so here, that portion of the 1985 Order is void.
Second, the 1985 Order is void because the court lacked the general statutory authority to order the annexation of Point Wells to Ronald. We take this opportunity to expound on the doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that subject matter jurisdiction incorporates the court‘s authority to issue a particular form of relief, as determined by the nature of the case.
In Marley v. Department of Labor & Industries, 125 Wn.2d 533, 541, 886 P.2d 189 (1994), we reviewed an administrative denial of a worker‘s compensation claim. The plaintiff argued that the Department of Labor and Industries’ order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it incorrectly determined that she was living in а state of abandonment under
Based on this discussion, Ronald claims that the court‘s authority to enter a particular order is wholly separate from subject matter jurisdiction. However, our discussion in Marley stands for the proposition that the court‘s authority to enter a particular order is simply one part of subject matter jurisdiction. When determining subject matter jurisdiction, the controlling question is whether the court possessed the authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action. We defined “type of controversy” as referring to “the nature of a case and the kind of relief sought.” Dougherty v. Dep‘t of Labor & Indus., 150 Wn.2d 310, 317, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003). Thus, subject matter jurisdiction is composed of two necessary components: (1) the authority to adjudicate thе particular claim and (2) the authority to issue a particular form of relief. These two components are intertwined. The form of relief is limited by the nature of the particular claim. For example, in a quiet title property claim, the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction is confined to issuing the appropriate relief, that is, to quiet title. The court would exceed its relief authority if it were to issue tax relief. To the extent an order did so, that portion of the order would be void. The dispositive inquiry to determine subject matter jurisdiction is whether the court had overall authority to adjudicate the particular claim, and the authority to issue a particular form of relief follows. Logically, we look to the relief issued because it is indicative of whether the court adjudicated a controversy that it should not have. Both are necessary components of subject matter jurisdiction.
Although we reviewed a contempt order in Dike v. Dike, our discussion is informative here. 75 Wn.2d 1, 8, 448 P.2d 490 (1968). In that case, we held that even where the underlying order is erroneous and the party fails to comply with it, the court maintains subject matter jurisdiction to enter a contempt order. We held that this was a legal error, not a jurisdictional deficiency. Notably, we distinguished that where the court “‘has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, and has the power to make the order or rulings complained of, but the latter is based upon a mistaken view of the law or upon the erroneous application of legal principles, it is erroneous,‘” as oppоsed to void for lack of jurisdiction. Dike, 75 Wn.2d at 7 (quoting Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 536, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943)). The long-standing principle still applies that “‘[o]bviously the power to decide includes the power to decide wrong, and an erroneous decision is as binding as one that is correct until set aside or corrected.‘” Dike, 75 Wn.2d at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robertson, 181 Va. at 537). But legal errors occur within a court‘s proper exercise of authority, where the court has the authority to adjudicate the claim and errs in its application of law or fact. Whereas, jurisdictional deficiencies result from a court acting outside of its adjudicative authority where it lacks any power to issue relief.
The distinction between the error in this case and the potential errors discussed in Marley and Dike is that those courts were authorized to exercise discretion and, at best, merely exercised that discretion improperly. Here, the 1985 court was not statutorily authorized to exercise any discretion over the annexation of Point Wells. The nature of this controversy is annexation. Annexation authority is a plenary power enjoyed by the State, which the legislature may delegate to courts by statute. Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 83 P.3d 419 (2004). In this case, former
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings regarding Ronald‘s remaining claims. We hold that to the extent the 1985 Order purports to annex Point Wells to Ronald, it is void. Ronald‘s geographic boundary does not include Point Wells and does not extend into Snohomish County. Point Wells remains within the geographic boundaries of Olympic and Snohomish County.
WE CONCUR:
Stephens, C.J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
Madsen, J.
Owens, J.
Whitener, J.
Ronald Wastewater Dist. et al. v. Olympic View Water and Sewer Dist. et
GONZÁLEZ, J. (concurring)
GONZÁLEZ, J. (concurring) – I agree with the majority that the 1985 superior court order is void to the extent it purports to annex an area in Snohomish County to a sewer district primarily located in King County. While the web оf statutes governing annexation of territory by a sewer district are not a model of clarity and consistency, it is clear that a cross-county sewer district can be created only with the participation of both counties’ legislative authorities and, at least in most cases, a public vote. See
I write separately to stress how limited our holding is lest it be seen as an invitation to attack settled judgment on the basis of legal error. Trial judges in Washington State do more than resolve controversies. Among other things, they may preside over marriages and adoptions, administer oaths, and, under certain circumstances, approve the transfer of a sewage system from a water-sewer district to a county and from a county to a water-sewage district.
While the county is the basic unit of government in Washington State, an enоrmous number of municipal and quasi-municipal corporations provide the services needed for the health and welfare of our society, both within their districts and by contract outside of them. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 187 (2d ed. 2013);
Our legislature has creаted mechanisms to create these districts and adjust their boundaries. E.g.,
This statutory shortcut is not available for sewer districts that cross county boundaries.
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the 1985 order was entered without subject matter jurisdiction. “The critical concept in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is the ‘type of controversy.‘” Dougherty v. Dep‘t of Labor & Indus., 150 Wn.2d 310, 315, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003) (quoting Marley v. Dep‘t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533, 539, 886 P.2d 189 (1994)). Approving a cross-county sewer district annexation is simply too different a case from one seeking the approval of an in-county transfer of a sewage system. The differences between those two types of cases may seem picayune but are in fact profound. It goes to the very way our state constitution has divided up power and responsibility between the legislature and the courts and between the state, county, and local governments.
I emphasize, however, that Washington State superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction.
With these observations, I respectfully concur.
González, J.
Yu, J.
Montoya-Lewis, J.