Case Information
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SARA BREZINSKI, individually and on :
behalf of all others similarly situated, : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. : NO. 20-cv-4939-JMY
:
WIDENER UNIVERSITY,
MEMORANDUM
YOUNGE, J. JANUARY 28, 2022
In reaction to government mandated closures and the life-threatening consequences of the novel coronavirus outbreak, in early 2020, Widener University shuttered its campuses. Rather than come to a grinding halt, however, Widener moved its classes online. Many would agree that these measures were prudent and unavoidable. But how Widener has managed the financial aspects of this process has become a central concern for Plaintiff and other students, who have paid thousands of dollars in tuition and fees. What followed is a putative class action complaint alleging the inability of Widener, with brick-and-mortar locations, to deliver services as promised as it transitioned from in-person courses to an online learning model. Plaintiff has alleged that because Widener cancelled all in-person activities and instruction, that she and other similarly situation students were deprived of the benefit of their bargain. In particular, Plaintiff argues that she received a materially different education of reduced value than what she and other students were promised.
This case, like many similar actions filed against educational institutions throughout the country, present novel legal issues about what happens when the unexpected occurs, and the only written expression of the parties’ agreement– such as course catalogs, registration materials and student handbooks – hardly look like a comprehensive contract. Now before this Court is Defendant Widener University’s Motion to Dismiss. This matter is briefed and appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7.1(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sara Brezinski was a full-time graduate student pursuing a Master’s of Education in Human Sexuality Studies at Widener University. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) On or about January 13, 2020, classes for the spring semester began at Widener and were scheduled to end on or around May 8, 2020. ( Id. at 5.) For the spring semester, Plaintiff paid $5,800 out-of-pocket to Defendant in tuition and certain mandatory fees, such as a technology, graduate student and health fee. ( Id. ) Prior to enrolling in Widener’s spring 2020 semester and paying tuition and fees, Plaintiff consulted Widener’s course catalog and the course registration process. ( Id. ) The online registration process at Widener permitted students to pick classes that were “On-Line” or at the “Main Campus” location. ( Id. At 3-5.) For the classes Plaintiff registered for, none made any mention of online learning. ( Id. ) Indeed, course specific syllabi included information regarding the on-campus class location such as the building and classroom number along with meeting dates and times. ( Id. ). Widener’s class attendance policy emphasized that “[r]egular attendance and class participation are important factors in student learning,” and that faculty are “expected to articulate this idea …[and to]…monitor student progress and attendance regularly,” but nothing implied in-person learning. ( Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that her understanding and belief was that every course she was enrolled in, was to be taught in-person. ( Id. ) Plaintiff also alleges that she “would not have paid as much, if any, tuition for the Spring 2020 semester at Widener had she known that the courses would not, in fact, be taught in-person.” ( Id. ) Plaintiff states in her Complaint that Widener’s tuition and fees for in-person learning are higher than for online courses and programs. [1] ( Id. at 10.)
In early 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic arrived profoundly impacting the daily life of most Americans and almost every business. The educational sector was not sparred. For the benefit and safety of all, and in response to the global pandemic, on March 11, 2020 Widener announced that it was suspending all in-person classes effective March 12, 2020 and would transition to online learning for the rest of the semester on March 19, 2020. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4; ECF No . 14-3 at 116-124.) On March 19, 2020, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf and the Pennsylvania Department of Health issued an order that prohibited all colleges and universities from resuming in-person instruction closing the Widener campus for the remainder of the 2019-2020 academic year. (ECF No. 14-3 at 83-86.)
By the time universities and colleges were permitted to reopen, the spring 2020 semester had already concluded. Plaintiff asserts that the on-line learning options offered by Widener, and which she received, was in no way equivalent to the in-person education Plaintiff paid for, depriving her of the opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique. ( Id. ). She also alleges that Plaintiff has not received a refund for any portion of her tuition or fees paid for this semester, despite the fact that in-person classes were shut down. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) As a result, on October 6, 2020, Plaintiff Sara Brezinski brought this action on behalf of herself, and others similarly situated, seeking a partial refund of tuition and fees paid to Widener University, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion and money had and received common law claims. On November 30, 2020, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Igbal
,
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we first separate the factual and
legal elements of a claim, accepting the well-pleaded facts as true and disregarding legal
conclusions. Then, we determine whether the alleged facts make out a plausible claim for relief.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside
,
In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations of the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.
Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.
,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Breach of Contract
In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are tantamount to an educational
malpractice claim, which is not cognizable under Pennsylvania law. Under Pennsylvania law,
which applies in this diversity action, there is a distinction between an action for breach of a
contractual obligation and one for educational malpractice; while the former may be maintained,
the latter may not.
See Cavaliere v. Duff’s Bus. Inst.
,
Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, is not challenging the quality of Widener’s education.
Rather, Plaintiff simply argues that the value of in-person classes and the on-campus experience
that Defendant allegedly promised is greater than the remote learning that she experienced. In
other words, Plaintiff alleges Widener retained payment for services that were not delivered. As
the majority of courts, including within this District, have concluded, this type of claim is
grounded in contract, not educational malpractice, and therefore, is justiciable.
See Smith v. Univ.
of Penn.
, No. 20-2086,
Widener, painting itself as a co-equal victim of the pandemic, also goes on at length about how its decision to move classes online was justified. Whether Widener had a good faith reason to shift classes online due to the unforeseen pandemic does not resolve the question of who should bear the cost of collateral damage to Plaintiff’s interests based on the contractual expectations of the parties. Rather, this case is about where that financial risk, if any, is contractually allocated.
Plaintiff’s argument is that she entered into both an “express” and “implied” contractual agreement with Defendant where in exchange for tuition and fees, Defendant was obligated to provide on-campus services, including in-person class instruction. Unfortunately, she never points to any explicit language by Widener showing that the Defendant promised that students were guaranteed in-person classes or that any of the fees were for in-person services. Instead, she argues that because students can register for “on-line” and “main campus” classes separately, and that course-specific syllabi and material refer to the class location, by implication, along with marketing material, Widener has promised on-campus, in-person education. She also argues that she is entitled to reimbursement of certain fees, such as a technology fee and a graduate student fee, due to Widener’s shift to remote learning but points to nothing that establishes that these fees were for in-person physical services. Because Plaintiff does not identify a specific contractual provision that establishes Widener had an obligation to provide in-person classes and educational services, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim should be dismissed. [2] For the reasons discussed infra , the Court agrees with the Defendant on this ground.
Under Pennsylvania law, the relationship between a student and a private educational
institution is contractual.
Reardon v. Allegheny Coll.,
Plaintiff cites to a host of cases from our sister courts and state courts which she believes
supports the denial of Defendant’s Motion. Those cases have, however, turned on the unique
facts and state law involved.
See, e.g. Manny Chong v. Northeastern University,
No. 20-10844-
RGS,
To the extent that Plaintiff relies on an implied, breach of contract theory, as observed in
Smith v. University of Pennsylvania
, “a cause of action for breach of an implied promise is not
cognizable under Pennsylvania law in the higher education context.” 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75473 * 6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2021). Indeed, the only implied contract Pennsylvania case law has
recognized in the educational context is the “reasonable expectation on statements of policy by
[the university] and the experience of former students that if he performs the required work in a
satisfactory manner and pays his fees, he will receive the degree he seeks.”
Gat v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. Of Hihger Educ.
,
Even if Pennsylvania law recognized an implied, breach of contract theory for failure to
provide in-person classes, after drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to establish a plausible claim that such a right should be implied here. The
existence of a contract is established by the “written guidelines, policies, and procedures as
contained in the written materials distributed to the student over the course of their enrollment in
the institution.”
Swartley
,
While the materials that form the basis of contract can include the student handbook, school policies and procedures, bulletins, and other materials, it is understood that course catalogs, syllabi and registration materials generally show what a university or college tentatively planned, not what they guarantee will happen. For instance, perhaps the location of a class changes due to unforeseen building repairs or a particular professor is no longer available to teach a course, due to illness or a scheduling conflict. To the extent information posted on a university’s registration portal or course catalog encouraged Plaintiff or another student to enroll in what was thought to be an in-person class, this material does not, by itself, create a basis for an implied, breach of contract. If that were the case, then by the same logic, Widener promised hundreds of other details turning its course catalog and syllabi into an enforceable code. That cannot conceivably be true. It is understood that these details can, and do often, change.
Nor is the outcome changed by the mere fact that in-person courses may or may not cost
more. Plaintiff contracted with Widener for a service which included enrolling in a course of
study – how Widener allocated resources towards this service is within its sound educational
discretion and it is not this Court’s role to second-guess those types of decisions. Plaintiff also
purports to utilize an express, breach of contract theory. But Plaintiff does not cite to a single
statement in Widener’s course catalog, syllabi or online registration portal which singles out in-
person classes as the one feature that would not change. Without that type of language, there is
no cause of action under Pennsylvania law for an express breach of contract claim by the mere
fact that a course catalog, syllabi or registration portal indicated the location of a class as being
in-person.
[3]
For similar reasons, Widener’s website and brochures distributed to prospective
students also cannot be said to create a guarantee of in-person classes. Under longstanding
Pennsylvania law, advertisements cannot constitute a legal offer to form a contract.
See Bourke
v. Kelly
,
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim boils down to her belief that the traditional model of in- person education is implied for brick-and-mortar educational institutions. But the only Pennsylvania case law permitting an implied theory supports the right to an education and degree, not the method and means. And while there are other courts holding that there is implied right to an in-person education, there is nothing in Pennsylvania law supporting that contention. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
B. Unjust Enrichment
In the alternative to a breach of contract claim, Plaintiff brings a claim for unjust enrichment.
Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment if the
parties’ relationship is governed by a written contract.
Scafer Elec, & Const. v. Mantia
, 67 A.3d
8, 13 (Pa. Super 2013),
aff’d on other grounds
,
C. Conversion
Plaintiff is also suing for conversion. Widener argues that Plaintiff’s claim for conversion
is barred by the gist of the action and economic loss doctrines. Conversion is a tort by which the
defendant deprives the plaintiff of his right to a chattel or interferes with the plaintiff's use or
possession of a chattel without the plaintiff's consent and without lawful justification.
Chrysler
Credit Corporation v. Smith
,
D. Money Had and Received.
Plaintiff’s final common law claim is “for money had and received.” A cause of action for
money had and received exists where money is wrongfully diverted from its proper use and falls
into the hands of a third person who, in equity and good conscience, has an inferior right to it, the
law implies a promise to pay over the funds to the person who has the greater right to them.
Solomon v. Gibson
,
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. An appropriate Order will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT: /s/ John Milton Younge Judge John Milton Younge
Notes
[1] Plaintiff’s implicit suggestion is that it also costs less to provide online coursework. While at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations as true, we note that discovery could reveal that the costs to Widener were increased by shifting online. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed below, whether Plaintiff paid more for in- person courses, or it costs Widener more to provide in-person learning, is not relevant to the disposition of this matter.
[2] Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to allege legally cognizable damages because she alleges an
“amorphous constellation of subjective benefits she associates with in-person instruction.” (ECF No. 14-
1 at 38.) We note that at the motion to dismiss stage, this Court must accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations
in her Complaint as true.
Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
,
[3] There is a world of difference between shifting classes to on-line learning in the absence of any affirmative guarantee, to not affording students an education and a denial of instruction. Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that the latter would not be a breach of the agreement to educate.