Rodrigue v. RodrigueRodrigue v. Rodrigue
Our task in this appeal, before us under
I.
Facts and Proceedings
George and Veronica were married in Louisiana in 1967 and were divorced there in 1993. In the absence of an election by them to have any other marital property regime apply, the Rodrigues’ Louisiana marriage effected the “legal regime” of matrimonial property,1 establishing between them a community of acquets and gains, commonly referred to simply as the community.2
During the marriage, George became a widely acclaimed, highly successful, and very prolific painter. He created numerous paintings both during the existence of the community and after its termination, a number of which depicted a stylized and easily recognizable image of a blue dog. Modeled after the family pet, Tiffany, the first blue dog painting was created in 1984. George obtained certificates of copyright for some but not all of his paintings.
Divorce terminated the community that had existed between Veronica and George throughout their marriage.3 As a general proposition, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that, on termination
Following the dissolution of his marriage with Veronica, George and co-Plaintiff-Appellee Richard Steiner, George‘s former business associate, filed this action in federal court seeking a declaration that George is the sole owner of intellectual property rights in all the paintings, particularly the blue dog image. They also sought to enjoin Veronica from (1) seeking a declaration of her co-ownership of those works, (2) making image transfers, and (3) suing for copyright infringement. Veronica filed a counterclaim in an effort to obtain a declaration that she owns an undivided one-half interest in (1) all intellectual property rights (including, but not limited to, the blue dog) generated during the existence of the community and (2) all post-community artworks that are “derivative” of that intellectual property. Veronica also sought an accounting for her half-interest in the proceeds of post-community use of those copyrights and derivatives.
After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted George‘s, grounding its decision in
In a scholarly and thorough analysis, the district court concluded that, as a matter of conflict preemption, subjecting copyrights on works of the author-spouse to Louisiana community property law would damagе federal interests in national uniformity and efficient exchange of copyrights. The court held that, as a result of this conflict, the state marital property law is preempted and cannot appertain. The court also considered
We are convinced that the district court visualized the correct method for reconciling the apparent conflict, but we disagree about the need for a congressional fix. We therefore adopt the approach considered but rejected by that court, and we reverse.
II.
Analysis
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.7
George contends that provisions of both the Copyright Act8 and the U.S. Constitution9 preempt state community property law,
We do not disagree with George‘s general premise; we do disagree, though, with his expansive view of the scope of the conflict between copyright law and community property law, and thus with the extent of the preemptive effect of such conflict. We are satisfied that the conclusion we reach today —— that an author-spouse in whom a copyright vests maintains exclusive managerial
We begin by delineating the precise scope of the language of
Section 201(a) specifies that the copyright “vests” in the author. Except in its title,12 this subsection never uses the words
True, the copyright “vests initially” in the “author,” and the “author” is the “originator,” the “maker,” the person to whom a work “owes its origin.”17 We do not question that George is the sole “author” of the copyrights here at issue. Neither do we mean to suggest that Veronica‘s co-ownership interests arise from co-authorship. We do conclude, though, that the language of
As a useful framework for understanding the Louisiana Civil Code provisions on which our holding ultimately rests, we begin with general concepts of Louisiana property law. In the Civil Law, the bundle of rights that together constitutes full ownership18 of property comprises three separate sub-bundles: (1) usus - the right to use or possess, i.e., hold, occupy, and utilize the property; (2) abusus - the right to abuse or alienate, i.e., transfer, lease, and encumber the property, and (3) fructus - the right to the fruits, i.e., to receive and enjoy the earnings, profits, rents, and revenues produced by or derived from the property.19 In Louisiana, those three facets of ownership may be allocated in various combinations among different persons, with each having less than full ownership.20 For example, the owner of
When the property in question is a copyright, allocation of these attributes of ownership within the community property framework, according to the rule we announce today, produces a division similar to usufruct but different in combination: The author-spouse alone holds the elements of usus and abusus — a combination that comprises the exclusive rights to possess, use, transfer, alienate, and encumber the copyright as he sees fit — free of any management, consent, or participation of the non-author spouse.22 Obviously,
With those general Civil Law property concepts in mind, we turn next to the Civil Code‘s articles on marital property. In broadest form, the Code embodies the concept of “equal management” of property belonging to the community: Each spouse, acting alone,
In concluding that copyrights should be treated the same as paychecks, cars, and partnership interests, we rely initially on Louisiana Civil Code article 2351 which proclaims that “[a] spouse has the exclusive right to manage, alienate, encumber, or lease movables issued or registered in his name as provided by law.” This right of exclusive management of those kinds of movables is not coterminous with the community but continues as long as the
The economic benefits that flow from particular types of one-spouse assets, including but not limited to cars, paychecks, partnership interests —— and copyrights —— can inure to the benefit of the community without doing violence to the legal results
In confirmation of this conclusion, we look first to the express preemption provision in the Act itself. When we do so we reach the same initial conclusion as did the district court, that the Act does not mandate the monolithic preemption of Louisiana community property law in toto. Section 301(a) of the Act states that “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title.” For openers, “the general scope of copyright” is not broad enough to cover the entire body of marital property law; that is, copyright law does not occupy the entire “field” and thereby totally eclipse all state marital
Indeed, the Copyright Act, in defining the scope of its own preemptive effect, expressly acknowledges that state law continues to operate unless there is a direct and irreconcilable clash between a state law right and an exclusive right under the Act with which such state law right is equivalent. Section 301(b) expresses that “[n]othing in [§ 301(a) of the Copyright Act] annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to . . . activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106.”33 To repeat, the only ownership rights that the Act grants exclusively to the author are the rights to (1) reproduce, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute copies, (4) perform, and (5) display the work.34 Among the entire “bundle” of rights comprising full ownership of property generally, the preemptive effect of federal copyright law extends only to this explicitly enumerated, lesser-included quintet. As those five exclusive rights of the author conflict with Louisiana‘s general principle of
Notably absent from the Copyright Act‘s exclusive sub-bundle of five rights is the right to enjoy the earnings and profits of the copyright. Nothing in the copyright law purports to prevent non-preempted rights from being enjoyed by the community during its existence or thereafter by the former spouses in community as co-owners of equal, undivided interests.
The § 301 preemption provision of the Copyright Act was intended to accomplish a “fundamental and significant change” in the existing state of the law, under which published works were governed by federal copyright law and unpublished works were governed by the common law of copyright. The new statute substituted a single, uniform system in place of the existing anachronistic and highly complicated dual system. That goal was accomplished in part by specifying a limited preemption which trumps only those common law or state law rights that are equivalent to federal copyright,35 such as state laws that purport to grant copyright protection tо particular works. We discern nothing in the Act‘s plain wording or legislative history to indicate that Congress —— fully aware of the existence of community
George nevertheless insists in the alternative that, even if § 301 preemption does not apply, “conflict preemption” does because designating copyrights as community property would do substantial damage to important federal interests.37 In this argument, George fails (or refuses) to recognize the jurisprudential corollаry that “[s]tate family and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden.”38 He attempts to bolster his conflict preemption argument by demonizing the Louisiana Civil Code doctrine of equal management: If copyrights were to be deemed community property, George contends, both he and Veronica would have the right, acting alone, to control, encumber, or dispose of the copyrights, which in turn would impair federal
George‘s first contention is negated by our ready recognition today that the author-spouse has the exclusive right to manage and control the copyright, i.e., to deal with it in any manner that is not inconsistent with federal copyright law. This conclusion is supported by our acknowledgment that the general rule of equal management is pre-empted vis à vis copyrights and by Louisiana Civil Code article 2351‘s provision for the exclusive management of movables rеgistered or issued in the name of one spouse. As equal management does not apply to copyrights, federal interests in predictability and efficiency are not impaired by it. A potential purchaser or licensee will still be able to obtain good “title”
George‘s second contention does not persuade us that allowing differing state laws —— in particular, community property laws that differ from state to state among the eight that presently have some version of such marital property regimes42 —— to apply just to the economic benefit derived from copyrights will somehow damage the federal interests in predictability and uniformity. Indeed, the Aсt itself subjects copyrights to varying state laws for other purposes. For example, copyrights are expressly transferrable by conveyance,43 and such conventional transfers are governed by individual, non-uniform state contract laws; yet no significant obstruction of federal interests has occurred to prompt preemption.44 In like manner, copyrights are expressly transferable
As for George‘s third contention —— that community entitlement to the “fruits” of copyrights would lessen the author‘s incentive to create or exploit his works, thereby conflicting with the
III.
Conclusion
In the end, we disagree with the district court only to the extent that it held the conflict between Louisiana community property law and federal copyright law irreconcilable absent congressional intercession. We therefore reverse the court‘s grant of summary judgment declaring George alone to be the owner of the blue dog and other copyrights created during his marriage to Veronica. Accordingly, we remand this case, appealed pursuant to
Specifically, we instruct the district court to determine on remand which copyrights are subject to the rules of community property law that we announce today, either directly as works created during the existence of the community of acquets and gains or derivatively as works created after the termination of the community but based on pre-divorce works.52 Even though the parties briefed the issue of derivative works in the instant appeal, the district court has not yet ruled on it so that issue is not ripe for our consideration and disposition. In holding that George alone is the owner of all copyrights in the artistic works, the district court denied Veronica‘s cross-motion for a summary judgment declaring her economic interests in the сopyrights, including determination of which post-divorce works were derivative of the artwork created during the marriage. That ruling, however, was not certified to be a final judgment ready for appeal under
We acknowledge that it is for the state court that has jurisdiction over judicial partition and settlement of the Rodrigue community to determine both the proper method for establishing the value of Veronica‘s share of these net economic benefits and the proper procedure for delivery of that share to her, whether that be, for example, by (1) an accounting based on the present value of the appraised fair market value of the fully exploited copyrights and derivatives during their expected lifetimes, (2) periodic accountings and payments to Veronica as the copyrights and derivatives are exploited and proceeds are derived from them, or (3) some other altogether different procedure.54 It follows, of
Finally, in the interest of judicial economy, we reserve to this panel limited appellate jurisdiction over this case with respect to future appeals —— if any —— from judgments rendered by the district court on remand in implementation of our instructions.
REVERSED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.