JACQUELINE RAMOS, et al. v. WALMART INC.
Civil Action No.: 21-13827(BRM)(AME)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
January 31, 2025
Document 193
WOLFSON, Special Master:
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs Jacqueline Ramos and Edwin Johnson (“Plaintiffs” or “Named Plaintiffs“) challenge Defendant Walmart Inc.‘s (“Walmart” or “Defendant“) criminal background check screen as discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD“) and the Pennsylvania Criminal History Record Information Act (“CHRIA“). Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to amend1 to substitute in two proposed plaintiffs, John Nole and Rahshan Paige (“Proposed Plaintiffs“), or in the alternative, Nole and Paige seek to intervene. The proposed pleading also narrows the membership of the Title VII and NJLAD disparate impact classes from Black and Latinx applicants to Black applicants alone. Because Plaintiffs do not otherwise seek to change any substantive counts of the operative complaint, the only issue before me is the appropriateness of the substitution of the
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. The Instant Lawsuit
On July 19, 2021, Plaintiff Ramos initiated this proposed class action under Title VII and the NJLAD on behalf of Black and Latinx individuals seeking employment. (ECF No. 1.) On September 23, 2021, before Walmart had entered an appearance, the original complaint was amended as of right—primarily to add Plaintiff Johnson2 as a proposed Title VII and CHRIA class representative and to include additional information regarding Plaintiffs’ administrative exhaustion. The SAC alleges that Walmart‘s overbroad criminal history screen for qualified applicants fails to account for evidence of rehabilitation or mitigation circumstances, and as a result, it disparately impacts Black and Latinx applicants, who historically are “significantly over arrested, convicted, and incarcerated in the United States.” (SAC, ¶¶ 2-3.) In that regard, Plaintiffs claim that “denying employment to applicants with old and unrelated convictions is an unwarranted stigmatization and unreasonable restriction on the economic opportunities of such minority populations,” (id. ¶ 3), in violation of Title VII, the NJLAD and CHRIA. (Id. ¶
II. Status of Discovery3
Since the inception of this case, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. Due to numerous and substantial disputes, the Court appointed me in April 2023 as a discovery special master to resolve these disputes and efficiently advance this litigation. I have overseen the parties’ discovery process since my appointment and am keenly aware of their disputes and the status of discovery.
Most of the fact discovery conducted thus far has focused on Walmart‘s hiring policies and criminal screening processes, applicable to any potential class member. Plaintiff Johnson‘s deposition was taken in March 2024; however, Plaintiff Ramos sought to withdraw from the suit one week prior to her scheduled deposition. Expert discovery has not yet commenced, and Rule 30(b)(6) depositions remain incomplete.4
Accordingly, although discovery has been halted due to the filing of the present motion, further fact discovery will be necessary. Indeed, according to Plaintiffs’ counsel,
II. Plaintiffs’ Withdrawal
A. Ramos
Ramos declared that for “personal reasons,” she decided to withdraw from this action on April 5, 2024. She further averred that she “can no longer serve as a class representative in this matter, and no longer wish[es] to participate in further individualized discovery.” (Ramos Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)
On April 9, 2024, approximately one week before Ramos‘s deposition, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed defense counsel that Ramos was withdrawing from suit. The next day, Walmart sought my permission to cancel the scheduled in-person Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, which I granted. I directed Plaintiffs to provide Walmart with a proposed amended complaint and for Walmart to respond with its position to those amendments. On April 25, 2024, Plaintiffs identified proposed Plaintiff Nole to substitute for Ramos as a named plaintiff.
B. Johnson
On May 21, 2024, Johnson stated that for “personal reasons,” he also had made the decision to withdraw from this action. (Johnson Decl. ¶ 6.) Like Ramos, Johnson
On the same day, Plaintiffs’ counsel notified Walmart that Johnson was withdrawing. During a May 24, 2024 status conference, Plaintiffs indicated their intent to file an amended complaint removing both Ramos and Johnson as named Plaintiffs and substituting Nole and Paige.6
III. Proposed Third Amended Complaint
In their Proposed Third Amended Complaint (“TAC“), Plaintiffs do not seek to add additional claims. Rather, they seek to substitute Proposed Plaintiffs Nole and Paige as named plaintiffs and putative class representatives, and to narrow the scope of the case by limiting the proposed class members under Title VII, the NJLAD and CHRIA to solely black applicants, removing Latinx applicants.
In and around late 2023, Nole, a black male, applied to Walmart online for a janitorial position at its Norristown, Pennsylvania location. (TAC ¶¶ 40-41.) While Walmart initially provided Nole an offer of employment in November 2023, Walmart allegedly revoked its offer based on Nole‘s criminal convictions, which Plaintiffs claim were more than 52 years old and all stem from a single arrest.7 (Id. ¶¶ 26, 41, 49.) According to Nole, “Walmart denied [him] employment despite the 50+ years that have passed since a criminal offense that occurred when he was a juvenile and strong evidence of subsequent rehabilitation in the form of extensive volunteer experience and meaningful contributions to the innate reentry community. (Id. ¶ 50.) Notwithstanding these mitigation factors, Plaintiffs allege that Walmart nonetheless considered decades old convictions that are not relevant to the position for which Nole applied. (See id. ¶ 54.) Nole is seeking to represent the Title VII and CHIRA putative class members.
B. Paige
In July 2022, Paige, also a black male, applied for an entry-level associate position at Walmart. (Id. ¶ 55.) Walmart initially offered Paige employment in its Linden, New Jersey store, however, it revoked the offer in August 2022 based on his background check.
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 16
As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether
The threshold question is whether
On the other end, courts have explained that when the scheduling order has been repeatedly extended with involvement and consent by both parties, it would be inappropriate to hold them to the original scheduling order. See In re L‘Oreal Wrinkle Cream Mktg. Practices Litig., No. 12-3571, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132997 at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2015) (explaining that “it makes zero sense to hold Plaintiffs to an amendment deadline of December 2014” when numerous extensions have extended discovery well into 2016); Batta v. HCL Am., Inc., No. 17-5988, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217483 at *4 (D.N.J Dec. 17, 2019) (“While the Court acknowledges that it did not explicitly extend the deadline for Plaintiff to file a motion to amend, it would be unreasonable to hold Plaintiff to the initial May 25, 2018 deadline to amend when fact discovery has been on-going in this matter and typically a motion to amend pleadings is near the close of fact discovery.“).
I, as a special master, recently dealt with this issue in L&M Healthcare Commc‘ns LLC v. Pantano, No. 22-481, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 235288 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2023). Although the posture of that case ultimately did not require me to resolve the issue, I noted that courts have differing views depending on the surrounding circumstances. Distilling
Here, after considering the surrounding facts, I find that
Accordingly, the deadlines set forth in the initial scheduling order are no longer the operative dates to which the parties have been adhering. “It would be illogical to hold Plaintiffs to an amendment deadline date in a scheduling order that long ago went stale,” especially since the discovery dates will be extended again after the resolution of this motion. In re L‘Oreal, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132997, at *9. Thus, on these facts, while Plaintiffs need not show good cause to amend, as discussed below, I also find that good cause exists.9 Furthermore, they still must satisfy
A. Standard of Review
Pursuant to
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or undeclared reasons—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”
Based on the Supreme Court‘s pronouncement in Foman, the Third Circuit has advised that “[t]here are three instances when a court typically may exercise its discretion to deny a
I will address each of these factors, below.
1. Undue Delay
Undue delay focuses on whether the party seeking leave has inexplicably failed to take advantage of previous opportunities to amend, resulting in unfair burdens to the court and the opposing party. Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2005). “The mere passage of time does not require that a motion to amend a complaint be denied on grounds of delay.” Cureton v. Nat‘l Collegiate Ath. Ass‘n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). In other words, delay becomes undue “when it places an unwarranted burden on the court or when the plaintiff has had previous opportunities to amend.” Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273). In making this determination, the court “focus[es] on the movant‘s reasons for not amending sooner,” Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273, and balances “these reasons against the burden of delay on the District Court.” Bjorgung, 550 F.3d at 266 (citing Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1988)); Le v. City of Wilmington, No. 08-615, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69038, at *6 (D. Del. July 12, 2010) (“In evaluating whether a party‘s delay is undue, the Court must focus on the movant‘s reasons for not amending its pleading earlier.“). In that regard, the Third Circuit places importance on a movant articulating a
Here, the thrust of Defendant‘s arguments on timing and delay are advanced under
Applying the more liberal standard of
The next month, the parties haggled over certain unemployment insurance discovery concerning Johnson, and on May 17, 2024, Defendant submitted a joint letter to me raising the dispute. During a conference call scheduled to discuss this discovery dispute, I granted Plaintiff an adjournment. Then, on May 21, 2024, Johnson determined that he would withdraw as a named plaintiff, and on the same day, his counsel informed Walmart of this decision. (McNerney Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11.) On May 24, 2024, I convened another status conference during which Plaintiffs indicated their intent to file an amended complaint removing both Ramos and Johnson as named plaintiffs and substituting Paige, who apparently retained Plaintiffs’ counsel a day prior, as well as Nole. Questioning the bases for both withdrawals, Defendant indicated that it would oppose amendment. Plaintiffs promptly filed this motion on June 7, 2024, pursuant to the briefing schedule I set.
According to Plaintiffs’ counsel, they had no prior knowledge that either Ramos or Johnson would withdraw as named plaintiffs for personal reasons. Rather, counsel became aware of Named Plaintiffs’ decisions only after both plaintiffs advised them on
While my determination is sufficient under
First and foremost, I previously found—and Judge Martinotti affirmed—that the reason for Named Plaintiffs’ withdrawal is not relevant to my assessment of this motion. Nonetheless, Defendant continues to question Plaintiffs’ decisions, speculating for
I note that the production of Johnson‘s unemployment insurance and employment records was disputed prior to his withdrawal, and both parties debated the legal relevance of those records. Even if that dispute somehow motivated Johnson to withdraw, I have no basis to question his counsel‘s representation that counsel could not have anticipated Johnson‘s withdrawal earlier. Put differently, because Johnson‘s withdrawal was personal rather than related to any defects in Plaintiffs’ claims, it is reasonable to conclude that his counsel would not have known Johnson‘s reasons for withdrawing any sooner.12
Finally, I address Defendant‘s insistence that Plaintiffs’ unspecified “personal reasons” do not suffice to show diligence. Citing Hitt v. Arizona Beverage Co., 2009 WL 4261192 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009), Defendant argues that personal reasons alone do not meet Plaintiffs’ burden. But, not only did Judge Martinotti and I already reject that
Notwithstanding this ruling, Defendant maintains that unspecified personal reasons would countenance “plaintiffs’ counsel to file a lawsuit without doing due diligence on their class representatives, proceed through discovery, and at any point they discover the plaintiff‘s inadequacy, claim ‘personal reasons’ for [withdrawal], and amend to swap out another plaintiff.” (Def. Opp. Br., 16.) I disagree. First, to make such an argument, Defendant presupposes that all the Declarations submitted by Named Plaintiffs and their counsel contain fabrications and misrepresentations. None of the surrounding circumstances in this case have led me to question the veracity of the Declarations. Next, I reiterate that to mount a proper argument in this context, Defendant need not focus on the underlying reasons for the withdrawal, but rather, when counsel could have known that Plaintiffs decided to withdraw. Here, counsel indicated that they became aware at the time Plaintiffs made their decisions, i.e., April 2, 2024 and May 21, 2024.
I am also persuaded that permitting Plaintiffs to amend will promote judicial economy. After years of class and some merits discovery, this Court has developed a deep familiarity with the case. Moreover, discovery does not merely involve Named Plaintiffs; rather, the parties’ disputes center primarily on document production related to
2. Prejudice
As to the prejudice prong, I do not find that Defendant would be unfairly prejudiced. Delay alone does not justify denying a motion to amend. See Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273. Rather, it is only where delay becomes prejudicial, which places “an unfair burden on the opposing party” that denial of a motion to amend is appropriate. Adams, 739 F.2d at 868. Accordingly, in deciding whether to grant leave to amend, “‘prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of the amendment.‘” Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Comm‘n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)).
To establish prejudice, the non-moving party must make a showing that allowing the amended pleading would (1) require the non-moving party to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, (2) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute, or (3) prevent a party from bringing a timely action in another
I begin with the most salient fact: Plaintiffs are not seeking to add any new claims; rather, they simply request the dismissal of the Latinx group from the operative complaint. Consequently, Defendant cannot claim undue prejudice when there are no new claims, substantive allegations, or expansions of the putative class. Kiser v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 831 F.2d 423, 428 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1987)). Instead, Defendant will defend against the same claims and with one less putative class — the Latinx class.
Further, Defendant argues that it has unnecessarily incurred significant expenses for written discovery related to Named Plaintiffs, and that the nullification of prior discovery and the need for new discovery sufficiently demonstrate prejudice. I am not persuaded.
First, Defendant contends it has been prejudiced by wasting three years of time and resources litigating Named Plaintiffs’ claims, particularly those involving the Latinx class, which is now being dismissed. Defendant maintains that these expenses, including expert fees, witness identification, and opinions, cannot be recovered. However, for purposes of this motion to amend, I do not find those costs prejudicial, because the proper inquiry is whether Defendant will incur additional expenses going forward. As Defendant
Even considering those expert costs, Plaintiffs correctly note, and I agree, that Defendant‘s expenditures necessarily involved reviewing all applicant data to evaluate the impact of Walmart‘s hiring practices, regardless of the protected class at issue. These evaluations remain useful to the case. More importantly, Defendant‘s efforts seemingly prompted Plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss certain claims and narrow the class definition, which inures to Defendant‘s benefit. To the extent that narrowing the classes may nullify some prior discovery, I am not convinced that this alone constitutes prejudice,14 because Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims remain unchanged and their central theory—that Walmart‘s criminal background check system has a disparate impact on Black applicants—has not shifted. Accordingly, I cannot find that Defendant‘s past expenses rise to the level of undue prejudice.
Lastly, Defendant claims prejudice by arguing that Nole and Paige would be inadequate class representatives. To support this position, Defendant submitted Declarations from Muro and Orellana — managers in Walmart‘s Associate Vetting Team. These Declarations contain facts outside the scope of the TAC and challenge the Proposed
For these reasons, I find that Defendant has not shown the type of prejudice necessary to defeat a motion to amend.
3. Futility
Futility means the pleading, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To determine whether a claim is futile, district courts apply the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under
a. Parties’ Arguments
In its Opposition Brief, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims16 are futile because neither Paige nor Nole filed an administrative charge of discrimination.17
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ position, Nole filed his own EEOC charge on October 22, 2024. (Nole EEOC Charge 1.)19 In his charge, Nole states that he seeks to bring “an individual and class-wide charge of discrimination against Walmart, Inc. . . . and piggyback on the charges previously brought by Edwin Johson . . . and Jacqueline Ramos . . . , which have a class period that begins on November 27, 2019.” (Id. 2.) Nole further specifies that his charge “is representative and is intended to place Walmart on notice of class-wide allegations of race and color discrimination.”20 (Id. 3.)
After oral argument on December 6, 2024, I directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on American Pipe21 tolling and relevant case law on the piggybacking rule. In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs challenge much of the authority cited by Defendant (to be discussed infra), but more importantly, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant conflates the legal standards governing American Pipe tolling with those governing piggybacking. Defendant, for its part, argues that the equitable considerations underlying American Pipe weigh heavily against allowing substitution, as “endless tolling” of a class action would, in its view, unfairly prejudice Walmart.
b. Single Filing Rule
In order to bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff is required to submit a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and provide notice of the charge to the defendant.
To invoke the Single Filing Rule, the putative plaintiff must first show that a timely charge with the EEOC was filed by a class representative that gave the employer notice regarding the alleged class-wide discrimination. Evans v. Port Auth., No. 06-3239, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77830, at *38 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2007) (citing Whalen, 56 F.3d at 506). Second, the plaintiff must also establish that the filed action is “on behalf of others similarly situated, or in other words is a class action.” Id. (citing Communs. Workers of Am., 282 F.3d at 217).
c. Paige
Here, because Nole‘s subsequent EEOC charge implicates both tolling and the Single Filing Rule, I will address his substitution in the next section. Turning to Paige, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs seek to expand the Single Filing Rule through his
First, if the Proposed Plaintiffs are permitted to substitute, Defendant can take discovery from these individuals, including depositions, in connection with the claims they assert in the TAC. There is simply no requirement — and Defendant has cited no legal authority to the contrary—that, under the Single Filing Rule, the Proposed Plaintiffs’ claims must have accrued at the same time Johnson‘s charge was filed. To be sure, some decisions instruct that a putative plaintiff who did not file an EEOC charge may only allege claims that accrued within the 300 days preceding the earliest-filed representative charge. See, e.g., Rupert v. PPG Indus., No. 07-0705, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131493, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2009). But my research has not revealed any rule or case requiring that Proposed Plaintiffs must have possessed viable claims at the time Johnson‘s or Ramos‘s charge was submitted.
Defendant‘s position essentially turns the Single Filing Rule on its head. Under that rule, as the Third Circuit has explained, a plaintiff such as Paige is excused from filing an EEOC charge if the original charge—filed by a plaintiff who subsequently brought a class action — alleges class-based discrimination. See Communs. Workers of Am., 282 F.3d at 217. That is precisely the scenario here. Johnson‘s initial charge, filed on September 22, 2020, unquestionably alleged class-wide discrimination, and Johnson is a
Defendant‘s policy arguments fare no better. It submits that the Single Filing Rule promotes two administrative purposes: notice to the employer and conciliatory opportunity. While Defendant does not contest notice, it contends that allowing Paige to piggyback off Johnson‘s charge undermines the Rule‘s conciliatory function. Yet that is precisely what the Rule allows: The Third Circuit adopted the Single Filing Rule in the context of class actions because “[w]here the class-wide nature of the allegations is made clear in the class representative‘s administrative charge, the party charged and the administrative agency have notice of the claims and conciliation can be pursued.” In re Conrail A.D.A. Litig., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21995, at *10. Since Paige is part of the putative class, any measures Walmart takes in conciliation will necessarily affect him as well.
Finally, Defendant erroneously claims that because Paige was ultimately deemed eligible for employment—an extraneous fact not alleged in the TAC—he would have discovered his eligibility had he filed his own EEOC charge. Not only does Defendant seek to introduce facts outside the four corners of the TAC (which is not permitted at the futility stage), but the Single Filing Rule itself does not require Paige to file any charge before joining this class action. Payne v. Consol Rail Corp., No. 99-2801, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1488 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2000), on which Defendant relies, does not compel a
As Defendant raises no other objections specific to Paige, I conclude that the TAC is not futile as to him.22
iii. Nole and American Pipe
Defendant contends that because Nole filed an EEOC charge, he cannot piggyback onto the charges filed by Johnson or Ramos. Instead, according to Defendant, Nole is only qualified to represent a class dating back to December 27, 2023 (i.e., 300 days preceding his charge), rather than from 2019. Although Defendant relies on cases concerning the Single Filing Rule to support this argument, its position also implicates American Pipe tolling. The Single Filing Rule excuses a plaintiff from exhausting administrative remedies before joining a pending class action, but it does not address the scope of the class that a newly substituted plaintiff may represent. Now that Nole has filed his own EEOC charge, he is no longer seeking to piggyback on Johnson‘s earlier charge. Instead, he seeks to substitute for Johnson or Ramos and represent the class in its current form.
Defendant primarily relies on Holowecki v. FedEx Corp., 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006) and Ruis v. Int‘l Business Machines Corp., 529 F. Supp. 3d 178, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). the analyses in these cases are not helpful or controlling under the facts here. First, in Holowecki, the Second Circuit allowed eleven plaintiffs who had not filed their own EEOC charges to “piggyback” onto a timely intake form and accompanying affidavit submitted by the named plaintiff, which the court deemed a proper charge for exhaustion purposes. Id. at 568–69. Accordingly, most of the analysis in Holowecki does not apply here. Instead, Defendant points to the portion of the decision addressing the claims of two individuals who had filed EEOC charges, but did not timely file their claims in court: “[a]n individual who has previously filed an EEOC charge cannot piggyback onto someone else‘s EEOC charge.” Id. at 564. Relying on that principle, Defendant argues that because Nole filed an EEOC charge while this Motion was pending, he is now precluded from piggybacking onto Johnson‘s or Ramos‘s earlier-filed charges. However, after filing his own charge, Nole is no longer seeking to piggyback on either Johnson‘s or Ramos‘s charges to make his claims exhausted or timely. Instead, he stands in to represent the class as a substituted plaintiff.
The court in Ruis addressed similar circumstances. In that case, all four named plaintiffs filed individual charges of discrimination with the EEOC. Ruis, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 202. While the defendant, IBM, conceded that two named plaintiffs had filed timely EEOC charges that fully exhausted their ADEA claims, it argued that the charges filed by
Although courts in the Third Circuit have not explicitly adopted the framework set forth in Holowecki, I need not determine its applicability in this case. As explained supra, since Nole has timely filed his own charge, he is no longer attempting to piggyback onto Named Plaintiffs’ charges. Instead, the central issue is whether Nole‘s charge can encompass the temporal scope of the class claims of Named Plaintiffs. On this point, Plaintiffs contend that American Pipe and its progeny should govern and resolve the issue in their favor.
At first, the tolling rule established in American Pipe seemed to apply exclusively to class members who moved to intervene in a timely manner after class certification was denied. However, the Supreme Court expanded this principle in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353–54 (1983), holding that tolling also extends to all members of the asserted class, including those who later filed individual lawsuits. The Court reasoned that a different outcome would result in “a needless multiplicity of actions—precisely the
Importantly, American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action individually or to file individual claims if the class fails, but American Pipe has its limits. It “does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations.” China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 584 U.S. 732, 735 (2018). In China Agritech, the Supreme Court held that American Pipe does not toll the claims of “a putative class representative . . . who brings his claims as a new class action after the statute of limitations has expired,” reasoning that “the ‘efficiency and economy of litigation’ [rationales] that support tolling of individual claims . . . do not support maintenance of untimely successive class actions.” Id. at 739 (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553).
Here, I have carefully reviewed all the cases cited by the parties. The issue presented is relatively novel. Since the statute of limitations has not expired on Nole‘s claims,23 he does not rely on American Pipe to preserve his timely claim. Rather, he invokes American Pipe as a basis to substitute as a named plaintiff, enabling him to represent the putative class in its currently defined time period. This class includes all nationwide Black Walmart applicants who were denied employment due to their criminal history,
To begin, courts in this District have permitted substitutions of named plaintiffs in a class action, emphasizing that “[i]t is both efficient and expeditious to allow Plaintiff to substitute in new lead plaintiffs and proceed with the case, as opposed to extended motion practice under
Having concluded that the substitution of a named plaintiff in a class action is permissible, my research reveals a dearth of case law addressing the temporal scope of a
Neither party has identified case law directly addressing this narrow and specific issue. After careful consideration, I find that the relation-back doctrine under
Plaintiffs shall submit their briefing on this issue by February 13, 2025, and Defendant shall submit its response by February 27, 2025.
DATED: January 31, 2025
/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
Hon. Freda L. Wolfson (ret.)
Special Master