Reed v. Friedman Mgmt. Corp.

541 F. App'x 40

2d Cir.

2013

Check Treatment

Docket

Sharon REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRIEDMAN MGT. CORP., David DaSilva, Agent, Viclar Realty Corp., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-2068-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Oct. 10, 2013.

After being taken into custody and given Miranda warnings, Moore admitted to knowingly taking possession of the kilogram of crack. He stated that the drugs had been supplied by Slocombe, that Moore planned to pay $30,000 for the kilo, and that he expected to realize $6,000 to $7,000 in profits from the sale of the drugs. Insofar as Moore claims that an agent‘s account of his confession lacked credibility because it was uncorroborated, that argument goes to the weight, and not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir.2006). Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, [and] assuming that the jury resolved all questions of witness credibility and competing inferences in favor of the prosecution,” United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 134 (2d Cir.2010), we easily conclude that Moore‘s sufficiency challenge is meritless.

We have considered Moore‘s remaining arguments and conclude that they too are without merit. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Sharon Reed, pro se, Detroit, MI.

Keith A. Brady, Rubin Fiorella & Friedman LLP, New York, NY, for Appellees.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., PIERRE N. LEVAL and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Sharon Reed, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court‘s judgment dismissing her complaint alleging that defendants Friedman Management Corporation (“Friedman“), David DaSilva, and Viclar Realty Corporation (“Viclar“) wrongfully deprived her of appropriate conditions in and sought to expel her from the apartment in which she lived for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Even after Twombly, we remain obligated to construe pro se complaints liberally. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009). We read pro se complaints with “special solicitude,” interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). District courts should frequently provide leave to amend before dismissing a pro se complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000). However, leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile. See id.

The district court erred in dismissing Reed‘s claim pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (“FHA“), as precluded by res judicata. “To prove that a claim is precluded [by res judicata], a party must show that (1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the [same] parties or those in privity with them; and (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.” Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir.2001) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In New York, the general rule against relitigation of a claim does not apply where “the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir.1986)). In this case, the Civil Court in which Reed litigated her eviction action could not have granted her the relief that she now seeks under the FHA. See N.Y. City Civ.Ct. Act § 202.

“`A pro se complaint should not be dismissed without the Court‘s granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.‘” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2010) (alterations and some internal quotation marks omitted)). We are mindful that in this case many of the factual allegations in the complaint are (1) not actionable under any circumstances; (2) irrelevant to the defendants actually sued; and (3) of questionable value to a lawsuit under the FHA. Nevertheless, because there is a plausible nucleus indicating that the pro se plaintiff might be able to state an actionable claim given another opportunity, the district court erred in denying her leave to amend her complaint.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

JOHN M. WALKER, JR.

PIERRE N. LEVAL

RICHARD C. WESLEY

CIRCUIT JUDGES

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