SARAH PITTU ET AL. v. BUGAJ CONTRACTORS COMPANY, LLC
(AC 47215)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued January 13—officially released July 29, 2025
0 Conn. App. 1
Moll, Suarez and Seeley, Js.
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Syllabus
The defendant contractor appealed from the judgment of the trial court discharging a mechanic‘s lien that the defendant had placed on certain real property owned by the plaintiffs. The defendant claimed that the court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant by requiring it to prove that it did not breach a contract entered into between the parties, rather than requiring it to prove only that there was probable cause to sustain its lien. Held:
This court concluded that, although the trial court articulated the correct burdens of proof delineated in the statute (
Procedural History
Application to reduce or discharge a mechanic‘s lien on certain real property owned by the plaintiffs, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens, judge trial referee; judgment granting the application, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Sabato P. Fiano, for the appellant (defendant).
Anthony J. Musto, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Bugaj Contractors Company, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court discharging a mechanic‘s lien that it had placed on certain real property owned by the plaintiffs, Sarah Pittu and Raul Herrera. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) shifted the burden of proof to the defendant at the hearing held pursuant to
The following facts, as found by the court or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. “In a contract dated December 23, 2020, the plaintiffs retained the defendant to perfоrm home improvement renovations [(project)] on [their] property [located at 222 High Ridge Road in Fairfield (property)]. Pursuant to the contract, the total cost of the project was $662,050 (plus any approved change orders). The evidence indicates that the plaintiffs paid $502,961.41 to the defendant and another $9843.35 to third parties for work under the contract or relating to it.2 . . .
“The work was scheduled to begin on January 4, 2021, and was to be substantially completed by August 15, 2021. The contract provide[s] that time was not of the essence. The contract further provide[s] that a [t]emporary certificate of occupancy shall be deemed substantial comрletion.” (Citations omitted; footnote added; internal
In September, 2022, the defendant filed a mechanic‘s lien on the property, which indicated that its filing was “in accordance with a certain contract between it and the [plaintiffs]” and was “for just services rendered and/or materials furnished” during the project. The plaintiffs subsequently filed an application to reduce or discharge the mechanic‘s lien, alleging that there was no probable cause to sustain the validity of the lien and/or that the amount of the lien was excessive. The defendant filed an objection thereto.
On May 19 and June 30, 2023, the court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens, judge trial referee, held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ application. Over the course of this hearing, the court received documentary evidence, which included the parties’ contract, certain invoices, and the certificate of mechanic‘s lien, and heard testimony from Pittu and Grzegorz Bugaj, the sole member of the defendant.3 At the hearing, Pittu testified that the defendant delayed work, failed to respond to communications from the рlaintiffs, and damaged and/or failed to repair items in the home and that, eventually, the relationship became contentious. Pittu testified that the defendant stopped work on the project in June, 2022. Bugaj testified to the contrary that he “did not stop working on the property. I wasn‘t allowed to work on the property [after June, 2022] and, no, I was not allowed to continue work or [to] obtain the certificate of occupancy.” Pittu denied that either she or Herrera had prevented the defendant from working on the project. In particular, Pittu testified that, in July, 2022, she had told Bugaj that he could return to the property after her daughter‘s birthday and that she would “get back tо him after.” “After the work stopped (and before the filing of the mechanic‘s lien), the parties engaged in discussions about the defendant resuming work under the contract, but these discussions were unsuccessful.”
After the conclusion of the hearing, the parties filed simultaneous posttrial hearing briefs and reply briefs. The plaintiffs argued therein that (1) the defendant did not establish probable cause to sustain the validity of its lien, and (2) they had established that the lien was invalid by clear and convincing evidence because the defendant failed to substantially perform under the contract and because it provided “no other basis” to support its lien. The defendant argued that it provided “clear, definitive, and specific evidence as to the amount of contract work that it completed at the property, versus the amount that it was paid by the plaintiffs.”
On December 12, 2023, the court issued a ruling granting the plaintiffs’ application to discharge the mechanic‘s lien. The court found that the defendant breached the parties’ contract by abandoning the project without explanation at the end of June, 2022. The court explicitly credited Pittu‘s testimony that the defendant had ceased working on the project without reason and discredited Bugaj‘s contrary testimony.
On appeal, the defendant claims, inter aliа, that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof by requiring it to prove a breach of contract claim at a proceeding in which it was statutorily required to prove only that there was probable cause that its mechanic‘s lien was valid. Specifically, the defendant argues that, although the court appeared to have required the defendant to have “affirmatively raised and disproved” that it did not breach its contract with the plaintiffs when it ceased work on the project, the defendant had no obligation to prove a breach of contract claim at the hearing on the plaintiffs’ application. The plaintiffs counter that “nothing in the . . . court‘s decision states that the defendant was required to prove anything regarding a breach of contract.” We conclude that the court improperly applied the law in grounding its determinations that (1) the defendant failed to establish probable cause that the lien was valid and (2) the plaintiffs established by clear and convincing evidence that the lien was not valid on its finding that the defendant breached the parties’ contract.5
We first set forth the standard of review and relevant legal principles. The issue of whether the court held the parties to the proper standard of proof is a question of law that we review de novo. See, е.g., Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App. 306, 330, 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903, 287 A.3d 601 (2023). In the absence of a contrary indication, “we must presume that the court applied the correct legal standard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eric M., 217 Conn. App. 809, 837, 290 A.3d 411, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 921, 291 A.3d 1040 (2023). Our review of the trial court‘s ultimate determinations that (1) the defendant did not establish probable cause that the lien was valid, and (2) the plaintiffs established the invalidity of the lien by clear and convincing evidence, however, are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, 695, 915 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 905, 920 A.2d 311 (2007); see also Kaplan v. Scheer, 182 Conn. App. 488, 501, 190 A.3d 31, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 913, 193 A.3d 49 (2018).
The determination of whether the trial court‘s decision is clearly erroneous “involves a two part function: [when] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of the court‘s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. That is the standard and scope of this court‘s judicial review of decisions of the trial court. Beyond that, we will not go. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the rеviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ProBuild East, LLC v. Poffenberger, 136 Conn. App. 184, 187–88, 45 A.3d 654 (2012). “Our deferential standard of review, however, does not extend to the court‘s interpretation of and application of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is entitled to plenary review on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., 150 Conn. App. 105, 112, 89 A.3d 896 (2014).
To the extent that the defendant‘s claim requires us to apply the relevant statutes governing mechanic‘s liens, our review is plenary. See, e.g., E & M Custom Homes, LLC v. Negron, 140 Conn. App. 92, 103, 59 A.3d 262 (2013), appeal dismissed, 314 Conn. 519, 102 A.3d 707 (2014); 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, supra, 99 Conn. App. 699–700. A mechanic‘s lien is a creature of statute. See Newtown Associates v. Northeast Structures, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 633, 636, 546 A.2d 310 (1988).
A mechanic‘s lien is not valid “unless the person performing the services or furnishing the materials (1) . . . lodges with the town clerk of the town in which the building, lot or plot of land is situated a certificate in writing, which shall be recorded by the town clerk with deeds of land, (A) describing the premises, the amount claimed as a lien thereon . . . and the date of the commencement of the performance of services or furnishing of materials, (B) stating that the amount claimed is justly due . . . .”
The procedures governing applications to discharge or reduce a mechanic‘s lien are also governed by statute.
After the hearing, “the court or judge may: (1) Deny the application or motion if probable cause to sustain the validity of the lien is established; or (2) order the lien discharged if (A) probable cause to sustain its validity is not established, or (B) by clear and convincing evidence its invalidity is established; or (3) reduce the amount of the lien if the amount is found to be excessive by clear and convincing evidence; or (4) order the lien discharged or reduce the amount of the lien conditionеd upon the posting of a bond, with surety, in a sum deemed sufficient by the judge to indemnify the lienor for any damage which may occur by the discharge or the reduction of amount.”
“The standard of proof applicable in proceedings to discharge mechanic‘s liens is a modest one. For a lien to be upheld, a lienor must establish only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the lien. Proof of probable cause is not as demanding as proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . It is important to remember that the [lienor] does not have to establish that he will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of thе claim. . . . The legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a man of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in entertaining it. . . . Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard. It does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, supra, 99 Conn. App. 694–95. Once probable cause has been established, the party applying for a discharge of the lien must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the lien is invalid. See Rutka v. Meriden, 145 Conn. App. 202, 210, 75 A.3d 722 (2013).
“In conducting our reviеw, we also must remain cognizant of the remedial purpose of our mechanic‘s lien statutes,
In the present case, the court articulated the correct burdens of proof delineated in
Although we presume the court applied the correct legal standard, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court incorrectly determined that its finding that the defendant breached the parties’ contract conclusively precluded it from asserting a valid mechanic‘s lien. Thus, we agree with the defendant that it “had no obligation to prove [a] breach of contract claim at the hearing.” (Emphasis omitted.) Therefore, we conclude that the court‘s determinations that (1) the defendant did not establish probable cause as to the validity of the lien and (2) the plaintiffs established the lien‘s invalidity by clear and convincing evidence rested on legally erroneous grounds. The court stated that the defendant‘s mechanic‘s lien claim was “premised entirely on the contract.” The court noted the defendant‘s argument that its calculation of the “amount owed under the contract [was] correct and accurate and [that] proof of substantial performance [was] unnecessary for this calculation.” The court rejected that contention, concluding that the “fallacy” of the defеndant‘s argument lay in its breach of the parties’ contract. Thus, the court concluded that its determination that the defendant breached the contract definitively established that the lien was not valid.6
The issue before the court was whether the defendant had established probable cause that the lien it placed on the property was valid and, if so, whether the plaintiffs established the lien‘s invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. A lienor may establish the validity of a mechanic‘s
“[I]n a foreclosure of a mechanic‘s lien, a contractor is entitled to the value of the materials that it furnished or the services that it rendered in the construction of a project. . . . [T]he substantial performance doctrine is not the only method available for ascertaining that value. The reasonable value of the materials and services can be proven by: (1) providing evidence that the contract priсe represents the value of a contractor‘s materials and services . . . (2) demonstrating the contractor substantially performed such that the contract is the proper valuation of its materials and services . . . or (3) submitting evidence of the cost to complete the work.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Absolute Plumbing & Heating, LLC v. Edelman, 146 Conn. App. 383, 396–97, 77 A.3d 889 (Absolute Plumbing), cert. denied, 310 Conn. 960, 82 A.3d 628 (2013).
The court found, and the defendant has not disputed on appeal, that there was no substantial performance in the present case. The contract provides that a “[t]emporary certificate of occupancy shall be deemed substantial completion . . . .” It is undisputed that the defendant did not obtain the certificate of occupancy before it stopped working on the project and that the contract was not fully performed. Whether the defendant substantially performed, although relevant under the framework outlined in Absolute Plumbing, was not dispositive of the lien‘s validity. Even if we assume without deciding that the court‘s finding that the defendant intentionally abandoned the project was not clearly erroneous, the defendant could still properly rely on the contract price, and the invoices and change orders submitted therewith, to demonstrate the “value of [its] materials and services . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Absolute Plumbing & Heating, LLC v. Edelman, supra, 146 Conn. App. 396–97.7 Thus, we reject the plaintiffs’ аrgument that “[o]nly when the contract is substantially performed can the contract price be used as the value of the lien.” We stated unequivocally to the contrary in Absolute Plumbing that substantial performance is not the only method available to establish the value of a contractor‘s materials or services. See Absolute Plumbing & Heating, LLC v. Edelman, supra, 396–97; see also, e.g., Pero Building Co. v. Smith, 6 Conn. App. 180, 185, 504 A.2d 524 (1986) (“[t]he right to a mechanic‘s lien is not a contractual right, rather it is a statutory right available to secure, as well as to enforce, payment for materials and labor rendered“). Accordingly, the court incorrectly concluded that the
Negron is also instructive to our analysis. In that case, this court affirmed the trial court‘s calculation of a mechanic‘s lien filed by the plaintiff contractor. See E & M Custom Homes, LLC v. Negron, supra, 140 Conn. App. 94. The trial court found, and this court affirmed, that the plaintiff in that case did not substantially perform under the parties’ contract. Id., 105–106. In fact, the trial court in Negron found that the defendant property owners were entitled to recover damages on their counterclaim, which asserted violations of the New Home Construction Contractors Act,
This court in Negron, however, did not conclude that the lack of substantial performance precluded the contractor from asserting any lien amount. Rather, we stated that, in such a case, the lien may be sustained on the value of the services and/or materials rendered. See E & M Custom Homes, LLC v. Negron, supra, 140 Conn. App. 105–106; cf., e.g., Intercity Development, LLC v. Andrade, 96 Conn. App. 608, 613–14, 901 A.2d 731 (2006) (plaintiff could not sustain mechanic‘s lien in reliance on contract price when it did not offer proof of reasonable value of work done and materials furnished), rev‘d in part on other grounds, 286 Conn. 177, 942 A.2d 1028 (2008).
In the present case, by contrast, the court incorrectly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to any lien amount on the basis of its breach of the parties’ contract, without considering whether the contract price and invoices presented represented the value of the defendant‘s services. At the hearing, the defendant submitted
The court stated that the defendant “insists that, before leaving the project, it provided services and materials under the contract for approximately $237,407, for which it was not paid . . . .” Because the court concluded that the defendant‘s breach of contract precluded it from recovering any lien amount, however, it did not make any findings as to the value of the defendant‘s services, or as to whether the contract price accurately reflected the value of services rendered, as opposed to the defendant‘s expectation of profit or other contract measure of damages. As stated previously, the court incorrectly concluded that the defendant‘s breach was dispositive of whether the lien was valid. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for a new hearing pursuant to
It bears reemphasis that “the burden of proof at a probable cause hearing is a low one, and the court in evaluating the evidence must weigh both factual and legal probabilities. . . . [A] probable cause hearing is not a full-scale trial on the merits and the defendant did not have to establish that [it] ultimаtely will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim.” (Citation omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v. Creadore, supra, 99 Conn. App. 698. For the foregoing reasons, the court incorrectly concluded that the mechanic‘s lien filed by the defendant was not valid in light of its finding that the defendant intentionally breached the parties’ contract.
The judgment granting the application to discharge the mechanic‘s lien is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.