RENEE’ A. RICE v. DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED, AND REVEREND CHARLES F. BODZIAK
No. 3 WAP 2020
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT
JULY 21, 2021
JUSTICE DONOHUE
[J-81-2020]; BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.; ARGUED: October 20, 2020
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered June 11, 2019 at No. 97 WDA 2018, reversing the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County entered December 15, 2017 at No. 2016 GN 1919, and remanding.
APPEAL OF: DIOCESE OF ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN, BISHOP JOSEPH ADAMEC (RETIRED), MONSIGNOR MICHAEL E. SERVINSKY, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF BISHOP JAMES HOGAN, DECEASED
OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE
DECIDED: JULY 21,
In this appeal, we address the proper application of the statute of limitations to a tort action filed by Renee’ Rice (“Rice“) against the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown and its bishops (collectively, the “Diocese“) for their alleged role in covering up and facilitating a series of alleged sexual assaults committed by the Reverend Charles F. Bodziak. Rice alleged that Bodziak sexually abused her from approximately 1974 through 1981. She did not file suit against Bodziak or the Diocese until June 2016, thirty-five years after the alleged abuse stopped.
I. Procedural History
A. Rice‘s Complaint
Rice filed her initial complaint on June 20, 2016, asserting multiple claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy. Rice (born in 1967) and her family were members of St. Leo, a parish within the Altoona-Johnstown Diocese and she attended the affiliated Catholic school. First Amended Complaint, 8/16/2016, ¶¶ 21-23. Rice alleges that Father Bodziak was assigned to St. Leo‘s and began a “grooming” process which included taking Rice and other children on various youth activities. Id. ¶ 25. She contended that he first sexually assaulted her in 1974 when she was between eight or nine years old, placing his hand between her legs while the two were seated in a vehicle following one of these outings. Id. ¶ 26. She averred that he would routinely touch her private areas during subsequent outings, and on one occasion he kissed her and inserted his tongue into her mouth. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. At some unspecified point in time, Bodziak allegedly spoke to Rice‘s parents, requesting and receiving their permission to have Rice perform various chores at the rectory, where Bodziak resided. According to Rice, the assaults escalated at this point, as Bodziak would supply Rice with alcohol and then fondle her genitalia and kiss her. On one occasion, he allegedly inserted his fingers into her vagina. Id. ¶ 29. Bodziak assured Rice that the activities “were acceptable because he liked her and she was ‘special.’ ” Id. ¶ 32. In her complaint, Rice alleged that these assaults initially occurred once or twice a month, and later rose to the level of approximately twice a week through 1981. Id. ¶ 33. Rice‘s complaint further alleged that Bishop Joseph Adamec served “as the Bishop or leader” of the Altoona-Johnstown Diocese from 1987 until 2011, while Bishop James Hogan filled that same role from 1966 through 1986. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Rice alleged that both men were empowered to supervise and control all priests assigned to the diocese, including parish assignments. Id. ¶ 6.
Rice did not report Bodziak‘s abuse to the authorities until “the first half of 2006” when she “reported her history of sexual abuse by Bodziak to Defendants Adamec and the Diocese.” Id. ¶ 43. By letter dated July 17, 2006, Bishop Adamec “invite[d] [Rice] to share that information through our diocesan process for reviewing allegations.” Exhibit A to Complaint. The letter explained that Rice could seek assistance from Sister Marilyn Welch as a designated victims’ advocate, who would help present the cases to the Diocesan Allegation Review Board. Rice did not respond.
In early 2014, the District Attorney of Cambria County issued a referral to the Office of Attorney General regarding reports of sexual abuse occurring within the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown. On March 1, 2016, the 37th Investigating Grand Jury issued a report finding that hundreds of children were victimized by over fifty individual priests or religious leaders. The grand jury determined that “Bishops James Hogan and Joseph Adamec ... took actions that further endangered children” by returning priests to the ministry/parishes “with full knowledge they were child predators.” Grand Jury Report at 6. The report discussed the existence of ” ‘secret archives’ ... used to hide scandalous information, such as sex abuse by priests.” Id. at 8 (quoting news coverage from the Tribune-Democrat newspaper).
B. The Trial Court and Superior Court Opinions
The Diocese filed an answer and new matter followed by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, raising the statute of limitations as a defense. The Diocese argued that as Bodziak‘s last alleged assault occurred in 1981 the statute of limitations expired long ago. In support, the Diocese relied on a line of cases stemming from the Superior Court‘s decision in Meehan v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 870 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2005), which reasoned, in relevant part, that
The child abuse is the injury in this matter, not the alleged cover-up by the Archdiocese (otherwise, any member of the Catholic Church could conceivably bring suit against the Archdiocese, absent any abuse, alleging injury from the Archdiocese‘s general conduct). Unlike traditional discovery rule cases where the injury, itself, is not known or cannot be reasonably ascertained, the plaintiffs’ injuries, here, were known when the abuse occurred.
The [Plaintiffs] are really claiming that they were unaware, not of their injury, but of a secondary cause of their injury (the primary cause being the individual who committed the abuse). The plaintiffs claim that a jury should determine if the plaintiffs should have investigated these secondary parties during the limitations period or if the plaintiffs were unable, despite reasonable diligence, to bring suit against these secondary parties until 2002.
Id. at 920. Accord Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 879 A.2d 270, 277 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“As in Meehan, appellant, here, is really claiming that he was unaware, not of his injury, but of a secondary cause of his injury[.]“). The trial court granted the motion, agreeing that “as in Meehan and Baselice, it was always known to the Plaintiff that the causes of her alleged injury were the actions of Defendant Bodziak and the Diocese overseeing him.” Trial Court Opinion and Order, 12/15/2017, at 10.
The Superior Court reversed. Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 212 A.3d 1055 (Pa. Super. 2019). The court concluded that the “discovery rule” and “fraudulent concealment” both applied and reversed the trial court. For the discovery rule analysis, the court held that Rice alleged sufficient facts to place the issues of notice and diligence to the jury. The Superior Court accepted that the relevant chronological event was when Rice could have learned of the cover-up, and not simply knowledge of the abuses as held by Meehan. The Superior Court concluded that ”Meehan, Baselice, and their progeny reviewed child-sexual-abuse allegations in [a] vacuum[,]” a practice forbidden by Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018), according to the Superior Court. Id. at 1064-65.
The panel proceeded to “apply Nicolaou to Ms. Rice‘s discovery-rule theory and alleged facts.” Id. at 1066. The Superior Court established what it perceived as dueling sets of facts that must be submitted
The Superior Court next addressed the fraudulent concealment argument. According to Rice she had a “special, confidential relationship” with the Diocese requiring it to disclose its knowledge of the cover-up to Rice. Id. at 1067. The Diocese argued that Meehan had previously rejected similar arguments. Meehan, 870 A.2d at 921-22 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged a relationship that “equates to a fiduciary relationship” and rejecting the fraudulent concealment doctrine). The Superior Court determined that the trial court‘s ruling “overextended Meehan.” Rice, 212 A.3d at 1067. It viewed Meehan as rejecting a fraudulent concealment argument only in the context of the “regular” parishioner-church relationship shared by all members of the parish, whereas this case involves an individualized relationship between Rice and the Diocese based on, inter alia, her service “as a parish organist, cantor, and rectory cleaner, coupled with her young age, Catholic schooling, and the trust she placed in the Diocesan Defendants to guide and to protect her.” Id. at 1060. Adopting the nomenclature of Doe v. Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2012 WL 3782454 (D. Idaho 2012) (unpublished), the Rice panel concluded that Pennsylvania law would henceforth recognize the possibility of a “parishioner-plus” relationship. See also Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742, 753 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (predicting without discussion of the parameters of the duty that this Court would recognize a relationship between church and parishioner for purposes of the breach of fiduciary duty tort).
According to the Superior Court, if Rice could prove the relationship existed, the fraudulent concealment theory could then apply. It is not entirely clear from the Superior Court‘s opinion the extent to which it distinguished between affirmative acts that misled Rice versus the Diocese‘s obligation to come forward and reveal facts based on the purported relationship. The court identified both positive acts of misrepresentation (“[Rice] claims that the Diocesan Defendants’ words and actions led her to believe she was safe with priests in general and with [Fr.] Bodziak in particular“) as well as passive acts (“their refusal to enlighten her“). Rice, 212 A.3d at 1073-74 (internal citations omitted, second alteration in original). The panel acknowledged that silence in the absence of a duty to speak cannot qualify as fraudulent concealment. Id. at 1068 (citing Lange v. Burd, 800 A.2d 336 (Pa. Super. 2002)). It logically
Finally, portions of the Superior Court‘s opinion suggested that Rice could bring a cause of action for civil conspiracy as a separate tort subject to its own time limitation period without reference to the underlying torts committed by Bodziak. It is unclear if the Superior Court opined that an action based on this tort could proceed even if the discovery rule and/or fraudulent concealment doctrines did not apply. On the one hand, the panel suggested that the civil conspiracy tort was separate. “If Ms. Rice proves all of this to a jury, she filed her lawsuit well within the two-year statute of limitations for civil conspiracy[.]” Id. at 1076. On the other, the Superior Court recognized that “it is well-settled that the statute of limitations for conspiracy is the same as that for the underlying action which forms the basis of the conspiracy.” Id. at 1062 (quoting Kingston Coal Co. v. Felton Min. Co., Inc., 690 A.2d 284, 287 (Pa. 1997)).
We granted the Diocese‘s petition for allowance of appeal on the following questions.
(1) Did the Superior Court commit reversible error by misinterpreting the fact-specific holding of Nicolaou v. Martin, 649 Pa. 227, 195 A.3d 880 (2018) — a latent disease/medical malpractice case that did not purport to overrule Meehan v. Archdiocese of Phila., 870 A.2d 912 (Pa. Super. 2005), Baselice v. Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 879 A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. 2005), or any other precedent — thereby abrogating the statute of limitations and the discovery rule in civil actions?
(2) Did the Superior Court commit reversible error by establishing for the first time a rule whereby a fiduciary once in a confidential relationship owes a never-ending duty to speak after the end of the relationship, thereby eliminating a plaintiff‘s duty to exercise due diligence and conduct a reasonable investigation in support of his/her causes of action?
(3) Did the Superior Court commit reversible error by overruling precedent and holding that a plaintiff may bring a secondary cause of action for civil conspiracy where the primary cause of the harm is time barred?
Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 226 A.3d 560 (Pa. 2020) (per curiam). When reviewing a trial court‘s order sustaining judgment on the pleadings, our standard of review is to determine whether, based on the facts the plaintiffs pled, “the law makes recovery impossible.” Cagey v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458, 463 (Pa. 2018). A judgment on the pleadings will be granted where, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Pa. 1998). We regard as true all well-pleaded allegations in Rice‘s pleadings, as she is the non-moving party, and consider against her only those factual allegations in the Diocese‘s pleadings that Rice has admitted. Grimes v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Phila., LLC, 105 A.3d 1188, 1190 (Pa. 2014).
II. Parties’ Arguments
The Diocese argues that Meehan was correctly decided and based on its reasoning, Rice‘s knowledge of Bodziak‘s alleged assaults commenced the running of the statute of limitations. The discovery rule cannot apply because it governs situations in which the plaintiff is reasonably unaware of the injury. Because Rice knew of Bodziak‘s torts, she was required to investigate the Diocese as a possible additional cause of her injuries during the period of
Regarding fraudulent concealment, the Diocese argues that it did not mislead Rice. It again focuses on Bodziak‘s tortious conduct and explains that for fraudulent concealment to apply, the qualifying affirmative acts by the Diocese would be limited to factual misrepresentations regarding those injuries, e.g., assertions that the alleged sexual abuse did not occur or that the acts did not occur on church property. Id. at 61. Turning to the theory that silence qualifies as the relevant act of concealment, it stresses that the key component of any fiduciary relationship is the superior position of one of the parties with respect to some fact known only to one side of the relationship. Id. at 65. Rice knew she was abused and did not need any further information from the Diocese to file suit against Bodziak. Additionally, the Diocese argues that the existence of any fiduciary-like relationship in this matter is irrelevant when considering application of fraudulent concealment in conjunction with the discovery rule, which still requires the plaintiff to act with reasonable diligence. In its view, the Superior Court‘s recognition of the “parishioner-plus” relationship completely relieves Rice of those obligations by creating a “never-ending, interminable duty to speak after the end of the relationship.” Id. at 67. Cases applying fraudulent concealment have found that upon termination of the relationship the duty to speak ends. As a result, the Superior Court‘s novel “parishioner-plus” rule exists without limitation and undermines our discovery rule jurisprudence by relieving Rice of her discovery rule obligations.
In contrast, Rice maintains that the focus for the discovery rule is on the plaintiff‘s ignorance of the injury and asserts that a plaintiff must be aware of both the injury and its cause. While conceding that she could have filed suit against Bodziak, Rice maintains that she “was not on actual or constructive notice of Defendants’ intentional acts and no amount of reasonable diligence could have discovered them, because the information regarding abusive priests was kept hidden in secret archives and unknowable to her or any outside agency” prior to the release of the grand jury report. Rice‘s Brief at 24. She argues that she had no obligation to investigate the Diocese‘s potential culpability absent a reason to suspect their involvement. Rice argues that whether or not she had an obligation to investigate presents a question of fact.
As to her ability to commence an investigation into the Diocese and its potential culpability based on her knowledge of the injury itself, Rice argues that the same logic applies to her case as in other cases where the discovery rule applies. For instance, a plaintiff suffering pain from a botched medical procedure can seek a second opinion and can learn the truth of what happened from that source. Rice argues that she was in a much worse position because she had no ability to discover the extent of the Diocese‘s alleged cover-ups. The information disclosed in the 2016 report was, in her view, “simply unknowable” until its publication. Id. at 32.
As to fraudulent concealment, Rice asserts that the Diocese both affirmatively misled her and had a duty to disclose its cover-up. For the former proposition, she disagrees that the concealment is limited to information regarding Bodziak‘s culpability; she states that her claims are focused on the Diocesan defendants themselves, who, inter alia, “falsely represented to her that each of the Diocese‘s priests ... would act in her best interests and in
Finally, while conceding that a plaintiff is still obligated to act diligently even in cases of fraud, Rice notes that our cases state that “there must be some demonstrable reason ‘to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it would be successful’ in the first place.” Id. at 45 (quoting Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 364 (Pa. 2009)). She argues that there was no reason to suspect the Diocese of wrongdoing.1
III. Applicable Law
“Generally speaking, statutes of limitations are rules of law that set time limits for bringing legal claims.” Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 237 A.3d 986, 993-94 (Pa. 2020). The time to file begins running “from the time the cause of action accrued[.]”
Various doctrines can save suits that would be otherwise untimely. Two are at issue here. The first, the discovery rule, “tolls the statute of limitations when an injury or its cause is not reasonably knowable.” In re Risperdal Litig., 223 A.3d 633, 640 (Pa. 2019). The purpose of this rule is clear: to “ensure that persons who are reasonably unaware of an injury that is not immediately ascertainable have essentially the same rights as those who suffer an immediately ascertainable injury.” Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 892 n.13. The plaintiff‘s inability to know of the injury must be “despite the exercise of reasonable diligence[.]” Fine, 870 A.2d at 858. This “is not an absolute standard, but is what is expected from a party who has been given reason to inform himself of the facts upon which his right to recovery is premised.” Id.
In Wilson, we explained that two competing approaches have developed to the discovery rule. The more liberal approach, favorable to plaintiffs, “key[s] the commencement of the limitations period to such time as the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of her cause of action.” Wilson, 964 A.2d at 363 (citation omitted). In contrast, the stricter and less plaintiff favorable “inquiry notice” approach “t[ies] commencement of the limitations period to actual or constructive knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a factual cause linked to another‘s conduct, without the necessity of notice of the full extent of the injury, the fact of actual negligence, or precise cause.” Id. at 364. “Pennsylvania‘s formulation of the discovery rule reflects the narrower of the two overarching approaches[.]” Id.
The Wilson Court explained that adoption of the stricter approach effectuates legislative intent. “Although the discovery rule evolved out of the common law, it is now appropriately regarded as an application of statutory construction arising out of the interpretation of the concept of the ‘accrual’ of causes of action.” Id. at 363 (footnote omitted). Thus, the rule “is best justified as an exercise in legislative interpretation rather than judicial innovation.” Id. at 367. Accordingly, our ability to expand the discovery rule beyond the boundaries of the inquiry notice approach is circumscribed if not eliminated in the absence of a constitutional claim. “Absent a constitutional claim, we decline to question the legislative judgment.” Id. at 369. We adhere to our statutory interpretations because “the legislative body is free to correct any errant interpretation of its intention.” Shambach v. Bickhart, 845 A.2d 793, 807 (Pa. 2004) (Saylor, J., concurring).2
The fraudulent concealment doctrine is a distinct but related theory. Whereas the “discovery rule” tolls the statute of limitations, the fraudulent concealment doctrine “is based upon estoppel [and] has its basis in equity.” Johnson v. Wetzel, 238 A.3d 1172, 1191 (Pa. 2020) (Wecht, J., concurring and dissenting). Generally speaking, tolling “pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” Dubose v. Quinlan, 173 A.3d 634, 644 (Pa. 2017) (quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014) (citation omitted)). When tolling is used as a proxy for “pause,” the statute of limitations has conceptually started running but the applicable tolling principle serves to delay the point at which the plaintiff is charged with the duty to file suit. Fraudulent concealment, in contrast, is rooted in the recognition that fraud can prevent a plaintiff from even knowing that he or she has been defrauded. Effectively, the distinction is that where fraud has prevented the plaintiff from knowing of his or her cause of action, that cause of action simply does not even exist until the plaintiff becomes aware of, i.e., “discovers,” the fraud.3
The relevant principles surrounding the fraudulent concealment doctrine were summarized by this Court in Molineux v. Reed, 532 A.2d 792 (Pa. 1987).
Where, “through fraud or concealment, the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry,” the defendant is estopped from invoking the bar of the statute of limitations. Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 405, 189 A.2d 267, 269 (1963). Moreover, defendant‘s conduct need not rise to fraud or concealment in the strictest sense, that is, with an intent to deceive; unintentional fraud or concealment is sufficient. Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445, 227 A.2d 833 (1967); Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Company, 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964). Mere mistake, misunderstanding or lack of knowledge is insufficient however, Schaffer v. Larzelere, supra; and the burden of proving such fraud or concealment, by evidence which is clear, precise and convincing, is upon the asserting party. Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Company, supra.
As indicated, fraud or concealment incorporates a causal element by asking whether the fraud or concealment “cause[d] the plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry[.]” Id. That naturally raises the question as to whether a defendant who engaged in acts that amount to concealment for purposes of the doctrine can still raise a statute of limitations defense absent a plaintiff possessing actual knowledge of his or her cause of action. In Fine, this Court acknowledged the question: “Inasmuch as the doctrine is premised on a defendant‘s
Finally, the analysis employed can depart from these general principles if the legislature signals a contrary intention. For instance, in Rotkiske, the high Court noted that “Congress has enacted statutes that expressly include the language Rotkiske asks us to read in, setting limitations periods to run from the date on which the violation occurs or the date of discovery of such violation.” 140 S. Ct. at 361 (citations omitted). Of note here, the Superior Court panel was persuaded by the fraudulent concealment analysis set forth in Doe v. Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2012 WL 3782454 (D. Idaho 2012). In that case, the applicable statute of limitation provided that where a suit is based on fraud or mistake the cause of action is “not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.”
IV. Analysis
A. Discovery Rule
We begin with this Court‘s discussion in Wilson describing the “inquiry notice” approach to the discovery rule as applied in Pennsylvania: it “t[ies] commencement of the limitations period to actual or constructive knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a factual cause linked to another‘s conduct, without the necessity of notice of the full extent of the inquiry, the fact of actual negligence, or precise cause.” 964 A.2d at 364. The Meehan line of cases correctly applied the inquiry notice construct and concluded that “The child abuse is the injury in this matter, not the alleged cover-up by the [Diocese]. ... [T]he plaintiffs’ injuries, here, were known when the abuse occurred.” Meehan, 870 A.2d at 920. Consequently, the statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, when Rice was last assaulted by Bodziak. Rice had two years from that date4 to discover other actors potentially liable for her injury.5
applying it to the facts of Ni[c]olaou would start the statutory period in 2009 at the latest, when the plaintiff was diagnosed with “probable Lyme disease,” if not at the time of the tick bite and resultant symptoms; and applying it to the facts of In re Risperdal would start the statutory period the minute the plaintiffs took the drug and began growing breasts.
Rice‘s Brief at 37. The flaw in the foregoing logic is that the plaintiff in Nicolaou, unlike Rice, lacked knowledge of an injury linked to the conduct of another.
Nicolaou involved a medical malpractice case for an injury arising out of the failure to diagnose and treat Lyme disease. Nicolaou was bitten by a tick sometime in 2001. Over the next eight to nine years, she sought treatment for symptoms of an unknown etiology from several providers, who ordered a total of four Lyme disease tests, all of which came back negative. An MRI reported findings “seen in infectious or inflammatory demyelinating process, such as [MS] or Lyme Disease[.]” Nicolaou, 195 A.3d at 883 (quoting record). Based on the MRI, a doctor informed Nicolaou that she suffered from multiple sclerosis (“MS“). Notwithstanding, Nicolaou continued to believe that she may have had Lyme disease. In July of 2009, she began seeing a nurse who relayed her opinion that Lyme disease, not MS, was the cause of Nicolaou‘s problems and prescribed antibiotics for Lyme disease to see how Nicolaou responded. She responded positively to the treatment. During one of these visits, the nurse offered the option of an advanced test for Lyme disease that cost approximately $250. Nicolaou initially declined but later decided to take the test, which came back positive for Lyme disease. Within two years of receiving the results, Nicolaou filed suit against various defendants for their misdiagnoses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on expiration of the statute of limitations.
The Superior Court affirmed, holding that as early as July of 2009 Nicolaou should have known as a matter of law that she suffered from Lyme disease. That conclusion was based on the MRI test which had indicated that Nicolaou suffered from either MS or Lyme disease, the nurse‘s opinion, the availability of an advanced test that would provide a definitive answer and her postponed decision to take it. We reversed, holding that the Superior Court erred by isolating those facts indicating a diagnosis of Lyme disease from the entirety of her history of seeking a diagnosis and
Nicolaou did not announce any new principle of law. The plaintiff‘s cause of action accrued when she knew or should have known that Lyme disease was not treated as a result of repeated misdiagnosis by her health care providers. Given the lengthy history of attempted contradictory diagnosis and treatment, the date of accrual could not be determined as matter of law by the court and a jury would decide when she knew of an injury redressable by a lawsuit. The Superior Court‘s determination that Nicolaou overruled/modified decades of settled law on the accrual of causes of action and the running of the period of the statute of limitations was clearly erroneous.
It is obvious that there are no circumstances that are remotely comparable to Nicolaou in the case before us. The question in Nicolaou was when the plaintiff knew she was injured. Here, tragically, Rice knew of her injury at the time of each alleged assault and she knew that Bodziak caused the injury. “In Pennsylvania, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 857 (citation omitted). An action against Bodziak could have been brought to a successful conclusion against Bodziak, at the latest, in 1983 or 1987.6 She did not file suit against Bodziak and seek discovery from the Diocese. Her complaint does not allege that she made any formal or informal inquiries of the Diocese regarding, among other things, what it knew about Bodziak, its efforts to supervise or monitor him or its protocols, in general, for the placement of priests in parishes. Rice concedes that she did nothing until the grand jury report was published in 2016.
As Meehan correctly concluded, the real claim here is ignorance “of a secondary cause” of the known legal injury. Meehan, 870 A.2d at 920. Inquiry notice “t[ies] commencement of the limitations period to actual or constructive knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a factual cause linked to another‘s conduct, without the necessity of notice of the full extent of the injury, the fact of actual negligence, or precise cause.” Wilson, 964 A.2d at 364. Those conditions are met here where there was an actual known cause of a significant harm. The answer to the question of whether there may have been other causes that needed to be investigated during the period of the statute of limitations. Because her claims for damages against the Diocese are based on Bodziak‘s alleged conduct, she was on inquiry notice regarding other potentially liable actors, including the Diocese, as a matter of law.7
This Court held in Fine that the standard applied under the discovery rule requiring that a plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence to discover both an injury and its causes also applies when fraudulent concealment is the asserted basis for tolling the statute of limitations. 870 A.2d at 860-61. The fraudulent concealment theory manufactured by the Superior Court eliminates the plaintiff‘s due diligence obligations. Fine remarked that applying an identical due diligence standard to applications of both fraudulent concealment and the discovery rule “will serve one of the overarching tenets in this area of our jurisprudence—the responsibility of a party who seeks to assert a cause of action against another to be reasonably diligent in informing himself of the facts upon which his recovery may be based.” Id. at 861.8 Thus, our resolution of the application of the discovery rule to Rice‘s belated filing of her case against the Diocese defendants also resolves the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine.
Rice alleges a variety of affirmative misrepresentations in support of her argument that the Diocese engaged in fraudulent concealment. She claims that the Diocese gave “false assurances in word and deed” that misled her into believing that “what had happened to her was an isolated event[.]” Rice‘s Brief at 52. She alleges a litany of facts that gave that impression, such as “hold[ing] Bodziak out as a cleric in good standing“; “us[ing] euphemisms to convey less serious reasons for removing offending clerics from Diocesan positions“; and “mak[ing] repeated and unequivocal public statements that they did not tolerate or ignore the sexual abuse of children and investigated all allegations of such behavior thoroughly and without delay.” Id. Assuming the truth of these assertions and their tendency to deceive, none of these alleged misrepresentations misdirected Rice from her knowledge that Bodziak assaulted her, i.e., that she was injured and Bodziak caused the injuries. With that knowledge, her duty was to inquire
Rice additionally argues that the Diocese‘s silence constitutes a fraudulent concealment based on a fiduciary “parishioner-plus” relationship. The parishioner-plus fiduciary relationship is founded on the notion that certain members of a religious congregation are elevated to a position of special confidence and trust such that the religious organization is required to make full disclosures. Id. at 3 (asserting Diocese was required to “disclose their knowledge of the risks posed by child predator clerics and Bodziak in particular“). The alleged duty to disclose is a result of the additional involvement of the plaintiff in the workings of the congregation. However, an examination of the cases cited by the Superior Court that apply the “duty to disclose” theory demonstrates that the jurisdiction either (1) applies the more plaintiff-friendly approach to the discovery rule which addresses knowledge of a cause of action, or (2) applied a statutory expression by the legislative branch suggesting broader considerations than the fundamental principles we have outlined. See, e.g., Doe v. Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2012 WL 3782454 (D. Idaho 2012); Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 943 N.E.2d 43, 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is codified ... ‘If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto... .’ “) (citation omitted); Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a fiduciary relationship and that the diocese owed a duty to investigate and to warn; statutory tolling provision applied where “any person, liable to an action by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of such action“). Here, under our inquiry notice approach and without a specific legislative command that modifies the general rules surrounding tolling, Rice not only had a reason but a duty to investigate the Diocese based on her knowledge of what Bodziak allegedly did. Thus, the Diocese‘s silence could not have dissuaded her from that investigation.
Under our jurisprudence, before a plaintiff may invoke the principles of fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff must use reasonable diligence to investigate her claims. The statute of limitations on Rice‘s claims accrued when she knew she was injured by Bodziak. She had two years to investigate the Diocese‘s role, if any, in causing her injury. Assuming, arguendo, the imposition of a duty to speak, the failure to do so does not trump a plaintiff‘s due diligence obligation to investigate other possible causes of her known injury. Other jurisdictions confronting this issue have similarly concluded. See, e.g., One Star v. Sisters of St. Francis, 752 N.W.2d 668, 682 (S.D. 2008) (plaintiffs were aware of abuse and identity of abusers; “[F]raudulent concealment does not apply, even where a confidential relationship exists, if the plaintiff obtains knowledge of the basic operative facts.“) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Mars v. Diocese of Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (even if fiduciary relationship could be established “No alleged conduct on the part of the Diocese prevented plaintiffs from gathering essential facts prior to the expiration of the statute.“); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, NC, 775 S.E.2d 918, 922 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“But under North Carolina law, even when there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the ‘duty of inquiry’ applies“) (citation omitted).
[D]etermining when a plaintiff knew or should have known of a cause of action requires evaluating “the reasonableness of a plaintiff‘s conduct in light of the defendant‘s fraudulent or misleading conduct.” This suggests that before a plaintiff may rely on the fraudulent concealment doctrine, he must have actually made an attempt to investigate his claim and that such an attempt must have been rendered futile as a result of the defendant‘s fraudulent or misleading conduct.
Id. at 816-17 (citation and footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
This analysis comports with application of a fraudulent concealment theory based on a heightened fiduciary duty in the context of the inquiry notice component of the statute of limitations. Determining whether the alleged failure to speak explains a plaintiff‘s failure to conduct investigation requires an examination of how the purported undisclosed information dissuaded her from pursuing her inquiry into other potential causes of the injury attributable to Bodziak. Here, Rice did not exercise any due diligence. There was no attempt to investigate through interrogatories, deposition, request for production of documents or otherwise. Even if the Diocese was obligated to disclose,9 the failure to do so does not excuse her own failure to conduct any investigation into the Diocese as an additional cause of her injuries.10
Rice‘s reliance on the parishioner-plus theory requires rejection of the inquiry notice approach to determine when a cause of action accrues. At its core, the theory advanced by Rice requires an application of the accrual method, expressly rejected in Wilson, that her injury does not accrue until she had actual or constructive knowledge of her cause of action against the Diocese. Instead, her injury accrued despite her lack of knowledge of causes additional to Bodziak. We acknowledged in Wilson, and do so now, again, that the inquiry notice approach is strict and can be perceived as harsh. It is, however, reflective of our discernment of legislative intent. Providing relief from the consequences of the harshness is not in the purview of this Court.
C. Civil Conspiracy
Finally, we address the Diocese‘s third argument. It challenges the Superior Court‘s suggestion that civil conspiracy is a standalone tort subject to its own statutory computation period without reference to the timeliness of some other underlying tort. The Diocese claims that the Superior Court arguably announced a new tolling doctrine. Rice agrees that a predicate tort is needed and identifies that tort as fraud. Rice‘s Brief at 62. Additionally, Rice agrees that the statute of limitations has expired on her fraud claims, although she “takes no position as to when her fraud claims accrued and by what date she was required to assert them.” Id. at 8 n.2. In any event, Rice agrees that “the outcome in her case depends on application of the discovery rule and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.” Id. As we conclude that neither the discovery rule nor fraudulent concealment apply, the issue has not been squarely presented and we disapprove of the Superior Court‘s decision to the extent it could be read to announce a standalone tolling doctrine for civil conspiracy cases.
V. Conclusion
We conclude, as the Superior Court properly did fifteen years ago under the same circumstances, that the inquiry notice approach to the discovery rule required Rice to investigate the Diocese as a potential additional cause of her injuries during the limitations period. Whether courthouse doors should be opened for suits based on underlying conduct that occurred long ago is an exercise in line drawing that includes difficult policy determinations.
Chief Justice Baer and Justices Saylor, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.
Chief Justice Baer files a concurring opinion.
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Todd joins.
JUSTICE DONOHUE