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Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga.
520 F.3d 1269
11th Cir.
2008
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*3 Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON, Circuit Judge, and ALTONAGA,* District Judge. ALTONAGA, District Judge: appeal, issues this a civil rights raising action claims of discrimination, race are whether the trial court erred in grant- ing summary judgment in favor of Appel- lees, below, Defendants Lynette Young (“COO Young”) and Dennis L. Rubin (“Rubin”), by misapplying the summary judgment standard to presented the facts and on the basis of Appellees’ qualified immunity. agree While we Appellant, with below, Plaintiff Gerard (“Rioux”), that he presented a prima facie case of discrimination and showed sufficient evi- dence of pretext, we find he has not shown Defendants clearly violated estab- law, lished federal and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND In December Rubin was hired as Fire Chief Atlanta Fire Department (“AFD”). Rubin, male, a Caucasian is the highest-ranking member of the AFD. Rubin’s predecessor appointed Rioux, had male, a Caucasian to the position Depu- ty Fire Chief Operations Field Divi- sion of AFD on a temporary basis in January 2004, Rubin made * Florida, Honorable Cecilia Altonaga, M. United sitting by States designation. Judge District for the Southern District during uncooperative been untruthful Chief Deputy Fire promotion Department Law investigation. The permanent. Sep- investigation its own completed with his concerns shared Rubin’s ofOne reached conclusions 2004 and tember Rioux, in- including personnel, supervisory awith by OPS reached those similar to AFD time of the response the slow

volved Law notably most exceptions, few (“FIU”) getting Unit Investigation Fire lied dur- Rioux had disagreed Department 2,May On fires. scenes investigation. ing the arrived at duty, Rioux off he was although concluded that a fire the scene Rubin, as given reports were Both Lieutenant FIU, including members American African Young, an well as COO *4 too taken (“Austin”), had Austin Michael COO to Rubin recommended woman. Austin, approached Rioux long to arrive. ranks two Rioux be demoted Young that him male, pulled grabbed and a Caucasian “discretionary Chief, the lowest Battalion coat, proceeded and of his lapel by the Young AFD. COO position officer” arriving late fire. him for chastise Rubin’s recommendation. with' concurred incident, Austin filed days after A few in- 28, 2004, was Rioux September On Rioux. against complaint a formal given and decision Appellees’ formed of Professional Stan- AFD Office The Al- report. Department’s Law copy of the investigation an (“OPS”) initiated dards at the his actions believes though Rioux commander The OPS incident. into the any AFD violate fire did not May of Afri- organization of an member was a the basic Rules, dispute does not he Work as the known firefighters American can with Austin of his interaction facts a section The OPS is Brothers Combined. night. Fire of the Chief AFD Office within demotion, the time of Around and Chief by AFD Fire is overseen and position fill vacated sought to Rubin began Shortly OPS after Rubin. Appellee, Michael Chief Deputy Chief. Assistant Young, COO Appellee investigation, its (‘Williams”), Ameri- an African Williams City supervisor and direct Rubin’s Sep- male, sometime testified that can Officer, called Operating Chief Atlanta him, and approached Rubin tember received “she had told Rubin Rubin like- “more than stating after Rubin would mayor received had even the perhaps rank, if Rioux in asked Williams ly” reduce Ivory Young Lee call from telephone accepting be interested would Williams from City Atlanta] [Councilman rejected posi- Williams position.1 ... ... that the Combined the Brothers Williams, also Rubin According to tion. ... was Rioux be- investigation Gerard others on two to Williams identified Although the ing [Rubin].” obstructed too, these, list,” “short Rubin’s allegations favoritism interference ulti- position was The African Americans. meritless, Rubin found against Rubin were (“Wil- Willis mately Nishiama offered over to the investigation also turned lis”), woman. an Asian (“Law Department Law City of Atlanta Department”). Deputy from his Rioux asserts demotion the result was not Battalion Chief Chief completed its OPS July On fire but May at of his actions Rioux had concluded investigation and Young’s desire rather COO Rubin’s AFD Work Rules. least four violated an African American. Rioux with replace Rioux had concluded OPS further deposition. regarding this issue at answering questions 1. Rubin evasive the organization believes of African as a similarly situated high-ranking Afri- American firefighters, Combined, Brothers (former can American firefighter AFD in conjunction with Young, COO convinced Marshal) Fire who was treated differently Austin complaint to file the against Rioux from Rioux after coming under investiga- ultimately Appellees’ influenced deci- tion. Rioux also alleged that Young “took sion to demote Rioux. He also maintains over investigation [Rioux’s] in order to re- that Rubin intended and tried to fill his move Rioux from his position as Deputy position with an American, African only Chief in hopes that an African-American settling on Willis when no African Ameri- replace would him.” of Atlanta can job. candidate would take the was dismissed from the action with preju- Finally, Rioux asserts the disciplinary dice due to the absence of any allegation action taken him was more severe that COO Young was the final policymaker than that imposed years two later on AFD City. for the Chief, (“Dun- Battalion Samuel Dunham ham”), an male, African American for what (“Second Rioux separately filed a lawsuit Rioux contends is similar misconduct. Complaint”) similar alleging claims under Dunham alleged grabbed to have *5 1981 sections against 1988 Rubin indi- arm member, of another AFD an African in vidually and his official capacity. The woman, American when she tried open to count, second under section alleged a refrigerator while leading tour of high denial of Rioux’s equal protection rights school through students an AFD facility. based on Rioux’s contention that similarly grabbing arm, After her Dunham verbally highly-ranked African American members berated complainant the in front of the AFD, of the including Dunham, Samuel students and other firefighters. After an were treated more favorably than Rioux OPS incident, investigation of the Dunham race, based on having despite committed received a six-day suspension and a writ- nearly identical disciplinary infractions to reprimand. ten those Rioux committed. The Second Com- Rioux filed the underlying action in this plaint alleged that Rubin’s to decision de- against case City the of Atlanta and COO mote Rioux “was motivated (“First Young Complaint”) in her individu- race, only not anas act of appeasement to al and capacities, official alleging discrimi- the Brothers Combined and others who nation in of Equal violation the Protection accusing continued him of racism toward Clause.2 The Complaint First alleged a Americans, African but part also as of first count 42 § under against U.S.C. continuing policy, custom, Rubin’s the Young, and this count was merged practice of achieving into Rioux’s and maintaining section 1983 what claim in stated count two.3 perceives First he Complaint as racial balance among the (“Grissom”) identified Nathaniel Grissom upper of ranks AFD.” Const, Equal 2. The provides, Protection XIV, Clause in U.S. § amend. 1. part, relevant that: No Section 1983 State shall “constitutes the any make or enforce law exclusive rem- abridge edy which against shall privileges the state or actors for immu- violations of the States; nities of rights citizens of the United § nor contained County in 1981.” Butts v. life, deprive shall any person Volusia, State (11th of Cir.2000) of liberty, property, process due without of Dist., (citing Jett v. Indep. Dallas Sch. law; deny any person nor its within 701, 731-32, U.S. jurisdiction equal protection of the (1989)). L.Ed.2d 598 laws. ato is entitled moving party and that ac- consolidated court The district Fed. law.” a matter as judgment Rubin and Young and COO against tions 56(c). making assess this in summary judgment R.Civ.P. granted thereafter the evi all “must view ment, the Court challenges Rioux favor. Defendants’ reasonably finding he factual inferences all order court’s dence trial of the portion light most sup- in the evidence evidence sufficient drawn from proffer did Stew discriminatory nonmoving party,” demotion claim favorable port Bridge, that COO conclusion Cheshire Happy trial court’s Herman’s art v. and the (11th Cir.1997), qualified entitled Inc., Rubin were Young in then- them claims doubts immunity for reasonable resolve all and “must non-mov capacities.4 personal facts favor about the Ins. Co. ant,” Omaha United Life DISCUSSION II. Am., Ins. Co. Sun Life appeal: arguments Cir.1990). three raises applying (1) court erred district Through Proving Discrimination B. to Rioux’s standard summary judgment Evidence (2) Circumstantial district arguments; pretext was not a concluding Dunham erred matter, argue the Appellees an initial As (3) Rioux; and comparator suitable es- that Rioux conclusion court’s district summary granting court erred district case of discrimina- facie prima tablished Young in and COO to Rubin judgment Thus, we turn was in error. tory demotion capacities on basis individual their first. to this issue dis- immunity. While claim *6 may prove a plaintiff A they argue the also respects, in all agree direct through discrimination intentional determined improperly district evidence, or evidence, circumstantial facie case of prima had established Rioux Earley v. See proof. through statistical discrimination. 1077, 1081 F.2d Corp., Int’l 907 Champion Orange v. (11th Cir.1990); Burke-Fowler Review A. Standard of (11th 1319, Fla., 1322-23 447 F.3d County, of sum grant review Court’s Cir.2006) (two dis of intentional theories novo, evidence de with judgment is mary disparate are VII under Title crimination favorable to light most in the considered or pattern discrimination treatment Aerospace, See, v. e.g., Wilson Rioux. B/E discrimination; treat disparate practice Cir.2004). (11th 1079, Inc., 1085 F.3d 376 direct may with proven be ment claims “if the is rendered Summary judgment evidence). offered Rioux circumstantial inter answers depositions, pleadings, of support in evidence only circumstantial file, together on and admissions rogatories, discrimination, and maintained claim of his affidavits, any, that there- if show with the that he papers summary judgment in his any material fact as to issue genuine is no briefs, did he brief, nor City’s dismissal in by Appellees in their 4. noted As argument. contrary at oral arguments clarify a view appears abandoned his to have concerning against Thus, any claim capacity appeal issues regarding of official Atlanta). (a City judgment of summary grant claim Rubin trial of court's 159, Graham, 165- 473 Kentucky U.S. See v. City abandoned. is deemed favor of 3099, (1985) 66, L.Ed.2d 114 87 Alabaster, 105 S.Ct. Greenbriar, 881 v. Ltd. is, (official actuality, suit capacity suit Cir.1989) (issues 1570, (11th n. 6 entity the government indi- against the local waived). argued appeal are deemed challenges represents). Rioux neither vidual brought this “solely consolidated case un- In the step last of the burden-shifting der the Douglas McDonnell analysis, circumstantial if the employer meets “its burden analysis.” evidence Consequently, production, we use presumption of discrimi burden-shifting framework rebutted, established nation is and the inquiry ‘pro Green, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 411 ceeds to a new level of specificity,’ in which 792, 802-05, 1817, U.S. 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d plaintiff must show that the proffered (1973), the sufficiency evaluate reason really pretext is a for unlawful dis his claim.5 Id. at crimination.” (quoting 1272-73 Tex Dep’t as Cmty. Burdine, v. Affairs Under the Douglas McDonnell frame- 248, 255, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed.2d work, plaintiff must show an inference of (1981)). The focused inquiry discriminatory intent, and therefore car- step last requires plaintiff to demon ries an initial burden of establishing a strate weaknesses, “such implausibilities, prima facie case discrimination. Id. at inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contra 802, 93 S.Ct. Presenting prima dictions employer’s proffered legiti facie case is not onerous as it requires only mate reasons its action that a reason plaintiff that the establish facts adequate able factfinder could find them unworthy permit an inference of discrimination. of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Pat Reno, v. 115 F.3d Holifield terns, Cir.1997) (11th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The successful prima assertion of a facie case then “creates rebuttable presump- 1. Prima Facie Case

tion that the employer unlawfully discrimi- nated against” plaintiff. E.E.O.C. More than one formulation of the Crabs, Inc., Joe’s Stone elements of prima facie case exist. The (11th Cir.2002) (citing U.S. Postal Court Douglas McDonnell recognized Aikens, Serv. Bd. Governors v. 460 U.S. this when it articulated four for a elements 711, 714, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 prima facie case6 but stated that “[t]he (1983)). occurs, If this prima and a facie facts necessarily vary will in Title VII *7 case of presented, discrimination is cases, the specification and the ... of pri the burden of producing evidence that the em- ma facie proof required ... is not neces ployer’s action taken for a legitimate, was sarily every applicable respect to differ non-discriminatory reason then shifts ing to factual situations.” 411 at U.S. 802 n. employer. the Crabs, 13, Joe’s Stone See 296 93 1817. correctly S.Ct. ar F.3d at 1272. gue that way one of establishing a prima Although 5. Douglas McDonnell was a Title Douglas, given McDonnell the facts of case, case, VII Title VII and section that claims the Court stated complainant 1983 a that may have in a the same Title VII case elements his where the meet burden of claims are establishing prima a facie of based on the case racial dis- same set of facts. Abel v. Dub (1) by showing belongs crimination 1334, that he berly, (11th 210 F.3d 1338 n. 3 Cir. (2) minority; a racial applied that he and was 2000). Nevertheless, granted "[t]he relief un qualified job for a for employer which the was against der Title VII employer, is the not indi that, (3) seeking applicants; despite quali- his employees vidual whose actions would consti fications, (4) that, rejected; he was and after Lomax, tute a violation of the Act.” Smith v. rejection, position his open the remained and 402, (11th Cir.1995) 45 F.3d n. 4 (empha 403 the employer seeking applicants continued original) (quoting sis in Busby City v. Or of persons from complainant’s qualifications. of lando, 764, (11th Cir.1991)). 931 F.2d 772 411 U.S. at 93 S.Ct. 1817.

1276 discriminatory demotion for facie test ma discrimination employment of case facie Eaton, Inc., Sheaffer, v. Sturniolo employ- an from following a demotion based on by articulated the test from plaintiff the which differs requires misconduct ee’s plaintiff the protected requires a it “(1) belongs to in that Appellants he that show (1) of job; the is a member for that: he (2) qualified class; was to demonstrate he employer (2) the (3) class; for which he was misconduct protected the a (4) mis- similar demoted; same or (3) the him was he was job; demoted similarly situated to that which replaced conduct he the demotion following similarly in, was not but engaged employee class. protected his outside someone Dep’t v. Alabama for.” Moore disciplined (11th Cir.1994); also see 1023, 1025 F.3d (11th 235, 238 Corr., Fed.Appx. Bd. County, Georgia v. Clinch Hinson Cir.2005) Holifield, (citing Cir.2000) (11th Educ., F.3d Children Dep’t v. 1562); Lathem accord involving in case same standard (applying (11th Servs., F.3d Youth & demotion). discriminatory claiming teacher Cir.1999). racial discrimination Where Hinson, the demotions In Sturniolo rules of work alleged application is discipline claimed were unrelated there and where employee, an discipline received than severe that more discipline not did employee no claim In Sturniolo similarly situated. by others here, rules, plain- then as the work violate case, Hinson, present in the unlike in miscon- engaged “that he tiff show must similarly situated claim no there was outside person to that of duct similar viola- a similar committed had employee disciplinary class, ... protected treated rules, been had work but tion of more against him enforced measures favorably plaintiffs. than the more the oth- enforced than those severe miscon- in similar engaged always who persons er maintained Rioux has While Gerwens, 874 (citing Jones employ Id. duct.” that another complaints in his two Cir.1989)). but was to him similarly situated ee was (Grissom than he severely less disciplined fa- prima this formulation Under and Dunham Complaint, First abili- challenge Rioux’s case, Appellees cie the com Second), has raised appears it he element, pertaining ty to the third meet an element not as parator issue is, a simi- comparator, showing rather, as evi showing, but prima facie who committed employee larly-situated step of the third rules, pretext, who dence but of work same violation burden-shifting Douglas severely than Rioux. We McDonnell disciplined less Orange e.g., Silvera v. challenge and framework. agree Appellees’ with Board, has that Rioux County School trial court’s conclusion *8 examined, Cir.2001) (where as em- similarly-situated court a presented such Thus, if the pre of showing below. explained complainant’s as ployee, of part the could required, disparate any was text, third there was element whether showing. facie prima employee not his similarly meet situated of a treatment race); Douglas, McDonnell aof different facie a prima of formulation Another (“Especially U.S. in however, case, been articulated has “would showing pretext of to a relevant” of discrimination raising cases claims involved employees that white be evidence demoted, it this is and plaintiff where a is comparable of petitioner in acts court the district other formulation re ... nevertheless seriousness he sat- asserts applied Appellant and that rehired.”); Pilot Sparks v. tained or pri- the applied court isfied. The district Carriers, Inc., Freight replace candidates to Rioux contained (11th Cir.1987) n. 20 (noting that compara three black firefighters, and Rubin at may tor evidence be used to show pretext). tempted to recruit a black officer- Williams&emdash;to We, too, sufficiency address the (4) replace Rioux; Rubin felt comparator evidence our examination of pressure from the AFD power black struc pretext, rather than as an element of ture to harshly discipline Rioux, amidst prima case, Rioux’s facie recognizing that allegations from the Brothers Combined it always is not possible for high-ranking that Rubin would favor Rioux following employees to find comparators. suitable earlier and harsh treatment Rubin had Holifield, 1563 given Grissom, to a black chief accused of (“[T]here are only a limited number of (treatment taking bribes the Brothers potential ‘similarly employees’ situated of); (5) Combined had been critical higher when supervisory level positions for aggressive response the delayed AFD’s involved.”). medical Indeed, doctors are arrival at May the 2004 fire was prompt this Court previously has stated that “[i]f ed himself, Rubin who had told Rioux plaintiff a to show the existence fails the Fire Investigation Unit needed to re similarly situated employee, summary spond (6) fires; more quickly to an infer judgment is appropriate where no other ence could be drawn that Austin goad was evidence discrimination present.” is ed into filing grievance the against Rioux Id. at 1562 (emphasis original). by members of the Combined; Brothers (7) Here, while agree we differences Rioux has manner and degree presented comparator, investigating it the Rioux undisputed incident as com that he pared has shown he is a the incident involving member of a proposed class; protected comparator (8) he Dunham; evidence job; demoted; he was showing Dunham was a following discretionary offi demotion, subject he cer replaced by someone same rules supervi sor&emdash;Rubin&emdash;as class, protected outside his an Asian Amer- who committed a Moreover, ican woman. similar offense absence of Rioux’s but who was similarly-situated employee, differently treated with respect as we in explain below, further vestigation of he has also come incident disciplinary forward with “other action taken evidence of discrimi- thereafter.

nation.” The foregoing categories evidence, view,

In Rioux’s combined with Rioux satisfying district im- the Stur properly niolo and prima discounted the following Hinson facie evidence test for dis from which an criminatory demotion, inference of lead discrimination us to conclude (1) could be found: that Rioux prima Rubin tried to satisfied his maintain facie show racial AFD, ing balance at under maintaining Douglas. McDonnell tracking race spreadsheet personnel de- 2. Legitimate Reason/Pretext cisions, Rioux’s, including regularly he presented (2) political superiors; parties agree Because Appel- Rubin had discussions with Atlanta lees had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory Councilman, (“Coun- Ivory Young, Lee Jr. reason for Rioux’s following demotion *9 Young”), cilman in which Rubin reviewed OPS and Law Department investigations, spreadsheet the expressed his desire presumption the of discrimination is elimi to particular achieve a nated, racial balance of see Vessels Atlanta Indep. Sch. among (11th the 50/50 AFD discre- Sys., 763, black/white 408 F.3d Cir.2005), 771 (3) ranks; tionary Rubin’s “short list” of accordingly we turn to inqui- the “focused” to pretext of evidence is sufficient Atlanta pretext. of showing concerning ry Appellees summary judgment. survive inqui “The Silvera, at 1258. 244 F.3d Vessels, court as the district distinguish employ the upon centers pretext ry into in that the did, plaintiff that ground on the own employee’s beliefs, not the er’s pieces three at least additional case offered Holi performance.” of his perceptions racial omitted). allegedly addition to (citations of evidence in at 1565 field, defendant, in by statements the ly-tinged weakness must demonstrate plaintiff The they assert can whom contrast employer’s implausibilities es In fur any additional evidence. not offer action reasons for its proffered legitimate cite position, of this support ther factfinder to a reasonable for sufficient racially- Silvera, a series of decisions which reasons. See the disbelieve held to be alone Combs, statements tinged (quoting F.3d at 1258 of genuine a issue create insufficient to 1538). not plaintiffs burden the It is See, e.g., Kin pretext. material fact as an regarding suspicion a merely to raise Trustees, App’x F. v. Bd. motive, demon caid rather but improper of (11th Cir.2006); Birming Riley v. material 816-17 issue of genuine is a there strate Educ., Fed.Appx. ham Bd. reason proffered employer’s fact that the of (11th Cir.2005). that argue Appellees also Chap pretextual. was for his demotion the correctly discounted the district court 1024-25 Transp., 229 AI man v. Young, and testi Cir.2000). testimony of Councilman role of Com mony regarding the Brothers that none of concluded court The district the investigation, as Rioux bined by Rioux7 submitted the other evidence Ap- that contradicts assertion record issue of genuine create a was sufficient by agenda of influenced pellees were proffered as to whether material fact parties. of either these pretextual. demotion for his was reason state- uncontroverted Rioux submitted catego- the two general We now address stating latter’s belief by in his ments Rubin presented Rioux ries of evidence the AFD composition of the racial Appellees’ legitimate show effort to composition the racial reflect should pretext was for his demotion reason concluding generally. City of Atlanta consists category The first discrimination. insufficient, the district this identi- evidence evidentiary matters of the first six standing for interpreted Vessels as could infer jury from which by fied Rioux racially that evidence proposition in- category The second discrimination. coupled with must be tinged Dunham. statements proposed comparator, volves his of discrimi- evidence other circumstantial (i) that Race Motivated Rioux’s Claim summary judgment. nation to survive Demotion Decision Rubin’s state- distinguished district court makeup racial regarding the ments decision Citing the Eleventh Circuit’s issue Ves- AFD from the statements at Vessels, argues F.3d at sels, concluding that Rubin’s statements ex- of statements Rubin his submission particu- for a express preference did per- AFD’s conform pressing desire court con- The district group.8 lar racial City racial make-up sonnel to the 133, 143, Prods., Inc., Plumbing 530 U.S. permitted to consider 7. The trier fact is (2000). L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. establishing plaintiff's prima facie evidence on the drawn case and inferences therefrom aware that undisputed proffered that Rubin It is the defendant's issue of whether American. 60% African Atlanta Reeves v. Sanderson pretextual. reason is *10 eluded total sum of the evidence When position Rubin offered Rioux’s to question Appellees’ Williams, did not call into prof- Rubin told Williams he been had fered reason for Rioux’s demotion and “instructed to take some actions with Chief speculation. amounted to mere While Rioux.” In deposition, his Rubin only ad- “speculation” may accurately describe mitted to offering position first Rioux’s Rioux, by some factual assertions other Williams being repeatedly after pressed to factual support assertions find in the rec- confirm that fact.

ord. Rioux maintains Rubin adheres ato de

Considering evidence, all the a reason- facto and unwritten affirmative poli- action able factfinder could prof- cy, determine the and an inference can be drawn legitimate fered reason for Rioux’s two- Rioux was demoted as part of the overall step demotion—an during altercation strategy of balancing.9 race pres- Rubin which Rioux seeking to impress upon ents a copy spreadsheet of his two to three his subordinates Rubin’s own year directive re- times a to Councilman Young; if garding responding more quickly to fires— Rubin were up to show at a meeting with- only was not actually event that moti- out documentation promotions on burden, vated Appellees. Rioux’s again, race, the basis of Councilman Young was to demonstrate weaknesses implau- or “would have made a more formal inquiry sibilities proffered legitimate reason and would required have that some docu- so permit jury as to a rational to conclude mentation provided by be the administra- explanation that the given was not the real tion.” response question, “How reason, or that the reason stated in- far away from balance between 50/50 sufficient to warrant action. adverse African Americans and you Caucasians do Combs, 1528; 106 F.3d at think promotions Carter get would have to before Springs Treatment, Three Residential you upon yourself would take it say Cir.1998). something to Chief Rubin ... ?” Council- admitted, man Young “If we get- started Rioux maintains that May between ting in percentiles the low percent September Brothers Combined below that.” and Councilman Young brought pressure Appellees. Dixon, bear on Cameron Taken together and viewed light Combined, President of the Brothers had most say, favorable we cannot meetings with Young COO to complain upon based foregoing summary of ad- about the Rioux investigation evidence, and about ditional that Rioux has not satis- process Rubin’s new for promoting cap- fied his of presenting burden disputed tains. Dixon complained to Young COO facts showing by were motivated about by vindictive attacks a discriminatory Rubin reason selecting the managers. Councilman, too, black level received, Rioux discipline con- contacted Young any COO and left a trast message discipline he could or would regarding the matter of have Chief with received the absence of the race- her. Young pressure based COO then asked exerted. Rubin to bring up her personnel moves, to date on (ii) Comparator Dunham as a and to also prepared be to update her on involving incident Rioux and ac- argument Rioux’s supporting second tions as a taken result. burden showing pretext, that Dunham 9. Rioux's demotion was recorded Rubin's Ms. was recorded Willis as the routine spreadsheet appointment as an of a Cauca- appointment of an Asian American. sian to Section Chief. replacement

1280 should employee discipline each as to was what employee who similarly-situated was a follow Rioux receive. favorably than more treated however, misconduct, fails.

ing similar regarding following facts The are employees whether determine “[T]o ranks respective Dunham’s and Rioux’s ‘whether situated, evaluate similarly we undisputed. are job responsibilities in or accused involved are employees highest Rioux, posi held the second who and are conduct or similar same of the Dunham, who held AFD, and tion in ” ways.’ Burke- disciplined different just among both highest, were the fourth Manicc Fowler, (quoting at 1323 447 F.3d department in a discretionary officers 40 Brown, 1368 F.3d ia 1,200 Prior to members. approximately Cir.1999) marks (citations quotation a Battalion demotion, was Dunham omitted)). an comparator employee A Battal approximately are There Chief. ‘in all plaintiff] “similarly [to situated ” A Battalion AFD. Chief in the ion Chiefs Wilson, at respects.’ relevant of fire stations a handful oversees typically 1562). Holifield, (quoting “ people. and less than compara of the quality ‘quantity and nearly identical be [must] misconduct tor’s demotion, was one Rioux to his Prior second-guessing from courts prevent Chiefs, second in Deputy Fire only three and con decisions reasonable employers’ Deputy As to Chief Rubin. command ” Burke- oranges.’ fusing apples with for five bat- Chief, responsible Rioux was Manicc Fowler, (quoting at 1323 stations, pieces talions, 35 fire (citation omitted). 1368) ia, 171 F.3d at appointments All AFD chief equipment. mis merely “similar” Misconduct discretionary; chiefs serve at are plaintiff is insuf disciplined of the conduct Rubin, a pleasure. After Chief Rubin’s ficient. Id. at n. highest level of su- has the Deputy Chief two Rioux advanced pleadings, In his Only Deputy AFD. in the pervision At and Dunham. comparators, Grissom when he is absent. fill in for Rubin Chiefs Court, and before this summary judgment him or would not consider Deputy A Chief compa- only Dunham as a proposes Rioux status as Bat- to have the same herself court argues that the district rator. Rioux Deputy Chief. or an Assistant talion Chief Dunham was improperly determined than responsibilities greater have Chiefs it fo- comparator because appropriate an Chiefs, hundreds of supervise Battalion differences between superficial cused on paid are more. people, more positions within employees’ respective more was Deputy Chief promotion court contends the the AFD. Rioux promotions be- than his other meaningful “nature instead on have focused should top profes- of his rising to the cause it was nature and the of the offenses committed sion. Silvera, 244 imposed.” punishments of the charges differences As district Appellees assert the F.3d at 1259. Dunham, Appel- Rioux and against levied Dunham, a properly determined found to while lees submit Chief, compa- not a suitable Battalion AFD work rules one of the have violated Chief, of: Deputy rator to because Dunham was in the workplace, violence on (1) respec- in their differences the material Compliance Department The Law not. (2) the job responsibilities; tive rank and actions that Rioux’s concluded Unit charges differences levied AFD violated four different May (3) them; differing nature of two rules and sections work the different identities investigations and 2006, Dunham was In March decision Code. making a final of the individuals *12 by charged violating OPS with AFD work level professionalism and who are ex- conduct, courtesy, rules and truthful- pected to set the standard of conduct for ness. department. the

Finally, Appellees argue that different Neither Rubin nor Young COO selected responsible decisionmakers were for the charges Rioux and Dunham were imposed Dunham, sanctions on Rioux and violated, found to have and charges and each incident investigated differ were not the same. Dunham was neither Silvera, ently. See F.3d at 1261 n. 5 charged with nor found to have violated an (“[Differences in by treatment different AFD workplace violence rule. As Rioux supervisors or decision makers can seldom correctly out, points the most important be the basis for a viable claim of discrimi factors in comparator analysis in the nation”) Gerwens, (citing Jones v. 874 disciplinary context are the nature of the (11th Cir.1989)). Appel offenses committed and the nature of the that, lees assert directly whereas Rubin punishments Silvera, imposed. punishment determined Rioux’s based on at 1259. comparator’s “[T]he misconduct Department the OPS and Law reports, nearly must be identical to plaintiffs in (a discipline six-day Dunham’s suspension prevent order to courts from second-guess- reprimand) letter of was determined ing employers’ reasonable decisions and by a OPS, Section Chief of Cindy (cita- confusing apples oranges.” with Id. Thompson, only submitted to Rubin omitted). tion and quotation internal marks approval later. The standard for similar fairly conduct is a one, rigorous here, are persuaded We while the Dunham incidents comparator certainly similar, was not a valid appear on the basis be the offenses arguments first two by Ap advanced Rioux and Dunham charged were with pellees concerning the material Moore, differences were different. 137 Fed.Appx. at respective men’s job (“We ranks and re have previously held that a dif- sponsibilities and the differences ference in the charged can pre- offenses charges levied against Admittedly, them. comparison clude a for Title pur- VII job differences in plaintiff ranks between a poses.”). not, employee and another are in and of Appellees’ argument that different deci- themselves, dispositive as to whether the sionmakers responsible for disciplin may two individuals be compared for pur (an ing Rioux argument and Dunham not poses of evaluating discrimination claim. order) considered in the district court’s Lathem, (different job F.3d at 793 unpersuasive. See Anderson v. WBMG- Here, dispositive). however, titles not (11th Cir.2001) 565-66 clearly matters, rank as Rioux was one of (different supervisors dispositive). not It only highest-ranked three of the members instance, is undisputed, for that all discre AFD, reporting directly to Rubin. tionary ultimately officers the AFD contrast, In position Dunham held a pleasure Chief, serve at the of the Fire one, but two levels distant from Rubin, and even as Appellees contend that position women, shared 30 men and directly Rubin was not involved consequently, significantly removed from Dunham, investigation they concede it Rubin. It cannot be said that conduct that was necessary approve for him to the ulti might be tolerated or pro treated with imposed. mate sanction gressive discipline at lower ranks must be similarly accepted Dunham, from the discipline Chiefs imme whose was meted advisors, diate Rioux’s, who are held to a higher years out two following cannot Moreover, must show plaintiff Rioux Id. comparator assist a valid serve as Nevertheless, violation was establishing as stat- the law pretext. showing words, of an unwritten ed, evidence Id. other clearly other established. ex- plan pressures right action must suffi affirmative contours of the be “[t]he and Council- by Brothers Combined erted official that a reasonable ciently clear Rubin’s offer along with Young, man doing he is that what would understand *13 and eva- African American to an position Saucier, at 533 right.” that U.S. violates offer, are suf- that regarding answers sive v. 202, (quoting Anderson 121 2151 S.Ct. with re- Rioux’s burden satisfy ficient to 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 483 U.S. Creighton, pretext. spect (1987)). 3034, rele L.Ed.2d 523 The 97 clear “it would inquiry is whether be vant Immunity Qualified C. Defense that his conduct officer to reasonable defense of Appellees’ turn to nowWe the situation he confronted.” unlawful in in the indi immunity, interposed qualified omitted). (citation Thus, objective “[i]f Id. money damages. claims for capacity vidual predict the time observers cannot —at government immunity protects “[(Qualified act was lawful official acts—whether discretionary funct performing officials adjudi full not, must await and the answer civil trials and from the burdens ions10 fu years in a district court cation Johnson, v. 88 liability,” McMillian from ture, immunity from the official deserves Cir.1996) (11th 1554, 1562 (citing Las F.3d Foy v. Hol damages.” liability civil Univ., 28 F.3d Alabama A&M v. siter Cir.1996) (11th 1528, ston, 94 1534 F.3d Cir.1994) (en banc)), (11th 1146, “[i]n 1149 510, Holloway, 510 (citing Elder v. U.S. only Id. It is exceptional all cases.” but 1019, 513-15, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 114 S.Ct. ‘clearly an conduct violates “when official’s (1994)). statutory or constitutional established claims, believed, estab if would would Rioux’s person rights of which reasonable ” pro Equal is not that “the official lish a violation of Protection have known’ immunity.” (quot Id. by qualified Clause, right tected free ensures the be which 800, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. ing Harlow v. discrimination from intentional based (1982)). 2727, 818, 102 L.Ed.2d 396 73 S.Ct. City v. Consol. Jack race. Williams (11th 1261, sonville, F.3d 1268 Cir. 341 immunity pro- thus inquiry Our 2003); Cooper also Yeldell v. Green must see following sequence. We ceeds in the (11th Inc., 1056, plaintiff has Hosp., whether the 1064 Cir. first determine challenged 1992) conduct violates shown that the intentional (holding that discrimina right. See statutory or constitutional firing practices hiring tion in violated 1231, 1237 Nugent, v. 488 McClish Clause). If the Equal trier Protection Katz, (11th Cir.2007) (citing Saucier v. showing pretext, fact believed 2151, 201, 194, 150 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. U.S. proffered legiti Appellees’ and disbelieved (2001)). obliged are to re- Again, we reason, Equal then a violation of the mate light favorable the facts in the most view would be shown. The Protection Clause plaintiff. Id. jury might evidence from which “other” discriminatory animus on the part infer establishing the violation The law Young, which have Rubin COO we is, it must be in pre-existing, must be that above, that show- constitutes time of the violation. summarized alleged effect undisputed were en- vant times. It is gaged discretionary at all rele- functions summary at the ing by judgment Clearly provides established law stage, motivated, of the violation of a state “can constitutional officials be part, by hostility a dislike or right. toward certain protected class which a citizen The trial court below the next addressed ” belongs lawfully and still act .... Foy, step qualified immunity analysis by (citing F.3d at 1534 Arlington Vil. of noting dispute that there was no real Dev., Hts. v. Housing Metro. 429 U.S. right employment to be free from dis 269-71 n. 97 S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 450 clearly crimination was established at the (1977)); see Healthy Doyle, also Mt. v. general time of Rioux’s demotion. As a 274, 286-87, U.S. 50 L.Ed.2d can all principle, agree we with that state (1977). Thus, “state officials act law ment. See Johnson Fort Laud fully despite intent, having discriminatory Cir.1997) erdale, they where the record shows would have *14 (“[T]he right workplace be free from fact, they, acted as in did act if they even discrimination and harassment on the ba (cit had discriminatory lacked intent.” Id. ... clearly sis race established at [was] ing Healthy, 286-87, Mt. 429 U.S. at times”); McClure, Bogle the relevant v. 568). 2, S.Ct. May The events of 2004 are (11th Cir.2003) 1347, 332 F.3d largely undisputed, and the results of the (“[TJhere is no doubt that in ... May OPS and Law Department investigations clearly it was that established intentional confirmed that department Rioux violated in workplace discrimination on account Viewing rules. in light facts most law.”) (citation of race violated federal Rioux, favorable to Appellees had ade omitted). However, “clearly estab quate lawful support reasons to their deci prong qualified immunity lished” of the sion to may demote have had analysis question asks the “in light of the improper race-based motives to take the specific case, context of the not as a broad challenged action as well. What Rioux has Williams, general proposition.” then, presented, case, is a “mixed-motives” (internal quotation at 1269 marks and cita which governed by analysis is set out omitted). tions in Foy. Stanley, See 219 F.3d at 1295 (“The decision in Foy proper turn sets out the We therefore to an examina analysis to in apply potential mixed-motive tion of “whether the defendant’s conduct cases.”) ‘objectively was nonetheless reasonable’ in light of that [Equal right.” Protection] Foy explained: Johnson, (citing F.3d adequate At least when an lawful motive

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. present, discriminatory is that a motive 3034). Rioux must demonstrate at this might sweep qualified also exist does not in step qualified immunity analysis immunity from the field even at that a reasonable fire chief and a reason summary it, judgment stage. Unless as operating city able chief officer of a would matter, a legal plain specific under the know that demoting high-ranking, subor facts and circumstances of the case that dinate, discretionary in officer the factual despite defendant’s conduct— presented circumstances here violated having adequate lawful sup- reasons to clearly established law. Stanley port the act—was the result of his un- Dalton, Ga., motive, lawful the defendant is entitled (11th Cir.2000) Harlow, (citing 457 U.S. immunity. Where the facts assumed 396). 73 L.Ed.2d And summary judgment purposes for in a it is this that he cannot show. involving qualified immunity case show Foy was the that Stanley concluded (lawful mo- here. and unlawful

mixed motives remained the law tivations) approach law does correct pre-existing n. 26. And case must at 1296 circuit. the merits this dictate favor, the defen- a defendant is plaintiffs Stanley reiterated so be decided immunity. only immunity where qualified is entitled dant entitled establishes that undisputably “the record F.3d at 1534-35. motivated, at in fact the defendant Foy used in reasoning Tracking the considerations.” by lawful part, least summary judgment denial reverse (emphasis original). at 1296 Id. immunity interposed where find that it defense, jury could here no aas inquiry objective reasonableness for fire chief have been unlawful would man- following proceeded Stanley officer to do operating city’s chief and the Chadwick, had police, the chief of ner. lacked dis they had did if Appellees as Stanley, police officer cause to resent jury 1535. No Id. at criminatory intent. named as years before Chadwick had who chief and fire that a reasonable find could after investigation. Years in an suspect never have would operating officer chief remarks, following several Stanley’s discriminatory for Rioux but demoted incidents, terminat- Chadwick disciplinary here, Foy, inas The record intent. Id. Stanley brought a section Stanley, and ed establishes undisputably of his first amend- 1983 action violation *15 part by lawful least in at were motivated of the denial of The rights. ment reversal by indepen the supported justifications, quali- on summary judgment a motion by OPS and conducted investigations dent undisputed immunity on two fied rested investigations which Department, the Law First, undisputably es- facts. record part were not a two decisionmakers these objectively valid reasons ex- that tablished they is no evidence there of and which took, because step for the Chadwick isted n. 9. McMil Id. manipulated. at Cf. discipline that underlying the incidents (affirming trial court lian, F.3d 1554 did in fact take led to the termination genu where summary judgment denial Thus, it jury “no could find place. as to reasons fact existed ine issues of to terminate would have been unlawful row, on death in plaintiff placed officials retaliatory Stanley as did absent Chadwick officers lied whether part, due to issue of at motive.” Id. reasons). their concerning Second, appro- summary judgment was ap- framework was Foy analytical The undisputably es- the record priate because case, to a mixed motives plied Stanley in motivated, at tablished Chadwick pronounce- Court following Supreme by in lawful considerations part, least Britton, 523 U.S. in ment Crawford-El four-year A disciplinary incidents. of the 140 L.Ed.2d 759 Stanley’s initial gap existed between time (1998). reject- Crawford-El, the Court In a speech naming Chadwick as protected required have would ed a rule that Stanley years, suspect, and in four those proof plaintiffs from heightened burden in that resulted engaged had actions cases. 523 U.S. in unconstitutional-motive police a reasonable discipline. “Even if 580-86, S.Ct. 1584. at Crawford- motive, retaliatory the law chief acted with how courts not address El decision did that a clearly not establish 1997 did objective reasonableness apply should with the police reasonable chief—faced jury question creates a plaintiff test after Stanley’s mis- undisputed evidence of motive, same improper mo- where improper acting at least claim, undisputably as it conduct tive is an element of ed, Stanley’s at least in part, misconduct- the lawful consider- part because Stanley in the have terminated Department’s should not ation of the OPS and Law (citing manner.” Id. John- same investigations findings. concluded We 1379). son, 126 F.3d at that, say cannot even assuming Appellees were acting improper with race-based ani- reversed the denial Similarly, Johnson mus race-balancing or desire to address summary judgment raising motion of a workplace, reasonable officials faced immunity ground on the that the with the same evidence of Rioux’s viola- plaintiff- discharge demotion and tions of work rules would have known that firefighter indisputable was based on motives, demoting Rioux clearly violated estab- adequate specifically, lawful firefighter’s obey failure to a direct order lished federal law. repeated disciplinary lies at his hear- pre-existing Because law did not provide Johnson,

ing. 126 F.3d at 1379. warning fair that demoting assuming that the defendants act- “[e]ven Rioux under these circumstances would vi- discriminatory retaliatory ed some with clearly law, Ap- olate established federal in demoting discharging motives John- pellees qualified immunity. are entitled to son, that a clearly the law did establish reasonable official faced with the same evi- III. CONCLUSION deception dence of disobedience and If presented Rioux had his claims under disciplined not have Johnson in the should VII, provisions of Title he would be Bogle, same manner.” Id. at 1379. Cf. entitled to have his claims of discrimina- (affirming 332 F.3d at 1356 denial of re- by jury. tion heard The result we reach judgment newed motion for as matter of compelled by remedy here is following jury law verdict where evidence chose, is, section 1983 claims suggested reorga- defendants’ evidence of individual decisionmakers rather than his plan designed nization was a sham to cov- *16 employer, recognizes for which the law jury er-up race-based transfers immunity. right qualified Again, be- squarely appellants intentionally found dis- present cause has not been able to race, rejecting criminated on account of Appellees’ evidence that decisions reasons). proffered nondiscriminatory motivated, part, by were not at least in Here, the record shows justifications, Appellees lawful are entitled motivated, part, by in fact least qualified immunity. Accordingly, objectively valid in demoting reasons judgment of the district court is AF- Notwithstanding Rioux. the evidence of FIRMED. pretext, which is sufficient to sustain showing Rioux’s burden of that his demo- EDMONDSON, Judge, Chief discrimination, tion was the result of there concurring in the result: Young is no evidence that Rubin or COO I qualified immunity would not reach the independent investigations influenced two issue I think the record estab- because May concerning the 2004 incident. lished no violation of the Constitution. 2,May There is no evidence that the point comparator. Plaintiff can to no place, incident did not fact take or that today’s opinion decisions set out the incident did not involve some violation support prima being facie case are not of one or more work second- rules followed, being are but extended highest ranking member of the AFD. No I disciplinary-demotion situation. also presented Appellees’ evidence was de- presented cisions to demote Rioux were not motivat- doubt that Plaintiff has suffi- If I believed pretext. cient evidence I would pretext, did establish

this record immunity could not

worry motive, just an unlawful no mixed

apply:

discriminatory one. DEVINE, Petitioner- R.

William

Appellant, America,

UNITED STATES

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-11206

Non-Argument Calendar. Appeals, States Court of

United

Eleventh Circuit. 20, 2008.

March

Case Details

Case Name: Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Mar 18, 2008
Citation: 520 F.3d 1269
Docket Number: 07-11657
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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