474 P.3d 547
Wash.2020Background
- Point Wells is located in Snohomish County and within Olympic View Water and Sewer District (Olympic); two properties there (former Standard Oil plant and the Briggs parcel) received sewer service from King County contractors.
- The Richmond Beach sewer system (RBSS) was originally operated by King County Sewer District No. 3 and, by contract, served Point Wells beginning in the early 1970s.
- In 1985 King County transferred RBSS to Ronald Wastewater District (Ronald) under the then-new transfer/annexation procedure in former RCW 36.94.410-.440; the written transfer agreement defined the “area served” to include Point Wells (outside King County).
- A Snohomish County superior court approved the transfer and, per the agreement, declared the area served annexed to Ronald (1985 Order); Ronald has served Point Wells since 1986 by virtue of that transfer.
- Snohomish County, Olympic, and the town of Woodway challenged the annexation as unauthorized; the trial court upheld the 1985 Order but the Court of Appeals reversed; the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1985 superior court order validly annexed Point Wells to Ronald under former RCW 36.94.410-.440 | Ronald: the statute permits transfer of the county’s "area served," and that phrase includes any territory the county actually served (first-in-time) | Olympic/Snohomish/Woodway: the statute limits annexable area to territory within the transferring county; King County could not transfer what it did not own | Held: The statute’s “area served” is limited to territory within the transferring county; annexation of Point Wells (in Snohomish County) is void. |
| Whether a county can convert contractual, out-of-county service into full annexation authority via the transfer process | Ronald/King County: contractual service is part of the "system" and may be transferred/annexed under the statute | Olympic/Snohomish/Woodway: contractual/permissive service is revocable and distinct from sovereign/jurisdictional authority; annexation requires consent or withdrawal | Held: Contracts/permissive service may be transferred as contractual obligations, but cannot be transformed into annexation of another district’s territory without consent. |
| Whether the 1985 court had personal jurisdiction / necessary joinder over Snohomish County, Olympic, and Woodway | Ronald/King County: the transfer proceeding was in rem with required publication notice; nonparties are bound | Olympic/Snohomish/Woodway: they were necessary parties with protected interests and received no statutory service; publication was insufficient | Held: Those entities were necessary parties and were not joined or personally served; the court lacked personal jurisdiction as to annexing their territory, rendering that portion of the order void. |
| Whether the 1985 order is merely voidable for legal error or void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore attackable now | Ronald: collateral challenge too late; at most the order is erroneous and binding until set aside | Olympic/Snohomish/Woodway: the order exceeded the court’s statutory authority and is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and may be attacked anytime | Held: The court lacked authority to order annexation of territory outside the transferring county; that portion of the order is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and may be set aside. |
Key Cases Cited
- Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358 (Wash. 2015) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wn.2d 319 (Wash. 1963) (districts may not serve territory inside another district absent withdrawal or consent)
- Marley v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 125 Wn.2d 533 (Wash. 1994) (subject matter jurisdiction includes authority to adjudicate the type of controversy and the relief sought)
- Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (U.S. 1950) (due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties)
- Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wn.2d 726 (Wash. 1995) (statutory service requirements required beyond basic due process to bind a party)
- Dike v. Dike, 75 Wn.2d 1 (Wash. 1968) (distinguishing erroneous orders from jurisdictional defects)
- City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d 492 (Wash. 1996) (court may not order relief that binds a nonparty whose interests were not before the court)
- John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gooley, 196 Wash. 357 (Wash. 1938) (three jurisdictional elements: subject matter, personal jurisdiction, and authority to render the judgment)
- Port of Grays Harbor v. Bankr. Estate of Roderick Timber Co., 73 Wn. App. 334 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (joinder requirements in in rem condemnation-type proceedings)