539 P.3d 442

Cal.

2023

RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Competency Statutory Scheme

1. Pre-1974

2. 1974 to the Present

3. Current Law Governing Competency

B. Determining Whether a Commitment Continues Past the Filing of a Certificate of Restoration

1. The Statutory Text Is More Consistent with Rodriguez's Position than the People's

b. The People's interpretation of the statutory text is unpersuasive

i. Section 1372

ii. The statutory presumption of competence

iii. The asserted primacy of location

iv. Other textual arguments

2. Rodriguez's Interpretation Furthers the Purposes of the Statute

3. The Statutory Background Cuts Against the People's Position

a. The evolution of the competency statutory scheme

b. The People's reliance on the 2018 amendment

c. The People’s argument that treatment is determinative

4. The Decisions Cited by the People Do Not Support Their Interpretation of the Statutory Text

5. We Are Not Persuaded by the People’s Remaining Arguments

a. "Arbitrarily truncated" time for treatment

b. "Delays predicated on defense counsel’s needs"

c. "Competent defendants evading prosecution"

C. Issues to Address on Remand

III. CONCLUSION

Notes

MARIO RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

S272129

Supreme Court of California

December 14, 2023

Sixth Appellate District H049016; Santa Clara County Superior Court C1647395, C1650275

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.

RODRIGUEZ v. SUPERIOR COURT

S272129

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

A criminal defendant cannot be tried while mentally incompetent. (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)¹ Although such defendants may be involuntarily committed for the purpose of restoring their competency (see § 1370; Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100–101), the commitment may not last indefinitely (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1); Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 720; In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 801 (Davis)). The statutory scheme governing competency proceedings limits the term of commitment. For individuals like defendant Mario Rodriguez charged with offenses that carry a maximum sentence exceeding two years, the period of commitment due to incompetency is limited to two years. (See § 1370, subd. (c)(1).)

In this case, Rodriguez was adjudged incompetent, committed to a state hospital, and then returned to court when a medical director of the hospital filed a certificate indicating he was restored to competency. (See § 1372, subd. (a)(1).) The certificate was filed within the two-year time limit specified by section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) (section 1370(c)(1)). By statute, the court was supposed to determine whether to approve the certificate — that is, decide “whether or not” Rodriguez has “recovered competence.” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1).) However, primarily because of restrictions on court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Rodriguez did not receive such a hearing within the two-year period of section 1370(c)(1). Claiming the time for commitment had run out, Rodriguez moved to dismiss the charges against him. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim. It held that time had not run out because a commitment ends when a certificate of restoration is filed, not when the court determines whether the defendant has been restored to competence. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 628, 652 (Rodriguez).)

The parties ask us to resolve a question of statutory interpretation: For purposes of calculating the maximum commitment period under section 1370(c)(1), does an incompetency commitment end when the medical treatment provider informs the court that the defendant has regained competency by filing a certificate of restoration, or does the commitment end only when the court has determined whether the defendant has been restored to competency? We resolve this question by determining whether the period between the filing of the certificate, and the court‘s ruling on that certificate, is covered by section 1370(c)(1)‘s two-year limit. And we conclude this period is not excluded from the two-year limit.

Because we reject the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that an incompetency commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of restoration, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. We remand with instructions for the Court of Appeal to consider issues that remain outstanding, including whether Rodriguez‘s aggregate commitments have exceeded the limit set by section 1370(c)(1) and what remedy he may be entitled to if the limit has been exceeded. (See, e.g., Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 382–390 & fn. 5 (Camacho); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December 2016, the Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Rodriguez with several felonies, each carrying a maximum sentence in excess of two years imprisonment. The charged offenses included assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) [maximum punishment of four years in state prison]); oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [maximum punishment of eight years in state prison]); rape by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264, subd. (a) [eight years]); and infliction of corporal injury on a present or former spouse, or a present or former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a) [four years]). Rodriguez was held to answer on all charges.

In late 2017, the court declared a doubt as to Rodriguez‘s competency, ordered a hearing regarding his competency, and suspended all proceedings. In May 2018, the court found Rodriguez not competent tо stand trial. On May 24, the court issued its commitment order, directing that Rodriguez “be committed to the [State] Department of State Hospitals for placement in a locked psychiatric facility.” The order specified that “[t]he Sheriff shall redeliver the patient to the Court upon receiving from the state hospital a copy of the certification of mental competency.” (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372, subd. (a)(2).) The court also ordered the State Department of State Hospitals (Department) to “provide a placement for defendant for treatment of his mental illness and restoration of competency by 5:00 p.m., June 29, 2018” and that Rodriguez be transported to his placement by that date. The record does not indicate when Rodriguez was actually transported or admitted to a state hospital.

On September 7, 2018, the medical director of Atascadero State Hospital certified Rodriguez as restored to competency. The parties stipulated that the certificate of restoration was filed with the superior court the same date. On September 20, the court found Rodriguez had been restored to competency and reinstated criminal proceedings.

In early January 2019, the court declared a new doubt as to Rodriguez‘s competency to stand trial and again suspended criminal proceedings. In April, the court found Rodriguez not competent.

On May 16, 2019, the court issued a second commitment order, once more directing that Rodriguez be committed to the Department. As before, the court specified a date by which the Department was to provide a placement for Rodriguez, setting that date as June 14, 2019. The court further noted in its commitment order that it found Rodriguez did “not have the capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication,” and it ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.

On January 9, 2020, the medical director of Atascadero State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was restored to competency. The parties stipulated the certificate of restoration was filed with the superior court the same date. Among the documents transmitted to the court, the medical director included a letter stating that Rodriguez was “being returned to court on psychotropic medication.” “It is important,” continued the director, “that [Rodriguez] remain on this medication for his own personal benefit and to enable him to be certified [as competent] under Section 1372 of the Penal Code.” The date when Rodriguez was discharged from the state hospital does not appear in the record. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 638.)

On January 24, 2020, the court set May 21 as the date for a contested hearing on Rodriguez‘s competency. In March, the court suspended almost all its operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the competency hearing set for May 21 did not take place.

On July 17, 2020, the parties returned to court following the relaxation of certain COVID-19 restrictions. The court rescheduled the competency hearing for August 24, a date later reset to September 21 at the request of both parties. The hearing did not occur on that date either. Instead, the court continued the hearing to November 2 “due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of courtrooms and court resources available.” The court subsequently continued the competency hearing several times due to the “pandemic and the [s]uperior [c]ourt‘s limited trial capacity.”

In March 2021, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss. Even though the Department had timely determined that he was competent to stand trial, Rodriguez argued that he was entitled to a dismissal because his commitment had lasted more than two years. Rodriguez contended a commitment must be measured based on “dates from one judicial decision until a second judicial decision” — in this case, from the date when the court issued the commitment order to the date when it eventually approved or rejected the certificate of restoration. Rodriguez thus argued his total commitment period — counting days from his first and second commitments — exceeded two years and was ongoing. (See In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1232 (Polk) [holding that the limit on a commitment term “applies to the aggregate of all commitments under the same charges“].)

On March 16, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that it had to first determine whether Rodriguez had regained competency before it could ascertain whether the statutory two-year limit had been reached. The court explained, “the days between the restoration certificate and the restoration hearing [would] only count towards the two year maximum commitment if, in fact, it is determined that the defendant is not restored to competence.” If instead “the defendant is [judicially determined to be] restored to competence,” the court continued, “then the date on the certificate of restoration will serve as the date of restoration for purposes of counting the days towards the maximum commitment.” After the court announced its decision, Rodriguez‘s counsel asked for a continuance, requesting that the court sign an order so that counsel could receive Rodriguez‘s updated mental health records related to his recent placement on “24-hour hold” and “suicide watch” while in county jail.

Between the date of the second commitment order and the court‘s decision on March 16, 2021, a total of 670 days had elapsed. When combined with the period between the first commitment order and the court‘s decision on September 2, 2018, finding Rodriguez restored to competеncy, 789 days — or more than two years — had passed. In contrast, if a commitment were deemed to begin with a commitment order and end upon the filing of a certificate of restoration, Rodriguez had been committed for a total of 344 days — or less than one year — during the two commitments.

Rodriguez challenged the trial court‘s denial of his motion to dismiss by filing a petition for writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeal, raising the same argument he presented in the trial court. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, agreeing with the People that Rodriguez‘s commitment ended when the certificate of restoration was filed. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.) Unlike the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded that the filing of the certificate of restoration terminates a commitment regardless of whether the court subsequently approves or rejects the certificate. (See id. at pp. 635–636.)

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal disagreed with People v. Carr (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1136 (Carr), which held that a judicial determination of competency, “not a health official‘s certification of competency that initiates court proceedings to consider whether the defendant has regained competency, terminates the defendant‘s commitment.” (Id. at p. 1140; Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.)

We granted review to resolve the split in authority. We now reject the Court of Appeal‘s holding that the two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1) stops with the filing of a certificate of restoration.

II. DISCUSSION

To determine whether the running of the clock set by section 1370(c)(1) continues past the filing of a certificate of restoration, we provide an overview of the relevant statutory framework, and then analyze the text of the governing statute and the context, history, and purpose of the competency scheme.

A. The Competency Statutory Scheme

1. Pre-1974

A defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Prior to 1974, “California law provided that persons charged with criminal conduct but found incompetent to stand trial were committed to state hospitals until they became ‘sane’ (i.e., competent). Because attainment of competence was the sole standard for release the commitments were indefinite, even permanent, so long as incompetence persisted.” (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 167 (Hofferber).)

In 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court held that “indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial” offends constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. (Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 731.) The court explained, “[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” (Id. at p. 738.) “If it is determined that this is not the case” — that is, the defendant is not likely to soon regain competency — “then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.” (Ibid.)

The following year, our court “adopt[ed] the rule of the Jackson [v. Indiana] case.” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801.) We further accepted that “the duration of commitments to state hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose which originally justified the commitment” (id. at p. 805), which is to “provide observation, care and treatment of [the committed individuals‘] mental condition, with a view toward restoring their capacity to stand trial” (id. at pp. 805–806). Accordingly, we instructed trial courts to direct hospital authorities to examine the persons committed and periodically report to the courts on their progress toward recovery of competency. We delegated to trial courts the discretion to “decid[e] whether, in a particular case, sufficient progress is being made to justify continued commitment pending trial” but imposed no specific time limits on how long a person may be held in “continued commitment.” (Id. at p. 807.) Consistent with Jackson v. Indiana, however, we specified that if “there exists no reasonable likelihood that the person will recover his competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, then the court should either order him released from confinement or initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.),” California‘s civil commitment scheme. (Ibid.)

2. 1974 to the Present

In response to Davis, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1529 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) in 1974. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511.) Sponsored by Assemblyman Frank Murphy, the bill was designed to “bring California‘s statutory provisions into accord” with the guidelines in Davis and Jackson v. Indiana. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324; see also Parker, California‘s New Scheme For The Commitment Of Individuals Found Incompetent To Stand Trial (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 484, 489 (Parker).) The Legislature specified that a defendant found incompetent to stand trial cannot be committed for more than three years. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.) The Legislature also provided for the return of a defendant to court if “ha[ving] been committed for 18 months” — half of a maximum three-year commitment term — the defendant is still hospitalized as incompetent. (Ibid.) Upon returning to court, a hearing is held to determine the defendant‘s competency. (Ibid.)

As part of the same enactment, the Legislature created a new type of conservatorship, referred to as a “Murphy” conservatorship after the sponsor of Assembly Bill No. 1529 (1973–1974 Reg. Sess.) (see, e.g., Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102). This allows for a one-year, renewable commitment of qualifying mentally inсompetent defendants who have reached the maximum time for a commitment under section 1370(c)(1). (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, §§ 6, 12, pp. 3319, 3322; see also, e.g., Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1096–1097; Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 169–170.) This new civil commitment procedure, together with the imposition of a maximum commitment period and additional periodic reporting requirements, sought to “integrate and resolve the conflicting concerns of protecting society from dangerous individuals who are not subject to criminal prosecution . . . and safeguarding the freedom of incompetent criminal defendants who present no threat to the public.” (Parker, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. at p. 485; see also, e.g., People v. Waterman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 565, 568 (Waterman); Hofferber, at pp. 176–177.)

The 1974 statutory scheme has been amended numerous times. Particularly relevant for our purposes are amendments enacted in 1980 and 2018. In 1980, the Legislature amended section 1372 to add procedures following the filing of a certificate of restoration of competency. As added, section 1372, subdivision (a)(2) specified that “[u]pon the filing of a certificate of restoration, the defendant shall be returned to the committing court.” (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1516.) The Legislature also added subdivisions (c) and (d) to section 1372 at that time. Subdivision (c) requires the court to provide notice of “the date of any hearing on the defendant‘s competence and whether or not the defendant was found by the court to have recovered competence” when a defendant is returned to court. (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.) Subdivision (d) specifies the court‘s responsibilities regarding the defendant‘s custodial status if it approves the certificate of restoration. (Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.)

In 2018, the Legislature reduced the maximum term of commitment from three years to two years. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 3.) The author of the bill explained that the legislation was motivated by (1) the need to reduce “[w]ait lists for placements in state-operated treatment facilities,” and (2) a reassessment of the maximum period of time reasonably necеssary “for restoring a person to competency, or for determining that he or she is not restorable” in response to advancements in “modern medical science.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1187 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 15, 2018, p. 4.) As part of the same bill, the Legislature eliminated the requirement that a defendant who remains committed for 18 months be returned to court for a redetermination of competency. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 3.)

3. Current Law Governing Competency

As it now stands, the statutory scheme governing competency works as follows: When a doubt arises in the trial court judge‘s mind regarding the mental competency of a criminal defendant, the judge may order a hearing to determine the defendant‘s competency.² (§ 1368, subds. (a), (b).) All criminal proceedings are suspended once the order issues. (Id., subd. (c).) At the competency hearing, the defendant is presumed competent and incompetence must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); see also Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 446–449, 452–453.) If a defendant is found incompetent, criminal proceedings remain “suspended until the person becomes mentally competent,” and the court issues a commitment order. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Specifically, “[t]he court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State Department of State Hospitals facility, as defined in Section 4100 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as directed by the State Department of State Hospitals, or to any other available public or private treatment facility, including a community-based residential treatment system approved by the community program director, or their designee, that will promote the

defendant‘s speedy restoration to mental competence, or placed on outpatient status as specified in Section 1600.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i).) After the issuance of the commitment order, a defendant who is ordered “delivered . . . to a . . . State Hospitals facility” is to be admitted to a state hospital or a facility under contract with the Department. (Ibid.)

Whether admitted to a state hospital facility, delivered to a community-based residential treatment program, or placed on outpatient status, a defendant is returned to court when any of the following occurs: (1) a medical director or comparable personnel certifies to the court that the defendant has been restored to competency;³ (2) an appointed psychiatrist or psychologist opines that the defendant has regained competency;⁴ (3) the court determines that “treatment for the defendant‘s mental impairment is not being conducted” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(4)); (4) a medical director or comparable personnel reports to the court that there is no substantial likelihood the

defendant will regain competency in the foreseeable future;⁵ or (5) the maximum commitment period set by section 1370(c)(1) has been reached.⁶ For ease of reference, we sometimes use the term “designated medical professional” through the remainder of this opinion to include the medical director of the Department or any relevant designee under the competency statutes.

Regarding the first path back to court, under section 1372, if the designated medical professional “determines that the defendant has regained mental competence,” that person “shall immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate of restoration.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Within 10 days of the filing of the certificate of restoration, the defendant “shall be returned to the committing court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(3)(C).) “When a defendant is returned to court with a certification that competence has been regained,” the court shall notify the appropriate personnel “of the date of any hearing on the defendant‘s competence and whether or not the defendant was found by the court to have recovered competence.” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1).)

Although sеction 1372 refers to a “hearing on the defendant‘s competence” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(1)), it does not “set forth any . . . procedures” for such a hearing. (People v. Rells (2000) 22 Cal.4th 860, 867 (Rells).) We have held, however, that “section 1372 allows its gaps to be filled by Penal Code section 1369,” which establishes the procedures for the initial hearing on the issue of a defendant‘s mental competence. (Id. at p. 868.) Thus, when a defendant returns to court after a certificate of restoration has been filed, the defendant is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise at a hearing. (See id. at pp. 867–868.) “If the committing court approves the certificate of restoration” (§ 1372, subd. (d)) — thus finding the defendant has recovered ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍competency — criminal proceedings resume (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and the court “shall hold a hearing to determine whether the person is entitled to be admitted to bail or released on own recognizance status pending conclusion of the proceedings” (§ 1372, subd. (d)). The court may, however, “reject[] a certificate of restoration” based on a medical evaluation (§ 1372, subd. (c)(2)), at which point a defendant may be returned to a treatment facility if the maximum commitment period has not yet been reached. (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

Different procedures apply if the maximum commitment term has been reached. As mentioned, section 1370(c)(1) prohibits commitments lasting more than two years. If the defendant has not regained competency, the statute does not provide for a hearing to redetermine a defendant‘s competency at this point. (Accord, In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 239, 246 (Taitano) [holding that trial courts are not authorized to hold competency hearings after the maximum statutory commitment period has expired where the court “had not received a certification that [the defendant] has been restored to competence by certain mental health officials (including the county medical health director) or the conservator“]; People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375 (Quiroz) [holding that a trial judge has no power “to convene a competency hearing after a state hospital certifies that a defendant, who has been involuntarily confined for three years due to incompetence to stand trial, is not likely to regain competency“].) Instead, section 1370 directs the committing court to “initiate conservatorship proceedings for the defendant” if “it appears to the court that the defendant is gravely disabled.” (§ 1370, subd. (c)(3).)

A defendant is gravely disabled if, “as a result of a mental health disorder,” the defendant “is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Alternatively, a defendant is gravely disabled — and subject to a Murphy conservatorship — if the defendant “has been found mentally incompetent” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)) and certain facts obtain, including that “[t]he person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder” (id., subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv)). If the defendant is deemed gravely disabled under either definition, the defendant may be confined as long as “conservatorship is still required.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361, subd. (b).) On the other hand, “If the defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 [citations]. Such a dismissal is ‘without prejudice to the initiation of any proceedings that may be appropriate’ under the [Lanterman-Petris-Short] Act.” (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102.)

To summarize the steps in the commitment process most relevant to the issue before us: A defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial shall be committed by court order. (See § 1370.) If the designated medical professional finds that the defendant‘s competency has been restored, the person files a certificate of restoration, triggering the defendant‘s return to court. (See §§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.) Following thе defendant‘s return, the court holds a hearing to determine whether to approve or reject the certificate. (See § 1372§ 1370, subd. (c); Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102.)

B. Determining Whether a Commitment Continues Past the Filing of a Certificate of Restoration

Because it involves a pure question of law, we review de novo the Court of Appeal‘s conclusion that the filing of a certificate of restoration terminates an incompetency commitment. (See, e.g., Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 870.) In interpreting the competency statutory scheme, ” ‘[O]ur task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the words of the statute, which are the most reliable indications of the Legislature‘s intent. [Citation.] We construe the words of a statute in context, and harmonize the various parts of an enactment by considering the provision at issue in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’ ” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 83 (Kim).) If ” ‘the [statutory] language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.’ ” (Ibid.)

1. The Statutory Text Is More Consistent with Rodriguez‘s Position than the People‘s

“The relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at which an incompetency commitment ends” when a certificate of restoration has been timely filed. (Carr, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) That is, section 1370(c)(1) does not expressly specify when a commitment ends for a defendant who has been certified as restored to competence. Likewise, section 1372 — the provision pertaining to certificates of restoration of competence — is silent regarding how the issuance of the certificate affects the running of the two-year maximum period of commitment.

Nonetheless, as we explain below, the crucial competency assessments before and after the filing of the certificate of restoration require judicial action аnd approval. The “legal force and effect” of the “filing of the certificate” is simply to “cause[] the defendant to be returned to court for further proceedings” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868; see also § 1372, subd. (a)), and even that return occurs pursuant to a court order. (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(C); § 1372, subd. (a)(2).) When the court‘s central role in competency proceedings is juxtaposed against the limited significance of a certificate of restoration, we conclude the Legislature did not intend for the filing of a certificate to “fix[] . . . the end date for calculation of the commitment treatment period under section 1370(c)(1),” as the court below concluded. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 652.)

a. The statutory text suggests that the two-year clock of section 1370(c)(1) does not stop with the filing of a certificate of restoration

We begin, “as always, with the text” of the relevant statutes. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 104, 114.)

Section 1370(c)(1) provides that “[a]t the end of two years from the date of commitment . . . but no later than 90 days prior to the expiration of the defendant‘s term of commitment, a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court.” Even when a certificate of restoration of competency has been filed, it is the court‘s decision whether to accept a certificate that determines whether criminal proceedings may resume, or whether — if the two-year timeframe has not elapsed — further treatment is required instead. A finding that a defendant has recovered mental recovered mental competence — and criminal proceedings may therefore resume — occurs only if “the committing court approves the certificate of restoration.” (§ 1372, subd. (d).) Conversely, if the court “rejects a certificate of restoration” (§ 1372, subd. (c)(2)), the defendant remains incompetent and “the person shall be returned to the state hospital or other facility” for further trеatment, provided the maximum commitment period has not been reached. (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106.)

competency requires a court order, and the court must act to approve the certificate of restoration even when not contested by the parties. (See § 1372, subds. (c), (d).) Moreover, before the court adjudicates a defendant competent, the defendant cannot seek bail or otherwise challenge the underlying charges because criminal proceedings remain suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) This array of procedures suggests that until the court decides whether to accept a certificate, the two-year clock on an incompetency commitment (§ 1370(c)(1)) has not stopped.

Section 1370(c)(1) also requires the defendant‘s return to court 90 days before the expiration of the maximum two-year commitment period. The reservation of a 90-day period cannot be wholly explained by the time it should take to transport the defendant. Section 1370 makes clear that the defendant must be transported “without delay” (§ 1370(c)(1)), “immediate[ly]” (id., subd. (c)(2)(A)), and most concretely, “within 10 calendar days” (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)). The statute thus allows time for necessary subsequent judicial proceedings to be completed before reaching the maximum period of commitment.

It is true the Legislature did not appear to have the issue before us specifically in mind when it amended section 1370(c)(1) in 2014, effective January 1, 2015, to include this 90-day period. (See Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2625 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 24, 2014, p. 1 [indicating that the language was added with the aim “to reduce the backlog of patients awaiting a state hospital placement in county jails by ensuring defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST) who cannot be restored to trial competency are returned to their original county of commitment in a timely manner“].) Nonetheless, the 90-day window is consistent with Rodriguez‘s general position that some judicial action is necessary to end a commitment period.

b. The People‘s interpretation of the statutory text is unpersuasive

The People‘s arguments do not persuade us that “the plain language of the statutory scheme” requires courts to exclude the period following the filing of a certificate of restoration from the two-year maximum commitment period.

i. Section 1372

First, the People rely heavily on section 1372‘s provisions regarding the certification of restoration to competence. Yet it is not clear how this section supports the People‘s interpretation. As previously summarized, section 1372 specifies that “[i]f the medical director of a state hospital [or other appropriate personnel] determines that the defendant has regained mental competence, the director or designee shall immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate of restoration with the court.” (§ 1372, subd. (a)(1).) Because the court‘s initial commitment order must have directed the sheriff to “redeliver the patient to the court . . . upon receiving from the state hospital or treatment facility a copy of the certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(2)), “the patient shall be returned to the committing court no later than 10 days following the filing of a certificate of restoration” (id., subd. (a)(3)(C)). Upon a defendant‘s return to court, all further proceedings occur at the court‘s discretion. (See § 1372, subds. (c)-(e).) In short, section 1372 specifies what the filing of a certificate of restoration accomplishes: It causes the sheriff to “redeliver the patient to the court” pursuant to the court order. (§ 1372, subd. (a)(2).) Section 1372 contains no hint that the time between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a court‘s ruling on the certificate is excluded from the commitment period.

The People maintain that “[n]othing in the plain language of the statutory scheme suggests that the discretionary hearing contemplated by section 1372 falls within the commitment time enumerated in section 1370, subd. (c)(1).” The Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion. (See Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 650 [”Section 1372 does not explicitly state any timeframe within which the restoration hearing must be held and does not reference section 1370(c)(1)‘s two-year maximum for an incompetency commitment“].)

As we have recognized, however, section 1372 “does not set forth any . . . procedures whatsoever” to govern the hearing on a defendant‘s recovery of mental competency. (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867; see also People v. Murrell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [observing that ”section 1372 does not directly provide for a hearing where the defendant may challenge the medical director‘s certification of competence” and the legislative intent to provide for such a hearing must be inferred].) Thus, the fact that section 1372 does not mention section 1370(c)(1)‘s two-year limit is neither surprising nor illuminating.⁷

ii. The statutory presumption of competence

Second, the People rely upon the presumption of competence (see § 1369, subd. (f)), which applies at a section 1372 hearing at which a judge determines whether to approve or reject a certificate of restoration. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 862.) The court below likewise relied on this presumption, reasoning that the absence of further treatment together with the presumption of competence meant that a defendant could no longer be regarded as subject to a commitment after the certificate‘s filing. (Rodriguez, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 653, 655-656.) But there is reason to question this analysis.⁸

The presumption of competence applies at every trial and retrial of a defendant‘s competency, even where there is reason to doubt a defendant is competent. As we have previously noted, “[t]he presumption that the defendant is mentally competent . . . is applicable at a trial of the defendant‘s mental competence” when a court first declares doubt as to the mental competence of the defendant. (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867.) The presumption therefore applies “in spite of the fact that it may run counter to any doubt expressed by the court and supported by the opinion of [the defendant‘s] own counsel.” (Ibid.) When the statute provided for a defendant‘s return to court if the defendant was still incompetent after an 18-month commitment (see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; former § 1370, subd. (b)(2)), the presumption of competence was likewise applicable at the retrial of the defendant‘s competence “in spite of the fact that it is inconsistent with his apparent nonrecovery of mental competence.” (Rells, at p. 867.)

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the Legislature simply intended for the presumption of competence to operate as a principle of law that a court applies in making a competency determination at any stage. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 862 [stating that the presumption of competence “operates to impose the burden of proof on the party, if any, who claims that the defendant is mentally incompetent, and fixes the weight thereof at preponderance of the evidence“]; Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 449 [explaining that the presumption of competence has limited legal effect, “affect[ing] competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases where the evidence is in equipoise; that is, where the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence that he is incompetent“].) It goes too far to conclude that the presumption reflects the Legislature‘s understanding that a commitment ends upon the filing of a certificate of restoration.

Furthermore, even when the presumption of competence does not run counter to doubts regarding the defendant‘s competency — and instead “conforms in fact with the certificate of restoration filed by the specified mental health official” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 867, italics omitted) — the court has the statutory authority to reject the certification and find a defendant incompetent (see § 1372, subd. (c)(2)).⁹ Yet, under the People‘s interpretation, even an erroneous certificate of restoration terminates an incompetency commitment. The People offer no persuasive explanation why the Legislature would intend that an incоmpetent defendant — who like Rodriguez may be moved between a state hospital and the county jail, all the while remaining confined and involuntarily medicated — should not have such time counted toward the maximum term of commitment merely because his doctor mistakenly concluded that he has regained competency.

iii. The asserted primacy of location

The People‘s third textual argument is based on section 1370. The People assert that section 1370 uses the words “delivered” and “committed” synonymously in arguing that a commitment consists only of that period “wherein the defendant is physically placed in the care and custody of the state hospital for restoration treatment.” (See § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i) [specifying that once a defendant is found incompetent, “[t]he court shall order that the mentally incompetent defendant be delivered by the sheriff to a State Department of State Hospitals facility . . . or to any other available public or private treatment facility . . . or placed on outpatient status“]; id., subd. (a)(2) [referring to the order made under subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) as “the order directing that the defendant be committed to the State Department of State Hospitals or other treatment facility or placed on outpatient status“].) Because a defendant is “committed” only upon being “delivered” to a treatment facility, the People maintain, “the definition of the ‘commitment’ . . . should not be conflated with the period of court-adjudged incompetency.” Instead, according to the People, this language signifies that it is a defendant‘s presence at a treatment facility that constitutes a commitment. And because a defendant is transferred back to county custody after being certified as having been restored to competency, the People contend, the defendant is no longer committed for purposes of calculating the two-year time limit.

There are significant problems with the People‘s argument that commitment only occurs when the defеndant is physically present at a treatment facility. First, if location is determinative of whether a defendant is committed, then a commitment should end with a defendant‘s actual transport from the treatment facility back to county custody — not with the filing of a certificate of restoration, as the People claim. Section 1372 makes clear that such transport may take as long as 10 days from the filing of the certificate. (§ 1372, subd. (a)(3)(C) [“In all cases, the patient shall be returned to the committing court no later than 10 days following the filing of a certificate of restoration“].) The People‘s position that a commitment ends with the filing of a certificate of restoration is therefore inconsistent with their own assertion that a commitment consists of the period when a defendant is physically in a treatment facility.¹⁰

Second, the People‘s position is inconsistent with various statutory provisions relating to competency determinations and proceedings that treat “commitment” as distinct from events such as “admission,” “transfer,” or “confinement.” For example, Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 “establish[es] a program for the [D]epartment to perform reevaluations primarily through telehealth evaluations for felony ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍incompetent to stand trial (IST) individuals in jail who have been waiting for admission to the [D]epartment.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4335.2, subd. (b).) Among the stated goals of allowing for such telehealth evaluations is “[t]o permit the [D]epartment to conduct reevaluations of IST defendants committed to the [D]epartment and awaiting admission to [D]epartment facilities.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), italics added; see also id., subd. (c) [“The [D]epartment, or its designee, have the authority and sole discretion to consider and conduct reevaluations for IST defendants committed to and awaiting admission to the [D]epartment“], italics added.) This provision suggests that a defendant is deemed committed upon having his or her place of treatment judicially determined, not when the defendant actually enters a treatment facility.

Along the same lines, section 1370 requires the Department to “make a written report to the court . . . concerning the defendant‘s progress toward recovery of mental competence” “[w]ithin 90 days after a commitment made pursuant to subdivision (a).” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1).) “Commitment,” as used in this provision — i.e., “a commitment made pursuant to subdivision (a)” — refers to the court‘s commitment order, and not admission to or physical placement in a state hospital. (Ibid.) Similarly, other subdivisions of section 1370 refer to “commit[ment]” and “confine[ment]” or “commit[ment]” and “transfer” to a facility as separate events. (See, e.g., § 1370, subd. (a)(5) [“When directing that the defendant be confined in a State Department of State Hospitals facility pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall commit the defendant to the State Department of State Hospitals“]; id., subd. (a)(6)(A) [specifying appropriate actions a court may take in the event “the defendant is committed or transferred to the State Department of State Hospitals pursuant to this section“].) A commitment thus does not necessarily coincide with actual presence in a state treatment facility.¹¹

iv. Other textual arguments

The People also rely on section 1370(c)(1), which specifies that “a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court” at the end of a two-year commitment period. The People argue that the two-year time limit in section 1370(c)(1) cannot “apply to court hearings after the defendant has been returned to court pursuant to section 1372, given that the remedy [under section 1370(c)(1)] is to return the defendant to the committing court — an event that has already occurred.”

The People‘s interpretation fails to recognize section 1370(c)(1)‘s multiple functions. This statute not only compels the transport of a defendant from one place to another, but also limits the amount of time that a defendant may be committed due to incompetency. (See § 1370(c)(1) [specifying that “[t]he court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department of State Hospitals under the same commitment” if a defendant has reached his maximum term of commitment].) Rodriguez seeks the application of this limit and a declaration that as a defendant whose commitment has reached the statutorily allowed maximum, “the court should either order him released from confinement or initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 807) — neither of which is “an event that has already occurred.”¹²

The People also contend that if we were to “conclud[e] that a court‘s competency finding is necessary to terminate [a] commitment,” commitments would last “indefinitely” for certain defendants. Specifically, the People point to defendants returned to court when a designated medical professional reports that “there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant[s] will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future” (§ 1370, subd. (b)(1)(A)) and those returned to court after their maximum commitment term has expired (§ 1370(c)(1)). The People maintain that because the statutes do not provide for a court hearing to redetermine defendants’ competency when they are returned via these two paths, such hearings would never occur and the defendants “would remain indefinitely committed.” (See Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 239; Quiroz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.) But we are addressing only the limited issue of whether the interval between the filing of a certificate of restoration and the court‘s ruling on it is excluded from the maximum commitment time set by section 1370(c)(1). Our holding does not mean that defendants returned without such certificates will be committed “indefinitely.”

Finally, in their amicus curiae brief submitted in support of the People, the State Department of State Hospitals and the State Department of Developmental Services make an argument that relies on the timing of when a commitment begins. According to amici curiae, “[i]t is undisputed that the maximum commitment period does not include the time bеfore a court conducts an initial competency hearing,” i.e., a hearing under section 1370. According to amici curiae, “[t]he time between the filing of a certificate of restoration and a section 1372 hearing should be treated the same way” and excluded from the maximum competency period.

But a defendant awaiting a competency hearing under section 1370 differs in important ways from a defendant awaiting a competency determination under section 1372. Before a court conducts an initial competency hearing under section 1370, the defendant has not been legally adjudicated as incompetent. In contrast, a defendant who has been certified by medical personnel as restored to competency necessarily has been previously determined to be incompetent, and until a court makes a competency finding pursuant to section 1372, the defendant cannot be treated as legally competent. In addition, a defendant who has not been adjudicated as incompetent may still be released on bail. (See § 1371.) A defendant who has been certified as competent, on the other hand, is ineligible for bail consideration until the court determines the defendant has regained competency. (See § 1372, subd. (d).)

In short, the period prior to a competency hearing under section 1370 occurs before the period of commitment and thus tells us very little about the period of commitment itself. The fact that “the time before a court conducts an initial competency hearing” under section 1370 is not counted toward the term of commitment does not persuade us to likewise exclude from a maximum period of commitment the interval before a court conducts a competency hearing under section 1372.

2. Rodriguez‘s Interpretation Furthers the Purposes of the Statute

The statutory text read in context is consistent with the understanding that the filing of a certificate of restoration does not stop the two-year clock set by section 1370(c)(1). But because the language of these statutes “‘supports more than one reasonable construction,‘” we look for an interpretation of the statute that will best “‘effectuate the purpose‘” of the competency statutory scheme. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 83.) We conclude Rodriguez‘s proposed interpretation furthers the purpose of the relevant competency statutes.

We have explained that “[t]he incompetence program . . . is a special form of pretrial detention” whose “purpose is restoration of a specific mental state without which the criminal process cannot proceed.” (Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569, italics omitted.) In adopting the “incompetence program” in 1974, the Legislature clearly intended to limit a defendant‘s time in “pretrial detention” and to suspend “the criminal process” so that the defendant can be restored to “a specific mental state.” (Ibid., italics omitted; see Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, pp. 3323-3324.) The Legislature also intended to “eliminate uncertainty among all persons concerned regarding court procedures.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, p. 3324.) This latter goal of providing certainty is evident in the Legislature‘s decision to limit the maximum term of commitment to three years (and later two), rather than the “reasonable period of time” mandated under Davis and Jackson v. Indiana. (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. at p. 738.) As we explained in Jackson v. Superior Court, “the Legislature established the [then] three-year maximum in section 1370(c) to protect defendants’ due process and equal protection rights not to be committed solely because of incompetence for longer than is reasonable.” (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.)

Rodriguez‘s proposed interpretation — specifically, not excluding the period between the filing of a certificate of competence, and the court‘s ruling on the certificate — is consistent with the Legislature‘s intent to limit the period of detention due to incompetency and provide certainty regarding the length of that detention period. Under this interpretation, incompetent defеndants are assured that they cannot be confined simply on account of their inability to proceed to trial for more than a specified two-year period.

By contrast, the People‘s proposed interpretation runs counter to the legislative goal of limiting a defendant‘s confinement “solely because of incompetence.” (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.) If we were to adopt the People‘s interpretation, a defendant could be held indefinitely while awaiting a competency hearing, subject only to the limits imposed by the due process clause. As explained previously, after the filing of a certificate of restoration but before the court adjudicates the defendant competent, the defendant cannot seek bail or otherwise challenge the underlying charges because the criminal proceedings remain suspended. (See §§ 1372, subd. (d), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Allowing defendants to remain in this state of limbo is contrary to the entire statutory scheme.

The People‘s construction would also eliminate any urgency in reaching a determination of competency. This again runs counter to the Legislature‘s intent, in imposing the two-year limit under section 1370(c)(1), to eliminate the uncertainty inherent in the “reasonable period of time” standard under Davis and Jackson v. Indiana and ensure that individuals who may never regain competence are not indefinitely detained with the criminal process suspended.

Furthermore, the fact that a defendant may continue to receive treatment even post-certification means that some of the period following the filing of the certificate is reasonably seen as a part of the process of treatment to determine whether competence can be, and ultimately is, regained — which is what the statute generally aims to expedite. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 16, pp. 3323-3324; see also, e.g., Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 801; Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 105.) Including this period within the limit of section 1370(c)(1) furthers the legislative intent underlying the comрetency statutes for this reason as well.

3. The Statutory Background Cuts Against the People‘s Position

Our interpretation of the relevant statutes is bolstered by the evolution of the competency scheme, which since 1974 has progressively moved control of incompetent defendants away from designated medical professionals at facilities providing competency restoration services, and toward supervision by the courts.

a. The evolution of the competency statutory scheme

In ending the indefinite commitment of mentally incompetent defendants in 1974, the Legislature imposed on the Department (and other facilities) the obligation to provide periodic reports to the court. Specifically, the Legislature mandated that “[w]ithin 90 days of a commitment . . . , the superintendent of the state hospital or other facility to which the defendant is committed shall make a written report to the court concerning the defendant‘s progress toward recovery of his mental competence.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, pp. 3318-3319.) Only if “the report discloses a substantial likelihood the defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable future” will the defendant “remain in the state hospital or other facility.” (Id. at p. 3319.) After the initial report, “at six-month intervals or until the defendant becomes mentally competent, the superintendent of the hospital or person in charge of the facility shall report to the court regarding the defendant‘s progress.” (Ibid.) Should a report at any point indicate that “there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable future, the committing court shall order him to be returned to the court.”¹³ (Ibid.)

In 1980, the Legislature extended the courts’ role in overseeing competency procedures by making them responsible for determining whether a defendant has regained competency when the defendаnt is returned to court following the filing of a certificate of restoration. (See Stats. 1980, ch. 547, § 14, p. 1517.) Before this amendment, once the designated medical professional certified a defendant as restored to competency, “[t]he defendant [was] then to be tried.” (Ashley, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 359; see also Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319.) That is, “the final determination” of a defendant‘s restoration of competency rested with the designated medical professional. (Phyle, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 849Ibid.) Now, a court may accept a certificate of restoration, finding the defendant competent and allowing criminal proceedings to resume. (See §§ 1372, subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(1).) Or, a court may reject a certificate of restoration, finding that the defendant remains incompetent. (See § 1372, subd. (c)(2).) In other words, the court may disagree with the designated medical professional, and it is the court‘s judgment that carries legal significance.14

In addition, courts are empowered to remove defendants from their commitment placement without input from the designated medical professional. In the 1974 enactment, the Legislature declared that a defendant “shall be returned to the committing court” if the court determines that “treatment for the defendant‘s mental impairment is [not] being conducted.” (Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 6, p. 3319; see also § 1370, subd. (b)(4).) In 2018, the Legislature specified that “[i]f, at any time after the court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial,” the court receives “substantial evidence . . . as to create a doubt in the mind of the judge as to the defendant‘s current mental incompetence,” the court may appoint an expert to examine the defendant. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(G), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 25.) If the expert opines that the defendant has regained competency, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of restoration of competence has been returned,” although no such certificate hаs been filed by the designated medical professional. (Ibid.)¹⁵ Neither of these procedures requires the state hospital‘s involvement.

Notes

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

The judge must order such a hearing if defense counsel also declares a doubt regarding a defendant‘s competency. (§ 1368, subd. (b).) Even where counsel believes the defendant is competent, however, the court “may nevertheless order a hearing.” (Ibid.; see also [explaining that our court has construed section 1368 ” ‘in conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law’ ” to mean that “[i]f the court is presented with substantial evidence of mental incompetence . . . the court must declare a doubt about the question and initiate an inquiry“].)

Section 1372, subdivision (a).

Section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) (“If, at any time after the court has declared a defendant incompetent to stand trial pursuant to this section, counsel for the defendant or a jail medical or mental health staff provider provides the court with substantial evidence that the defendant‘s psychiatric symptoms have changed to such a degree as to create a doubt in the mind of the judge as to the defendant‘s current mental incompetence, the court may appoint a psychiatrist or a licensed psychologist to opinе as to whether the defendant has regained competence. If, in the opinion of that expert, the defendant has regained competence, the court shall proceed as if a certificate of restoration of competence has been returned pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1372“).

Section 1370, subdivision (b)(1)(A) (specifying the reporting obligations of medical personnel and stating “[i]f the report [filed by the medical director of the State Department of State Hospitals, the person in charge of a treatment facility, or outpatient treatment staff] indicates that there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future, custody of the defendant shall be transferred without delay to the committing county and shall remain with the county until further order of the court. The defendant shall be returned to the court for proceedings pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) no later than 10 days following receipt of the report. The court shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department of State Hospitals under the same commitment“).

Section 1370(c)(1) (“At the end of two years from the date of commitment or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the most serious offense charged in the information, indictment, or complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision, whichever is shorter, but no later than 90 days prior to the expiration of the defendant‘s term of commitment, a defendant who has not recovered mental competence shall be returned to the committing court, and custody of the defendant shall be transferred without delay to the committing county and shall remain with the county until further order of the court. The сourt shall not order the defendant returned to the custody of the State Department of State Hospitals under the same commitment. The court shall notify the community program director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court orders“).

We also note that section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii) specifies that “[i]f a certificate of restoration of competency was filed with the court pursuant to Section 1372 and the court subsequently rejected the certification,” the court shall provide “a new computation or statement setting forth the amount of credit for time served, if any, to be deducted from the defendant‘s maximum term of commitment based on the court‘s rejection of the certification.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii), italics added.) This language appears to contemplate that when “a certificate of restoration of competency was filed with the court pursuant to Section 1372 and the court subsequently rejected the certification,” the period in between the filing of the certificate and the court‘s rejection thereof is relevant for purposes of computing the maximum period of commitment allowed by section 1370(c)(1). (§ 1370, subd. (a)(3)(C)(ii).)

The Court of Appeal relied on in concluding that “the filing of the certificate triggers a presumption of mental competency under section 1372.” (.) But merely stated that the filing of the certificate of restoration ”trigger[s] a hearing on a defendant‘s recovery of mental competence.” (, italics added.) At this hearing, as explained post, the presumption of competence operates as a principle of law as in any competency proceeding. It is a misreading of to conclude that a restoration certificate itself creates the presumption of competence.

This contrasts with previous versions of the law, in which a designated medical professional‘s certification that a defendant has recovered mental competency served to render a person competent as a matter of law. (See Stats. 1974, ch. 1511, § 7, p. 3320; [after a superintendent of a state hospital certifies thаt a defendant has regained competence, “[t]he defendant is then to be tried“]; ; .)

In this case, the dates of the trial court‘s orders of commitment are not the dates of Rodriguez‘s transport to a state hospital or the dates of his admission to such a facility — i.e., they are not when Rodriguez was “physically placed in the care and custody of the state hospital for restoration treatment.” The record does not reflect when Rodriguez was transported to or from a state hospital for either of his two commitments (see ), making it impossible to evaluate how long Rodriguez has been committed under the People‘s reading of the statutes. This gap in the record may be explained by the fact that the parties below agreed that the dates of the transports were not legally significant. Before the Court of Appeal, the People “apparently concede[d] that Rodriguez‘s ‘commitment’ under section 1370(c)(1) began on the date of the trial court‘s order of commitment.” (.)

We need not decide in this case whether defendants placed on outpatient status (see § 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(A)(ii)) are, in fact, committed for purposes of the two-year limit. Under the People‘s reading of the statutes, however, defendants who are on outpatient status are never committed because they are never physically in the custody of a treatment facility. It is unclear what meaning, if any, section 1370(c)(1)‘s two-year limit would have under the People‘s reading.

The People‘s argument also ignores the possibility that an incompetent defendant may be treated at the county jail. Welfare and Institutions Code section 4100 enumerates the types of facilities over which the Department has jurisdiction. Among these are “county jail treatment facilit[ies] under contract with the State Department of State Hospitals to provide competency restoration services.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4100, subd. (g).) A defendant committed to a Department facility could be at the county jail treatment facility for the entire commitment period.

Section 1370(c)(1) therefore requires that defendants treated at the county jails “be returned to the committing court” and their “custody . . . be transferred without delay to the committing county” at the end of their maximum terms of commitment and “shall remain with the county until further order of the court.” (Ibid.) This means that section 1370(c)(1) requires defendants already in county custody be returned to county custody until the court takes action regarding their commitment status. (Ibid.) Yet, the People do not argue that section 1370(c)(1) is inapplicable to defendants receiving treatment at a county jail facility despite their county custody constituting “an event that has already occurred.” For such defendants, like those in Rodriguez‘s situation, section 1370(c)(1) is applicable regardless of the defendant‘s physical location.

These reporting requirements have remained substantially unchanged since 1974, although the statutory language has been amended to take into account placement options not previously available. (See § 1370, subd. (b).)

Relying on passages from various Court of Appeal decisions, the People argue that “[t]he evil remedied by In re Davis and later addressed by the Legislature in enacting section 1370, subd. (c)(1) [in 1974], was the languishing of incompetent defendants in treatment facilities, not delays in judicial determinations of competency or other court business when defendants are within the court‘s direct control.” Davis makes clear, however, that we were also concerned with the lack of court supervision over defendants “confined in state hospitals.” (Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 806.) It was with an eye toward imposing more judicial oversight that we directed “the hospitals’ authorities [to] report [to the superior courts] . . . regarding the . . . progress toward competence” of “all persons . . . committed as incompetent to stand trial.” (Ibid.) These reporting requirements, designed to help courts determine whether progress was made in restoring competency, were then enacted into law when the Legislature overhauled the competency statutory scheme in 1974. In other wоrds, our court in Davis and the Legislature in 1974 both sought to put incompetent defendants more “within the court‘s direct control.”

The courts in Carr and Rodriguez touched on this point as it relates to the question before us. The Carr court reasoned that “if the commitment terminates when a health official files a certification of competence, [no] plausible purpose [would be] served in requiring [a] court to approve the certification as expressly contemplated in section 1372, subdivision (d).” (.) The court below responded to Carr by positing that “[t]he issuance of the restoration certificate and the subsequent court hearing have distinct statutory objectives.” (

Likewise, “the court shall proceed as if a certificate of restoration of competence has been returned” if the Department elects to conduct a telehealth reevaluation of a defendant adjudicated mentally incompetent when the defendant is still in county custody and “in the opinion of the department‘s expert, the defendant has regained competence.” (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(H)(ii).) If the filing of a certificate ends a commitment as the People argue, it follows that an opinion of restored competency rendered under section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(G) and (a)(1)(H) should also automatically end a commitment. It seems unlikely the Legislature would have intended for multiple еvents, potentially happening on different dates, to mark the end of a commitment, as that would sow conflict and confusion.

As various amicus curiae point out, the People’s position would mean that commitment does not encompass “the period of time while an individual is awaiting treatment even where the current average wait time for placement in a state hospital competency restoration program” is significant. As discussed ante, such an interpretation runs counter to the legislative intent to limit the period of detention due to incompetency and provide certainty regarding the length of the detention period.

In doing so, and distinguished . held equal protection and due process principles mandated application of precommitment custody credits when the maximum commitment period is measured by the maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious offense charged because “the denial of credit[s] necessarily results in longer confinement for indigents unable to post bail bonds. This discriminatory treatment is constitutionally forbidden.” (, fn. omitted.) However, when the maximum commitment period is set to the statutory maximum limit, and held that there are no potential equal protection or due process violations and the statute controls because similarly situated defendants are not deprived of the benefit of the precommitment jail time if convicted. (See ; .)

In the course of its decision, stated that “[s]ection 1370, subdivision (c)(1)’s three-year statutory limit applies to the total period actually spent in commitment at a mental institution. ([

Tо the extent the Department is concerned about running out of time to provide treatment, its concerns appear to be based on defendants who have been certified as competent and yet are “returned to the hospitals for additional competency services.” Defendants “returned to the hospital for additional competency services” are those defendants whose certifications of competency have been rejected by a court, or who had again become incompetent in short succession. Although we do not lightly dismiss the Department’s concerns that for these defendants the Department will not have a full two-year period in which to provide treatment, ultimately, in setting a maximum term of commitment, the Legislature has accepted that there will be some individuals for whom the allotted time is not enough to restore competency. It is not the role of the courts to second-guess these legislative choices.

Because we reach this conclusion based on a reading of the statutes, we do not address Rodriguez’s argument that a holding for the People here would violate constitutional principles of “due process, equal protection, effective assistance of counsel, and proscriptions on cruel and unusual punishment.”

We briefly acknowledge the arguments the parties have made for and against the availability of such tolling in this context. Rodriguez argues that “[c]ontinuances and waivers are not authorized by sections 1370 and 1372, so the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍courts cannot read into the statutes what has ‘been omitted.’ ” The People, on the other hand, counter that tolling, like many of the procedures governing a section 1372 hearing, may be considered “implied” by the statutes.

This court’s decision to issue a stay in connection with granting Rodriguez’s petition for review should not be understood to resolve the question whether Rodriguez is entitled to the relief he seeks.

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