Pryor v. PryorPryor v. Pryor
APPEARANCES:
Anthony C. Pryor, pro se, for Appellant.
Gloria K. Pryor, pro se, for Appellee.
Kline P.J.:
{¶1} Anthony C. Pryor (hereinafter “Anthony“) appeals the judgment of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court granted Anthony a divorce from Gloria K. Pryor (hereinafter “Gloria“). On appeal, Anthony first contends that the trial court did not (1) equitably divide the marital property or (2) follow the procedures of
I.
{¶2} Anthony and Gloria were married on May 26, 2000. They had one child together during their marriage.
{¶3} In 2002, Anthony and Gloria were indicted for various crimes. See, generally, State v. Pryor, Fairfield App. No. 05-CA-52, 2005-Ohio-6656; State v. Pryor, Fairfield App. No. 02CA91, 2004-Ohio-609. Gloria accepted a plea bargain and agreed to testify against Anthony. Anthony claims that Gloria “falsely testified” against him so that she could (1) obtain a lighter sentence and (2) deflect blame away from her own actions. Regardless, Anthony was convicted of several crimes and sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
{¶4} Anthony and Gloria were both incarcerated as a result of their crimes. Sometime thereafter, Gloria‘s mother adopted the only child produced from Anthony and Gloria‘s marriage. Moreover, Anthony, Gloria, and Anthony‘s mother were all denied visitation rights with the child.
{¶5} On June 29, 2005, Anthony filed for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty, adultery, incompatibility, imprisonment, and mental anguish. Anthony alleged that Gloria engaged in extreme cruelty by falsely testifying against him.
{¶6} Over the next three years, Anthony filed numerous motions related to the divorce. In his first motion, Anthony asked to be transported to the trial court for any and all hearings. Later, he filed a motion requesting spousal support because of Gloria‘s “extreme cruelty.” Anthony also filed several evidentiary motions related to his personal property and Gloria‘s supposedly false testimony. The trial court did not rule on any of Anthony‘s motions except to deny his motion for default judgment.
{¶7} Anthony was incarcerated during the proceedings below, and he has remained incarcerated throughout this appeal. However, Gloria was apparently released from prison sometime in 2006.
{¶8} On October 28, 2008, the trial court held a final divorce hearing. Anthony was not present at the hearing, but Gloria did appear unrepresented by counsel. In relevant part, the trial court‘s January 15, 2009 Decree of Divorce provides the following:
{¶9} “The court, having considered the evidence presented and noting that [Anthony] has filed what have been styled depositions of himself and a witness upon written questions pursuant to
{¶10} * * *
{¶11} It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
{¶12} * * *
{¶13} 2) The minor child, * * * having been determined to be emancipated, neither parent is designated as the residential parent and legal custodian of [the child] and no support or companionship orders are made with regard to [the child].
{¶14} 3) Each party shall receive those items of household goods and furnishings, personal effects and personal property currently in that party‘s possession free and clear of the claims of the other party.
{¶15} 4) Each party is to receive any bank accounts of any type, pension or profit sharing plans in that party‘s name free and clear of the claims of the other party.
{¶16} * * *
{¶17} 6) No spousal support shall be required.”
{¶18} Anthony appeals, asserting the following three assignments of error: I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONDUCT A HEARING PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE 3105.171.” II. “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT DID NOT RULE ON THE MOTIONS PENDING BEFORE CONDUCTING THE FINAL HEARING ON DIVORCE.” And, III. “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ISSUE THE APPELLANT SPOUSAL
II.
{¶19} Gloria, as the appellee, filed a pro se brief on June 23, 2009, but that brief did not comply with
III.
{¶20} In his first assignment of error, Anthony essentially contends that the trial court did not (1) equitably divide the marital property or (2) follow the procedures of
{¶21} We review the overall appropriateness of the trial court‘s property division in a divorce proceeding under an abuse of discretion standard. See Cherry v. Cherry (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 348, at paragraph two of the syllabus. However, the characterization of property as separate or marital is a mixed question of law and fact, not a discretionary matter. Barkley v. Barkley (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 155, 159. As such, we review the determination regarding the proper characterization of property under the manifest weight of the evidence
{¶22} Once the court makes the determination of whether property is marital or separate property, we review the actual distribution of the asset under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard. Kelly v. Kelly (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 641, 642-643, citing
{¶23}
{¶24} Here, we note that Anthony failed to provide a transcript of the final divorce hearing. In relevant part,
{¶25} Without a transcript of the final divorce hearing, we must also presume that the trial court followed
{¶26} Accordingly, we overrule Anthony‘s first assignment of error.
IV.
A. Anthony‘s Appearance at the Final Divorce Hearing
{¶28} First, Anthony contends that he should have been present for the final divorce hearing. Anthony filed at least two motions on this subject, including a “Motion to Transport to Divorce Hearing” and a “Motion to Convey to Final Divorce Hearing.”
{¶29} “As an incarcerated prisoner, [Anthony] had no absolute due process right to attend a civil trial to which he was a party.” Lopshire v. Lopshire, Portage App. No. 2008-P-0034, 2008-Ohio-5946, at ¶35, citing Mancino v. Lakewood (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 219, 221. See, also, Matter of Vandale (June 30, 1993), Washington App. No. 93CA31. “‘A ruling on the request of an incarcerated criminal to prosecute a pro se civil action by requiring penal authorities to transport him to a preliminary hearing or trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.‘” Abuhilwa v. Board, Pickaway App. No. 08CA3, 2008-Ohio-5326, at ¶7, quoting Mancino at 221.
{¶30} “The Mancino court recognized that whether a prisoner should be permitted to attend a civil trial to personally argue his case depends upon the
{¶31} Here, the trial court did not explicitly rule on Anthony‘s motions regarding his attendance at the final divorce hearing. Therefore, the trial court did not discuss any of the Mancino factors on the record. However, we believe that the record supports the decision to hold the final divorce hearing without Anthony being present. First, the trial court could have reasonably found that the cost and inconvenience of transporting Anthony to the final divorce hearing outweighed any of the other relevant factors. See Abuhilwa at ¶9. Second, the
{¶32} Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Anthony‘s request to attend the final divorce hearing.
B. The Civ.R. 75(D) Report
{¶33} Anthony further contends that the trial court did not provide him with a
{¶34} In relevant part,
{¶35} The trial court initially ordered a
{¶36} Accordingly, the trial court did not err by implicitly denying Anthony‘s various motions related to the
C. Evidentiary Motions
{¶37} Anthony also contends that the trial court should have granted his various evidentiary motions. Because the trial court did not rule on his various motions, Anthony claims that he “was not given an opportunity to be heard at his final divorce hearing in any fashion[.]” Merit Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 9.
{¶38} Here, we do not believe that Anthony was prejudiced by the trial court‘s implicit denial of his evidentiary motions. The trial court explicitly stated that it had considered the evidence filed by Anthony. Thus, Anthony is mistaken when he claims that “there is no[] evidence to support that the court considered or even looked at these motions prior to making a ruling or a Decree of Divorce.” Id. Further, we once again note that Anthony has not provided a transcript of the final divorce hearing. Therefore, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings below. And as a result, Anthony cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court‘s failure to grant his evidentiary motions.
{¶39} Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we overrule Anthony‘s second assignment of error.
V.
{¶40} In his third assignment of error, Anthony contends that the trial court failed to consider Gloria‘s “extreme cruelty” when the trial court denied his request for spousal support – the “extreme cruelty” being Gloria‘s act of supposedly falsifying evidence in Anthony‘s criminal trial. Essentially, Anthony contends that he should be awarded spousal support as compensation for his “mental anguish.”
{¶41}
{¶42} Here, “extreme cruelty” and “mental anguish” are not enumerated factors in
{¶43} Accordingly, we overrule Anthony‘s third assignment of error. Having overruled all of Anthony‘s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED, and appellant pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Abele, J. and McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________________
Roger L. Kline, Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.