RAMI ZIYADAT v. DIAMONDROCK HOSPITALITY COMPANY, d.b.a. The Westin Beach Resort Fort Lauderdale
No. 20-10485
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
July 13, 2021
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-61374-WPD; [PUBLISH]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(July 13, 2021)
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit brought by a former guest at a Florida hotel alleging (as relevant here) a violation of
I
A
Rami Ziyadat reserved an eight-night stay at the Westin Fort Lauderdale in his own name. He and his fiancée, Taylor Schneider, arrived together and enjoyed their first three days at the Westin without incident. On the fourth day, Ziyadat and Schneider went to the pool, ordered a drink, and headed toward a nearby area to tan. The parties offer different accounts of what happened next.
According to Ziyadat‘s story—which we must accept as true for purposes of this appeal—when he got up for some water, the towel attendant stared at him. In particular, Ziyadat says, the attendant seemed to be staring at his tattoo, which included faded Arabic letters and a chain encircling his bicep. According to Ziyadat, as he and Schneider were getting out of the pool, the attendant said to him: “You don‘t look like you belong here. What are you doing here?” Ziyadat told the attendant that he and Schneider were hotel guests and asked her what she meant. She responded that she was calling security.
The towel attendant had a different story. According to her, Ziyadat was engaging in inappropriate behavior in the presence of children—including trying to remove Schneider‘s bikini top. She also claimed that he was using profane language and that he vomited in the pool. Ziyadat denies all this; he says that he acted pleasantly and that the towel attendant‘s account—the bikini, the profanity, the vomit—was a “complete fabrication.”
Ziyadat alleges that he and Schneider left the pool and went to the front desk, where they told a manager, Robert Munn, their version of events. Munn issued them vouchers and then went to visit with his family, who had just arrived. Ziyadat and Schneider returned to the pool, but, according to Ziyadat, they felt like they were being watched by two security guards. As Ziyadat explains it, the towel attendant had told one of the guards her story about his supposed misbehavior.
Ziyadat and Schneider abandoned their pool plan and instead went up to their room to get ready to explore the Everglades. But as they were preparing to leave, they heard a knock at their door. It was Munn and the head of security. Munn explained to Ziyadat and Schneider that they were being evicted for “inappropriate” behavior and for “violat[ing] hotel policy.” Ziyadat and Schneider were then escorted out by security. And to add insult to injury, Munn denied their refund request for the remaining days.
B
Ziyadat sued Diamondrock Hospitality Company d/b/a The Westin Beach Resort Fort Lauderdale. He alleged that the Westin discriminated against him in violation of
The Westin filed a motion to dismiss Ziyadat‘s complaint for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. The district court reasoned that even if Ziyadat had sufficiently alleged that the towel attendant mistreated him because of his race, he had not alleged that her racial animus caused his contractual injury—namely, his eviction. The court reasoned that the allegations suggested that Munn spoke to Ziyadat, Schneider, and the security guards, but not the towel attendant, and, therefore, that the towel attendant‘s alleged animus played no causal role in Ziyadat‘s contractual injury. Having dismissed Ziyadat‘s federal claim, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over his state-law breach of contract and defamation claims and dismissed the case.
On appeal, Ziyadat contends that he has alleged a plausible claim that the Westin discriminated against him in violation of
II
Under
As relevant here, in order to state a claim under
A
As to the first element, a plaintiff may establish racial discrimination directly or circumstantially. Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, Ziyadat hasn‘t adequately alleged direct discrimination. To state a claim for direct racial discrimination, a plaintiff must allege the overt invocation of race by the alleged discriminator—for instance, the use of a racial slur or racially charged language. See Kinnon v. Arcoub, Gopman & Assocs., Inc., 490 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2007) (intentional discrimination established directly where defendant‘s employee used a racial slur); cf. Lopez v. Target Corp., 676 F.3d 1230, 1231–33 (11th Cir. 2012) (defendant conceded intentional discrimination where its employee mocked and spoke slowly and loudly toward Hispanic customer). Ziyadat‘s complaint contains no such allegations.
He doesn‘t contend that the towel attendant ever disparaged his race, used racially charged language, or otherwise said anything about race to anyone. To be sure, Ziyadat alleged that the towel attendant stared at him and his tattoo and said, “You don‘t look like you belong here. What are you doing here?” But the fact that she purportedly acknowledged how he “look[ed]” no more establishes that she discriminated against him because of his race than it establishes that she discriminated against him because of his facial hair, tattoos, height, demeanor, clothing, or physique. Because not all discrimination based on appearance is based on race, Ziyadat hasn‘t alleged facts that would establish direct discrimination.
We conclude, though, that Ziyadat has alleged a plausible circumstantial case of racial discrimination. A
Ziyadat has adequately alleged that he was treated differently from comparators who were similarly situated to him in all material respects. Ziyadat says that he and his fiancée were hotel guests, sat by the pool, and behaved entirely appropriately.
So in sum: We hold that, at this stage of the proceedings, Ziyadat has alleged intentional racial discrimination by the towel attendant sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
B
Ziyadat also bears the burden of showing that race was a but-for cause of his injury. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1014. When the intentionally discriminating employee does not herself have decisionmaking authority, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the discriminating employee‘s racial animus (1) was intended to cause and (2) did cause the contractual injury. See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 1999). Ziyadat has plausibly alleged both here.
First, Ziyadat has sufficiently alleged that the towel attendant intended to cause him a contractual injury. According to Ziyadat, the attendant (1) said “[y]ou don‘t look like you belong here” and asked “[w]hat are you doing here?“, (2) announced that she was calling security, (3) summoned security guards to the pool, and (4) fabricated a story to the security guards about Ziyadat‘s misconduct—all as part of a “deliberate attempt to cause [him] injury.” At this stage of the proceedings, we think it a reasonable inference that the attendant‘s statements that Ziyadat didn‘t belong “here” meant that she thought he didn‘t belong at the Westin and thus should be evicted. Cf. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 423 (2011) (finding that lower-level employees intended to cause a contractual injury where they had said they were “out to get” and “get rid” of the plaintiff).
Second, Ziyadat has plausibly alleged that the towel attendant‘s racial animus in fact caused his contractual injury—his eviction. See Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1014. Under but-for causation statutes, like
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There is one last thing. The parties devote considerable attention to the applicability of the so-called “cat‘s paw” theory of liability to
We see no reason why the cat‘s-paw theory is incompatible with a but-for causation standard. The cat‘s-paw theory concerns the conditions under which a lower-level employee‘s animus can be imputed to a decisionmaker. The motivating-factor and but-for standards concern causation. In a cat‘s-paw case, we merely apply the operative causation standard—whatever it may be—to the actions of the lower-level employee. There are plenty of cat‘s-paw scenarios, including this one, in which the injury wouldn‘t have occurred if not for the plaintiff‘s race, and thus that seem to satisfy the but-for standard. Accordingly, the cat‘s-paw theory isn‘t inconsistent with the stricter causal standard.
The Sims case, on which Westin relies, isn‘t to the contrary, but rather supports our conclusion. There, we assumed without deciding that a plaintiff could allege cat‘s-paw liability even under the but-for causation standard, and that to do so, he must allege that the “[lower-level employee‘s] animus was a ‘but-for’ cause of, or a determinative influence on, [the decisionmaker‘s] ultimate decision.” 704 F.3d at 1337. We agree and, as already explained, have
III
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that at this preliminary stage Ziyadat has plausibly alleged a circumstantial prima facie case for racial discrimination in contracting sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Whether he ultimately prevails on his claim, of course, will be determined at summary judgment and, if necessary, a trial.
VACATED and REMANDED.
NEWSOM
CIRCUIT JUDGE