ESMERALDA RODRIGUEZ, Aрpellant, v. LUIS DANIEL ZAVALA, Respondent.
No. 93645-5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Filed JUN 29 2017
GONZALEZ, J.
En Banc
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GONZALEZ,
BACKGROUND
In addition to an infant child, L.Z.,1 Esmeralda Rodriguez and Luis Zavala
Zavala tried to control Rodriguez. He restricted her communication with friends and family members, and he appeared uninvited wherever she was when she failed to return his phone calls.
Zavala‘s history of violence against Rodriguez reached its peak one day in June 2015 after the couple had separated. At 2:00 a.m. that morning and in violation of a previous restraining order, Zavala pounded on Rodriguez‘s door, threatening to break windows unless she let him in. Rodriguez went to the door and opened it enough to tell Zavala to leave. Taking advantage of the opening, Zavala pushed past Rodriguez, cornered her, and began choking her. He told Rodriguez he was going to “end what [he] started.” Clerk‘s Papers at 5.
Rodriguez feared Zavala would make good on his past threats and kill her, her daughters, their son, and then kill himself. After Zavala‘s hands wrapped around her neck, Rodriguez reached out, grasped a kitchen knife, and stabbed Zavala and screamed to her daughter to call for help. The police arrived and arrested Zavala.
A few dаys later, Rodriguez petitioned ex parte for a domestic violence protection order for herself and her children, including L.Z. In her petition, Rodriguez described the assault that compelled her to seek the order, as well as Zavala‘s history of violence. The court issued a temporary order pending a full hearing. The temporary order restrained Zavala from contacting Rodriguez and all four children.
At the later prоtection order hearing, Zavala appeared. Rodriguez recounted the choking incident and told the court that L.Z. had been asleep in another room during the most recent attack. She feared Zavala would take their son based on previous threats. Zavala admitted to coming to the house because he wanted to see L.Z. but denied Rodriguez‘s allegations of abuse. The trial court issued a protective ordеr for Rodriguez and her daughters, but excluded L.Z., explaining that the boy was not “present” during the assault or threatened at all. Report of Proceedings at 10-11. According to the trial judge, “[L.Z.] wasn‘t involved in any of this.” Id. at 12. The order was effective for one year, expiring on June 26, 2016.
Rodriguez appealed. Among other things, she argued that her son should have been included in the final protection order based on her fear that Zavala would hurt L.Z. Rodriguez v. Zavala, No. 33649-2-III, slip op. аt 7-8 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2016) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/336492_unp.pdf. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that a petitioner may seek relief based only on her fear of imminent harm to herself. Id. at 9. We granted review and now reverse. Rodriguez v. Zavala, 187 Wn.2d 1001, 386 P.3d 1092 (2017).
ANALYSIS
1. DEFINITION OF “DOMESTIC VIOLENCE”
Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred when it did not include L.Z. in the domestic violence protection order. She asserts that the plain meaning of “domestic violence” in
a. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether to grant or deny a domestic violence protection order is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hecker v. Cortinas, 110 Wn. App. 865, 869, 43 P.3d 50 (2002) (citing State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). However, a key question in this case is whether the definition of “domestic violence” in chapter
When possible, we derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision itself, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010); Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10. Plain language that is not ambiguous does not require construction. State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (quoting State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994)).
b. STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “DOMESTIC VIOLENCE”
To commence a domestic violence protection order action, a person must file a petition “alleging that the person has been the victim of domestic violence committed by the respondent.”
(a) physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in
RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family оr household member.
When read together, the relevant provisions explain that any person may petition for protection by alleging that the person has been the victim of “domestic violence“—that is, the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm between family members.
The Court of Appeals‘s interpretation is unnecessarily narrow. By relating the fear of harm back to the petitioner, it ignores the final prepositional phrase “between family or household members.”2
The context of the statute, related provisions, and statutory scheme as a whole also indicate that “domestic violence” in
The legislative intent of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (ch.
The plain language of
Therefore, Rodriguez‘s fear that Zavala would harm L.Z. constitutes domestic violence under
2. HARM AND EXPOSURE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Rodriguez also contends that exposure to domestic violence is harmful and itself constitutes domestic violence under the DVPA. Rodriguez and amicus submitted multiple psychological studies supporting her contention to this court and to the Court of Appeals. See Pet. for Review at 15-18; App.‘s Opening Br. at 8-13; Br. of Amicus Curiae Child Justice, Inc. at
The Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue, concluding that Rodriguez was raising a new argument because she had not presented the studies to the trial court or filed a RAP 9.11(a) motion for new evidence on review. Rodriguez, No. 33649-2-III, slip op. at 9 (citing In re Det. of Ambers, 160 Wn.2d 543, 557 n.6, 158 P.3d 1144 (2007); RAP 9.11(a); State v. Ziegler, 114 Wn.2d 533, 541, 789 P.2d 79 (1990)). As Rodriguez notes, she alleged L.Z. was in her home when she was attacked by Zavala and she “requested that the [trial c]ourt determine whether these facts met the definition of domestic violence. Argument on appeal that exposure to domestic violence is harmful to children and constitutes domestic violence, as defined under the DVPA, was just that; argument, not a new issue.” Pet. for Review at 14-15. Considering that she was pro se, as many petitioners are, the argument was well presented. Whether a child‘s presence in a violent home *
meets the definition of “domestic violence” relates to the question of whether the exposure to said violence is harmful under the DVPA, so we will address it here. RAP 2.5 (reviewing courts possess discretion to decide whether an argument was sufficiently raised at trial); see also In re Estate of McKiddy, 47 Wn. App. 774, 779-80, 737 P.2d 317 (1987) (the appellate court considered an issue that “arguably related” to issues raised in the trial court), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate of Hansen, 128 Wn.2d 605, 910 P.2d 1281 (1996).
We hold that exposure to domestic violence is hаrmful under the DVPA. The harm caused by domestic violence can be physical or psychological. As discussed above,
Scholarly research supports the conclusion that exposure to domestic violence is a simpler, more insidious method of inflicting harm. While exposure to abuse may not leave visible scars, the secondary physical and psychological effects of exposure arе well documented. See, e.g., Danny, 165 Wn.2d at 212-13 (“[t]he legislature has specifically recognized that children ‘are deeply affected by the violence’ in their homes” (quoting LAWS OF 1991, ch. 301, § 1)); DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: CHILDREN‘S
In addition to witnessing violence, hearing and seeing its effects on loved ones may harm a child‘s brain development and lead to learning disabilities, put children under emotional stress, and contribute to an increase in anxiety, sleep disorders, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Pet. for Review at 15-16 (citing multiple sciеntific studies in support); see also State v. Janes, 121 Wn.2d 220, 223-28, 850 P.2d 495 (1993) (17-year-old murdered his stepfather after years of direct and indirect exposure to domestic violence); Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 197-98 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting studies on the emotional and physical ramifications for children exposed to domestic violence), vacated in part on other grounds by Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 F. App‘x 313, 316 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished). More importantly, our legislature has recognized that domestic violence is “at the core of other major social problems: Child abuse, other crimes of violence against person or property, juvenile delinquency, and alcohol and drug abuse.” LAWS OF 1992, ch. 111, § 1.
Ample evidence supports the view that direct and indirect exposure to domestic violence is harmful. Here, L.Z. was in the house while his father choked his screaming mother at 2:00 a.m. in violation of a no contact order. It may well be that the infant heard these violent acts. It strains common sense to think that L.Z. was not somehow exposed to domestic violence given the facts of this case. Therefore, we hold that such exposure constitutes domestic violence under chapter
3. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that L.Z. was not involved in domestic violence where Zavala was threatening the entire family. An abuse of discretion is found when a judge‘s decision is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). A decision is based untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997) (citing State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)). The court possessed clear authority to issue a protection order under these facts, regardless of the existence or absence of a parenting plan. As discussed above, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in reviewing the definition of “domestic violence” and abused its discretion.
CONCLUSION
Zavala‘s violent threats against L.Z. are “domestic violence” under the plain language of
González, J.
WE CONCUR:
Fairhurst, C.J.
Madsen, J.
Johnson, J.
Wiggins, J.
Stephens, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
Owens, J.